Contextualism,art, and rigidity: Levinson,Currie and Davies

The topic of this paper is the role played by context in art. In this regard I examine three theories linked to the names of J. Levinson, G. Currie and D. Davies. Levinson’s arguments undermine the structural theory. He finds it objectionable because it makes the individuation of artworks independent of their histories. Secondly, such a consequence is unacceptable because it fails to recognise that works are created rather than discovered. But, if certain general features of provenance are always work-constitutive, as it seems that Levinson is willing to claim, these features must always be essential properties of works. On the other hand, consideration of our modal practice suggests that whether a given general feature of provenance is essential or non-essential depends upon the particular work in question or is “work relative”. D. Davies builds his performance theory on the basis of the critical evaluation of Currie’s action-type hypotheses (ATH). Performances, says Davies, are not to be identified with “basic actions” to which their times belong essentially, but with “doings” that permit of the sorts of variation in modal properties required by the work-relativity of modality. He is also a fierce critic of the contextualist account. Contextualism is in his view unable to reflect the fact that aspects of provenance bear upon our modal judgements with variable force.In the second part of the paper I consider Davies’s “modality principle”. Davies is inclined to defend the claim that labels used for designation of works are rigid designators. Such a view offers a ground for discussion about the historicity of art. What has been meant when people claim that art is an historical concept? I argue that any historical theory implies a two-dimensional notion of “art”. At the end of the paper I suggest that Davies should embrace the theory of contingent identity and not the colocationist view about the relationship that exists between a particular artwork and its physical bearer.     

Two comments and a problem for David Davies’ performance theory

This paper considers the view, recently put forward by David Davies in Art and Performance, that works of art should be identified with the generative performances that result in the object, rather than with the object. It attempts to disarm two of Davies arguments by, first, providing a criterion by which the contextualist can accommodate all and only the relevant generative properties as properties of the work, and, second, providing an alternative explanation for his modal intuitions. Finally, it draws attention to Davies’ difficulties in providing a clear criterion for the identity of the work of art.     

On Davies’ argument from relational properties

In Art as Performance, David Davies identifies certain properties relevant to artistic appreciation of artworks that, he suggests, are naturally construed as belonging to the artist’s creative performance rather than to any product of that performance (the “work-product”). He further argues, against an anticipated opponent, that such properties cannot be excluded as irrelevant to artistic appreciation in any principled way. I argue that the cited properties can be intelligibly construed as properties of the associated work-product, whether or not they are relevant to artistic appreciation; but that some are not relevant to artistic appreciation. In doing so, I offer a principle determining when a property of an artwork is relevant to artistic appreciation. I conclude that, on its own, Davies’s argument offers no good grounds to abandon our practice of thinking of the artwork as the product of an artist’s activity, rather than the activity itself.     

‘Seeing is believing’ and ‘believing is seeing’

The principal concern of my paper is a distinction between two ways of appreciating works of art, characterised here in terms of the phrases ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘believing is seeing’. I examine this distinction in the light of an epistemological requirement at times at least grounded in what David Davies, in his Art as Performance, refers to as the ‘common sense theory of art appreciation’ in order to assess exactly what aspect of the philosophical approach generally known as aesthetic empiricism his account commits him to reject. I argue that the ‘experiential requirement’, if only conceived in a slightly broader way than is usual, might very well have an important role to play not only in the appropriate appreciation of works that do not demonstrate the need for such a requirement (primarily works of late modern and conceptual art), but also in the ontological account Davies himself favours.     

A Priori knowledge contextualised and Benacerraf’s dilemma

In this article, I discuss Hawthorne’s contextualist solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma. He wants to find a satisfactory epistemology to go with realist ontology, namely with causally inaccessible mathematical and modal entities. I claim that he is unsuccessful. The contextualist theories of knowledge attributions were primarily developed as a response to the skeptical argument based on the deductive closure principle. Hawthorne uses the same strategy in his attempt to solve the epistemologist puzzle facing the proponents of mathematical and modal realism, but this problem is of a different nature than the skeptical one. The contextualist theory of knowledge attributions cannot help us with the question about the nature of mathematical and modal reality and how they can be known. I further argue that Hawthorne’s account does not say anything about a priori status of mathematical and modal knowledge. Later, Hawthorne adds to his account an implausible claim that in some contexts a gettierized belief counts as knowledge.     

Functionalism about Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction

Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of its realization bases. This consequence undermines the alethic functionalists’ non-deflationary ambitions. A plausible response to Kim’s argument fails to carry over to alethic functionalism on account of significant differences between alethic functionalism and psychological functionalism. Lynch’s revised view in his book Truth as One and Many (2009) fails to answer our challenge. The upshot is that, while mental functionalism may survive Kim’s argument, it mortally wounds functionalism about truth.     

Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility?

Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility faces the obvious difficulty that not all universals are compatible. In this paper I develop three objections against Armstrong’s attempt to account for property incompatibilities. First, Armstrong’s account cannot handle incompatibilities holding among properties that are either simple, or that are complex but stand to one another in the relation of overlap rather than in the part/ whole relation. Secondly, at the heart of Armstrong’s account lies a notion of structural universals which, building on an objection by David Lewis, is shown to be incoherent. I consider and reject two alternative ways of construing the composition of structural universals in an attempt to meet Lewis’ objection. An important consequence of this is that all putative structural properties are in fact simple. Finally, I argue that the quasi-mereological account presupposes modality in a way that undermines the reductionist aim of the combinatorialist theory of which it is a central part. I conclude that Armstrong’ quasi-mereological account of property incompatibility fails. Without that account, however, Armstrong’s combinatorial theory either fails to get off the ground, or else must give up its goal of reducing the notion of possibility to something non-modal.     

Dancy Cartwright: Particularism in the philosophy of science

This paper aims to explore the space of possible particularistic approaches to Philosophy of Science by examining the differences and similarities between Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism—as expressed in both his earlier writings (e.g., Moral Reasons, 1993), and, more explicitly defended in his book Ethics without Principles (2004)—and Nancy Cartwright’s particularism in the philosophy of science, as defended in her early collection of essays, How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), and her later book, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (1999). I shall argue that Dancy’s particularism is more radical, but also more plausible, than Cartwright’s, concluding that we have good reason to embrace a scientific particularism that is far closer to Dancy’s ethical particularism than any view defended by Nancy Cartwright, or any other philosopher from the ‘Stanford school’ of scientific theory.     

The relation between intuitionistic and classical modal logics

Intuitionistic propositional logicInt and its extensions, known as intermediate or superintuitionistic logics, in many respects can be regarded as just fragments of classical modal logics containingS4. The main aim of this paper is to construct a similar correspondence between intermediate logics augmented with modal operators—we call them intuitionistic modal logics—and classical polymodal logics We study the class of intuitionistic polymodal logics in which modal operators satisfy only the congruence rules and so may be treated as various sorts of □ and ◇. Supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Translated fromAlgebra i Logika, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 121–155, March–April, 1997.     

Unrestricted Quantification and Reality: Reply to Kim

In my book, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise, I use the novel idea of modal tense to respond to a number of arguments against modal realism. Peter van Inwagen’s million-carat-diamond objection is one of them. It targets the version of modal realism by David Lewis and exploits the fact that Lewis accepts absolutely unrestricted quantification. The crux of my response is to use modal tense to neutralize absolutely unrestricted quantification. Seahwa Kim says that even when equipped with modal tense, I am unsuccessful, given my view of reality and the proper use of modal tense in speaking of reality. I counter her attempt at resurrecting van Inwagen’s objection and clarify how we should use modal tense and how we should talk about reality.     

Euler’s constant, q-logarithms, and formulas of Ramanujan and Gosper

The aim of the paper is to relate computational and arithmetic questions about Euler’s constant γ with properties of the values of the q-logarithm function, with natural choice of~q. By these means, we generalize a classical formula for γ due to Ramanujan, together with Vacca’s and Gosper’s series for γ, as well as deduce irrationality criteria and tests and new asymptotic formulas for computing Euler’s constant. The main tools are Euler-type integrals and hypergeometric series. 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification Primary—11Y60; Secondary—11J72, 33C20, 33D15 The work of the second author is supported by an Alexander von Humboldt research fellowship Dedication: To Leonhard Euler on his 300th birthday.     

Roof duality,complementation and persistency in quadratic 0–1 optimization

The paper is concerned with the ‘primal’ problem of maximizing a given quadratic pseudo-boolean function. Four equivalent problems are discussed—the primal, the ‘complementation’, the ‘discrete Rhys LP’ and the ‘weighted stability problem of a SAM graph’. Each of them has a relaxation—the ‘roof dual’, the ‘quadratic complementation,’ the ‘continuous Rhys LP’ and the ‘fractional weighted stability problem of a SAM graph’. The main result is that the four gaps associated with the four relaxations are equal. Furthermore, a solution to any of these problems leads at once to solutions of the other three equivalent ones. The four relaxations can be solved in polynomial time by transforming them to a bipartite maximum flow problem. The optimal solutions of the ‘roof-dual’ define ‘best’ linear majorantsp(x) off, having the following persistency property: if theith coefficient inp is positive (negative) thenx _i=1 (0) in every optimum of the primal problem. Several characterizations are given for the case where these persistency results cannot be used to fix any variable of the primal. On the other hand, a class of gap-free functions (properly including the supermodular ones) is exhibited.     

A viability approach to the inverse set-valued map theorem

The purpose of this paper is to characterize by means of viability tools the pseudo-lipschitzianity property of a set-valued map F in a neighborhood of a point of its graph in terms of derivatives of this set-valued map F in a neighborhood of a point of its graph, instead of using the transposes of the derivatives. On the way, we relate these properties to the calmness index of a set-valued map, an extensions of Clarke’s calmness of a function, as well as Doyen’s Lipschitz kernel of a set-valued map, which is the largest Lipschitz submap.     

On the covering of syntax-directed translations for context-free grammars

A necessary and sufficient set of conditions is obtained that relates any two context-free grammarsG ₁ andG ₂ with the property that wheneverG ₂ left—or right—coversG ₁, the syntax-directed translations (SDT’s) with underlying grammarG ₁ is a subset of those with underlying grammarG ₂. Also the case thatG ₂ left—or right—coversG ₁ but the SDT’s with underlying grammarG ₁ is not a subset of the SDT’s with underlying grammarG ₂ is considered; in this case an algorithm is described to obtain the syntax-directed translation schema (SDTS) with underlying grammarG ₂ to the given SDTS with underlying grammarG ₁, if it exists.     

Are wooden tables necessarily wooden?

This paper defendsintensional essentialism: a property (intensional entity) is not essential relative to an individual (extensional entity), but relative to other properties (or intensional entities). Consequently, an individual can have a property only accidentally, but in virtue of having that property the individual has of necessity other properties. Intensional essentialism is opposed to various aspects of the Kripkean notion of metaphysical modality, eg, varying domains, existence as a property of individuals, and its category of properties which are both empirical and essential with respect to particular individuals and natural kinds. The key notion of intensional essentialism isrequisite. A requisite is explicated as a relation-in-extension between two intensions (functions from possible worlds and moments of time)X, Y such that wherever and wheneverX is instantiatedY is also instantiated. We predict three readings of the sentence. “Every wooden table is necessarily wooden”, one involving modalityde re and the other two modalityde dicto. The first reading claims that no individual which is a wooden table is necessarily wooden. The claim is backed up by bare particular anti-essentialism. The two other interpretations claim that it is necessary that whatever is a wooden table is wooden. However, as we try to show, one is logically far more perspicuous thanks to the concept of requisite and thus preferable to more standardde dicto formalizations.     

Infinite highly connected planar graphs of large girth

We construct infinite planar graphs of arbitrarily large connectivity and girth, and study their separation properties. These graphs have no thick end but continuum many thin ones. Every finite cycle separates them, but they corroborate Diestel’s conjecture that everyk-connected locally finite graph contains a possibly infinite cycle — see [3] — whose deletion leaves it (k — 3)-connected.     

Decidability of the interpolation problem and of related properties in tabular logics

Propositional modal and positive logics are considered as well as extensions of Johansson’s minimal logic. It is proved that basic versions of the interpolation property and of the Beth definability property, and also the Hallden property, are decidable on the class of tabular logics, i.e., logics given by finitely many finite algebras. Algorithms are described for constructing counterexamples to each of the properties mentioned in handling cases where the logic under consideration does not possess the required property.     

Essential Spectral Inclusions for Operators on Banach Spaces

This paper centers on local spectral conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the equality of the essential spectra of two bounded linear operators on complex Banach spaces that are intertwined by a pair of bounded linear mappings. In particular, if the operators T and S are intertwined by a pair of injective operators, then S is Fredholm provided that T is Fredholm and S has property (δ) in a neighborhood of 0. In this case, ind(T) ≤ ind(S), and equality holds precisely when the eigenvalues of the adjoint T* do not cluster at 0. By duality, we obtain refinements of results due to Putinar, Takahashi, and Yang concerning operators with Bishop’s property (β) intertwined by pairs of operators with dense range. Moreover, we establish an extension of a result due to Eschmeier that, under appropriate assumptions regarding the single-valued extension property, leads to necessary and sufficient conditions for quasi-similar operators to have equal essential spectra. In particular it turns out that the single-valued extension property plays an essential role in the preservation of the index in this context.      

Upper bounds for parent-identifying set systems

We derive new upper bounds on the size set families having the c-identifiable parent property (c-IPP) and the c-traceability property (c-TA) and compare these bounds to similar results on parent-identifying codes. An earlier version of this paper appeared in [4]. Sandia National Laboratories—This is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.     

Logical Extensions of Aristotle’s Square

We start from the geometrical-logical extension of Aristotle’s square in [6,15] and [14], and study them from both syntactic and semantic points of view. Recall that Aristotle’s square under its modal form has the following four vertices: A is □α, E is , I is and O is , where α is a logical formula and □ is a modality which can be defined axiomatically within a particular logic known as S5 (classical or intuitionistic, depending on whether is involutive or not) modal logic. [3] has proposed extensions which can be interpreted respectively within paraconsistent and paracomplete logical frameworks. [15] has shown that these extensions are subfigures of a tetraicosahedron whose vertices are actually obtained by closure of by the logical operations , under the assumption of classical S5 modal logic. We pursue these researches on the geometrical-logical extensions of Aristotle’s square: first we list all modal squares of opposition. We show that if the vertices of that geometrical figure are logical formulae and if the sub-alternation edges are interpreted as logical implication relations, then the underlying logic is none other than classical logic. Then we consider a higher-order extension introduced by [14], and we show that the same tetraicosahedron plays a key role when additional modal operators are introduced. Finally we discuss the relation between the logic underlying these extensions and the resulting geometrical-logical figures.