Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount

We studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offers price deductions to customers. With a price sensitive market, the expected demand with cooperative advertising and price deduction is demonstrated. When the manufacturer is a leader, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment, local advertisement and associated manufacturer’s allowance with any given price deduction. When the manufacturer offers more price deduction to customers, the retailer will increase local advertisement if the manufacturer provides the same portion of the local advertising allowance. We obtained the necessary and sufficient condition for the price deduction to ensure an increase of manufacturer’s profit, and a search procedure for determining such an optimal price deduction is provided as well. When the manufacturer and retailer are partners, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment and local advertisement. For any given price deduction, the total profit for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than that with the non-cooperative scheme. When price elasticity of demand is larger than one, the resulting closed form optimal price deduction with partnership is also obtained. To increase profits for both parties in a supply chain, we recommend that coordination in local and national cooperative advertising with a partnership relationship between manufacturer and retailer is the best solution. The bargaining results show how to share the profit gain between the manufacturer and the retailer, and determine the associated pricing and advertising policies for both parties.     

A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply chains

Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs. This paper considers vertical co-op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain; this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement. Four game-theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members. Comparisons and insights are developed. These embrace three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and one cooperative game. In the latter case, both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level; subsequently, the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit.     

Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: A cooperative game theory approach

Manufacturer–retailer supply chains commonly adopt a wholesale price mechanism. This mechanism, however, has often led manufacturers and retailers to situations of conflicts of interest. For example, due to uncertain market demand, retailers prefer to order flexibly from manufacturers so as to avoid incurring inventory costs and to be able to respond flexibly to market changes. Manufacturers, on the other hand, prefer retailers to place full orders as early as possible so that they can hedge against the risks of over- and under-production. Such conflicts between retailers and manufacturers can result in an inefficient supply chain. Motivated by this problem, we take a cooperative game approach in this paper to consider the coordination issue in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain using option contracts. Using the wholesale price mechanism as a benchmark, we develop an option contract model. Our study demonstrates that, compared with the benchmark based on the wholesale price mechanism, option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto-improvement. We also discuss scenarios in which option contracts are selected according to individual supply chain members’ risk preferences and negotiating powers.     

不同风险态度下的三层供应链集成优化

研究了在决策者不同风险态度下的由供应商、分销商和零售商组成三层供应链集成优化问题。考虑供应链中价格、质量、交货、需求和供应的不确定风险因素为模糊变量,应用可信性理论建立了模糊机会约束规划模型,可信性测度的置信水平代表了决策者的风险偏好程度。使用模糊变量的乐观值和悲观值将机会约束转化为清晰的等价形式。最后,通过数值算例分析了决策者的风险态度的变化对集成供应链的影响。     

交易流动性不对等环境下基于收入共享契约的供应链协调

供应链中存在单一生产商、单一零售商和一个交易流动性不对等的第三方B2B电子交易市场。在零售需求不确定的情况下,分别建立了供应链集中决策模型、传统固定合约均衡决策模型、收入共享契约分散决策模型,验证了收入共享契约在多渠道采购环境下仍可以协调供应链,分析了使供应链达到帕累托改进的收入共享契约的参数设定,最后分别从卖出流动性和买入流动性两个角度讨论了交易流动性对供应链的影响。研究结果表明,卖出流动性好的电子交易市场可以促使供应链达到最优生产量,实现整体收益的最大化;两种交易流动性的趋好都会提高供应链效率,但生产商更偏好卖出流动性好的电子交易市场。     

基于供应链的“互联网+回收”平台合作推广研究

针对第三方回收商自有“互联网+回收”平台知名度不高的情况,网络零售商负责销售产品、推广销售平台的同时,利用自身平台知名度向消费者宣传推广“互联网+回收”平台。文章对比分析非合作和合作情形下,供应链成员的最佳策略。研究表明:供应链成员的合作比不合作更有利;成本共担契约下的供应链合作和转移支付契约下的合作相比,网络零售商和第三方回收商投入更多的推广努力,回收价格更低,回收量更大;协同合作情形下回收量、双方的推广努力达到最大,回收价格最低。     

碳限额与交易机制下受资金约束的供应链优化

在碳限额与交易机制下,研究零售商受资金约束的供应链优化问题。构建了制造商占优的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,通过引入减排成本分担机制,分别给出了分散决策和集中决策的最优解。通过收益共享契约,实现了供应链协调和供应链成员利润的帕累托改善。通过算例分析了不同减排成本分担系数、碳交易价格对供应链利润和订购量、碳减排决策的影响,为供应链各成员开展减排合作提供了理论依据。研究结果表明,供应链成员的合作不仅可以提高供应链总绩效,而且有利于为消费者提供更多、更绿色的产品;碳价格的提高,促使供应链更加努力减排,从而提高了供应链总利润。     

考虑成员风险态度的零售商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

针对由制造商、回收商和资金约束的零售商组成的三级闭环供应链,考虑供应链成员面对市场需求不确定时表现出不同的风险态度,研究了闭环供应链的定价与回收决策问题。首先给出了产品的市场需求函数与回收商的回收成本函数;然后基于均值-方差法,构建了各成员和闭环供应链的效用函数;进一步地,依据博弈论的思想,确定了不同渠道权力结构下的最优零售价格、最优回收率和最优批发价格;最后分析了闭环供应链成员风险态度和贷款利率对供应链最优决策和效用的影响。研究表明,成员风险态度和贷款利率能够影响闭环供应链最优决策和效用,其中,风险规避的零售商和制造商对闭环供应链其他成员均有利,但是对自身和闭环供应链不利;风险规避的回收商对闭环供应链成员均不利;贷款利率的增长会降低成员和闭环供应链的效用。     

零售商主导的模糊供应链博弈——考虑销售努力的情形

以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策。结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性。研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高。原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益。     

不确定情况下逆向供应链的协作与定价策略研究

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统,应用博弈理论和模糊理论对逆向供应链的协作与定价策略进行了研究.针对回收产品价格的不确定性,将回收价格看作是三角模糊数,采用Chen与H sieh提出的梯级平均综合表示法确定模糊回收价格的解模糊值,由此,建立非合作博弈模型和合作博弈模型,并给出均衡条件下制造商和零售商各自的回收价格策略.最后,举例说明了该方法的有效性.     

广告分担、价格折扣与供应链的纵向合作广告

研究了生产商和零售商的纵向合作广告问题。分别在广告分担和价格折扣策略下，探讨了双方的均衡结果和利润。当生产商的边际利润较小时，生产商的最优决策是不采取任何一种策略。当生产商的边际利润达到一定范围时，广告分担策略是双方共同的最优选择。而无论在什么样的条件内，价格折扣策略都不会使双方同时满意。为了增加双方的收益，供应链成员应该在广告上集成决策。最后给出了系统集成的可行最优解的范围和Nash讨价还价解。     

Supply chain coordination through integration of innovation effort and advertising support

This study integrates firms’ innovation and advertising decisions in a two-echelon supply chain, where a monopoly manufacturer sells products to ultimate consumers through an autonomous retailer. Considering that both innovation and advertising contribute to the product demand, we first investigate the optimal equilibriums of channel members under two different game structures: the non-cooperative and cooperative. In the non-cooperative structure, the manufacturer controls the innovation effort and wholesale price while the retailer controls the advertising rate and retail pricing. In the cooperative structure, the manufacturer agrees to share part of retailer’s advertising expenditure. We find that both the optimal operation and marketing decisions are sensitive to effects of innovation and advertising on demand as well as the manufacturer’s cost reduction coefficient due to innovation. Further, we find that the manufacturer always prefers cooperation. Meanwhile, only when the firms’ investments significantly contribute to the market mechanism, does the retailer have incentive to implement a cooperative program. In addition, we further propose a new two-way subsidy policy to coordinate channel members’ business functions.     

Dynamic conformance and design quality in a supply chain: an assessment of contracts’ coordinating power

We consider a two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one supplier who collaborate on improving both design and conformance quality. Design quality is supposed to increase product desirability, and therefore market demand, while conformance quality should reduce the proportion of defective items, and therefore increase the manufacturer’s sales revenue. We investigate how the supply chain parties allocate effort between design and conformance quality under both cooperative and non-cooperative settings in an intertemporal framework. Furthermore, we evaluate wholesale price contracts and revenue-sharing contracts in terms of their performance and coordination power. We show that although a revenue-sharing contract enables the manufacturer to effectively involve the supplier in quality improvement, neither contract type allows for perfect coordination resulting in the quality that can be achieved by a cooperative supply chain. We thus suggest a reward-based extension to the revenue-sharing contract, to ensure system-wide optimal quality performance. Importantly, we find that the supplier would be better off adopting a reward-based revenue sharing contract and refusing a standard revenue-sharing contract, while the opposite would be true for the manufacturer.     

Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: Stability and fair profit allocation

This paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract. We consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously changed before and after forming the integration. A cooperative game is formulated to normatively analyze the stable and fair profit allocations under the grand coalition in such an environment. Our main result demonstrates that vertical integration is stable when all members are pessimistic in the sense that they are sure that they will not become the contracting leader if they deviate from the grand coalition. We find that in this case, the grand coalition’s profit must be allocated more to the retailer and the members with higher costs. Nevertheless, we also show the conditions under which the upstream manufacturer can have strong power as in traditional supply chains.     

考虑互惠偏好的闭环供应链系统合作机制研究

将互惠偏好引入到闭环供应链系统合作机制中,研究了由一个制造商,一个零售商和一个再制造商组成的三层闭环供应链,运用Stackelberg博弈理论分析了闭环供应链整体及各成员的最优决策问题,并对5种情形(决策模式)下的均衡结果进行比较分析.研究发现在考虑互惠偏好行为下,分散决策模式和局部联盟决策模式下的系统利润低于集中决策模式下的收益;新产品和再制造产品的销售量(零售价格)与制造商对零售商的互惠偏好系数呈正(负)相关,与零售商对制造商的互惠偏好系数呈负(正)相关;5种决策模式的供应链系统利润与制造商对零售商的互惠偏好系数呈正相关,与零售商对制造商的互惠偏好系数呈负相关.     

Coordination of cooperative cost-reduction efforts in a supply chain partnership

We study cooperative cost reduction in a decentralized supply chain with a single manufacturer and multiple suppliers. The manufacturer assembles components that are procured from the suppliers to produce a final product. Both the manufacturer and the suppliers invest in reducing the unit production costs of the components. We see that neither of the two well-known conventional contracts, the wholesale price contract and the cost-plus pricing contract, generally coordinates the supply chain, i.e., under both of these types of contract, the individual optimal cost-reduction efforts of players deviate from the centralized system-optimal solution. However, this result is not surprising because these contracts encourage either only the manufacturer or only the suppliers alone to invest in cost reduction.     

Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions

This paper surveys some applications of cooperative game theory to supply chain management. Special emphasis is placed on two important aspects of cooperative games: profit allocation and stability. The paper first describes the construction of the set of feasible outcomes in commonly seen supply chain models, and then uses cooperative bargaining models to find allocations of the profit pie between supply chain partners. In doing so, several models are analyzed and surveyed, and include suppliers selling to competing retailers, and assemblers negotiating with component manufacturers selling complementary components. The second part of the paper discusses the issue of coalition formation among supply chain partners. An exhaustive survey of commonly used stability concepts is presented. Further, new ideas such as farsightedness among supply chain players are also discussed and analyzed. The paper also opens some avenues of future research in applying cooperative game theory to supply chain management.     

收购价不确定下订单农业供应链融资方式选择——外部融资VS内部融资

基于“保底收购,随行就市”的订单价格机制,构建了“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链模型,求解了外部融资均衡和内部融资均衡,分析了收购公司和农户对外部融资方式和内部融资方式的选择意愿以及订单农业供应链的融资方式选择结果。研究发现,公司总是希望农户选择期望回报率低的融资方式,然而自有资金高的农户却偏爱期望回报率高的融资方式,这是因为期望回报率高时农户会降低投产量,而公司为激励农户会提高保底价,此时对农户而言保底价增大带来的收益要大于期望回报率增加带来的损失,但供应链整体利益却受到损害。最重要的是,公司出台内部融资的补贴和额外收费政策可以实现供应链双方的共赢。     

Integrated inventory models considering the two-level trade credit policy and a price-negotiation scheme

This paper develops the integrated inventory models with permissible delay in payment, in which customers’ demand is sensitive to the buyer’s price. The models consider the two-level trade credit policy in the vendor–buyer and buyer–customer relationships in supply chain management. A simple recursive solution procedure is proposed for the integrated models to determine the buyer’s optimal pricing and production/order strategy. Although the total profit from the buyer and vendor increases together, the buyer’s share lessens. To compensate the buyer’s loss due to the cooperative relationship, a negotiation system is presented in order to allocate the profit increase to the vendor and buyer to determine the pricing and production/order strategy. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis are provided to illustrate the proposed model. The results indicate that the total profit from the buyer and vendor together can increase, although a price discount is given to the buyer in the proposed models.     

Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.