Stationary perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts

This paper characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining model with characteristic functions, and provides strategic foundations of some cooperative solution concepts such as the core, the bargaining set and the kernel. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that a linear programming formulation successfully characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of our bargaining game. We suggest a linear programming formulation as an algorithm for the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of a class of n-person noncooperative games. Second, utilizing the linear programming formulation, we show that stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of n-person noncooperative games provide strategic foundations for the bargaining set and the kernel.     

New Method to Characterize Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Differential Games

In this paper, we present a method for computing Nash equilibria in feedback strategies. This method gives necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize subgame perfect equilibria by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This characterization allows one to know explicitly the solution of the game in some cases. In other cases, this approach makes a qualitative study easier. We apply this method to nonrenewable resource games.     

Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? a counterexample

In this note, an example is given to show that a strictly perfect equilibrium need not be proper.     

Perfect equilibria in stochastic games

We examine stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. For the -discounted case, as well as for the irreducible limiting average case, we show the existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria and give characterizations of those equilibria. In the final section, we give an example which illustrates that the existence of stationary limiting average equilibria in a nonirreducible stochastic game does not imply the existence of a perfect limiting average equilibrium.Support was provided by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO via the Netherlands Foundation for Mathematics SMC, Project 10-64-10.     

考虑损失厌恶行为与谈判破裂的Rubinstein谈判博弈研究

本文考虑具有损失厌恶行为与破裂风险的Rubinstein谈判博弈。首先构建子博弈完美均衡,并证明子博弈完美均衡的存在性及唯一性。然后分析子博弈完美均衡的性质,结果表明:参与人受益于对手的损失厌恶行为,而因自身具有损失厌恶行为遭受损失;谈判破裂概率对均衡结果的影响取决于贴现因子与参与人的损失厌恶系数;当谈判破裂的概率趋于零时,极限均衡结果收敛于经典的Rubinstein谈判博弈结果。最后建立了与非对称Nash谈判解的关系,其中参与人的议价能力与自身的损失厌恶水平呈负相关性,与对手的损失厌恶水平呈正相关性;参与人的议价能力依赖于谈判破裂概率与出价时间间隔的比值。     

Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty

In this paper, we analyze the class of all smooth separating sequential equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty. Trade between players occurs whenever there is surplus to be shared and delay is used to signal their valuations. When the buyer and the seller have a common discount rate, we show that the final outcome is unique among all these equilibria: the difference between the highest possible buyer's valuation and the lowest possible seller's valuation always narrows down at a rate exactly equal to the discount rate. When their discount rates differ, the more patient side always reveals his valuation first in the unique smooth separating equilibrium. Received: November 1997/Final version: December 1999     

Nash equilibria in optimal reinsurance bargaining

We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents’ strategic choices to a range of risk aversion coefficients. It is shown that at the strictly beneficial Nash equilibria, agents appear homogeneous with respect to their risk preferences. While the game does not cause any loss of total welfare gain, its allocation between agents is heavily affected by the agents’ strategic behavior. This allocation is reflected in the reinsurance premium, while the insurance indemnity remains the same in all strictly beneficial Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the effect of agents’ bargaining power vanishes through the game procedure and the agent who gets more welfare gain is the one who has an advantage in choosing the common risk aversion at the equilibrium.     

Stationary and nonstationary strategies in Hotelling's model of spatial competition with repeated pricing decisions

This paper examines Hotelling's model of location with linear transportation cost. Existence of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria in the infinitely repeated price game with fixed locations is proved. These subgame perfect equilibria have a stick and carrot structure. Given firm locations, there are discount factors sufficiently high that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium with a two-phase structure. Given the discount factors, there are stationary subgame perfect equilibria for a wide range of locations. However, for some pairs of location, no symmetric simple penal code exists, all subgame perfect profiles are nonstationary, and there is only one seller in the market in infinitely many periods. Received July 1996/Final version May 1998     

Discrete–time delta hedging and the Black–Scholes model with transaction costs

The paper deals with the problem of discrete–time delta hedging and discrete-time option valuation by the Black–Scholes model. Since in the Black–Scholes model the hedging is continuous, hedging errors appear when applied to discrete trading. The hedging error is considered and a discrete-time adjusted Black–Scholes–Merton equation is derived. By anticipating the time sensitivity of delta in many cases the discrete-time delta hedging can be improved and more accurate delta values dependent on the length of the rebalancing intervals can be obtained. As an application the discrete-time trading with transaction costs is considered. Explicit solution of the option valuation problem is given and a closed form delta value for a European call option with transaction costs is obtained.     

Bargaining on whales: A differential game model with pareto optimal equilibria

A two-country differential game model of whaling is used for analysing a dynamic bargaining problem. At a given initial time, the two countries may either continue on a noncooperative mood of play characterized by an open-loop Nash-equilibrium, or negotiate a bargaining solution which we define as the Kalaï-Smorodinsky solution. The cooperative solution calls for a restraint in the whaling efforts which leaves a temptation to cheat for any player. The model shows how, by announcing a credible threat, namely to make whaling an ‘open-access’ fishery, a country can eliminate this temptation to cheat and transform the cooperative solution into an equilibrium.     

Multi-asset investment-consumption model with transaction costs

In this paper, we consider the multi-asset optimal investment-consumption model: a riskless asset and d risky assets. when the initial time is t?0, for a proportional transaction costs and discount factors, we proof that the value function of the model is a unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.     

Replication and shortfall risk in a binomial model with transaction costs

The shortfall risk is defined as the optimal mean value of the terminal deficit produced by a self-financing portfolio whose initial value is smaller than what is required to replicate a contingent claim. In this paper we look for an explicit expression for it, as well as for the optimal strategy, when the market model is a binomial model with proportional transaction costs. We first study replication of European claims which satisfy suitable assumptions. We then investigate the shortfall minimization problem in a framework very similar to that without transaction costs. The author thanks the referee for useful comments on an earlier version of the present paper.     

American option valuation in a stochastic volatility model with transaction costs

In the present paper we analyse the American option valuation problem in a stochastic volatility model when transaction costs are taken into account. We shall show that it can be formulated as a singular stochastic optimal control problem, proving the existence and uniqueness of the viscosity solution for the associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman partial differential equation. Moreover, after performing a dimensionality reduction through a suitable choice of the utility function, we shall provide a numerical example illustrating how American options prices can be computed in the present modelling framework.     

On an investment-consumption model with transaction costs: an asymptotic analysis

In this paper we examine the Akian, Menaldi and Sulem (1996) model for the optimal management of a portfolio, when there are transaction costs which are equal to a fixed percentage of the amount transacted. We analyse this model in the realistic limit of small transaction costs. Although the full problem is a free boundary diffusion problem in as many dimensions as there are assets in the portfolio, we find explicit solutions for the optimal trading policy in this limit. This makes the solution for a realistically large number of assets a practical possibility.     

Hedging of the European option in discrete time under proportional transaction costs

In the paper hedging of the European option in a discrete time financial market with proportional transaction costs is studied. It is shown that for a certain class of options the set of portfolios which allow to hedge an option in a discrete time model with a bounded set of possible changes in a stock price is the same as the set of such portfolios, under assumption that the stock price evolution is given by a suitable CRR model.     

Computation of equilibria in an economy with increasing returns to scale technologies

The purpose of this paper is to show that equilibria in an economy with increasing returns to scale technologies are computable.     

Portfolio selection in discrete time with transaction costs and power utility function: a perturbation analysis

In this article, we study a multi-period portfolio selection model in which a generic class of probability distributions is assumed for the returns of the risky asset. An investor with a power utility function rebalances a portfolio comprising a risk-free and risky asset at the beginning of each time period in order to maximize expected utility of terminal wealth. Trading the risky asset incurs a cost that is proportional to the value of the transaction. At each time period, the optimal investment strategy involves buying or selling the risky asset to reach the boundaries of a certain no-transaction region. In the limit of small transaction costs, dynamic programming and perturbation analysis are applied to obtain explicit approximations to the optimal boundaries and optimal value function of the portfolio at each stage of a multi-period investment process of any length.