Flexible supply contracts under price uncertainty

This article develops supply contracts covering environments with changing prices. We investigate characterization properties of the price processes, while considering costs and discount factors. We determine expressions of the contract’s expected low price and its second moment for a given horizon. We then employ these expected price and second moment values to identify an expected optimum time before the contract expires at which the lowest price occurs. Simulation experiments verify our analysis, and they illustrate how the optimum purchase time decreases as the drift term increases.     

Analysis of supply contracts from a supplier's perspective

Hexin Wang and Khairy A. H. Kobbacy Centre for Operational Research and Applied Statistics, University of Salford, Salford, M5 4WT, UK Email: w.wang{at}salford.ac.uk Received on 9 May 2006. Accepted on 22 December 2006. Incentive structure and demand uncertainty may cause supplychains to operate at a low efficiency. Therefore, many supplycontracts are employed in practice to improve the performanceof supply chains, i.e. to benefit all members involved in thechain. Supply chain contracts provide mechanisms to change theincentive structures of the supply chain members so that theirdecisions can improve the supply chain efficiency, while alsoprotect their own interests. It is important to understand theimpacts of supply contracts and their differences from a supplier'sperspective, since it is often the supplier who initiates asupply contract. This paper reports on a comprehensive analysisof supply contracts from a supplier's perspective. Six commonlyused supply contracts are analysed and the contract parametersare optimized to maximize the supplier's expected profit withconsideration to improve the retailer's profit. This case hasnot been thoroughly investigated in literature to date. Therisk-sharing mechanism and the division of the increased profitbetween the retailer and supplier for some of the contractsare also investigated in detail.     

Price-only contracts with backup supply

This paper studies a supply chain in which a manufacturer holds backup supply with extra cost to satisfy demand unmet by a retailer. We provide a simple threshold condition for when the manufacturer should hold backup supply. We also study how the backup supply affects the supply chain performance.     

On the role of revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains

The supply chain coordinating role of revenue-sharing has, to date, been examined only in static models. With downstream competition, the central conclusion in these models is negative: revenue-sharing cannot, except in degenerate form, achieve coordination. Incorporating dynamics, by allowing inventory carryover in discrete time, this paper establishes a foundation for revenue-sharing contracts in aligning incentives.     

Long-term and penalty contracts in a two-stage supply chain with stochastic demand

Recent applications of game-theoretic analysis to supply chain efficiency have focused on constructs between a buyer (the retailer or manufacturer) and a seller (the supplier) in successive stages of a supply chain. If demand for the final product is stochastic then the supplier has an incentive to keep its capacity relatively low to avoid creating unneeded capacity. The manufacturer, on the other hand, prefers the supplier’s capacity to be high to ensure that the final demand is satisfied. The manufacturer therefore constructs a contract to induce the supplier to increase its production capacity. Most research examines contracting when final demand is realized after the manufacturer places its order to the supplier. However, if final demand is realized before the manufacturer places its order to the supplier, these types of contracts can be ineffective. This paper examines two contracts under the latter timing scenario: long-term contracts in which the business relationship is repeated, and penalty contracts in which the supplier is penalized for too little capacity. Results indicate long-term contracts increase the profit potential of the supply chain. Furthermore, the penalty contracts can ensure that the supplier chooses a capacity level such that the full profit potential is achieved.     

A two-stage supply chain coordination mechanism considering price sensitive demand and quantity discounts

This paper explores the coordination between a supplier and a buyer within a decentralized supply chain, through the use of quantity discounts in a game theoretic model. Within this model, the players face inventory and pricing decisions. We propose both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches considering that the product traded experiences a price sensitive demand. In the first case, we study the dynamics of the game from the supplier's side as the leader in the negotiation obtaining a Stackelberg equilibrium, and then show how the payoff of this player could still improve from this point. In the second case, a cooperative model is formulated, where decisions are taken simultaneously, emulating a centralized firm, showing the benefits of the cooperation between the players. We further formulate a pricing game, where the buyer is allowed to set different prices to the final customer as a reaction to the supplier's discount decisions. For the latter we investigate the difference between feasibility of implementing a retail discount given a current coordination mechanism and without it. Finally the implications of transportation costs are analyzed in the quantity discount schedule. Our findings are illustrated with a numerical example showing the difference in the players’ payoff in each case and the optimal strategies, comparing in each case our results with existing work.     

Transshipment incentive contracts in a multi-level supply chain

Transshipments within a supply chain can be difficult to implement as the costs and benefits are often incurred by different parties. This difficulty becomes even more problematic when the costs and benefits are not completely known by all parties. The primary purpose of this paper is to introduce the role of asymmetric information into the design of supply chain transshipment contracts. Using a representative supply chain from within the soft drink industry as an example, a multi-level contracting framework is developed that aligns incentives to encourage transshipments and improve performance in the absence of all parties having full information. Analysis of the proposed framework suggests that, even if a transshipment is likely to be unprofitable to the transshipping dyad, it may still be best for the entire supply chain. Moreover, overall supply chain inventories with transshipments do not necessarily increase relative to the no-transshipment case.     

Retail price markup commitment in decentralized supply chains

We investigate the operational decisions and resulting profits for a supply chain facing price-dependent demand under a policy where there is an ex-ante commitment made on the retail price markup. We obtain closed-form solutions for this policy under the assumption of a multiplicative demand function and we analytically compare its performance with that of a traditional price-only policy. We compare these results to results obtained when demand follows a linear additive form. These formulations are shown to be qualitatively different as the manufacturer’s wholesale pricing decision is independent of the retail price markup commitment in the multiplicative case, but not when demand is linear additive. We demonstrate that the ex-ante commitment can lead to Pareto-improving solutions under linear additive demand, but not under the multiplicative demand function. We also consider the effect of pricing power in the supply chain by varying who determines the retail price markup.     

Managing a dual-channel supply chain under price and delivery-time dependent stochastic demand

Several leading manufacturers recently combined the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel to reach a wider range of customers. We examine such a dual-channel supply chain under price and delivery-time dependent stochastic customer demand. We consider five decision variables, the price and order quantity for both the retail and the online channels and the delivery time for the online channel. Uncertainty frequently arises in both retail and online channels and so additional inventory management is required to control shortage or overstock and that has an effect on the optimal order quantity, price, and lead time. We developed mathematical models with the profit maximization motive. We analyze both centralized and decentralized systems for unknown distribution function of the random variables through a distribution-free approach and also for known distribution function. We examine the effect of delivery lead time and customers’ channel preference on the optimal operation. For supply chain coordination a hybrid all-unit quantity discount along a franchise fee contract is used. Moreover, we use the generalized asymmetric Nash bargaining for surplus profit distribution. A numerical example illustrates the findings of the model and the managerial insights are summarized for centralized, decentralized, and coordinated scenarios.     

First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts

We investigate a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing problem under demand uncertainty who has the option to source from multiple suppliers. The suppliers’ manufacturing costs are private information. A widely used mechanism to find the least costly supplier under asymmetric information is to use a sealed-bid reverse auction. We compare the combinations of different simple auction formats (first- and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (push and pull) under full contract compliance, both for risk-neutral and risk-averse retailer and suppliers. We show the superiority of a first-price push auction for a risk-neutral retailer. However, only the pull contracts lead to supply chain coordination. If the retailer is sufficiently risk-averse, the pull is preferred over the push contract. If suppliers are risk-averse, the first-price push auction remains the choice for the retailer. Numerical examples illustrate the allocation of benefits between the retailer and the (winning) supplier for different number of bidders, demand uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and degree of risk-aversion.     

The impact of consumer returns policies on consignment contracts with inventory control

We consider a consignment contract with consumer non-defective returns behavior. In our model, an upstream vendor contracts with a downstream retailer. The vendor decides his consignment price charged to the retailer for each unit sold and his refund price for each returned item, and then the retailer sets her retail price for selling the product. The vendor gets paid based on net sold units and salvages unsold units as well as returned items in a secondary market. Under the framework, we study and compare two different consignment arrangements: the retailer/vendor manages consignment inventory (RMCI/VMCI) programs. To study the impact of return policy, we discuss a consignment contract without return policy as a benchmark. We show that whether or not the vendor offers a return policy, it is always beneficial for the channel to delegate the inventory decision to the vendor. We find that the vendor’s return policy depends crucially on the salvage value of returns. If the product has no salvage value, the vendor’s optimal decision is not to offer a return policy; otherwise, the vendor can gain more profit by offering a return policy when the salvage value turns out to be positive.     

Analysis of supply contracts with quantity flexibility

This paper explores a class of supply contracts under which a buyer receives discounts for committing to purchases in advance. The further in advance the commitment is made, the larger the discount. As time rolls forward, the buyer can increase the order quantities for future periods of the rolling horizon based on updated demand forecast information and inventory status. However, the buyer pays a higher per-unit cost for the incremental units. Such contracts are used by automobile and contract manufacturers, and are quite common in fuel oil and natural gas delivery markets. We develop a finite-horizon dynamic programming model to characterize the structure of the optimal replenishment strategy for the buyer. We present heuristic approaches to calculate the order volume in each period of the rolling horizon. Finally, we numerically evaluate the heuristic approaches and draw some managerial insights based on the findings.     

The coordinating contracts for a fuzzy supply chain with effort and price dependent demand

This paper investigates the coordination of a two-echelon supply chain with fuzzy demand that is dependent on both retail price and sales effort. In contrast with the centralized and decentralized decision models, two coordinating models based on symmetric information and asymmetric information about retailer’s scale parameter are developed by game theory, and the corresponding analytical solutions are obtained. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples yield the maximal supply chain profits in two coordination situations are equal to that in the centralized situation and greater than that in the decentralized situation. Furthermore, under asymmetric information contract, the maximal expected profit obtained by the low-scale-level retailer is higher than that under symmetric information contract.     

Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts

Suppliers often make proactive investments to strategically position themselves to win contracts with a large buyer. Such investments reduce the suppliers’ variable costs of serving the buyer’s demand. We show that an auction mechanism does not always benefit the buyer, the supply chain, or the society. We identify scenarios where the buyer can implement the supply chain and socially optimal solution by committing to a bilateral relationship with fair reimbursement, and forgoing the benefits of competition altogether. We explore the role of commitment by the buyer (to a procurement mechanism) and by the suppliers (to an investment level) by analyzing different timing games under symmetric and asymmetric information about suppliers’ types. We show that it never benefits anyone for the suppliers to commit first. Equilibrium investments and cost structures depend upon the buyer’s bargaining power (opportunity cost). However, the winning supplier’s investments are almost always below the supply chain optimal level.     

Monotonicity properties of wholesale price contracts

This paper contributes to the supply chain contracts literature in economics and operations by performing qualitative sensitivity analysis of a wholesale price contract in a two-echelon supply chain setting. Order-theory tools are used to derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity of contract parameters.The upstream supplier is modeled as a Stackelberg leader. The supplier is assumed to have complete information about the costs and revenue function of the downstream retailer. It is shown that an equilibrium wholesale price weakly increases with an increase in the supplier production cost rate, but it may increase or decrease with an increase in the retailer cost rate. As either the supplier production cost or the retailer cost increases, the supplier profit decreases weakly. Additional sensitivity analysis is performed assuming certain properties of the retailer revenue function.Several well-known results in the supply chain contracting literature can be considered as special cases of the more general theorems developed here. In particular, this paper reexamines the analysis of a newsvendor supply chain problem by Lariviere and Porteus [Lariviere, M.A., Porteus, E.L., 2001. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3, 293–305]. This paper generalizes and extends their work, by establishing properties of the newsvendor demand distribution that guarantee monotonicity of the contract parameters, without requiring a unique contract solution.     

Controlling the bullwhip effect in a supply chain system with constrained information flows

The bullwhip effect problem is one of the most important issues in supply chain management. Limited information sharing increases the difficulty of reducing the bullwhip effect and leads to inefficient supply chain management. The purpose of this paper is to explore new ways to reduce the bullwhip effect in supply chain systems that face uncertainties with respect to information sharing. We first present a supply chain state transition model, based on which we explore the endogenous mechanism of bullwhip effect, especially those related to impacts from limited information sharing. Then we propose a novel inventory control method and study the corresponding control optimization problem, with the aim of reducing inventory volatility in supply chains. Both quantitative analysis and simulation study are conducted. Simulation results show the effectiveness and flexibility of our proposed method in reducing bullwhip effect and in improving supply chain performance, even under conditions of limited information sharing.     

Side-payment contracts in two-person nonzero-sum supply chain games: Review,discussion and applications

This paper investigates supply chain coordination with side-payment contracts. We first summarize specific side-payment contracts and present our review on the literature that developed general side-payment schemes to coordinate supply chains. Following our review, we discuss two criteria that a proper side-payment contract must satisfy, and accordingly introduce a decision-dependent transfer payment function and a constant transfer term. We present the condition that the transfer function must satisfy, and use Nash arbitration scheme and Shapley value to compute the constant transfer term and derive its closed-form solution. Next, we provide a five-step procedure for the development of side-payment contract, and apply it to four supply chain games: Cournot and Bertrand games, a two-retailer supply chain game with substitutable products and a one-supplier, one-retailer supply chain. More specifically, for the Cournot game, we construct a linear transfer function and a constant side-payment to coordinate two producers. For the Bertrand game, we build a nonlinear transfer function which is equivalent to a revenue-sharing contract, and show that the constant term is zero and two firms in the game equally share the system-wide profit. For a supply chain with substitutable products, we present a side-payment contract to coordinate two retailers. For a two-echelon supply chain, we develop a proper side-payment scheme that can coordinate the supply chain and also help reduce the impact of forward buying on supply chain performance.     

Game-theoretic analyses of decentralized assembly supply chains: Non-cooperative equilibria vs. coordination with cost-sharing contracts

This paper considers a multiple-supplier, single manufacturer assembly supply chain where the suppliers produce components of a short life-cycle product which is assembled by the manufacturer. In this single-period problem the suppliers determine their production quantities and the manufacturer chooses the retail price. We assume that the manufacturer faces a random price-dependent demand in either additive or multiplicative form. For each case, we analyze both simultaneous-move and leader–follower games to respectively determine the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, and find the globally-optimal solution that maximizes the system-wide expected profit. Then, we introduce appropriate buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate this assembly supply chain, so that when all the suppliers and the manufacturer adopt their equilibrium solutions, the system-wide expected profit is maximized.     

Coordinated control of distribution supply chains in the presence of fuzzy customer demand

This paper considers a single product inventory control in a Distribution Supply Chain (DSC). The DSC operates in the presence of uncertainty in customer demands. The demands are described by imprecise linguistic expressions that are modelled by discrete fuzzy sets. Inventories at each facility within the DSC are replenished by applying periodic review policies with optimal order up-to-quantities. Fuzzy customer demands imply fuzziness in inventory positions at the end of review intervals and in incurred relevant costs per unit time interval. The determination of the minimum of defuzzified total cost of the DSC is a complex problem which is solved by applying decomposition; the original problem is decomposed into a number of simpler independent optimisation subproblems, where each retailer and the warehouse determine their optimum periodic reviews and order up-to-quantities. An iterative coordination mechanism is proposed for changing the review periods and order up-to-quantities for each retailer and the warehouse in such a way that all parties within the DSC are satisfied with respect to total incurred costs per unit time interval. Coordination is performed by introducing fuzzy constraints on review periods and fuzzy tolerances on retailers and warehouse costs in local optimisation subproblems.     

Competitive food supply chain networks with application to fresh produce

In this paper, we develop a network-based food supply chain model under oligopolistic competition and perishability, with a focus on fresh produce. The model incorporates food deterioration through the introduction of arc multipliers, with the inclusion of the discarding costs associated with the disposal of the spoiled food products. We allow for product differentiation due to product freshness and food safety concerns, as well as the evaluation of alternative technologies associated with various supply chain activities. We then propose an algorithm with elegant features for computation. A case study focused on the cantaloupe market is investigated within this modeling and computational framework, in which we analyze different scenarios prior/during/after a foodborne disease outbreak.