Stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic stochastic differential games

This paper obtains the Stackelberg solution to a class of two-player stochastic differential games described by linear state dynamics and quadratic objective functionals. The information structure of the problem is such that the players make independent noisy measurements of the initial state and are permitted to utilize only this information in constructing their controls. Furthermore, by the very nature of the Stackelberg solution concept, one of the players is assumed to know, in advance, the strategy of the other player (the leader). For this class of problems, we first establish existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg solution and then relate the derivation of the leader's Stackelberg solution to the optimal solution of a nonstandard stochastic control problem. This stochastic control problem is solved in a more general context, and its solution is utilized in constructing the Stackelberg strategy of the leader. For the special case Gaussian statistics, it is shown that this optimal strategy is affine in observation of the leader. The paper also discusses numerical aspects of the Stackelberg solution under general statistics and develops algorithms which converge to the unique Stackelberg solution.This work was performed while the second author was on sabbatical leave at the Department of Applied Mathematics, Twente University of Technology, Enschede, Holland.     

Some thoughts on saddle-point conditions and information structures in zero-sum differential games

For a very simple two-stage, linear-quadratic, zero-sum difference game with dynamic information structure, we show that (i) there exist nonlinear saddle-point strategies which require the same existence conditions as the well-known linear, closed-loop, no-memory solution and (ii) there exist both linear and nonlinear saddle-point strategies which require more stringent conditions than the unique open-loop solution. We then discuss the implication of this result with respect to the existence of saddle points in zero-sum differential games for different information patterns.     

On linear stochastic differential games with average cost criterions

In this paper, we consider scalar linear stochastic differential games with average cost criterions. We solve the dynamic programming equations for these games and give the synthesis of saddle-point and Nash equilibrium solutions.The authors wish to thank A. Ichikawa for providing the initial impetus and helpful advice.     

Infinite-Horizon Stochastic Differential Games with Branching Payoffs

In this paper, we consider infinite-horizon stochastic differential games with an autonomous structure and steady branching payoffs. While the introduction of additional stochastic elements via branching payoffs offers a fruitful alternative to modeling game situations under uncertainty, the solution to such a problem is not known. A theorem on the characterization of a Nash equilibrium solution for this kind of games is presented. An application in renewable resource extraction is provided to illustrate the solution mechanism.     

On saddle-point optimality in differential games

A family of two-person, zero-sum differential games in which the admissible strategies are Borel measurable is defined, and two types of saddle-point conditions are introduced as optimality criteria. In one, saddle-point candidates are compared at each point of the state space with all playable pairs at that point; and, in the other, they are compared only with strategy pairs playable on the entire state space. As a theorem, these two types of optimality are shown to be equivalent for the defined family of games. Also, it is shown that a certain closure property is sufficient for this equivalence. A game having admissible strategies everywhere constant, in which the two types of saddle-point candidates are not equivalent, is discussed.This paper is based on research supported by ONR.     

Nash and Stackelberg Differential Games

A large class of stochastic differential games for several players is considered in this paper.The class includes Nash differential games as well as Stackelberg differential games.A mix is possible.The...     

Subgame Consistent Solutions of a Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game with Nontransferable Payoffs

Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal. Recently, mechanisms for the derivation of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic cooperative differential games with transferable payoffs have been found. In this paper, subgame consistent solutions are derived for a class of cooperative stochastic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. The previously intractable subgame consistent solution for games with nontransferable payoffs is rendered tractable.This research was supported by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong, Grant HKBU2056/99H and by Hong Kong Baptist University, Grant FRG/02-03/II16.Communicated by G. Leitmann     

Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games

The paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic differential games incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in stochastic differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. Important cases abound in regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental control. An illustration in cooperative resource extraction is presented.     

Maximum Principle for Stochastic Differential Games with Partial Information

In this paper, we first deal with the problem of optimal control for zero-sum stochastic differential games. We give a necessary and sufficient maximum principle for that problem with partial information. Then, we use the result to solve a problem in finance. Finally, we extend our approach to general stochastic games (nonzero-sum), and obtain an equilibrium point of such game.     

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solutions in Stochastic Differential Games

Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that: (i) the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and to any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal; (ii) all players do not have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. In this paper, we develop a mechanism for the derivation of the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic differential games with transferable payoffs. The payoff distribution procedure of the subgame consistent solution can be identified analytically under different optimality principles. Demonstration of the use of the technique for specific optimality principles is shown with an explicitly solvable game. For the first time, analytically tractable solutions of cooperative stochastic differential games with subgame consistency are derived.     

Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for linear-convex stochastic differential games

The uniqueness of Nash equilibria is shown for a class of stochastic differential games where the dynamic constraints are linear in the control variables. The result is applied to an oligopoly.This paper benefitted from comments by two anonymous referees and by L. Blume and C. Simon.     

A near-optimal closed-loop solution method for nonsingular zero-sum differential games

This paper presents a method for generating nearoptimal closed-loop solutions to zero-sum perfect information differential games with and without the final time explicitly specified, and with and without control constraints. This near-optimal closed-loop solution is generated by periodically updating the solution to the two-point boundary-value problem obtained by the application of the necessary conditions for a saddle-point solution. The resulting updated open-loop control is then used between updating intervals. Three examples are presented to illustrate the application of this method.     

On the existence of the stabilizing solution of generalized Riccati equations arising in zero-sum stochastic difference games: the time-varying case

In this paper, a large class of time-varying Riccati equations arising in stochastic dynamic games is considered. The problem of the existence and uniqueness of some globally defined solution, namely the bounded and stabilizing solution, is investigated. As an application of the obtained existence results, we address in a second step the problem of infinite-horizon zero-sum two players linear quadratic (LQ) dynamic game for a stochastic discrete-time dynamical system subject to both random switching of its coefficients and multiplicative noise. We show that in the solution of such an optimal control problem, a crucial role is played by the unique bounded and stabilizing solution of the considered class of generalized Riccati equations.     

Zero-sum games with incompletely defined payoff

It is shown that a saddle-point solution exists in a two-person, zero-sum game whose payoff is given by a matrix which is not completely defined. On the other hand, we show that such games do not always have a value, so that a saddle-point solution is not necessarily an optimal solution.This work was supported by the Centre d'Etudes Atomiques, Saclay, France.     

Differential games without pure strategy saddle-point solutions

In some two-player, zero-sum differential games, pure strategy saddle-point solutions do not exist. For such games, the concept of a minmax strategy is examined, and sufficient conditions for a control to be a minmax control are presented. Both the open-loop and the closed-loop cases are considered.The research was partially supported by ONR under Contract No. N00014-69-A-0200-12. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eleventh Annual Allerton Conference on Circuit and System Theory, Monticello, Illinois, 1973.The author wishes to acknowledge his many valuable discussions of this problem with Professor G. Leitmann and also to thank one of the reviewers for his suggestions for simplifying the proof of Theorem 2.1.     

多目标的随机结盟对策的ZS-值

本文研究的是多目标随机结盟对策的问题，是将单目标的随机结盟对策的ZS-值拓展到多目标的随机结盟对策上，同时考虑了局中人对不同目标的偏好程度，从而，给出了多目标随机结盟对策的ZS-值的定义，并讨论了该值的性质及定理。     

Stochastic Games for N Players

The objective of this paper is to present a useful application of the theory of regularity of systems of nonlinear partial differential equations to the solution of stochastic differential games with N players. It is particularly interesting to notice that the structure of games fits perfectly with what is requested to prove the regularity property which is needed.     

均值-方差准则下具有负债的随机微分博弈

研究了均值-方差准则下,具有负债的随机微分博弈.研究目标是:在终值财富的均值等于k的限制下,在市场出现最坏的情况下找到最优的投资策略使终值财富的方差最小.即:基于均值-方差随机微分博弈的投资组合选择问题.使用线性-二次控制的理论解决了该问题,获得了最优的投资策略、最优市场策略和有效边界的显示解.并通过对所得结果进行进一步分析,在经济上给出了进一步的解释.通过本文的研究,可以指导金融公司在面临负债和金融市场情况恶劣时,选择恰当的投资策略使自身获得一定的财富而面临的风险最小.     

On the existence of good stationary strategies for nonleavable stochastic games

This paper discusses the problem regarding the existence of optimal or nearly optimal stationary strategies for a player engaged in a nonleavable stochastic game. It is known that, for these games, player I need not have an -optimal stationary strategy even when the state space of the game is finite. On the contrary, we show that uniformly -optimal stationary strategies are available to player II for nonleavable stochastic games with finite state space. Our methods will also yield sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal and -optimal stationary strategies for player II for games with countably infinite state space. With the purpose of introducing and explaining the main results of the paper, special consideration is given to a particular class of nonleavable games whose utility is equal to the indicator of a subset of the state space of the game.