Controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information

Applying a real option approach, this paper examines how asymmetric information alters key variables of a firm’s supplier switching process, such as the timing of contracting (hurried versus delayed contracting), transfer payments, set-up, switching, and abandonment decisions. In a symmetric information setting, delayed contracting is unambiguously beneficial. Abandoning the once established relation with the entrant supplier is never an issue. In contrast, under asymmetric information hurried contracting with potentially abandoning the relation can be beneficial. Consistent with adverse selection models, we find that under delayed contracting, in equilibrium, the firm switches less frequently to the entrant supplier (switching inertia). Surprisingly, we also find that under hurried contracting the firm switches more frequently to the entrant supplier (switching acceleration) and may abandon the relation. Finally, we study how these key variables of the supplier switching process change when also the incumbent supplier has private information (two-sided asymmetric information case).     

A stochastic and asymmetric-information framework for a dominant-manufacturer supply chain

Consider a dominant manufacturer wholesaling a product to a retailer, who in turn retails it to the consumers at $p/unit. The retail-market demand volume varies with p according to a given demand curve. This basic system is commonly modeled as a manufacturer-Stackelberg ([mS]) game under a “deterministic and symmetric-information” (“det-sym-i”) framework. We first explain the logical flaws of this framework, which are (i) the dominant manufacturer-leader will have a lower profit than the retailer under an iso-elastic demand curve; (ii) in some situations the system’s “correct solution” can be hyper-sensitive to minute changes in the demand curve; (iii) applying volume discounting while keeping the original [mS] profit-maximizing objective leads to an implausible degenerate solution in which the manufacturer has dictatorial power over the channel. We then present an extension of the “stochastic and asymmetric-information” (“sto-asy-i”) framework proposed in Lau and Lau [Lau, A., Lau, H.-S., 2005. Some two-echelon supply-chain games: Improving from deterministic–symmetric-information to stochastic-asymmetric-information models. European Journal of Operational Research 161 (1), 203–223], coupled with the notion that a profit-maximizing dominant manufacturer may implement not only [mS] but also “[pm]”—i.e., using a manufacturer-imposed maximum retail price. We show that this new framework resolves all the logical flaws stated above. Along the way, we also present a procedure for the dominant manufacturer to design a profit-maximizing volume-discount scheme using stochastic and asymmetric demand information.     

A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation

A system-theoretic approach to cooperation, interaction and allocation is presented that simplifies, unifies and extends the results on classical cooperative games and their generalizations. In particular, a general Weber theory of linear values is obtained and a new theory for local cooperation and general interaction indices is established. The model is dynamic and based on the notion of states of cooperation that change under actions of agents. Careful distinction between “local” states of cooperation and general “system” states leads to a notion of entropy for arbitrary non-negative and efficient allocations and thus to a new information-theoretic criterion for fairness of allocation mechanisms. Shapley allocations, for instance, are exhibited as arising from random walks with maximal entropy. For a large class of cooperation systems, a characterization of game symmetries in terms of λ-values is given. A concept for cores and Weber sets is proposed and it is shown that a Weber set of a game with selection structure always contains the core.     

Pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information

A product costs the manufacturer c/unit to produce; the retailer sells it at p/unit to the consumers. The retail-market demand volume V varies with p according to a given demand curve D_p. How would or should the “players” (i.e., the manufacturer and the retailer) set their prices? In contrast to many studies that assume a dominant manufacturer implementing the “manufacturer-Stackelberg” (“[mS]”) game, this paper examines how a dominant retailer should operate when his knowledge of c is imperfect. We first derive optimal decisions (some of them counter-intuitive) for the dominant retailer when he is restricted to choosing between [rS] (retailer-Stackelberg) and [mS]. Second, we propose a “reverse quantity discount” scheme that the dominant retailer (i.e., the downstream player) can offer to the manufacturer (note that the standard discount scheme is offered by the upstream player). We show that this discounting scheme is quite effective compared to the considerably more complicated though nevertheless theoretically optimal “menu of contracts.” We also reveal a largely overlooked function of discounting; i.e., discounting enables an “ignorant” but dominant player to usurp the earnings attributable to the knowledge of the dominated player. Finally, we also show that discounting works well when the demand curve is linear, but becomes ineffective when the demand curve is iso-elastic – a result echoing the conclusions of some earlier related works.     

Risky asset allocation and consumption rule in the presence of background risk and insurance markets

This study examines joint decisions regarding risky asset allocation and consumption rate for a representative agent in the presence of background risk and insurance markets. Contrary to the conclusion of the “mutual fund separation theorem”, we show that the optimal risky asset mix will reflect an agent’s risk attitude as long as background risk is not independent of investment risk. This result can, however, be used to solve the “riskyasset allocation puzzle”. We also unveil that optimal insurance to shift background risk is determined through establishing a hedging portfolio against investment risk and is an arrangement maintaining the balance between growth and volatility of expected consumption. Because the optimal insurance we obtain generally leads to a smoother consumption path, it may plausibly explain the “equity premium puzzle” in the financial literature.     

Shapley mappings and the cumulative value for n-person games with fuzzy coalitions

In this paper we prove existence and uniqueness of the so-called Shapley mapping, which is a solution concept for a class of n-person games with fuzzy coalitions whose elements are defined by the specific structure of their characteristic functions. The Shapley mapping, when it exists, associates to each fuzzy coalition in the game an allocation of the coalitional worth satisfying the efficiency, the symmetry, and the null-player conditions. It determines a “cumulative value” that is the “sum” of all coalitional allocations for whose computation we provide an explicit formula.     

On the core of cooperative queueing games

We consider a class of cooperative games for managing several canonical queueing systems. When cooperating parties invest optimally in common capacity or choose the optimal amount of demand to serve, cooperation leads to “single-attribute” games whose characteristic function is embedded in a one-dimensional function. We show that when and only when the latter function is elastic will all embedded games have a non-empty core, and the core contains a population monotonic allocation. We present sufficient conditions for this property to be satisfied. Our analysis reveals that in most Erlang B and Erlang C queueing systems, the games under our consideration have a non-empty core, but there are exceptions, which we illustrate through a counterexample.     

On the dynamic programming principle for uniformly nondegenerate stochastic differential games in domains

We prove the dynamic programming principle for uniformly nondegenerate stochastic differential games in the framework of time-homogeneous diffusion processes considered up to the first exit time from a domain. The zeroth-order “coefficient” and the “free” term are only assumed to be measurable. In contrast with previous results established for constant stopping times we allow arbitrary stopping times and randomized ones as well. The main assumption, which will be removed in a subsequent article, is that there exists a sufficiently regular solution of the Isaacs equation.     

Strategic and operational decisions in restaurant revenue management

The paper addresses restaurant revenue management from both a strategic and an operational point of view. Strategic decisions in restaurants are mainly related to defining the most profitable combination of tables that will constitute the restaurant. We propose new formulations of the so-called “Tables Mix Problem” by taking into account several features of the real setting. We compare the proposed models in a computational study showing that restaurants, with the capacity of managing tables as renewable resources and of combining different-sized tables, can improve expected revenue performances. Operational decisions are mainly concerned with the more profitable assignment of tables to customers. Indeed, the “Parties Mix Problem” consists of deciding on accepting or denying a booking request from different groups of customers, with the aim of maximizing the total expected revenue. A dynamic formulation of the “Parties Mix Problem” is presented together with a linear programming approximation, whose solutions can be used to define capacity control policies based on booking limits and bid prices. Computational results compare the proposed policies and show that they lead to higher revenues than the traditional strategies used to support decision makers.     

Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior

We consider an M/M/1 queueing system in which the queue length may or may not be observable by a customer upon entering the system. The “observable” and “unobservable” models are compared with respect to system properties and performance measures under two different types of optimal customer behavior, which we refer to as “selfishly optimal” and “socially optimal”. We consider average customer throughput rates and show that, under both types of optimal customer behavior, the equality of effective queue-joining rates between the observable and unobservable systems results in differences with respect to other performance measures such as mean busy periods and waiting times. We also show that the equality of selfishly optimal queue-joining rates between the two types of system precludes the equality of socially optimal joining rates, and vice versa.     

Controlling adverse effect on work in process inventory while reducing machine setup time

Earlier research has found that the presence of setup time variance can cause an adverse effect on waiting time and inventory as one reduces setup time for a product on a single machine that processes a number of products in a cyclic production system [Sarkar, D., Zangwill, W.I., 1991. Variance effects in cyclic production systems. Management Science 37 (4) 444–453; Zangwill, W.I., 1987. From EOQ towards ZI. Management Science 33 (10) 1209–1223]. This finding validates what other researchers had believed from a rather anecdotal perspective: “variability reduction” is extremely important for improving overall effectiveness of a pull or JIT system [Schonberger, Richard J., 1982. Japanese Manufacturing Techniques: Nine Hidden Lessons in Simplicity. The Free Press, New York]. In this paper, we offer explicit mathematical equations that characterize the variance levels in order to offer exact conditions under which WIP improves or worsens when one reduces setup time.     

Customization competition between branded firms: Continuous extension of product line from core product

We study a competition of product customization between two branded firms by a game-theoretic approach. Firms produce products with two attributes: one attribute indicates a characteristic with regard to “function” or “design” of a product and the other indicates “taste” or “flavor” of the product, which reflects consumers’ brand/taste preferences. Two branded firms have their own specific core products and our customization is defined as a continuous extension of their product line from the core product only along the “function” attribute. In particular, we allow asymmetric positions of core products, which may create the position advantage/disadvantage between firms. We suppose that consumers incur their selection costs with regard to finding their most favorable item among a rich variety of products and firms incur their customizing costs with regard to extending their product lines. We first show that in the equilibrium, branded firms should fundamentally adopt their customizations to cover the center space in the market as far as possible, regardless of the position of the competitor’s core product. Therefore, the position of the core product contributes to the creation of a competitive advantage: when one firm’s core product is located more closely to the center of the market than the competitor’s, its customization can always cover more range of the center space in the market, while keeping its degree of customization smaller than the competitor’s. Furthermore, we show some implications of unit-cost improvement: in a short run, a firm is better off concentrating on the improvement of the unit selection cost rather than the unit customizing cost. In contrast, in a long run, both firms can benefit from the improvement of the unit customizing cost.     

Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making

In this paper, incorporating a social psychological aspect of decision making, called attitudes, into analysis of games in normal form, the author proposes a new equilibrium concept, called relational dominant strategy equilibrium (RDSE). The author also analyzes relationships between RDSE and dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE), and shows the following fact: RDSE coincides with DSE under a condition on attitudes of players. The story of “The Gift of the Magi” by Henry is analyzed and given a convincing interpretation using the proposed equilibrium concept.     

Mental representations of important real-life decisions

Two studies investigated how decision makers characterize alternatives in important real-life decisions, which they themselves had made (to leave a partner, to choose an education and to choose a home). First, the participants indicated a very high degree of involvement in the decisions studied and about half of the participants gave maximum involvement ratings for the partner decision. Second, the results showed that concepts that are essential in most decision theories, such as, consequence, probability and value were important characteristics of the decisions. Third, emotion, positive and negative affect were also important characteristics. Fourth, value and emotion were uncorrelated. Fifth, the patterns of characteristics of decisions made in the past did not differ markedly from the characteristics given to future decisions. Principal component analyses were performed on the ratings of applicability of the different characteristics across participants for each decision situation. Three factors were extracted. There was one factor for positive affect/emotions and another factor for negative affect/emotions verified in oblique solutions. Thus, different scales are needed to represent emotion/affect components (and not bipolar scales) in real-life important decisions. The third factor represented the way in which a decision was represented (moving pictures dialogue etc.). An analysis restricted to the participants who rated 100% involvement showed an additional fourth factor with “what others would think”, “similar situations”, “values” and “money” as the most prominent characteristics. This points to the importance of controlling for participant involvement in studies of human decision making to enable generalizations to real-life decisions.     

Applications of bulk queues to group testing models with incomplete identification

A population of items is said to be “group-testable”, (i) if the items can be classified as “good” and “bad”, and (ii) if it is possible to carry out a simultaneous test on a batch of items with two possible outcomes: “Success” (indicating that all items in the batch are good) or “failure” (indicating a contaminated batch). In this paper, we assume that the items to be tested arrive at the group-testing centre according to a Poisson process and are served (i.e., group-tested) in batches by one server. The service time distribution is general but it depends on the batch size being tested. These assumptions give rise to the bulk queueing model M/G^(m,M)/1, where m and M(>m) are the decision variables where each batch size can be between m and M. We develop the generating function for the steady-state probabilities of the embedded Markov chain. We then consider a more realistic finite state version of the problem where the testing centre has a finite capacity and present an expected profit objective function. We compute the optimal values of the decision variables (m, M) that maximize the expected profit. For a special case of the problem, we determine the optimal decision explicitly in terms of the Lambert function.     

How strange can an attractor for a dynamical system in a 3-manifold look?

The aim of this paper is to characterise those compact subsets K of 3-manifolds M that are (stable and not necessarily global) attractors for some flow on M. We will show that it is the topology of M−K, rather than that of K, the one that plays a relevant role in this problem.A necessary and sufficient condition for a set K to be an attractor is that it must be an “almost tame” subset of M in a sense made precise under the equivalent notions of “weakly tame” and “tamely embedded up to shape”, defined in the paper. These are complemented by a further equivalent condition, “algebraic tameness”, which has the advantage of being checkable by explicit computation.A final section of the paper is devoted to a partial analysis of the same question when one replaces flows by discrete dynamical systems.     

Strategy optimization for deductive games

This paper presents novel algorithms for strategy optimization for deductive games. First, a k-way-branching (KWB) algorithm, taking advantage of a clustering technique, can obtain approximate results effectively. Second, a computer-aided verification algorithm, called the Pigeonhole-principle-based backtracking (PPBB) algorithm, is developed to discover the lower bound of the number of guesses required for the games. These algorithms have been successfully applied to deductive games, Mastermind and “Bulls and Cows.” Experimental results show that KWB outperforms previously published approximate strategies. Furthermore, by applying the algorithms, we derive the theorem: 7 guesses are necessary and sufficient for the “Bulls and Cows” in the worst case. These results suggest strategies for other search problems.     

Fréchet-Urysohn for finite sets, II

We continue our study [G. Gruenhage, P.J. Szeptycki, Fréchet Urysohn for finite sets, Topology Appl. 151 (2005) 238-259] of several variants of the property of the title. We answer a question from that paper by showing that a space defined in a natural way from a certain Hausdorff gap is a Fréchet α₂ space which is not Fréchet-Urysohn for 2-point sets (FU₂), and answer a question of Hrušák by showing that under MAω₁, no such “gap space” is FU₂. We also introduce versions of the properties which are defined in terms of “selection principles”, give examples when possible showing that the properties are distinct, and discuss relationships of these properties to convergence in product spaces, to the αi-spaces of A.V. Arhangel'skii, and to topological games.     

A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value

everal new families of semivalues for weighted n-person transferable utility games are axiomatically constructed and discussed under increasing collections of axioms, where the weighted Shapley value arises as the resulting one member family. A more general approach to such weighted games defined in the form of two components, a weight vector λ and a classical TU-game v, is provided. The proposed axiomatizations are done both in terms of λ and v. Several new axioms related to the weight vector λ are discussed, including the so-called “amalgamating payoffs” axiom, which characterizes the value of a weighted game in terms of another game with a smaller number of players. They allow for a new look at the role of players’ weights in the context of the weighted Shapley value for the model of weighted games, giving new properties of it. Besides, another simple formula for the weighted Shapley value is found and examples illustrating some surprising behavior of it in the context of players’ weights are given. The paper contains a wide discussion of the results obtained.     

Topological games and continuity of group operations

We consider a topological game GΠ involving two players α and β and show that, for a paratopological group, the absence of a winning strategy for player β implies the group is a topological one. We provide a large class of topological spaces X for which the absence of a winning strategy for player β is equivalent to the requirement that X is a Baire space. This allows to extend the class of paratopological or semitopological groups for which one can prove that they are, actually, topological groups.Conditions of the type “existence of a winning strategy for the player α” or “absence of a winning strategy for the player β” are frequently used in mathematics. Though convenient and satisfactory for theoretical considerations, such conditions do not reveal much about the internal structure of the topological space where they hold. We show that the existence of a winning strategy for any of the players in all games of Banach-Mazur type can be expressed in terms of “saturated sieves” of open sets.