A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕ^Max) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT’s strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative “experience-first” approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body (“hard”) problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.     

Thermodynamic State Machine Network

We describe a model system—a thermodynamic state machine network—comprising a network of probabilistic, stateful automata that equilibrate according to Boltzmann statistics, exchange codes over unweighted bi-directional edges, update a state transition memory to learn transitions between network ground states, and minimize an action associated with fluctuation trajectories. The model is grounded in four postulates concerning self-organizing, open thermodynamic systems—transport-driven self-organization, scale-integration, input-functionalization, and active equilibration. After sufficient exposure to periodically changing inputs, a diffusive-to-mechanistic phase transition emerges in the network dynamics. The evolved networks show spatial and temporal structures that look much like spiking neural networks, although no such structures were incorporated into the model. Our main contribution is the articulation of the postulates, the development of a thermodynamically motivated methodology addressing them, and the resulting phase transition. As with other machine learning methods, the model is limited by its scalability, generality, and temporality. We use limitations to motivate the development of thermodynamic computers—engineered, thermodynamically self-organizing systems—and comment on efforts to realize them in the context of this work. We offer a different philosophical perspective, thermodynamicalism, addressing the limitations of the model and machine learning in general.     

The Mathematical Universe

I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters, randomness and initial conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and Gödel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Gödel’s sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and may help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, computations, simulations and physical systems.     

IIT’s Scientific Counter-Revolution: A Neuroscientific Theory’s Physical and Metaphysical Implications

IIT includes commitments about the very nature of physical reality, a fact both highly unusual for an empirical theory within neuroscience, and surprisingly underappreciated within the literature. These commitments are intimately tied to the theory; they are not incidental. This paper demonstrates as much by raising certain objections in a “naive” way, and then exposing how the principled IIT responses would rely upon metaphysical positions. Along the way we draw on the IIT literature for support for these interpretations, but also point to a need for elaboration and clarification. Section 1 applies the Placement Argument in a way that leads to problem involving zombies, treated in Section 2. Section 3 frames the zombie problem as an apparent dilemma, and addresses that dilemma by drawing on claims in the IIT literature concerning physical reality. Section 4 raises a related dilemma and treats it in a way that dovetails with the treatment in Section 3 of physical reality. All of this underscores not just the breadth of IIT, but the relevance of this breadth to a full consideration of IIT’s merits.     

Geometry of 2d spacetime and quantization of particle dynamics

We analyze classical and quantum dynamics of a relativistic particle in 2d spacetimes with constant curvature. We show that global symmetries of spacetime specify the symmetries of physical phase-space and the corresponding quantum theory. To quantize the systems we parametrize the physical phase-space by canonical coordinates. Canonical quantization leads to unitary irreducible representations of SO_↑(2.1) group.     

A Drive towards Thermodynamic Efficiency for Dissipative Structures in Chemical Reaction Networks

Dissipative accounts of structure formation show that the self-organisation of complex structures is thermodynamically favoured, whenever these structures dissipate free energy that could not be accessed otherwise. These structures therefore open transition channels for the state of the universe to move from a frustrated, metastable state to another metastable state of higher entropy. However, these accounts apply as well to relatively simple, dissipative systems, such as convection cells, hurricanes, candle flames, lightning strikes, or mechanical cracks, as they do to complex biological systems. Conversely, interesting computational properties—that characterize complex biological systems, such as efficient, predictive representations of environmental dynamics—can be linked to the thermodynamic efficiency of underlying physical processes. However, the potential mechanisms that underwrite the selection of dissipative structures with thermodynamically efficient subprocesses is not completely understood. We address these mechanisms by explaining how bifurcation-based, work-harvesting processes—required to sustain complex dissipative structures—might be driven towards thermodynamic efficiency. We first demonstrate a simple mechanism that leads to self-selection of efficient dissipative structures in a stochastic chemical reaction network, when the dissipated driving chemical potential difference is decreased. We then discuss how such a drive can emerge naturally in a hierarchy of self-similar dissipative structures, each feeding on the dissipative structures of a previous level, when moving away from the initial, driving disequilibrium.     

Neural Dynamics under Active Inference: Plausibility and Efficiency of Information Processing

Active inference is a normative framework for explaining behaviour under the free energy principle—a theory of self-organisation originating in neuroscience. It specifies neuronal dynamics for state-estimation in terms of a descent on (variational) free energy—a measure of the fit between an internal (generative) model and sensory observations. The free energy gradient is a prediction error—plausibly encoded in the average membrane potentials of neuronal populations. Conversely, the expected probability of a state can be expressed in terms of neuronal firing rates. We show that this is consistent with current models of neuronal dynamics and establish face validity by synthesising plausible electrophysiological responses. We then show that these neuronal dynamics approximate natural gradient descent, a well-known optimisation algorithm from information geometry that follows the steepest descent of the objective in information space. We compare the information length of belief updating in both schemes, a measure of the distance travelled in information space that has a direct interpretation in terms of metabolic cost. We show that neural dynamics under active inference are metabolically efficient and suggest that neural representations in biological agents may evolve by approximating steepest descent in information space towards the point of optimal inference.     

Data-Driven Corrections of Partial Lotka–Volterra Models

In many applications of interacting systems, we are only interested in the dynamic behavior of a subset of all possible active species. For example, this is true in combustion models (many transient chemical species are not of interest in a given reaction) and in epidemiological models (only certain subpopulations are consequential). Thus, it is common to use greatly reduced or partial models in which only the interactions among the species of interest are known. In this work, we explore the use of an embedded, sparse, and data-driven discrepancy operator to augment these partial interaction models. Preliminary results show that the model error caused by severe reductions—e.g., elimination of hundreds of terms—can be captured with sparse operators, built with only a small fraction of that number. The operator is embedded within the differential equations of the model, which allows the action of the operator to be interpretable. Moreover, it is constrained by available physical information and calibrated over many scenarios. These qualities of the discrepancy model—interpretability, physical consistency, and robustness to different scenarios—are intended to support reliable predictions under extrapolative conditions.     

An ESR Framework for the Study of Consciousness

I will argue that, in an interdisciplinary study of consciousness, epistemic structural realism (ESR) can offer a feasible philosophical background for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena in neuroscience and cognitive science while also taking into account the mathematical structures involved in this type of research. Applying the ESR principles also to the study of the neurophysiological phenomena associated with free will (or rather conscious free choice) and with various alterations of consciousness (AOCs) generated by various pathologies such as epilepsy would add explanatory value to the matter. This interdisciplinary approach would be in tune with Quine’s well known idea that philosophy is not simple conceptual analysis but is continuous with science and actually represents an abstract branch of the empirical research. The ESR could thus resonate with scientific models of consciousness such as the global neuronal workspace model (inspired by the global workspace theory—GWT) and the integrated information theory (IIT) model. While structural realism has already been employed in physics or biology, its application as a meta-theory contextualising and relating various scientific findings on consciousness is new indeed. Out of the two variants: ontic structural realism (OSR) and epistemic structural realism (ESR), the latter can be considered more suitable for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena because it removes the pressure of the still unanswered ‘What is consciousness?’ ontological question and allows us to concentrate instead on the ‘What can we know about consciousness?’ epistemological question.     

Unraveling Hidden Major Factors by Breaking Heterogeneity into Homogeneous Parts within Many-System Problems

For a large ensemble of complex systems, a Many-System Problem (MSP) studies how heterogeneity constrains and hides structural mechanisms, and how to uncover and reveal hidden major factors from homogeneous parts. All member systems in an MSP share common governing principles of dynamics, but differ in idiosyncratic characteristics. A typical dynamic is found underlying response features with respect to covariate features of quantitative or qualitative data types. Neither all-system-as-one-whole nor individual system-specific functional structures are assumed in such response-vs-covariate (Re–Co) dynamics. We developed a computational protocol for identifying various collections of major factors of various orders underlying Re–Co dynamics. We first demonstrate the immanent effects of heterogeneity among member systems, which constrain compositions of major factors and even hide essential ones. Secondly, we show that fuller collections of major factors are discovered by breaking heterogeneity into many homogeneous parts. This process further realizes Anderson’s “More is Different” phenomenon. We employ the categorical nature of all features and develop a Categorical Exploratory Data Analysis (CEDA)-based major factor selection protocol. Information theoretical measurements—conditional mutual information and entropy—are heavily used in two selection criteria: C1—confirmable and C2—irreplaceable. All conditional entropies are evaluated through contingency tables with algorithmically computed reliability against the finite sample phenomenon. We study one artificially designed MSP and then two real collectives of Major League Baseball (MLB) pitching dynamics with 62 slider pitchers and 199 fastball pitchers, respectively. Finally, our MSP data analyzing techniques are applied to resolve a scientific issue related to the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.     

Stochastic Chaos and Markov Blankets

In this treatment of random dynamical systems, we consider the existence—and identification—of conditional independencies at nonequilibrium steady-state. These independencies underwrite a particular partition of states, in which internal states are statistically secluded from external states by blanket states. The existence of such partitions has interesting implications for the information geometry of internal states. In brief, this geometry can be read as a physics of sentience, where internal states look as if they are inferring external states. However, the existence of such partitions—and the functional form of the underlying densities—have yet to be established. Here, using the Lorenz system as the basis of stochastic chaos, we leverage the Helmholtz decomposition—and polynomial expansions—to parameterise the steady-state density in terms of surprisal or self-information. We then show how Markov blankets can be identified—using the accompanying Hessian—to characterise the coupling between internal and external states in terms of a generalised synchrony or synchronisation of chaos. We conclude by suggesting that this kind of synchronisation may provide a mathematical basis for an elemental form of (autonomous or active) sentience in biology.     

A Graph-Transformational Approach to Swarm Computation

In this paper, we propose a graph-transformational approach to swarm computation that is flexible enough to cover various existing notions of swarms and swarm computation, and it provides a mathematical basis for the analysis of swarms with respect to their correct behavior and efficiency. A graph transformational swarm consists of members of some kinds. They are modeled by graph transformation units providing rules and control conditions to specify the capability of members and kinds. The swarm members act on an environment—represented by a graph—by applying their rules in parallel. Moreover, a swarm has a cooperation condition to coordinate the simultaneous actions of the swarm members and two graph class expressions to specify the initial environments on one hand and to fix the goal on the other hand. Semantically, a swarm runs from an initial environment to one that fulfills the goal by a sequence of simultaneous actions of all its members. As main results, we show that cellular automata and particle swarms can be simulated by graph-transformational swarms. Moreover, we give an illustrative example of a simple ant colony the ants of which forage for food choosing their tracks randomly based on pheromone trails.     

The observation of decay

It is argued that the usual formulation of quantum mechanics does not satisfactorily describe physical change: the standard formula for a transition probability does not follow from the postulates. Instead, these yield the paradox that a watched pot never bolls (sometimes called “Zeno's paradox”). The paradox is reviewed and the possibility of avoiding it is discussed. A simple model of a decaying system is analysed; the system is then considered in continuous interaction with an apparatus designed to observe the time development of the system. In the light of this analysis, the possibility is considered of replacing the usual (diserete) projection postulate by a continuous projection postulate.     

A Toss without a Coin: Information,Discontinuity, and Mathematics in Quantum Theory

The article argues that—at least in certain interpretations, such as the one assumed in this article under the heading of “reality without realism”—the quantum-theoretical situation appears as follows: While—in terms of probabilistic predictions—connected to and connecting the information obtained in quantum phenomena, the mathematics of quantum theory (QM or QFT), which is continuous, does not represent and is discontinuous with both the emergence of quantum phenomena and the physics of these phenomena, phenomena that are physically discontinuous with each other as well. These phenomena, and thus this information, are described by classical physics. All actually available information (in the mathematical sense of information theory) is classical: it is composed of units, such as bits, that are—or are contained in—entities described by classical physics. On the other hand, classical physics cannot predict this information when it is created, as manifested in measuring instruments, in quantum experiments, while quantum theory can. In this epistemological sense, this information is quantum. The article designates the discontinuity between quantum theory and the emergence of quantum phenomena the “Heisenberg discontinuity”, because it was introduced by W. Heisenberg along with QM, and the discontinuity between QM or QFT and the classical physics of quantum phenomena, the “Bohr discontinuity”, because it was introduced as part of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM, under the assumption of Heisenberg discontinuity. Combining both discontinuities precludes QM or QFT from being connected to either physical reality, that ultimately responsible for quantum phenomena or that of these phenomena themselves, other than by means of probabilistic predictions concerning the information, classical in character, contained in quantum phenomena. The nature of quantum information is, in this view, defined by this situation. A major implication, discussed in the Conclusion, is the existence and arguably the necessity of two—classical and quantum—or with relativity, three and possibly more essentially different theories in fundamental physics.     

The Relativity of Indeterminacy

A long-standing tradition, largely present in both the physical and the philosophical literature, regards the advent of (special) relativity—with its block-universe picture—as the failure of any indeterministic program in physics. On the contrary, in this paper, we note that upholding reasonable principles of finiteness of information hints at a picture of the physical world that should be both relativistic and indeterministic. We thus rebut the block-universe picture by assuming that fundamental indeterminacy itself should also be regarded as a relative property when considered in a relativistic scenario. We discuss the consequence that this view may have when correlated randomness is introduced, both in the classical case and in the quantum one.     

A new axiomatic characterization of the von Neumann entropy

We lay down a series of postulates which we consider indespensable for any measure of the intrinsic dispersion of quantum states. Then we show that the v. Neumann entropy S(W)=–kTr(WlnW) is uniquely determined by these postulates up to a scaling factor. Thus the v. Neumann entropy can be characterized as the only reasonable measure of the intrinsic dispersion of quantum states. Our postulates have no direct bearing on phenomenological thermodynamics or information theory.     

A unified quantum theory of mechanics and thermodynamics. Part I. Postulates

A unified axiomatic theory that embraces both mechanics and thermodynamics is presented in three parts. It is based on four postulates; three are taken from quantum mechanics, and the fourth is the new disclosure of the existence of quantum states that are stable (Part I). For nonequilibrium and equilibrium states, the theory provides general original results, such as the relation between irreducible density operators and the maximum work that can be extracted adiabatically (Part IIa). For stable equilibrium states, it shows for the first time that the canonical and grand canonical distributions are the only stable distributions (Part IIb). The theory discloses the incompleteness of the equation of motion of quantum mechanics not only for irreversible processes but, more significantly, for reversible processes (Part IIb). It establishes the operational meaning of an irreducible density operator and irreducible dispersions associated with any state, and reveals the relationship between such dispersions and the second law (Part III).     

A Symmetrical Interpretation of the Klein-Gordon Equation

This paper presents a new Symmetrical Interpretation (SI) of relativistic quantum mechanics which postulates: quantum mechanics is a theory about complete experiments, not particles; a complete experiment is maximally described by a complex transition amplitude density; and this transition amplitude density never collapses. This SI is compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) for the analysis of Einstein’s bubble experiment. This SI makes several experimentally testable predictions that differ from the CI, solves one part of the measurement problem, resolves some inconsistencies of the CI, and gives intuitive explanations of some previously mysterious quantum effects.     

Revisiting Born’s Rule through Uhlhorn’s and Gleason’s Theorems

In a previous article we presented an argument to obtain (or rather infer) Born’s rule, based on a simple set of axioms named “Contexts, Systems and Modalities" (CSM). In this approach, there is no “emergence”, but the structure of quantum mechanics can be attributed to an interplay between the quantized number of modalities that is accessible to a quantum system and the continuum of contexts that are required to define these modalities. The strong link of this derivation with Gleason’s theorem was emphasized, with the argument that CSM provides a physical justification for Gleason’s hypotheses. Here, we extend this result by showing that an essential one among these hypotheses—the need of unitary transforms to relate different contexts—can be removed and is better seen as a necessary consequence of Uhlhorn’s theorem.     

Neuroontology, neurobiological naturalism, and consciousness: a challenge to scientific reduction and a solution

One of the great challenges to a science of consciousness is the inability to reduce critical features of consciousness to neural processes. In this paper I identify four neuroontologically irreducible features (NOIF) - referral of neural states, mental unity, qualia, and mental causation - defined as aspects of consciousness in which subjective experience is not wholly reducible to objectively observed or objectively understood neurons (ontological subjectivity). I next analyze the emergent and unique system properties of the neural hierarchy and argue that while the NOIF are indeed ontologically subjective, each of the NOIF individually can be explained by the unique architecture and functional properties of the neural hierarchy that lead to both emergent properties and their irreducibility in a manner that does not violate any known physical laws nor require any new physics or the application of physics to emergence or reduction beyond that normally applied to biology in general. I conclude that consciousness is a neurobiologically unique and local phenomenon that is specific to particular neural systems, a view that is consistent with both ontological subjectivity and biological naturalism. I call this position weakly emergent nonreductive physicalism or neurobiological naturalism.