Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: Costs and benefits of privatized firms

In this paper, we examine the interactions between investment timing and management effort in the presence of asymmetric information between the owner and the manager where the manager has an informational advantage. We find that investment timing is later under asymmetric information than under full information, implying a decrease in the value of equity option. However, in order to minimize any distortion under underinvestment, management effort is greater under asymmetric information than under full information. We show that there are trade-offs in the efficiencies of investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information. These results fit well with the findings of past empirical studies concerning the costs and benefits of privatized firms.     

Strategic investment under uncertainty: A synthesis

Investment is a central theme in economics, finance, and operational research. Traditionally, the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility (investment under uncertainty) or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings (industrial organization). Research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years. In this paper, we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams. We highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage (first- versus second-mover advantage), the manner in which information is revealed, firm heterogeneity, capital increment size, and the number of competing firms.     

Modeling investment behavior under price cap regulation

Motivated by the frequently observed criticism of the regulatory practice arising from companies in the industries concerned, we investigate the impact of regulation on investment behavior. Therefore, we model the investment timing and volume of a firm acting in a regulated market. When capping prices, the regulatory authority imposes a price ceiling on market prices. Accordingly, we use a real option approach where the price cap that limits possible future firm values enters the firm’s portfolio in form of a short call option position. By comparing this framework to a competitive benchmark model, we derive an optimal price setting rule for regulators. Moreover, it can be shown how deviations from this optimum affect the investment behavior of firms.      

The effect of depreciation allowances on the timing of investment and government tax revenue

We develop a model of the behavior of a potential investor (under uncertainty and in a fiscal environment) who wishes to invest into a project in the real sector of an economy and faces a timing problem. We find an optimal solution within this model and examine the dependence of the tax revenue from the newly created firm on the depreciation policy. It is shown that there exists a domain in the space of the parameters of the investment project where both the tax revenue and the incentives can be increased by using the depreciation policy.     

Duopolistic competition under risk aversion and uncertainty

A monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and the level of risk aversion increase. By contrast, the presence of a rival typically hastens entry under risk neutrality. Here, we examine these two opposing effects in a duopoly setting. We demonstrate that the value of a firm and its entry decision behave differently with risk aversion and uncertainty depending on the type of competition. Interestingly, if the leader’s role is defined endogenously, then higher uncertainty makes her relatively better off, whereas with the roles exogenously defined, the impact of uncertainty is ambiguous.     

A mispricing model of stocks under asymmetric information

We extend the theory of asymmetric information in mispricing models for stocks following geometric Brownian motion to constant relative risk averse investors. Mispricing follows a continuous mean-reverting Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. Optimal portfolios and maximum expected log-linear utilities from terminal wealth for informed and uninformed investors are derived. We obtain analogous but more general results which nests those of Guasoni (2006) as a special case of the relative risk aversion approaching one.     

Minimum standards for investment performance: A new perspective on non-life insurer solvency

The aim of this paper is to develop an alternative approach for assessing an insurer’s solvency as a proposal for a standard model for Solvency II. Instead of deriving minimum capital requirements–as is done in solvency regulation–our model provides company-specific minimum standards for risk and return of investment performance, given the distribution structure of liabilities and a predefined safety level. The idea behind this approach is that in a situation of weak solvency, an insurer’s asset allocation can be adjusted much more easily in the short term than can, for example, claims cost distributions, operating expenses, or equity capital. Hence, instead of using separate models for capital regulation and solvency regulation–as is typically done in most insurance markets–our single model will reduce the complexity and costs for insurers as well as for regulators. In this paper, we first develop the model framework and second test its applicability using data from a German non-life insurer.     

Technology selection and capacity investment under uncertainty

We analyze the problem of technology selection and capacity investment for electricity generation in a competitive environment under uncertainty. Adopting a Nash-Cournot competition model, we consider the marginal cost as the uncertain parameter, although the results can be easily generalized to other sources of uncertainty such as a load curve. In the model, firms make three different decisions: (i) the portfolio of technologies, (ii) each technology’s capacity and (iii) the technology’s production level for every scenario. The decisions related to the portfolio and capacity are ex-ante and the production level is ex-post to the realization of uncertainty. We discuss open and closed-loop models, with the aim to understand the relationship between different technologies’ cost structures and the portfolio of generation technologies adopted by firms in equilibrium. For a competitive setting, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first not only to explicitly discuss the relation between costs and generation portfolio but also to allow firms to choose a portfolio of technologies. We show that portfolio diversification arises even with risk-neutral firms and technologies with different cost expectations. We also investigate conditions on the probability and cost under which different equilibria of the game arise.     

Introducing regulation in the measurement of efficiency,with an application to the Canadian air carriers industry

This paper proposes a method to measure efficiency in highly regulated capital-intensive industries in the presence of state-owned enterprises. We generalize the data envelopment analysis method to include regulation in the model, as well as the quasi-fixed nature of capital and its links with the firms’ investment decisions. The framework is then applied to the Canadian air carriers industry to study the impact of regulation changes on the efficiency of the various carriers, between 1960 and 1999. Our results show that deregulation explains a large part of the measured inefficiency.     

Inventory and investment in setup and quality operations under Return On Investment maximization

In this paper, we construct and analyze a Return On Investment (ROI) maximization model for inventory and capital investment in setup and quality operations under an investment budget constraint. Specifically, we show how such an ROI maximization model can be formulated and derive analytical results such as the conditions under which the inventory is reduced and for the determination of the unique global optimal solution. In addition, by applying the Reformulation-Linearization Technique (RLT), we show via numerical examples how this nonconvex optimization model can be solved effectively and how RLT may produce superior results to those from the conventional Cut Across the Board Rule (CABR). Various managerial insights are provided throughout the paper. For example, as the investment budget increases (or decreases), a fundamental shift of investment strategies (setup cost reduction vs. quality improvement) may be necessary so as to maximize ROI.     

Competition through capacity investment under asymmetric existing capacities and costs

This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity, scale economies, and production policy have an important influence on the capacity outcomes when firms compete in the market place. We formulate a game-theoretical model where each firm has an existing capacity and faces both fixed and variable costs in purchasing additional capacity. Specifically, the firms simultaneously (or sequentially) make their expansion decisions, and then simultaneously decide their production decisions with these outputs being capacity constrained. We also compare our results with cases where production has to match capacity. By characterizing the firms’ capacity and production choices in equilibrium, our analysis shows that the operational factors play a crucial role in determining what happens. The modeling and analysis in the paper gives insight into the way that the ability to use less production capacity than has been built will undermine the commitment value of existing capacity. If a commitment to full production is not possible, sinking operational costs can enable a firm to keep some preemptive advantage. We also show that the existence of fixed costs can introduce cases where there are either no pure strategy equilibrium or multiple equilibria. The managerial implications of our analysis are noted in the discussion. Our central contribution in this paper is the innovative integration of the strategic analysis of capacity expansion and well-known (s,S)$(s\text{,}S)$ policy in operations and supply chain theory.     

Optimal investment,consumption and proportional reinsurance under model uncertainty

This paper considers the optimal investment, consumption and proportional reinsurance strategies for an insurer under model uncertainty. The surplus process of the insurer before investment and consumption is assumed to be a general jump–diffusion process. The financial market consists of one risk-free asset and one risky asset whose price process is also a general jump–diffusion process. We transform the problem equivalently into a two-person zero-sum forward–backward stochastic differential game driven by two-dimensional Lévy noises. The maximum principles for a general form of this game are established to solve our problem. Some special interesting cases are studied by using Malliavin calculus so as to give explicit expressions of the optimal strategies.     

Optimal investment and risk control for an insurer under inside information

This paper is devoted to the study of the optimal investment and risk control strategy for an insurer who has some inside information on the financial market and the insurance business. The insurer’s risk process and the risky asset process in the financial market are assumed to be very general jump diffusion processes. The two processes are supposed to be correlated. Under the criterion of logarithmic utility maximization of the terminal wealth, we solve our problem by using forward integral approach. Some interesting particular cases are studied in which the explicit expressions of the optimal strategy are derived by using enlargement of filtration techniques.     

Optimal investment under operational flexibility, risk aversion, and uncertainty

Traditional real options analysis addresses the problem of investment under uncertainty assuming a risk-neutral decision maker and complete markets. In reality, however, decision makers are often risk averse and markets are incomplete. We confirm that risk aversion lowers the probability of investment and demonstrate how this effect can be mitigated by incorporating operational flexibility in the form of embedded suspension and resumption options. Although such options facilitate investment, we find that the likelihood of investing is still lower compared to the risk-neutral case. Risk aversion also increases the likelihood that the project will be abandoned, although this effect is less pronounced. Finally, we illustrate the impact of risk aversion on the optimal suspension and resumption thresholds and the interaction among risk aversion, volatility, and optimal decision thresholds under complete operational flexibility.     

Optimal investment,consumption and timing of annuity purchase under a preference change

In this paper, we study the optimal investment and consumption strategies for a retired individual who has the opportunity of choosing a discretionary stopping time to purchase an annuity. We assume that the individual receives a fixed annuity income and changes his/her preference after paying a fixed cost for annuitization. By using the martingale method and the variational inequality method, we tackle this problem and obtain the optimal strategies and the value function explicitly for the case of constant force of mortality and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function.     

Strategic optimization in R&D investment

We use d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's strategic optimal R&D investment in a duopoly Cournot competition model to construct myopic optimal discrete and continuous R&D dynamics. We show that for some high initial production costs, the success or failure of a firm is very sensitive to small variations in its initial R&D investment strategies.     

Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence

In this paper we experimentally investigate Cournot duopolies with an extended timing game. The timing game has observable delay, that is, firms announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in the first period. With random matching we find that, given the actual experimental behavior in the subgames, subjects play a timing game more akin to a coordination game with two symmetric equilibria rather than the predicted game with a dominant strategy to produce early. As a result, a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.     

Robust network design in telecommunications under polytope demand uncertainty

We consider a model for robust network design in telecommunications, in which we minimize the cost of the maximum mismatch between supply and demand. In the present study, the demand is uncertain and takes its values in a polytope defined by constraints. This problem is hardly tractable, so we limit ourselves to computing lower bounds (by a column-generation mechanism) and upper bounds (using an algorithm due to Falk and Soland for maximizing a separable convex function over a polytope). The experimental gap obtained turns out to be large, and this seems to be mainly due to poor upper bounds. Two possible solutions are suggested for further research aimed at improving them: dc optimization (to minimize the difference of two convex functions) and AARC modeling (affinely adjustable robust counterpart).     

Real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric firms

This paper examines strategic investment games between two firms that compete for optimal entry in a project that generates uncertain revenue flows. Under asymmetry on both the sunk cost of investment and revenue flows of the two competing firms, we investigate the value of real investment options and strategic interaction of investment decisions. Compared to earlier models that only allow for asymmetry on sunk cost, our model demonstrates a richer set of strategic interactions of entry decisions. We provide a complete characterization of pre-emptive, dominant and simultaneous equilibriums by analyzing the relative value of leader’s and follower’s optimal investment thresholds. In a duopoly market with negative externalities, a firm may reduce loss of real options value by selecting appropriate pre-emptive entry. When one firm has a dominant advantage over its competitor, both the dominant firm and dominated firm enter at their respective leader’s and follower’s optimal thresholds. When the pre-emptive thresholds of both firms happen to coincide, the two firms enter simultaneously. Under positive externalities, firms do not compete to lead.     

Strategic delegation in a differentiated duopoly with asymmetric costs

This paper examines the impact of product differentiation on strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs. We show that compared with the no-delegation case, when both firms delegate, although the cost-inefficient firm always gets worse, the efficient firm gets better when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently low and/or the cost asymmetry is sufficiently large. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, the efficient firm always makes its manager more aggressive, however, the inefficient firm may make its manager less aggressive.