Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games

We consider cost sharing for a class of facility location games, where the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a player-specific matroid defined on the set of resources. We assume that resources have nondecreasing load-dependent costs and player-specific delays. Our model includes the important special case of capacitated facility location problems, where players have to jointly pay for opened facilities. The goal is to design cost sharing protocols so as to minimize the resulting price of anarchy and price of stability. We investigate two classes of protocols: basic protocols guarantee the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium and separable protocols additionally require that the resulting cost shares only depend on the set of players on a resource. We find optimal basic and separable protocols that guarantee the price of stability/price of anarchy to grow logarithmically/linearly in the number of players. These results extend our previous results (cf. von Falkenhausen & Harks, 2013), where optimal basic and separable protocols were given for the case of symmetric matroid games without delays.     

Partial and multiple match tournaments

This paper generalizes the usual tournament structure to include both partial (some pairs of players do not compete) and multiple match (some pairs of players may compete more than once) cases. Beginning with the set of all partial tournaments, a set of axioms is introduced which any distance function on this set should satisfy. In the presence of these axioms, a unique distance function (the l^p norm) is shown to exist. It is then shown that the minimum distance tournament, from the multiple match tournaments provided, is also the minimum violations ranking.     

Non-interactive correlation distillation, inhomogeneous Markov chains, and the reverse Bonami-Beckner inequality

In this paper we studynon-interactive correlation distillation (NICD), a generalization of noise sensitivity previously considered in [5, 31, 39]. We extend the model toNICD on trees. In this model there is a fixed undirected tree with players at some of the nodes. One node is given a uniformly random string and this string is distributed throughout the network, with the edges of the tree acting as independent binary symmetric channels. The goal of the players is to agree on a shared random bit without communicating. Our new contributions include the following:

? In the case of ak-leaf star graph (the model considered in [31]), we resolve the open question of whether the success probability must go to zero ask » ∞. We show that this is indeed the case and provide matching upper and lower bounds on the asymptotically optimal rate (a slowly-decaying polynomial).

? In the case of thek-vertex path graph, we show that it is always optimal for all players to use the same 1-bit function.

? In the general case we show that all players should use monotone functions. We also show, somewhat surprisingly, that for certain trees it is better if not all players use the same function.

Our techniques include the use of thereverse Bonami-Beckner inequality. Although the usual Bonami-Beckner has been frequently used before, its reverse counterpart seems not to be well known. To demonstrate its strength, we use it to prove a new isoperimetric inequality for the discrete cube and a new result on the mixing of short random walks on the cube. Another tool that we need is a tight bound on the probability that a Markov chain stays inside certain sets; we prove a new theorem generalizing and strengthening previous such bounds [2, 3, 6]. On the probabilistic side, we use the “reflection principle” and the FKG and related inequalities in order to study the problem on general trees.     

Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer–supplier game in supply chain management

We study a game model of multi-leader and one-follower in supply chain optimization where n suppliers compete to provide a single product for a manufacturer. We regard the selling price of each supplier as a pre-determined parameter and consider the case that suppliers compete on the basis of delivery frequency to the manufacturer. Each supplier's profit depends not only on its own delivery frequency, but also on other suppliers' frequencies through their impact on manufacturer's purchase allocation to the suppliers. We first solve the follower's (manufacturer's) purchase allocation problem by deducing an explicit formula of its solution. We then formulate the n leaders' (suppliers') game as a generalized Nash game with shared constraints, which is theoretically difficult, but in our case could be solved numerically by converting to a regular variational inequality problem. For the special case that the selling prices of all suppliers are identical, we provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. An explicit formula of the Nash equilibrium is obtained and its local uniqueness property is proved.     

The Unconditional Sojourn Time Distribution in the Queue GI/M/1-K with Processor Sharing Service

We consider a processor shared GI/M/1 queue which can accommodate a finite number K of customers. Using singular perturbation techniques, we construct asymptotic expansions for the distribution of a tagged customer's sojourn time. We assume that K is large and treat several different cases of the model parameters.     

A geometric model for odd differential K-theory

Odd K-theory has the interesting property that it admits an infinite number of inequivalent differential refinements. In this paper we provide a bundle theoretic model for odd differential K-theory using the caloron correspondence and prove that this refinement is unique up to a unique natural isomorphism. We characterise the odd Chern character and its transgression form in terms of a connection and Higgs field and discuss some applications. Our model can be seen as the odd counterpart to the Simons–Sullivan construction of even differential K-theory. We use this model to prove a conjecture of Tradler–Wilson–Zeinalian [16], which states that the model developed there also defines the unique differential extension of odd K-theory.     

Competitive diffusion process of repurchased products in knowledgeable manufacturing

This paper presents a diffusion model to explain the competitive diffusion of the repurchased products in knowledgeable manufacturing. The acute market competition accelerates the products’ improvement, which requires that the manufacturing enterprises be highly capable of rapid reaction by means of knowledgeable manufacturing. To forecast the diffusion behavior effectively enables the realization of knowledgeable manufacturing system (KMS) which targets T (time), Q (quality), C (cost), S (service), and E (environment). Various diffusion models have emerged since Bass model was firstly proposed in 1969. A nonlinear model of the repurchased competitive products is proposed on the basis of the product diffusion analysis. By taking the frequently purchased products as example, the stability of the model is examined in light of the qualitative theory of differential equations and proved by the approximate linearization method. As the qualitative analysis reveals, between the two frequently purchased products competing in the same market, one undoubtedly occupies a fixed market share while the other may finally be eliminated from the market. A special case of the problem is that both products are one-time-purchased. With the corresponding model given, the qualitative analysis shows that either of the products occupies a market share, the size of which is determined by the product’s competitive strength and the new product’s time-to-market. A system dynamics model is then established and simulated by vensim. The result is consistent with that of the qualitative analysis.     

A Shared-Constraint Approach to Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Games

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over this shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization problem are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.     

Jeux à champ moyen. I – Le cas stationnaire

We introduce here a general approach to model games with a large number of players. More precisely, we consider N players Nash equilibria for long term stochastic problems and establish rigorously the ‘mean field’ type equations as N goes to infinity. We also prove general uniqueness results and determine the deterministic limit. To cite this article: J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I 343 (2006).     

A complete parametrization of cyclic field extensions of 2-power degree

Letq be a power of 2 at least equal to 8 and ζ be a primitiveq-th root of unity, and letK be any field of characteristic zero. We define the group of special projective conormsS _K as a quotient of the group of elements ofK(ζ) of norm 1:S _K is obviously trival if the groul Gal (K(ζ)/K) is cyclic. We prove that for some fieldsK, the groupS _K is finite, and it is even trivial for certain fields such as ? or ?(X ₁,...,X _m). We then prove that the groupS _K completely paramatrizes the cycle extensions ofK of degreeq. We exhibit an explicit polynomial defined over ?(T ₀,...,T _q/2) which parametrizes all cyclic extensions ofK of degreeq associated to the trivial element ofS _K. In particular, this polynomial parametrizes all cyclic extensions ofK of degreeq whenever the groupS _K is trivial.     

Representation of finite games as network congestion games

Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game.     

On the solution of affine generalized Nash equilibrium problems with shared constraints by Lemke’s method

Affine generalized Nash equilibrium problems (AGNEPs) represent a class of non-cooperative games in which players solve convex quadratic programs with a set of (linear) constraints that couple the players’ variables. The generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) associated with such games are given by solutions to a linear complementarity problem (LCP). This paper treats a large subclass of AGNEPs wherein the coupled constraints are shared by, i.e., common to, the players. Specifically, we present several avenues for computing structurally different GNE based on varying consistency requirements on the Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared constraints. Traditionally, variational equilibria (VE) have been amongst the more well-studied GNE and are characterized by a requirement that the shared constraint multipliers be identical across players. We present and analyze a modification to Lemke’s method that allows us to compute GNE that are not necessarily VE. If successful, the modified method computes a partial variational equilibrium characterized by the property that some shared constraints are imposed to have common multipliers across the players while other are not so imposed. Trajectories arising from regularizing the LCP formulations of AGNEPs are shown to converge to a particular type of GNE more general than Rosen’s normalized equilibrium that in turn includes a variational equilibrium as a special case. A third avenue for constructing alternate GNE arises from employing a novel constraint reformulation and parameterization technique. The associated parametric solution method is capable of identifying continuous manifolds of equilibria. Numerical results suggest that the modified Lemke’s method is more robust than the standard version of the method and entails only a modest increase in computational effort on the problems tested. Finally, we show that the conditions for applying the modified Lemke’s scheme are readily satisfied in a breadth of application problems drawn from communication networks, environmental pollution games, and power markets.     

Sums of values represented by a quadratic form

Let q be a quadratic form over a field K of characteristic different from 2. We investigate the properties of the smallest positive integer n such that ?1 is a sum of n values represented by q in several situations. We relate this invariant (which is called the q-level of K) to other invariants of K such as the level, the u-invariant and the Pythagoras number of K. The problem of determining the numbers which can be realized as a q-level for particular q or K is studied. We also observe that the q-level naturally emerges when one tries to obtain a lower bound for the index of the subgroup of non-zero values represented by a Pfister form q. We highlight necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the q-level to be finite. Throughout the paper, special emphasis is given to the case where q is a Pfister form.     

A robust optimization model for dynamic market with uncertain production cost

This article presents a robust optimization formulation for dealing with production cost uncertainty in an oligopolistic market scenario. It is not uncommon that players in the market face an equilibrium selling price but uncertain production costs. We show that, based on a nominal problem, the robust optimization formulation can be derived as a variational inequality with control and state variables. This convenient approach may be applied for computing optimal solutions efficiently, which help manufacturers dramatically and rapidly reform production and distribution schedules such that they can compete in the market successfully.     

Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints

Harrington et al. (Math Program Ser B 104:407–435, 2005) introduced a general framework for modeling tacit collusion in which producing firms collectively maximize the Nash bargaining objective function, subject to incentive compatibility constraints. This work extends that collusion model to the setting of a competitive pool-based electricity market operated by an independent system operator. The extension has two features. First, the locationally distinct markets in which firms compete are connected by transmission lines. Capacity limits of the transmission lines, together with the laws of physics that guide the flow of electricity, may alter firms’ strategic behavior. Second, in addition to electricity power producers, other market participants, including system operators and power marketers, play important roles in a competitive electricity market. The new players are included in the model in order to better represent real-world markets, and this inclusion will impact power producers’ strategic behavior as well. The resulting model is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Properties of the specific MPEC are discussed and numerical examples illustrating the impacts of transmission congestion in a collusive game are presented.     

Avoider-Enforcer games

Let p and q be positive integers and let H be any hypergraph. In a (p,q,H) Avoider-Enforcer game two players, called Avoider and Enforcer, take turns selecting previously unclaimed vertices of H. Avoider selects p vertices per move and Enforcer selects q vertices per move. Avoider loses if he claims all the vertices of some hyperedge of H; otherwise Enforcer loses. We prove a sufficient condition for Avoider to win the (p,q,H) game. We then use this condition to show that Enforcer can win the (1,q) perfect matching game on K2n for every q?cn/logn for an appropriate constant c, and the (1,q) Hamilton cycle game on Kn for every q?cnloglogloglogn/lognlogloglogn for an appropriate constant c. We also determine exactly those values of q for which Enforcer can win the (1,q) connectivity game on Kn. This result is quite surprising as it substantially differs from its Maker-Breaker analog. Our method extends easily to improve a result of Lu [X. Lu, A note on biased and non-biased games, Discrete Appl. Math. 60 (1995) 285-291], regarding forcing an opponent to pack many pairwise edge disjoint spanning trees in his graph.     

Competition for cores in remanufacturing

We study competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independently operating remanufacturer (IO). Different from the existing literature, the OEM and IO compete not only for selling their products but also for collecting returned products (cores) through their acquisition prices. We consider a two-period model with manufacturing by the OEM in the first period, and manufacturing as well as remanufacturing in the second period. We find the optimal policies for both players by establishing a Nash equilibrium in the second period, and then determine the optimal manufacturing decision for the OEM in the first period. This leads to a number of managerial insights. One interesting result is that the acquisition price of the OEM only depends on its own cost structure, and not on the acquisition price of the IO. Further insights are obtained from a numerical investigation. We find that when the cost benefits of remanufacturing diminishes and the IO has more chance to collect the available cores, the OEM manufactures less in the first period as the market in the second period gets larger to protect its market share. Finally, we consider the case where consumers have lower willingness to pay for the remanufactured products and find that in that case remanufacturing becomes less profitable overall.     

On the Regularity of Crossed Products

We study some generalizations of the notion of regular crossed products K * G. For the case when K is an algebraically closed field, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the twisted group ring K * G to be an n-weakly regular ring, a ξ^* N-ring or a ring without nilpotent elements.     

Heavy-Traffic Limits for Loss Proportions in Single-Server Queues

We establish heavy-traffic stochastic-process limits for the queue-length and overflow stochastic processes in the standard single-server queue with finite waiting room (G/G/1/K). We show that, under regularity conditions, the content and overflow processes in related single-server models with finite waiting room, such as the finite dam, satisfy the same heavy-traffic stochastic-process limits. As a consequence, we obtain heavy-traffic limits for the proportion of customers or input lost over an initial interval. Except for an interchange of the order of two limits, we thus obtain heavy-traffic limits for the steady-state loss proportions. We justify the interchange of limits in M/GI/1/K and GI/M/1/K special cases of the standard GI/GI/1/K model by directly establishing local heavy-traffic limits for the steady-state blocking probabilities.