Semigroups with strong and nonstrong magnifying elements

The question if there exist semigroups containing both strong and nonstrong magnifying elements was recently raised up by K.D. Magill Jr. in [3] and by F. Catino and F. Migliorini in [1]. In this note we give an affirmative answer to this question.     

Some monothetic subsemigroups of S(ℝ)

In this note we verify a conjecture of Magill [3] about orders of “steplike” functions. These functions turn out to be useful in producing a finite subsemigroup of S(ℝ) of any given order.     

On Schützenberger monoids in transformations semigroups

K. D. Magill and S. Subbiah [4] have studied the semigroup of continuous selfmaps of a topological space. They have shown that the Schützenberger group of theH containing a selfmap a is in a close relation to the group of homeomorphic selfmaps of the range of a. There arose a naturalproblem to find a generalization of the Schützenberger group, which is in the similar relation to the semigroup of continuous selfmaps of the range of a. C. E. Clark and J. H. Carruth [1] introduced a notion of a Schützenberger monoid. In this paper Schützenberger monoids in an arbitrary semigroup of transformations are studied and it is shown that this notion is the generalization we were looking for.     

Endomorphisms of monadic Boolean algebras

A classical result about Boolean algebras independently proved by Magill [10], Maxson [11], and Schein [17] says that non-trivial Boolean algebras are isomorphic whenever their endomorphism monoids are isomorphic. The main point of this note is to show that the finite part of this classical result is true within monadic Boolean algebras. By contrast, there exists a proper class of non-isomorphic (necessarily) infinite monadic Boolean algebras the endomorphism monoid of each of which has only one element (namely, the identity), this being the first known example of a variety that is not universal (in the sense of Hedrlín and Pultr), but contains a proper class of non-isomorphic rigid algebras (that is, the identity is the only endomorphism). Received February 3, 2006; accepted in final form September 5, 2006.     

On the consistency of the Banzhaf semivalue

In this note we show that the Banzhaf semivalue is consistent with respect to a suitable reduced game which keeps a clear parallelism with that defined by Hart and Mas-Colell in (1989) to prove the consistency of the Shapley value. We also use this reduced game property to characterize the Banzhaf semivalue.     

The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets

The Mas-Colell bargaining set is shown to contain the classical bargaining set for superadditive NTU games satisfying the nonlevelness condition. Without superadditivity this is no longer true, but in the TU case the containment still holds for the closure of the Mas-Colell bargaining set. Received: April 2000/Revised version: November 2000     

Equilibrium computation of the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model

The 8-th problem raised by [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 2010. Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games. Journal of the European Economics Association 8 (1), 7–33], is solved. To be specific, I show that the set of SP equilibria can be determined by a finite number of systems of linear inequalities, which are efficiently solvable when there are two players. This is more or less surprising because the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model and the SP equilibrium both seem to be rather complicated, and it is well known that an arbitrary Nash equilibrium is hard to compute, even when there are only two players. Using this algorithm, it is shown that players of Prisoners’ Dilemma can cooperate to some extent in the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining, and full cooperation is attainable as ρ$\rho$, a parameter of this model, approaches to 1. Quantitative efficiency, i.e. price of anarchy, is also analyzed.     

A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives

In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.  The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j.  These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition. Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999     

Stable cores of large games

We give general conditions, based on the largeness of the core, under which cores of exact TU games are their unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. We show that this condition is satisfied by convex games and by nonatomic exact market games. In this way, we extend and unify earlier results existing in literature. Under some additional conditions we also prove the equivalence between the core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set.We thank Jean-Francois Mertens, Enrico Minelli, William Thomson, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. We also thank seminar audiences at CORE, Cornell, Pescara, and Rochester. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Universitá e della Ricerca.     

Fuzzy extensions of bargaining sets and their existence in cooperative fuzzy games

Recently, the concept of classical bargaining set given by Aumann and Maschler in 1964 has been extended to fuzzy bargaining set. In this paper, we give a modification to correct some weakness of this extension. We also extend the concept of the Mas-Colell's bargaining set (the other major type of bargaining sets) to its corresponding fuzzy bargaining set. Our main effort is to prove existence theorems for these two types of fuzzy bargaining sets. We will also give necessary and sufficient conditions for these bargaining sets to coincide with the Aubin Core in a continuous superadditive cooperative fuzzy game which has a crisp maximal coalition of maximum excess at each payoff vector. We show that both Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell fuzzy bargaining sets of a continuous convex cooperative fuzzy game coincide with its Aubin core.     

Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency

Let f be a single valued solution for cooperative TU games that satisfies inessential game property, efficiency, Hart Mas-Colell consistency and for two person games is strictly monotonic and individually unbounded. Then there exists a family of strictly increasing functions associated with players that completely determines f. For two person games, both players have equal differences between their functions at the solution point and at the values of characteristic function of their singletons. This solution for two person games is uniquely extended to n person games due to consistency and efficiency. The extension uses the potential with respect to the family of functions and generalizes potentials introduced by Hart and Mas Colell [6]. The weighted Shapley values, the proportional value described by Ortmann [11], and new values generated by power functions are among these solutions. The author is grateful to anonymous referee and Associate Editor for their comments and suggestions.     

Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining

We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with then-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the continuation probability, . For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of and (b) large values of . For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of is provided.We are grateful to Andreu Mas-Colell for help and encouragement and to two referees for every helpful comments.     

Fixed points of contractible valued correspondences

This note generalizes a theorem of Mas-Colell (1974) showing that a contractible valued correspondence with closed graph can be approximated by functions. The generalization is applied to two topics in the theory of fixed points, essential sets and the Lefschetz fixed point index, yielding extensions of the basic results in these areas to the case of contractible valued correspondences.This research was begun during a postdoctoral fellowship at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute, where I was supported by National Science Foundation Grants MCS-8120790 and SES-8420114. Revisions were undertaken at Cornell University. This is a revised and expanded version of MSRI Working Paper 05117-86 Essential Sets of Fixed Points for Contractible Valued Correspondences. I would like to acknowledge helpful conversations with Roger Livesay and Andreu Mas-Colell. The influence of Mas-Colell's work will be evident.     

Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games

Partitioning games are useful on two counts: first, in modeling situations with restricted cooperative possibilities between the agents; second, as a general framework for many unrestricted cooperative games generated by combinatorial optimization problems.We show that the family of partitioning games defined on a fixed basic collection is closed under the strategic equivalence of games, and also for taking the monotonic cover of games. Based on these properties we establish the coincidence of the Mas-Colell, the classical, the semireactive, and the reactive bargaining setswith the core for interesting balanced subclasses of partitioning games, including assignment games, tree-restricted superadditive games, and simple network games. Prepared during the author’s Bolyai János Research Fellowship. Also supported by OTKA grant T46194.     

A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets

The aim of the paper is to characterize the classical convexity notion for cooperative TU games by means of the Mas-Colell and the Davis–Maschler bargaining sets. A new set of payoff vectors is introduced and analyzed: the max-Weber set. This set is defined as the convex hull of the max-marginal worth vectors. The characterizations of convexity are reached by comparing the classical Weber set, the max-Weber set and a selected bargaining set.     

An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value

The Maschler–Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games is axiomatized, by means of a marginality axiom.Previous versions: October 2003 (Center for the Study of Rationality DP-337), December 2004. Research partially supported by a grant of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. The author thanks Andreu Mas-Colell, Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter, the referees, and the editor for their comments and suggestions.     

On the homeomorphism of continuous mappings

Denote by C(X) the partially ordered (PO) set of all continuous epimorphisms of a space X under the natural identification of homeomorphic epimorphisms. The following homeomorphism theorem for bicompacta is implicitly contained in Magill’s 1968 paper: two bicompacta X and Y are homeomorphic if and only if the PO sets C(X) and C(Y) are isomorphic. In the present paper, Magill’s theorem is extended to the category of mappings in which the role of bicompacta is played by perfect mappings. The results are obtained in two versions, namely, in the category TOP _Z (of triangular commutative diagrams) and in the category MAP (of quadrangular commutative diagrams).     

Cartan矩阵的分解和Brauer特征标次数猜想

设G为有限群,N是G的正规子群.记J=J(F[N])为F[N]的Jacobson根,I=Ann(J)={α∈F[G]|Jα=0}为J在F[G]中的零化子.本文主要研究了,根据F[G/N]和F[G]/I的Cartan矩阵,分解F[G]的Cartan矩阵.这种分解在Cartan不变量和G的合成因子之间建立了一些联系.本文指出N中p-亏零块的存在性依赖于Cartan不变量或者I在F[G]中的性质,证明了Cartan矩阵的分解部分地依赖于B所覆盖的N中的块的性质.本文研究了b为N上的块且l(b)=1时,覆盖b的G中的块B的性质.在两类情形下,本文证明了块代数上关于Brauer特征标次数的猜想成立,涵盖了Holm和Willems研究的某些情形.进而对Holm和Willems提出的问题给出了肯定的回答.另外,本文还给出了Cartan不变量的一些其它结果.     

Asymptotic expansion of stochastic flows

Summary We study the asymptotic expansion in small time of the solution of a stochastic differential equation. We obtain a universal and explicit formula in terms of Lie brackets and iterated stochastic Stratonovich integrals. This formula contains the results of Doss [6], Sussmann [15], Fliess and Normand-Cyrot [7], Krener and Lobry [10], Yamato [17] and Kunita [11] in the nilpotent case, and extends to general diffusions the representation given by Ben Arous [3] for invariant diffusions on a Lie group. The main tool is an asymptotic expansion for deterministic ordinary differential equations, given by Strichartz [14].