Opportunistic timing and manipulation in Australian Federal Elections

In many parliamentary systems, election timing is an important decision made by governments in order to maximize their expected remaining life in power. Governments can also introduce policy or economic actions to enhance their popular standing and thus their chance of being re-elected. On the other hand, an oppositions’ natural objective is to gain power, and they will also apply controls through their own policies to reduce the governments’ chance of being re-elected. In this paper we employ a dynamic programming approach to determine the optimal timing for governments and oppositions to best utilize their limited resources. At each decision branch, the optimal control is interpreted as a Nash–Cournot equilibrium of a zero-sum political game which, in certain states, admits mixed strategy solutions. We perform a case study on the Australian Federal Election for House of Representatives.     

A review of O.R. practice in Spain

Summary First, a brief history of the development of Operations Research practice in Spain is presented. Secondly, and this forms the bulk of the paper, the most relevant OR applications in Spain, reported in the specialized literature, are commented in some detail. We have adopted the application-oriented classification criteria of IAOR, which allows us to distinguish those subjects that have been tackled more frequently. Finally the fluctuating role played by the university OR groups in providing advice to firms and public and private institutions is considered.     

Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer’s problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer’s objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We report the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer’s problem. We find that simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers are interim optimal.     

WILDLIFE RESERVES,POPULATIONS, AND HUNTING OUTCOME WITH SMART WILDLIFE

We consider a hunting area and a wildlife reserve and answer the question: How does clever migration decision affect the social optimal and the private optimal hunting levels and population stocks? We analyze this in a model allowing for two‐way migration between hunting and reserve areas, where the populations’ migration decisions depend on both hunting pressure and relative population densities. In the social optimum a pure stress effect on the behavior of smart wildlife exists. This implies that the population level in the wildlife reserve tends to increase and the population level in the hunting area and hunting levels tend to decrease. On the other hand, the effect on stock tends to reduce the population in the wildlife reserve and increase the population in the hunting area and thereby also increase hunting. In the case of the private optimum, open‐access is assumed and we find that the same qualitative results arise when comparing a situation with and without stress effects, but of course at a higher level of hunting. We also show that when net social benefits of hunting dominate the net social benefits of populations, wildlife reserves are optimally placed in areas of low carrying capacity and vice versa.     

Introducing competition in healthcare services: The role of private care and increased patient mobility

We study the operational implications from competition in the provision of healthcare services, in the context of national public healthcare systems in Europe. Specifically, we study the potential impact of two alternative ways through which policy makers have introduced such competition: (i) via the introduction of private hospitals to operate alongside public hospitals and (ii) via the introduction of increased patient choice to grant European patients the freedom to choose the country they receive treatment at. We use a game-theoretic framework with a queueing component to capture the interactions among the patients, the hospitals and the healthcare funders. Specifically, we analyze two different sequential games and obtain closed form expressions for the patients’ waiting time and the funders’ reimbursement cost in equilibrium. We show that the presence of a private provider can be beneficial to the public system: the patients’ waiting time will decrease and the funders’ cost can decrease under certain conditions. Also, we show that the cross-border healthcare policy, which increases patient mobility, can also be beneficial to the public systems: when welfare requirements across countries are sufficiently close, all funders can reduce their costs without increasing the patients’ waiting time. Our analysis implies that in border regions, where the cost of crossing the border is low, “outsourcing” the high-cost country’s elective care services to the low-cost country is a viable strategy from which both countries’ systems can benefit.     

Designing coalition-based fair and stable pricing mechanisms under private information on consumers’ reservation prices

We model the relation between an aggregator and consumers joining a coalition to reduce the risk resulting from the unpredictability of their base load demand, as a Stackelberg game formulated as a mathematical bilevel program with private information on the consumers’ reservation prices. At the upper-level of the Stackelberg game, the aggregator optimizes his daily price profile so as to reach a net targeted profit which is the maximum value guaranteeing that no consumer will leave the coalition - to contract with a conventional retailer considered here as a fixed alternative - while meeting fairness criterion imposed by the cost-sharing mechanism. At the lower-level, the consumers are asked to provide in day ahead an estimate of their base load hourly demand profile and to schedule their shiftable loads depending on the price signal sent by the aggregator. We provide algorithms that determine the unique price profile and consumer shiftable load schedules as functions of the reservation price estimates. The Stackelberg game between the aggregator and the consumers being repeated for a period of time, the aggregator has the possibility to update his estimates of the reservation prices relying on a feedback function which depends on the percentage of activated loads. A randomized algorithm for consumers’ reservation price learning based on regret minimization is provided. For four cost-sharing mechanisms such as uniform allocation, stand-alone cost, Shapley value, separable and non-separable costs, we determine the closed form of the aggregator’s optimal net targeted profit guaranteeing the stability of the coalition. We also determine conditions guaranteeing the core non-emptiness and prove that for a profit-maximizing aggregator, the stand-alone cost is always preferable to the Shapley value, which coincides with the uniform allocation. Furthermore, the optimal size of the coalition - in terms of the aggregator’s profit - can be determined analytically when the Shapley value is implemented as cost-sharing mechanism. The results are illustrated on a case study where we show that there exists an optimal net targeted profit below which the consumers energy bill is lower when joining the aggregator than with the conventional retailer. Coalition dynamics is also analyzed numerically depending on the consumer inertia in their energy supplier choice process, for each cost-sharing mechanism.     

A MODEL OF TROPICAL MARINE RESERVE‐FISHERY LINKAGES

ABSTRACT. The excessive and unsustainable exploitation of our marine resources has led to the promotion of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool. Marine reserves, areas in which fishing is restricted or prohibited, can offer opportunities for the recovery of exploited stock and fishery enhancement. In this paper we examine the contribution of fully protected tropical marine reserves to fishery enhancement by modeling marine reserve‐fishery linkages. The consequences of reserve establishment on the long‐run equilibrium fish biomass and fishery catch levels are evaluated. In contrast to earlier models this study highlights the roles of both adult (and juvenile) fish migration and larval dispersal between the reserve and fishing grounds by employing a spawner‐recruit model. Uniform larval dispersal, uniform larval retention and complete larval retention combined with zero, moderate and high fish migration scenarios are analyzed in turn. The numerical simulations are based on Mombasa Marine National Park, Kenya, a fully protected coral reef marine reserve comprising approximately 30% of former fishing grounds. Simulation results suggest that the establishment of a fully protected marine reserve will always lead to an increase in total fish biomass. If the fishery is moderately to heavily exploited, total fishery catch will be greater with the reserve in all scenarios of fish and larval movement. If the fishery faces low levels of exploitation, catches can be optimized without a reserve but with controlled fishing effort. With high fish migration from the reserve, catches are optimized with the reserve. The optimal area of the marine reserve depends on the exploitation rate in the neighboring fishing grounds. For example, if exploitation is maintained at 40%, the ‘optimal’ reserve size would be 10%. If the rate increases to 50%, then the reserve needs to be 30% of the management area in order to maximize catches. However, even in lower exploitation fisheries (below 40%), a small reserve (up to 20%) provides significantly higher gains in fish biomass than losses in catch. Marine reserves are a valuable fisheries management tool. To achieve maximum fishery benefits they should be complemented by fishing effort controls.     

Optimizing reserves in school choice: A dynamic programming approach

We introduce a new model of school choice with reserves in which asocial planner is constrained by a limited supply of reserve seats and tries to find the matching that is optimal according to a social welfare function. We construct the optimal distribution of reserves via a quartic-time dynamic programming algorithm. Due to the modular nature of the algorithm, the resulting mechanism is strategy-proof for reserve-eligible students.     

Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments

We consider an MRI scanning facility run by a Radiology department. Several hospital departments compete for capacity and have private information regarding their demand for scans. The fairness of the capacity allocation by the Radiology department depends on the quality of the information provided by the hospital departments. We employ a generic Bayesian game approach that stimulates the disclosure of true demand (truth-telling), so that capacity can be allocated fairly. We derive conditions under which truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated with a numerical example.     

ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL MARINE RESERVES WITHOUT SPATIAL HETEROGENEITY IN A SIMPLE TWO‐PATCH MODEL

Bioeconomic analyses of spatial fishery models have established that marine reserves can be economically optimal (i.e., maximize sustainable profit) when there is some type of spatial heterogeneity in the system. Analyses of spatially continuous models and models with more than two discrete patches have also demonstrated that marine reserves can be economically optimal even when the system is spatially homogeneous. In this note we analyze a spatially homogeneous two‐patch model and show that marine reserves can be economically optimal in this case as well. The model we study includes the possibility that fishing can damage habitat. In this model, marine reserves are necessary to maximize sustainable profit when dispersal between the patches is sufficiently high and habitat is especially vulnerable to damage.     

Price subsidies and guaranteed buys of a new technology

We consider a problem of a government that wishes to stimulate the adoption of a new technology in order to replace an older, environmentally less desirable, technology. The new technology is manufactured by a monopolist firm which has learning-by-doing in its production process. The firm sells the new product to both private households and government institutions and wishes to determine an optimal pricing policy. The government has at its disposal two instruments: subsidizing the consumer price and making purchases of the new technology from the firm. We assume profit maximization on the part of the firm. The government wishes to maximize the cumulative number of units of the new technology sold to private households by the terminal date of the government program. The problem is set up as a Stackelberg differential game in which we identify an open-loop equilibrium, supposing that the government can credibly precommit to its subsidy and buying program.     

An Efficient Algorithm for Simulating the Drawdown Stopping Time and the Running Maximum of a Brownian Motion

We define the drawdown stopping time of a Brownian motion as the first time its drawdown reaches a duration of length 1. In this paper, we propose an efficient algorithm to efficiently simulate the drawdown stopping time and the associated maximum at this time. The method is straightforward and fast to implement, and avoids simulating sample paths thus eliminating discretisation bias. We show how the simulation algorithm is useful for pricing more complicated derivatives such as multiple drawdown options.     

Perpetual American Double Lookback Options on Drawdowns and Drawups with Floating Strikes

We present closed-form solutions to the problems of pricing of the perpetual American double lookback put and call options on the maximum drawdown and the maximum drawup with floating strikes in the Black-Merton-Scholes model. It is shown that the optimal exercise times are the first times at which the underlying risky asset price process reaches some lower or upper stochastic boundaries depending on the current values of its running maximum or minimum as well as the maximum drawdown or maximum drawup. The proof is based on the reduction of the original double optimal stopping problems to the appropriate sequences of single optimal stopping problems for the three-dimensional continuous Markov processes. The latter problems are solved as the equivalent free-boundary problems by means of the smooth-fit and normal-reflection conditions for the value functions at the optimal stopping boundaries and the edges of the three-dimensional state spaces. We show that the optimal exercise boundaries are determined as either the unique solutions of the associated systems of arithmetic equations or the minimal and maximal solutions of the appropriate first-order nonlinear ordinary differential equations.

     

矩阵对策的公平性研究

众所周知，零和二人有限对策也称为矩阵对策。设做一个矩阵对策的两个局中人都希望对策结果尽可能公平。当两个局中人使用对策解中的策略进行对策时，如果对策结果最公平，那么这个对策解称为最优的。本文证明了最优对策解集的一些性质，然后给出矩阵对策公平度的概念并证明了它的一些有趣的性质。     

Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of the two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. [Renault, J., Scarlatti, S., Scarsini, M., 2005. A folk theorem for minority games. Games Econom. Behav. 53 (2), 208–230], who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a finitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoffs Hausdorff-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to infinity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.     

Optimal dividend policy when risk reserves follow a jump–diffusion process with a completely monotone jump density under Markov-regime switching

The paper studies optimal dividend distribution for an insurance company whose risk reserves in the absence of dividends follow a Markov-modulated jump–diffusion process with a completely monotone jump density where jump densities and parameters including discount rate are modulated by a finite-state irreducible Markov chain. The major goal is to maximize the expected cumulative discounted dividend payments until ruin time when risk reserve is less than or equal to zero for the first time. I extend the results of Jiang (2015) for a Markov-modulated jump–diffusion process from exponential jump densities to completely monotone jump densities by proving that it is also optimal to take a modulated barrier strategy at some positive regime-dependent levels and that value function as the fixed point of a contraction is explicitly characterized.     

CREATION OF MARINE RESERVES AND INCENTIVES FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION

Abstract Despite a number of benefits, marine reserves provide neither incentives for fishermen to protect biodiversity nor compensation for financial loss due to the designation of the reserves. To obtain fishermen's support for marine reserves, some politicians have suggested that managers of new marine reserves should consider subsidizing or compensating those fishermen affected by the new operations. The objective of this paper is to apply principal–agent theory, which is still infrequently applied to fisheries, to define the optimal reserve area, fishing effort, and transfer payments in the context of symmetric and asymmetric information between managers and fishermen. The expected optimal reserve size under asymmetric information is smaller than that under symmetric information. Fishing efforts encouraged with a transfer payment are always less compared to those without payment. This reflects the fact that as the manager induces the fishermen to participate in the conservation program, the fishermen will take into account their effects on fish stock by decreasing their effort. Examples are also supplied to demonstrate these concepts.     

On the decisiveness of a game in a tournament

In sport tournaments in which teams are matched two at a time, it is useful for a variety of reasons to be able to quantify how important a particular game is. The need for such quantitative information has been addressed in the literature by several more or less simple measures of game importance. In this paper, we point out some of the drawbacks of those measures and we propose a different approach, which rather targets how decisive a game is with respect to the final victory. We give a definition of this idea of game decisiveness in terms of the uncertainty about the eventual winner prevailing in the tournament at the time of the game. As this uncertainty is strongly related to the notion of entropy of a probability distribution, our decisiveness measure is based on entropy-related concepts. We study the suggested decisiveness measure on two real tournaments, the 1988 NBA Championship Series and the UEFA 2012 European Football Championship (Euro 2012), and we show how well it agrees with what intuition suggests. Finally, we also use our decisiveness measure to objectively analyse the recent UEFA decision to expand the European Football Championship from 16 to 24 nations in the future, in terms of the overall attractiveness of the competition.     

Licensing radical product innovations to speed up the diffusion

We present a differential game to study how companies can simultaneously license their innovations to other firms when launching a new product. The licensee may cannibalize licensor’s sales, albeit this can be compensated by gains from royalties. Nonetheless, patent royalties are generally so low that licensing is not an attractive strategy. In this paper we consider the role of licensing to speed up the product diffusion. Word of mouth by licensee’s customers and licensee’s advertising indirectly push forward sales of the licensing company, accelerating new product diffusion. We find evidence that licensing can be a potentially profitable strategy. However, we also find that a weak Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection can easily diminish the financial attractiveness of licensing.     

A capacity reservation game for suppliers with multiple blocks of capacity

This paper studies a supplier competition model in which a buyer reserves capacity from a number of suppliers that each have multiple blocks of capacity (e.g., production or power plants). The suppliers each submit a bid that specifies a reservation price and an execution price for every block, and the buyer determines what blocks to reserve. This game involves both external competition between suppliers and internal competition between blocks from each supplier. We characterize the properties of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the game. Such equilibria may not always exist, and we provide the conditions under which they do.