The impact of delivery lags on irreversible investment under uncertainty

We consider the valuation and rational exercise of irreversible investment opportunities in the presence of revenue uncertainty and delivery lags. In order to capture supply side market imperfections in the markets for investment goods, we assume that the lag depends on the revenue process faced by the investor. We show that such imperfections have a pronounced decelerating impact on rational investment demand as they may increase the value of waiting in excess of the exercise payoff even for projects which otherwise would be perceived as highly remunerative. We also consider the comparative static properties of the optimal investment policy and its value, and demonstrate that typically increased uncertainty decreases the investment incentives by increasing the value of waiting.     

供应链中的生产能力投资风险分配

在供应链中,每个管理者都会面临各种各样的供应和需求不确定性.这些不确定性会造成生产能力的过剩或不足,从而导致很大的利益损失,但是未必每个公司都会面临生产能力投资风险.针对一个单生产商单零售商系统,本文分析了三种不同的合同设计（推进式批发价合同,拉动式批发价合同和期权合同）对生产商和零售商的利润和生产能力投资风险的影响,推进式批发价合同和拉动式批发价均不能协调供应链,故我们找到其帕累托集;而对于期权合同,它能够协调整个供应链并且整合推进式和拉动式两种批发价合同使得生产商和零售商共同承担生产能力投资风险.在分析的过程中,我们将结果与已有的结果进行了比较,指出了其异同之处.     

Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis

In this paper, we use a biform-game approach for analyzing the impact of surplus division in supply chains on investment incentives. In the first stage of the game, firms decide non-cooperatively on investments. In the second stage, the surplus is shared according to the Shapley value. We find that all firms have inefficiently low investment incentives which, however, depend on their position in the supply chain. Cross-subsidies for investment costs can mitigate, but not eliminate the underinvestment problem. Vertical integration between at least some firms.yields efficient investments, but may nevertheless reduce the aggregated payoff of the firms. We show how the size of our effects depends on the structure of the supply chain and the efficiency of the investment technology. Various extensions demonstrate that our results are qualitatively robust.     

论保险投资新政对寿险公司投资收益的影响

近年来,保险监管部门颁布了多项保险投资新政,保险资金运用上的限制得到了放松.保险投资新政的实施对寿险公司投资收益有着怎样的影响呢?运用双重差分模型(DID模型),定量估计了保险投资新政实施前后的寿险公司投资收益的具体变化,并分析了何种因素对寿险公司的投资收益有显著影响.研究发现,保险投资新政对寿险公司的总投资收益率的提高有着积极的影响,保险投资新政对不同规模的寿险公司投资收益的影响存在着差异,仅考虑政策的调整因素,大型寿险公司的总投资收益率增量超过中小型寿险公司1.13%,综合考虑其它指标的影响后,其总投资收益率增量仍然超过中小型寿险公司0.097%.实证结果为保险监管部门的政策实施以及寿险公司的经营提供了新思路.     

考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约

研究收益共享契约下供应链成员具有公平关切时的鲜活农产品供应链协调问题。基于鲜活农产品的新鲜度和运输损耗因素,考虑供应链成员的公平关切特性,建立二级鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约模型。进而分析了仅有零售商或供应商一方考虑公平关切,以及双方都考虑公平关切等不同情形下的供应链协调机制。分析结果表明,考虑供应链成员公平关切特性的情况下,当批发价满足一定条件时,收益共享契约能够使鲜活农产品供应链实现协调,且公平关切对供应链成员的效用有一定影响。最后运用算例对研究结果进行了验证。     

Sustainability investment under cap-and-trade regulation

Carbon emission abatement is a hot topic in environmental sustainability and cap-and-trade regulation is regarded as an effective way to reduce the carbon emission. According to the real industrial practices, sustainable product implies that its production processes facilitate to reduce the carbon emission and has a positive response in market demand. In this paper, we study the sustainability investment on sustainable product with emission regulation consideration for decentralized and centralized supply chains. We first examine the order quantity of the retailer and sustainability investment of the manufacturer for the decentralized supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer. After that, we extend our study to the centralized case where we determine the production quantity and sustainability investment for the whole supply chain. We derive the optimal order quantity (or production quantity) and sustainability investment, and find that the sustainability investment efficiency has a significant impact on the optimal solutions. Further, we conduct numerical studies and find surprisingly that the order quantity may be increasing in the wholesale price due to the effects of the sustainability and emission consideration. Moreover, we investigate the achievability of supply chain coordination by various contracts, and find that only revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain whereas the buyback contract and two-part tariff contract cannot. Important insights and managerial implications are discussed.     

On optimal proportional reinsurance and investment in a Markovian regime-switching economy

In this paper, the surplus of an insurance company is modeled by a Markovian regimeswitching diffusion process. The insurer decides the proportional reinsurance and investment so as to increase revenue. The regime-switching economy consists of a fixed interest security and several risky shares. The optimal proportional reinsurance and investment strategies with no short-selling constraints for maximizing an exponential utility on terminal wealth are obtained.     

多利率下的寿险费率测算模型

为了能够在多利率条件下测算人寿保险的费率,本文建立了一个线性规划模型.根据该模型,能够合理安排保费资金的投资期限以达到最大的保险利益,从而为费率和红利的测算提供了依据.列出了两个典型寿险产品的计算数据,结果表明,寿险费率的测算主要取决于长期利率.对于储蓄型寿险,资金的运用应该以长期投资为主,分红水平可以由长期利率与预定利率之差来确定.     

Reverse supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contract: A case for the personal computers industry

Products that are not recycled at the end of their life increasingly damage the environment. In a collection – remanufacturing scheme, these end-of-life products can generate new profits. Designed on the personal computers industry, this study defines an analytical model used to explore the implications of recycling on the reverse supply chain from an efficiency perspective for all participants in the process. The cases considered for analysis are the two- and three-echelon supply chains, where we first look at the decentralized reverse setting followed by the coordinated setting through implementation of revenue sharing contract. We define customer willingness to return obsolete units as a function of the discount offered by the retailer in exchange for recycling devices with a remanufacturing value. The results show that performance measures and total supply chain profits improve through coordination with revenue sharing contracts on both two- and three-echelon reverse supply chains.     

Supply chain coordination with insurance contract

We propose an insurance contract under which the supplier shares the risk of overstock and understock with the retailer, improving the efficiency of the supply chain with a newsvendor-type product. We first show that the insurance contract could coordinate the supply chain, and obtain bargaining solution in the supply chain model. Then we investigate the effects of agents’ risk aversion on the supply chain model and acquire the Pareto-optimal solution through the mean–variance approach. After that, we compare the insurance contract with the revenue sharing contract, focusing particularly on their differences. Finally, extensive numerical studies are conducted, and managerial implications are proposed.     

基于批发价契约的多零售商横向转载的供应链协调

研究了多零售商横向转载的供应链批发价契约协调问题。以包含一个制造商和多个零售商的供应链系统为研究对象,基于批发价契约研究了零售商转载下的供应链协调问题,获取了批发价契约可以协调零售商存在横向转载的供应链的理论证据,并给出了相应的产生供应链协调的条件,详细分析了协调情形下供应链系统最优订货量与多零售商无转载及单报童等情形下的最优订货量之间的关系。进一步研究了制造商与零售商在Stackelberg博弈下,零售商横向转载对制造商收益的影响,并提出了在Stackelberg博弈模型中,批发价契约也有可能促使制造商选择供应链系统最优订货量所对应的批发价格,使得供应链协调,且给出了此种协调产生的具体条件。数值算例则对两种供应链协调情形下的订货量、批发价格及期望收益进行了计算与仿真。研究表明,批发价契约可能会使得多零售商存在转载的供应链实现协调,传统的双重边际化效应将会由于制造商和零售商的理性而被弱化。     

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??It is assumed that both an insurance company and a reinsurance company adopt the variance premium principle to collect premiums. Specifically, an insurance company is allowed to investment not only in a domestic risk-free asset and a risky asset, but also in a foreign risky asset. Firstly, we use a geometry Brownian motion to model the exchange rate risk, and assume that the insurance company could control the insurance risk by transferring the insurance business into the reinsurance company. Secondly, the stochastic dynamic programming principle is used to study the optimal investment and reinsurance problems in two situations. The first is a diffusion approximation risk model and the second is a classical risk model. The optimal investment and reinsurance strategies are obtained under these two situations. We also show that the exchange rate risk has a great impact on the insurance company's investment strategies, but has no effect on the reinsurance strategies. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of some parameters is provided.     

Optimal Investment-Reinsurance Strategy with Exchange Rate Risk under Variance Premium Principl

It is assumed that both an insurance company and a reinsurance company adopt the variance premium principle to collect premiums. Specifically, an insurance company is allowed to investment not only in a domestic risk-free asset and a risky asset, but also in a foreign risky asset. Firstly, we use a geometry Brownian motion to model the exchange rate risk, and assume that the insurance company could control the insurance risk by transferring the insurance business into the reinsurance company. Secondly, the stochastic dynamic programming principle is used to study the optimal investment and reinsurance problems in two situations. The first is a diffusion approximation risk model and the second is a classical risk model. The optimal investment and reinsurance strategies are obtained under these two situations. We also show that the exchange rate risk has a great impact on the insurance company's investment strategies, but has no effect on the reinsurance strategies. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of some parameters is provided.     

基于“进场费+收益共享”契约的供应链协调策略研究

在超市等自助零售环境下,影响产品需求的往往是产品的感知质量,而产品感知质量不仅取决于产品质量水平,还受货架空间展示量的影响。本文基于价格和感知质量依赖的需求函数,分别建立了一体化供应链集中决策模型以及考虑是否存在进场费的寄售契约下零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了制造商和零售商的产品定价和货架空间展示策略,并给出了进场费+收益共享的供应链协调策略。研究结果表明分散供应链环境下产品的最优零售价格并不总高于集中决策下产品的最优定价,也就是说提升感知质量在一定程度上可以缓解双重边际效应。另外,收取进场费的收益共享模式可以实现供应链的完美协调,这在理论上说明了进场费模式在一定的市场环境下是合理的。     

专利保护下再制造闭环供应链差别定价与协调研究

本文目的是研究当再制造闭环供应链系统中原制造商具专利保护以及新产品与再制造品之间存在差异情况下,闭环供应链系统成员的最优决策及系统协调机制设计问题。根据现实情形构建了再制造闭环供应链差别定价模型,利用博弈理论讨论了集中决策与分散决策情形下节点企业的最优定价策略及最优利润。研究结果表明,废旧产品的再造率和专利许可费用均对废旧产品的回收价格和回收量具有一定的影响;消费者对再制造品的接受程度会影响到供应链系统各方的最优定价策略及利润;提出的一种收益-费用分担契约协调机制,可以实现分散决策下闭环供应链系统的协调和效率优化。     

Insuring a risky investment project

In the standard model for insurance demand, the risk is totally exogenous and the insurance premium is paid for out of riskless wealth. This model yields results that are mostly in contradiction to everyday observation and have been used to question the pertinence of expected utility theory on which the model is based. For some years now, several papers have made attempts to provide foundations for a theory of insurance demand that leads to less provocative comparative statics results. In these papers, the risk for which coverage is sought becomes endogenous, and the decision to purchase insurance is made simultaneously with the decision on how much to invest in insurable assets. All these papers use a standard financial investment framework. This paper offers a contribution to this literature by using a slightly different framework: the case of a firm exposed to an insurable risk affecting return on a real investment project. The model is kept simple by using a two-state environment. It yields results that are both more complete and more general than results in previous work with the same motivation.     

Optimal inventory and insurance decisions for a supply chain financing system with downside risk control

This research considers a supply chain financing system consisting of a capital‐constrained retailer, a supplier and a risk‐averse bank. The retailer may be subject to credit limit because of the bank's downside risk control, and hence, credit insurance should be needed to enhance his financing ability. This paper develops a mathematical optimization model by incorporating insurance policy into the well‐known newsvendor financing model. The optimal inventory and insurance decisions under different scenarios, that is, no insurance, insurance with symmetric information and insurance with asymmetric information, are derived. This work also discusses how the retailer's capital level, the bank's risk aversion, and the insurer's loading factor affect the optimal inventory and insurance decisions. The results show that the retailer will use credit insurance if he is sufficiently capital‐constrained or the insurer's risk loading factor is low enough. Moreover, credit insurance can bring Pareto improvement to the supply chain financing system, which verifies the prevalence of credit insurance in practice. Several numerical experiments are presented to examine the sensitivities of key parameters. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

To borrow or insure? Long term care costs and the impact of housing

We assess the impact of housing, the availability of reverse mortgages and long-term care (LTC) insurance on a retiree’s optimal portfolio choice and consumption decisions using a multi-period life cycle model that takes into consideration individual longevity risk, health shocks and house price risk. We determine how much an individual should borrow against their home equity and how much to insure health care costs with LTC insurance. We introduce an endogenous grid method, along with a regression based approach, to improve computational efficiency and avoid the curse of dimensionality. Our results confirm that borrowing against home equity provides higher consumption in earlier years and longevity insurance. LTC insurance transfers wealth from healthy states to disabled states, but reduces early consumption because of the payment of insurance premiums. Housing is an illiquid asset that is important in meeting bequest motives, and it reduces the demand for LTC insurance for the wealthy. We show that the highest welfare benefits come from combining a reverse mortgage with LTC insurance because of strong complementary effects between them. This result highlights the benefits of innovative products that bundle these two products together.     

Dynamic hybrid products in life insurance: Assessing the policyholders’ viewpoint

Dynamic hybrid life insurance products are intended to meet new consumer needs regarding stability in terms of guarantees as well as sufficient upside potential. In contrast to traditional participating or classical unit-linked life insurance products, the guarantee offered to the policyholders is achieved by a periodical rebalancing process between three funds: the policy reserves (i.e. the premium reserve stock, thus causing interaction effects with traditional participating life insurance contracts), a guarantee fund, and an equity fund. In this paper, we consider an insurer offering both, dynamic hybrid and traditional participating life insurance contracts and focus on the policyholders’ perspective. The results show that higher guarantees do not necessarily imply a higher willingness-to-pay, but that in case of dynamic hybrid contracts, a minimum guarantee level should be offered in order to ensure that the willingness-to-pay exceeds the minimum premium the insurer has to charge when selling the contract. In addition, strong interaction effects can be found between the two products, which particularly impact the willingness-to-pay of the dynamic hybrids.     

价格和服务双因素影响的供应链协调决策模型研究

以单个制造商和存在竞争的两个零售商组成的供应链结构模型为研究对象,建立价格和服务两个重要因素影响的市场需求函数,研究供应链协调决策模型。以销售价格、服务质量和制造商批发价格作为三个决策变量,分析集中决策和分散决策两种情景的最优策略,研究收益共享、服务成本分担、收益共享成本分担等三种不同契约的供应链协调问题,并使用数值仿真方法,分析了相关参数变化对系统协调的影响。仿真结果表明:收益共享契约和成本分担契约需满足一定条件才能达到供应链协调,但其效果不一定实现帕累托最优;收益共享和成本分担契约可实现供应链协调,但收入共享系数需在合理区间取值;改进的收益共享成本分担契约能够避免共享系数的盲区,更加有效地达到供应链协调,保持供应链良好运行。