碳税机制下考虑不同低碳策略的动态博弈模型及复杂性研究

考虑碳排放税,建立双寡头制造商分别实施废品回收和绿色低碳广告投入策略的动态博弈模型。通过系统稳定域,分岔图,功率谱等分析了博弈模型纳什均衡解处的稳定性及参数对系统稳定域的影响,同时对系统的复杂性特征进行了研究。结果表明,消费者回收价格敏感性增加会使整个系统稳定域缩小,而绿色低碳广告投入水平增加只会使实施该策略的企业自身稳定域扩大;当制造商价格调整速度过快时,系统会进入混沌状态;混沌状态下,对比实施广告策略的制造商,实施废品回收策略的制造商价格调整行为对市场造成的震荡更大。最后使用反馈控制策略对系统混沌状态进行了有效的控制,研究结果对制造商低碳策略选择及价格决策有着较好的借鉴意义。     

考虑横向和纵向公平关切的双渠道农产品供应链决策分析

针对"农超对接"和电商渠道并存的双渠道农产品供应链,考虑农业合作社的公平关切行为,构建农业合作社间的Bertrand博弈模型以及农业合作与超市间的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比研究农业合作社的横向公平关切和纵向公平关切对供应链均衡策略的影响.研究表明:农业合作社的横向公平关切和纵向公平关切对直销价格、批发价格以及零售价格的影响不尽相同;零售商的横向公平关切和纵向公平关切对农业合作社的效用和超市的利润并不总是起到积极作用.     

零售商公平关切下双渠道闭环供应链的协调

在双渠道闭环供应链中考虑零售商具有公平关切行为倾向,针对集中、分散两种决策情形分别建立双渠道闭环供应链定价模型,研究和对比了两种不同决策情形对直销价格、零售价格、回收价格及供应链系统利润的影响.研究表明,分散决策情形的系统利润要低于集中决策情形的系统利润;制造商提供一个由批发价格、直销价格和回收转移价格组成的协调契约可以协调双渠道闭环供应链,但该契约只对零售商有利,对制造商不利,为此,通过增加一个利润共享补充协议或两部定价补充协议可以有效协调双渠道闭环供应链,实现制造商和零售商的双赢;而零售商公平关切行为的存在将增强零售商参与协调时的议价能力,进一步影响零售商利润分享比例或零售商支付给制造商固定费用的变化范围.     

公平关切下考虑成本分担的闭环供应链回收与定价决策

文章针对同时进行新产品和再制造产品的生产活动的制造商和同时进行销售和回收活动的零售商组成的闭环供应链系统,在考虑闭环供应链中公平关切行为和成本分担的情形下分析零售商公平关切、制造商的成本分担对供应链系统决策的影响.研究表明:当零售商公平中性时,制造商的成本分担与零售商的回收率正相关,且制造商的成本分担能够提高回收率、降低制造商向零售商支付回收产品的单位转让价格;当制造商不参与回收成本分担时,零售商的公平关切程度与零售商的利润正相关,与回收率、制造商的利润均为负相关,且并不会影响供应链系统的总利润;当公平关切行为和成本分担契约同时存在时,成本分担契约对供应链决策的影响远小于公平关切行为对供应链决策的影响.最后,通过算例分析验证了以上结论.     

专业零售商与厂家直售商的多渠道供应价格博弈的混沌动力学研究

在零售市场,专业零售商与厂家直售商的价格竞争日益突起,再次背景下构建了专业零售商和厂家直售商组成的多渠道供应链价格博弈模型。利用管理学、经济学以及混沌动力学有关理论,对多渠道供应链中各渠道间长期价格博弈的动态演化过程进行理论验证和数据仿真,研究了专业零售商和厂家直售商的价格决策变量的变化给市场带来的影响。研究表明,双方价格决策变量的不断增加,市场从稳定进入混沌无序状态。采用调整参数可以对混沌进行有效的控制,研究结果具有较好的理论和实际应用价值。     

网络外部性和公平关切下三级ESC的广告、服务与定价决策

考虑网络外部性和公平关切的影响,研究三级ESC中的广告、服务与定价决策.首先,构建了两种决策模型,分别是无公平关切行为的分散决策模型和零售商具有双向公平关切行为的分散决策模型,探讨了网络外部性和公平关切行为对三级ESC决策的影响;然后采用数值分析,对每种模型的结论进行验证.研究结果表明:1)在零售商没有公平关切行为的分散决策下,网络外部性对三级ESC系统的决策具有积极作用.2)在零售商具有双向公平关切行为的分散决策下,产品的批发价格以及制造商的利润均是关于网络外部性强度的减函数.3)零售商的公平关切行为造成了三级ESC系统的效率损失,但不会改变电商平台的广告资金投入的水平.     

公平关切视角下的生鲜农产品订货策略与供应链协调

针对零售商的公平关切以及生鲜农产品的易变质特性,在以Nash谈判解作为零售商公平参照点的基础上,分析了零售商的公平关切对订货策略以及协调契约的影响,结果表明:零售商的公平关切会使其缩短订货周期、降低订货量;随着零售商公平关切度的增大,其公平关切效用先增大后减小,并且零售商会逐渐由供应商保鲜策略转变为不保鲜策略,而供应商的利润会减小;保鲜成本分担契约能够有效的协调零售商公平关切下的生鲜农产品供应链,但零售商的公平关切会降低协调契约的有效性.     

基于异质预期的量子伯川德博弈复杂动力机制分析

针对伯川德双寡头垄断博弈经济系统中出现的混沌现象,利用量子博弈论,构建了基于有限理性与天真预期行为的量子伯川德动态博弈模型,分析了量子纠缠度对纳什均衡点稳定性及复杂动力行为的影响。结果表明:量子纠缠度能增强该系统的稳定性,企业价格调整速度达到某一程度时会导致该系统的复杂混沌特性,纠缠度可以有效控制混沌状态。最后利用数值模拟从分岔、最大李雅普诺夫指数、奇怪吸引子、初始条件敏感性及分数维数方面验证了理论准确性。     

考虑零售商公平关切的期权合约研究

当供应链中的企业都是完全理性时,一个合理设计的期权合约可使得供应链达到协调。本文考虑一个具有公平关切的零售商的供应链系统,分析期权合约下零售商的订货决策,以及使供应链达到协调的条件。研究发现,零售商的公平关切偏好对期权合约的协调作用有着显著的影响:尽管与完全理性的供应链系统相比,可协调供应链的期权合约的定价规则没有变化,但是随着零售商公平关切程度的提高,供应商可能获得的最大利润减小,协调性期权合约的可选择范围不断缩小,直至消失.算例分析进一步验证了以上结论,并说明了即使存在协调性期权合约,零售商可能会因为对不公平的厌恶而极大降低自身效用,出现负的效用值,导致该合约被拒绝。     

基于竞合博弈节能补贴对双渠道低碳供应链决策影响分析

制造商为主导的双渠道低碳供应链竞合博弈中,在无节能家电补贴下不考虑制造商公平关切行为、节能家电补贴下不考虑制造商公平关切行为、节能家电补贴下考虑制造商公平关切行为三种情形下,分别对比分析能效比、零售商销售努力程度、消费渠道偏好以及制造商公平关切程度对制造商、零售商决策及收益的影响.研究发现:节能家电补贴政策会放大渠道间...     

Competition analysis of a triopoly game with bounded rationality

A dynamic Cournot game characterized by three boundedly rational players is modeled by three nonlinear difference equations. The stability of the equilibria of the discrete dynamical system is analyzed. As some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of Nash equilibrium is lost and a complex chaotic behavior occurs. Numerical simulation results show that complex dynamics, such as, bifurcations and chaos are displayed when the value of speed of adjustment is high. The global complexity analysis can help players to take some measures and avoid the collapse of the output dynamic competition game.     

Complexity of sales effort and carbon emission reduction effort in a two-parallel household appliance supply chain model

This paper studies the complexity of sales effort and carbon emission reduction effort in a Bertrand household appliance supply chain system. A two-parallel model consisting of a traditional supply chain without any carbon emission reduction effort and a low-carbon supply chain with carbon emission reduction effort is established. The chain to chain competition is analyzed in three scenarios, one of which is a horizontal Nash game, and the others are the traditional supply chain Stackelberg game and the low-carbon supply chain Stackelberg game. The optimal solutions of the horizontal Nash game and the Stackelberg game are obtained and three models’ dynamic evolutions based on the bounded rationality are investigated. A dynamic Stackelberg game model with respect to five variables is proposed and investigated via the stable region, the bifurcation, and the maximum Lyapunov exponent. The profits of the two-parallel household appliance supply chains are compared in three dynamic game structures. An interesting phenomenon that the system will enter a six-cycle state after the two-cycle state and fall into chaos directly is discovered in the traditional supply chain Stackelberg game. Our results suggest that the adjustments of price would affect the stability and profits much more than the sales effort and carbon emission reduction effort in all three game structures. Every supply chain should take the suitable adjustment speeds for the price and sales effort to keep the system in the stable state. Each adjustment should not exceed the domain of attraction.     

基于公平关切的双渠道低碳供应链博弈分析

以制造商为主导的双渠道低碳供应链中,在制造商、零售商为公平中性、零售商具有公平关切以及制造商具有公平关切3种情形下,分别对比分析单位低碳产品碳减排量、零售商销售努力程度、公平关切程度对制造商、零售商决策及效用的影响.研究发现:在制造商主导的供应链中,无论哪一方具有公平关切,也不论公平关切程度大小,制造商大多是获利方;公...     

Study on a 3-dimensional game model with delayed bounded rationality

A nonlinear dynamic triopoly game model is studied based on the theory of nonlinear dynamics and previous researches in this paper. A lagged structure is introduced to the model to study stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment process when players price their products with delayed bounded rationality. Numerical simulations are provided to demonstrate the complexity of system evolvement and influence of the strategy of delayed bounded rationality on system stability. We find that besides the lagged structure, suitable delayed parameters are also important factors to eliminate chaos or expand the stable region of the system, and various players’ adjustment parameters have different effect on stability of the system.     

Application of duopoly multi-periodical game with bounded rationality in power supply market based on information asymmetry

In the power market, each entity is not completely rational when generate strategy, and the market information held by each entity is not exactly the same. In this paper, duopoly power providers with different selling adjustment structures are simplified from the actual grid background, where one provider can sell part of its power to another at contract price to store the power. Each provider is trying to maximize its profit by adjusting its power selling strategy. The process of evolutionary game with multi-periods bounded rational is established. One provider adjusts its selling strategy through the multi-periods market price and another through its multi-periods marginal profit. The quantity of power sold by each provider will tend to Nash equilibrium and how information asymmetry affects the stability of Nash equilibrium is analyzed through comparing dynamic power selling with and without information asymmetry. Information asymmetry has a great impact on one provider but not another. The numerical simulations also show that the information asymmetry will increase the stability region of the system. Different adjustment suggestions are proposed for different providers when information asymmetry occurs.     

考虑公平偏好的供应链最优信用期和定价策略研究

论文将公平偏好引入商业信用供应链的运作中,研究公平偏好如何影响供应链的商业信用和定价策略。论文在三种情况下,即仅供应商关注公平,仅零售商关注公平和双方均关注公平,运用Stackelberg博弈分析了供应商的最优商业信用期及零售商的最优零售价格。研究发现,当零售商具有公平偏好时,零售价格与其公平偏好程度无关;零售商的公平偏好程度越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越长。当仅供应商具有公平偏好时,供应商的公平偏好程度越大,零售商的零售价格越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越短;当双方都具有公平偏好时,零售商的零售价格关于双方偏好均为增函数;供应商的商业信用期限为自身偏好系数的增函数,为零售商偏好系数的减函数。供应链成员的效用为自身偏好系数的增函数,对方偏好系数的减函数;双方具有公平偏好时,供应链利润小于无公平偏好时的供应链利润。     

质押贷款下的贷款价值比的研究

当零售商以仓单质押的模式向银行申请贷款时,如果零售商面临着报童问题,那么零售商的生产经营决策,就会影响到质押物的价格,从而影响到银行的利润.从企业-银行不合作博弈的角度出发,考虑质押物的处理价不高于储存费用的情况下,银行的贷款价值比的确定问题.研究发现,当银行付予物流企业的监管费用高于某一数值时,银行的贷款行为将使其利润为负.