Bifurcations and chaos in a nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game

A nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game is investigated in this paper. The conditions of existence for saddle-node bifurcation, transcritical bifurcation and flip bifurcation are derived using the center manifold theorem and the bifurcation theory. We prove that there exists chaotic behavior in the sense of Marotto＇s definition of chaos. The numerical simulations not only show the consistence with our theoretical analysis, but also exhibit the complex but interesting dynamical behaviors of the model. The computation of maximum Lyapunov exponents confirms the theoretical analysis of the dynamical behaviors of the system.     

Local stability of the Cournot solution with increasing heterogeneous competitors

In this paper we try to solve a paradox related to the results of Theocharis (1960). When the number of competitors increases the Cournot–Nash equilibrium loses stability. We relax the assumption about homogeneity in the decision mechanism and show that if we admit heterogeneity than by increasing the number of competitors the stability region on the parameters’ space may enlarge instead of shrinking.     

The stability of a Cournot oligopoly: the effects of adaptive expectations

It is crucial to characterize the long-term behaviour for oligopolistic firms by the analysis of asymptotic stability of the equilibrium. Convergent trajectories are usually preferred in the traditional market since unstable orbits may make the behaviour unpredictable. Under some fairly general and reasonable assumptions in an oligopolistic industry, a Cournot oligopoly model is constructed where each firm maximizes its profit in consideration of adaptive expectations with respect to its rivals' choices. We finally arrive at the conclusion that the introduction of adaptive expectations can contribute largely to the convergence to Nash equilibrium, making the long-run market behaviour more predictable.     

On the Tikhonov Well-Posedness of Concave Games and Cournot Oligopoly Games

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether theorems known to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, provide also sufficient conditions for the Tikhonov well-posedness (T-wp). We consider several hypotheses that ensure the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE), such as strong positivity of the Jacobian of the utility function derivatives (Ref. 1), pseudoconcavity, and strict diagonal dominance of the Jacobian of the best reply functions in implicit form (Ref. 2). The aforesaid assumptions imply the existence and uniqueness of NE. We show that the hypotheses in Ref. 2 guarantee also the T-wp property of the Nash equilibrium.As far as the hypotheses in Ref. 1 are concerned, the result is true for quadratic games and zero-sum games. A standard way to prove the T-wp property is to show that the sets of -equilibria are compact. This last approach is used to demonstrate directly the T-wp property for the Cournot oligopoly model given in Ref. 3. The compactness of -equilibria is related also to the condition that the best reply surfaces do not approach each other near infinity.     

A dynamic Cournot–Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game

This paper studies market outcome equivalence of two dynamic production-capital investment games under uncertainty. One is played under complete information, while the other, feedback (FB) game, is played under incomplete information about the opponents’ costs and market demand. The FB game structure may be observed in some newly initiated industries, in which a homogeneous good is exchanged via an auction mechanism. In that case, the FB game setting may predict the complete information equilibrium market outcomes.      

On a dynamic fractional game

Consider a two-person zero-sum game constructed by a dynamic fractional form. We establish the upper value as well as the lower value of a dynamic fractional game, and prove that the dual gap is equal to zero under certain conditions. It is also established that the saddle point function exists in the fractional game system under certain conditions so that the equilibrium point exists in this game system.     

Analysis of the dynamics of Cournot team-game with heterogeneous players

In this paper, we study a dynamical system of a two-team Cournot game played by a team consisting of two firms with bounded rationality and a team consisting of one firm with naive expectation. The equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability are studied. It is demonstrated that, as some parameters in the model are varied, the stability of the equilibrium will get lost and many such complex behaviors as the period bifurcation, chaotic phenomenon, periodic windows, strange attractor and unpredictable trajectories will occur. The great influence of the model parameters on the speed of convergence to the equilibrium is also shown with numerical analysis.     

Explicit Stability Zones for Cournot Game with 3 and 4 Competitors

The dynamical system of 3 and 4 competitors in a Cournot game is studied. The stability of its fixed points (Nash-equilibria) are also investigated. The stable and unstable regions are explicitly shown. The bifurcation characteristics are found. Periodic orbits with different periods 7, 25, 18, 13, 17 etc., are detected in both cases. The study of these models is very rich in bifurcation phenomena.     

下游差异Cournot厂商的提成许可策略与创新激励

不同的上游市场结构对下游厂商的许可策略、创新激励产生不同的影响.文章分别基于上游原料供应商为独占垄断、双头垄断以及完全竞争的假设,结合提成许可策略,比较分析了下游产品市场差异Cournot厂商的创新激励.结果表明：上游厂商的市场势力越强,下游厂商的显著创新激励越低,但显著创新的提成许可激励却越高.这一结果为厂商与政府的创新管理提供了理论依据.     

Complex dynamic properties of Cournot duopoly games with convex and log-concave demand function

A Cournot duopoly game is proposed where the interdependence between firms depends on convex and log-concave demand function. In this paper, a model of two rational firms that are in competition and produce homogeneous commodities is introduced. The equilibrium points of this model are obtained and their dynamical characteristics such as stability, bifurcation and chaos are investigated. Furthermore, a multi-team Cournot game is introduced. Through simulation the dynamical characteristics of the equilibrium points of this game are illustrated.     

相异成本和广义非线性需求下多寡头古诺模型及应用

在已有的寡头古诺模型基础上进一步扩展,建立了综合考虑竞争者成本差异和市场广义非线性需求的扩展多寡头古诺模型。给出了扩展多寡头古诺模型Nash均衡解的一般求解方法以及两类特殊需求函数下Nash均衡解的解析表达式。接着进一步探讨了模型的性质,重点讨论成本差异对均衡的影响及其与经典模型的异同,并利用模型的结论简单解释若干经济现象。模型性质探讨表明,边际成本差异会对均衡产量及其在各类寡头之间的分配产生重要影响。作为应用,将相关结论应用到以稀土开采管理为代表的稀有资源管理的策略分析上,提出了若干建议。     

The Sprague-Grundy function of the game Euclid

We show that the Sprague-Grundy function of the game Euclid is given by g(x,y)=⌊|y/x-x/y|⌋ for x,y≥1.     

On Nash–Cournot oligopolistic market equilibrium models with concave cost functions

We consider Nash–Cournot oligopolistic market equilibrium models with concave cost functions. Concavity implies, in general, that a local equilibrium point is not necessarily a global one. We give conditions for existence of global equilibrium points. We then propose an algorithm for finding a global equilibrium point or for detecting that the problem is unsolvable. Numerical experiments on some randomly generated data show efficiency of the proposed algorithm.     

Cyclic behavior in dynamic investment decisions for deregulated energy markets

In the first years after the deregulation of the electricity industry, investment into new generation capacity has not taken place on a large scale in any central european country. Recent increases in prices indicate that investment could be very profitable. However, the fear is that the need for new capacity can be overestimated and that could lead to a decrease in prices and profits and consequently to a reduction/stop of new investments. The aim of this paper is to model and analyze factors that influence the stability of electricity prices. The electricity market is modeled using a Cournot game and the stability of electricity prices is analyzed by simulations. The research was supported by the grant 1/3001/06 of the Grant Agency of Slovak Republic (VEGA) and grant VVGS 36/2006.     

A simplified expression of the Shapley function for fuzzy game

In this paper, a simplified expression of the Shapley function for games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of Shapley functions defined in some particular games with fuzzy coalition. The simplified expression of the Shapley function is compared with two definitions established by Butnariu, Tsurumi et al. A conclusion is drawn that the simplified expression of the Shapley function is equivalent to Butnariu’s definition when characteristic function is a game with proportional values, and is equivalent to Tsurumi’s definition when characteristic function is a game with Choquet integral forms. Furthermore, from an angle of interaction between two participation levels, the properties of the two games defined by Butnariu and Tsurumi are respectively studied.     

Cutting lemma and union lemma for the domination game

Two new techniques are introduced into the theory of the domination game. The cutting lemma bounds the game domination number of a partially dominated graph with the game domination number of a suitably modified partially dominated graph. The union lemma bounds the S-game domination number of a disjoint union of paths using appropriate weighting functions. Using these tools a conjecture asserting that the so-called three legged spiders are game domination critical graphs is proved. An extended cutting lemma is also derived and all game domination critical trees on 18, 19, and 20 vertices are listed.     

Explicit optimal value for Dynkin's stopping game

Under the One-step Look Ahead rule of Dynamic Programming, an explicit game value of Dynkin's stopping problem for a Markov chain is obtained by using a potential operator. The condition on the One-step rule could be extended to the k-step and infinity-step rule. We shall also decompose the game value as the sum of two explicit functions under these rules.     

On Nordhaus–Gaddum type inequalities for the game chromatic and game coloring numbers

A seminal result by Nordhaus and Gaddum states that $2\sqrt{n}\le \chi \left(G\right)+\chi \left(\overline{G}\right)\le n+1$ for every graph $G$ of order $n$, where $\overline{G}$ is the complement of $G$ and $\chi$ is the chromatic number. We study similar inequalities for ${\chi }_g\left(G\right)$ and $co{l}_g\left(G\right)$, which denote, respectively, the game chromatic number and the game coloring number of $G$. Those graph invariants give the score for, respectively, the coloring and marking games on $G$ when both players use their best strategies.     

博弈公平性的概率研究

在Bernoulli序列的情况下讨论了博弈试验,给出了博弈公平性的概率极限定义,并在[0,1)-值选择函数的条件下,对以前的一些定理作了适当推广.