Rooted-tree solutions for tree games

In this paper, we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by a tree on the set of agents. Agents in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the tree. We introduce natural extensions of the average (rooted)-tree solution (see [Herings, P., van der Laan, G., Talman, D., 2008. The average tree solution for cycle free games. Games and Economic Behavior 62, 77–92]): the marginalist tree solutions and the random tree solutions. We provide an axiomatic characterization of each of these sets of solutions. By the way, we obtain a new characterization of the average tree solution.     

Note on graphs and weakly cyclic matrices

The main result consists of a combinatorial characterization of weakly cyclic matrices of odd index. The case of even index is also considered.     

On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games

The insurance situation in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-insurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper we present certain conditions on the parameters of the model that guarantee the 1-convexity property of co-insurance games which in turn ensures the nonemptiness of the core and the linearity of the nucleolus as a function of the variable premium. Further we reveal conditions when a co-insurance game is representable in the form of a veto-removed game and present an efficient final algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a veto-removed game.     

Weighted and roughly weighted simple games

In this paper we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to have rough weights. We define two functions f(n) and g(n) that measure the deviation of a simple game from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted majority game, respectively. We formulate known results in terms of lower and upper bounds for these functions and improve those bounds. We also investigate rough weightedness of simple games with a small number of players.     

Asymmetric marking games on line graphs

This paper investigates the asymmetric marking games on line graphs. Suppose G is a graph with maximum degree Δ and G has an orientation with maximum outdegree k, we show that the (a,1)-game coloring number of the line graph of G is at most . When a=1, this improves some known results of the game coloring number of the line graphs.     

On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players’ preferences are additive.     

Coordination games on graphs

We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong equilibria and k-equilibria respectively). We show that pure Nash equilibria and 2-equilibria exist, and give an example in which no 3-equilibrium exists. Moreover, we prove that strong equilibria exist for various special cases. We also study the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) for these solution concepts. We show that the PoS for strong equilibria is 1 in almost all of the special cases for which we have proven strong equilibria to exist. The PoA for pure Nash equilbria turns out to be unbounded, even when we fix the graph on which the coordination game is to be played. For the PoA for k-equilibria, we show that the price of anarchy is between \(2(n-1)/(k-1) - 1\) and \(2(n-1)/(k-1)\). The latter upper bound is tight for \(k=n\) (i.e., strong equilibria). Finally, we consider the problems of computing strong equilibria and of determining whether a joint strategy is a k-equilibrium or strong equilibrium. We prove that, given a coordination game, a joint strategy s, and a number k as input, it is co-NP complete to determine whether s is a k-equilibrium. On the positive side, we give polynomial time algorithms to compute strong equilibria for various special cases.     

Two-person games on graphs

Every vertex of an abstract-directed graph is characterized in terms of a two-person game. A vertex is winning if by choosing it a player can assure himself of a win, it is losing if by choosing it he cannot prevent his opponent from winning, and it is drawing if it is neither winning nor losing. The sets of winning, losing, and drawing vertices are identified in terms of a set-valued function on the graph.     

Uniform cyclic edge connectivity in cubic graphs

A cubic graph which is cyclicallyk-edge connected and has the further property that every edge belongs to some cyclick-edge cut is called uniformly cyclicallyk-edge connected(U(k)). We classify theU(5) graphs and show that all cyclically 5-edge connected cubic graphs can be generated from a small finite set ofU(5) graphs by a sequence of defined operations.MATHDAHCOTAGE.AC.NZ     

Geodetic contraction games on graphs

LetG = (V, E) be a finite graph. The setL of labeled vertices is initially empty. Two players A and B move alternately (A first), by choosing an unlabled vertexu V\L; thenu itself and all vertices on shortest paths betweenu and any vertex ofL are adjoined toL. WhenL =V, the game is over. Innormal play, the first player unable to move loses and his opponent wins. The outcome is reversed formisère play. We resolve the game by determining its winning strategies for the following cases: trees in normal play; cycles in normal and misère play; and complete graphsK _m with rays all of lengthn, in normal play.Partial support by Canadian Research Grants 69-0695 and A-4792 during visits at the University of Calgary and Simon Fraser University is gratefully acknowledged.     

Optimizing weakly triangulated graphs

A graph is weakly triangulated if neither the graph nor its complement contains a chordless cycle with five or more vertices as an induced subgraph. We use a new characterization of weakly triangulated graphs to solve certain optimization problems for these graphs. Specifically, an algorithm which runs inO((n + e)n ³) time is presented which solves the maximum clique and minimum colouring problems for weakly triangulated graphs; performing the algorithm on the complement gives a solution to the maximum stable set and minimum clique covering problems. Also, anO((n + e)n ⁴) time algorithm is presented which solves the weighted versions of these problems.The author acknowledges the support of an N.S.E.R.C. Canada postgraduate scholarship.The author acknowledges the support of the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research under grant number AFOSR 0271 to Rutgers University.     

Generating weakly triangulated graphs

We show that a graph is weakly triangulated, or weakly chordal, if and only if it can be generated by starting with a graph with no edges, and repeatedly adding an edge, so that the new edge is not the middle edge of any chordless path with four vertices. This is a corollary of results due to Sritharan and Spinrad, and Hayward, Hoång and Maffray, and a natural analog of a theorem due to Fulkerson and Gross, which states that a graph is triangulated, or chordal, if and only if it can be generated by starting with a graph with no vertices, and repeatedly adding a vertex, so that the new vertex is not the middle vertex of any chordless path with three vertices. Our result answers the question of whether there exists a composition scheme that generates exactly the class of weakly triangulated graphs. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

On weakly cospectral graphs

We prove that any set of pair-wise nonisomorphic strongly connected weakly cospectral pseudodigraphs whose set of nilpotency indices is finite also is finite.     

Colouring games on outerplanar graphs and trees

Let f be a graph function which assigns to each graph H a non-negative integer f(H)≤|V(H)|. The f-game chromatic number of a graph G is defined through a two-person game. Let X be a set of colours. Two players, Alice and Bob, take turns colouring the vertices of G with colours from X. A partial colouring c of G is legal (with respect to graph function f) if for any subgraph H of G, the sum of the number of colours used in H and the number of uncoloured vertices of H is at least f(H). Both Alice and Bob must colour legally (i.e., the partial colouring produced needs to be legal). The game ends if either all the vertices are coloured or there are uncoloured vertices with no legal colour. In the former case, Alice wins the game. In the latter case, Bob wins the game. The f-game chromatic number of G, χ_g(f,G), is the least number of colours that the colour set X needs to contain so that Alice has a winning strategy. Let be the graph function defined as , for any n≥3 and otherwise. Then is called the acyclic game chromatic number of G. In this paper, we prove that any outerplanar graph G has acyclic game chromatic number at most 7. For any integer k, let ?_k be the graph function defined as ?_k(K₂)=2 and ?_k(P_k)=3 (P_k is the path on k vertices) and ?_k(H)=0 otherwise. This paper proves that if k≥8 then for any tree T, χ_g(?_k,T)≤9. On the other hand, if k≤6, then for any integer n, there is a tree T such that χ_g(?_k,T)≥n.     

On some weakly bipartite graphs

We characterize a class of weakly bipartite graphs. In this case, the max-cut problem can be solved by finding a minimum two-commodity cut.     

Submanifolds weakly associated with graphs

We establish an interesting link between differential geometry and graph theory by defining submanifolds weakly associated with graphs. We prove that, in a local sense, every submanifold satisfies such an association, and other general results. Finally, we study submanifolds associated with graphs either in low dimensions or belonging to some special families.