大型群体决策问题中的简单多数规则（3个评选对象场合）

一个群体决策问题取决于两个因素,一个是群体决策的规则,另一个是投票。当选定群体决策规则时,一个群体决策问题由投票完全决定,此时,群体决策问题与投票之间一一对应。简单多数规则是个简单且被广泛采用的群体决策规则,但它有缺陷,我们可举出些群体决策问题使用简单多数规则没法从投票得到最后群体决策的结果。这里我们将给出一个简单多数规则的有趣性质,即在3个评选对象场合,使用简单多数规则没法从投票得到最后群体决策结果的n个评选人的群体决策问题的个数与所有n个评选人的群体决策问题的个数之比当评选人个数n趋向无穷时趋于零,这说明3个评选对象的大型群体决策场合,简单多数规则的缺陷不严重。     

The Condorcet criterion and committee selection

Recent studies have evaluated election procedures on their propensity to select committees that meet a Condorcet criterion. The Condorcet criterion has been defined to use majority agreement from voters' preferences to compare the selected committee to all other committees. This study uses a different definition of the Condorcet criterion as defined on committees. The focus of the new definition is on candidates. That is, we consider majority agreement on each candidate in the selected committee as compared to each candidate not in the selected committee.This new definition of the Condorcet criterion allows for the existence of majority cycles on candidates within the selected committee. However, no candidate in the non-selected group is able to defeat any candidate in the selected committee by majority rule. Of particular interest is the likelihood that a committee meeting this Condorcet criterion exists. Attention is also given to the likelihood that various simple voting procedures will select a committee meeting this Condorcet criterion when one does exist.     

Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters

Let us suppose that certain committee is going to decide, using some fixed voting rules, either to accept or to reject a proposal that affects your interests. From your perception about each voter’s position, you can make an a priori estimation of the probability of the proposal being accepted. Wishing to increase this probability of acceptance before the votes are cast, assume further that you are able to convince (at least) one voter to improve his/her perception in favor of the proposal. The question is: which voters should be persuaded in order to get the highest possible increase in the probability of acceptance? In other words, which are the optimal persuadable voters? To answer this question a measure of “circumstantial power” is considered in this paper, which is useful to identify optimal persuadable voters. Three preorderings in the set of voters, based on the voting rules, are defined and they are used for finding optimal persuadable voters, even in the case that only a qualitative ranking of each voter’s inclination for the proposal has been made.     

Preference aggregation and DEA: An analysis of the methods proposed to discriminate efficient candidates

There are different ways to allow the voters to express their preferences on a set of candidates. In ranked voting systems, each voter selects a subset of the candidates and ranks them in order of preference. A well-known class of these voting systems are scoring rules, where fixed scores are assigned to the different ranks and the candidates with the highest score are the winners. One of the most important issues in this context is the choice of the scoring vector, since the winning candidate can vary according to the scores used. To avoid this problem, Cook and Kress [W.D. Cook, M. Kress, A data envelopment model for aggregating preference rankings, Management Science 36 (11) (1990) 1302–1310], using a DEA/AR model, proposed to assess each candidate with the most favorable scoring vector for him/her. However, the use of this procedure often causes several candidates to be efficient, i.e., they achieve the maximum score. For this reason, several methods to discriminate among efficient candidates have been proposed. The aim of this paper is to analyze and show some drawbacks of these methods.     

Maximal Condorcet Domains

A Condorcet domain is a subset of the set of linear orders on a finite set of candidates (alternatives to vote), such that if voters preferences are linear orders belonging to this subset, then the simple majority rule does not yield cycles. It is well-known that the set of linear orders is the Bruhat lattice. We prove that a maximal Condorcet domain is a distributive sublattice in the Bruhat lattice. An explicit lattice formula for the simple majority rule is given. We introduce the notion of a symmetric Condorcet domain and characterize symmetric Condorcet domains of maximal size.     

Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting

I consider a model in which imperfectly informed voters with common interests participate in a multicandidate election decided by either plurality rule or a runoff. Prior to the election, each voter receives a private signal corresponding to the candidate the voter thinks is best. Voters are relatively more likely to think a given candidate is best if the candidate is a relatively better candidate. I show that there is a sequence of equilibrium strategies for the voters such that, as the number of voters goes to infinity, the probability that the best candidate is elected goes to 1. I further show that all candidates receive significant vote shares in any equilibrium in which information fully aggregates under plurality rule and that voters do at least as well when the election is decided by a runoff as they do when the election is decided by plurality rule.     

Classes of generalized ∗-modules

We study the class, STAR , of all ?-modules by means of the classes, S_λ, of all ?λ-modules, λ> 0 being a cardinal. Since STAR, equals the intersection of the decreasing chain S_λ, λ > 0, our approach ‘from above’ complements the usual approach ‘from below’ consisting in the study of quasi-progenerators and tilting modules. We present relations between categorical properties of ?-;modules and those of ?-modules. Answering a question of Menini, we use the solution of the Artin's problem to show that the chain Sλ,λ > No, is strictly decreasing in general.     

关于核完备空间的几个问题

<正> 1955年A.Grothendieck在建立核空间理论的同时,作为例子也具体给出了一类特殊的完备空间——gestufen空间具有核性的充要条件,十年之后,A.Pietsch和作者的一篇未发表的工作各自独立地得到了一般完备空间的核性条件,从此核完备空间的研究就展开了,如可参看[7—9]. 本文是继续探讨这方面的问题,共分四个部分:首先,为完整起见,在§1我们将重新叙述和证明完备空间为核的条件(我们原先的证明就与Pietsch不同);其次,在§2中我     

Asymptotic solution of contact problemsfor a relatively thick elastic layer when there are friction forces in the contact area

The plane contact problem of the theory of elasticity of the interaction between a punch, having a base in the form of a paraboloid,and a layer, taking Coulomb friction in the contact region into account, is considered. It is assumed that either the lower boundary of the layer is fixed or there are no normal displacements and shear stresses on it, and that normal and shear forces are acting on the punch. Here, the punch-layer system is in a condition of limit equilibrium, and the punch does not turn during the deformation of the layer. The case of quasi-statistics, when the punch moves evenly over the layer surface, can be considered similarly in a moving system of coordinates. The problem is investigated by the large-λ method (see [1–3], etc.), which is further developed here, namely, simple recurrence relations are derived for constructing any number of terms of the series expansion of the solution of the corresponding integral equation in negative powers of the dimensionless parameter λ related to the thickness of the layer.     

A note on 3-blocked designs

A blocking set of a design different from a 2-(λ + 2, λ + 1, λ) design has at least 3 points. The aim of this note is to establish which 2-(v, k, λ) designs D with r ≥ 2λ may contain a blocking 3-set. The main results are the following. If D contains a blocking 3-set, then D is one of the following designs: a 2-(2λ + 3, λ + 1, λ), a 2-(2λ + 1), λ + 1, λ), a 2-(2λ - 1, λ, λ), a 2-(4λ + 3, 2λ + 1, λ) Hadamard design with λ odd, or a 2-(4λ - 1, 2λ, λ) Hadamard design. Moreover a blocking 3-set in a 2-(4λ + 3, 2λ + 1, λ) Hadamard design exists if and only if there is a line with three points. In the case of 2- (4λ - 1, 2λ, λ) Hadamard design with λ odd, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a blocking 3-set, while in the case λ even, a necessary condition is given. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

集值映射的不动点指数与带间断非线性项的椭圆型方程的多重解

<正> 本文研究二阶半线性椭圆边值问题■的多重解(符号详见§3),其中φ(x,t)允许对t是不连续的.一些自由边界问题可以化归这类问题.为了统一处理φ(x,t)对t连续与不连续两种情形,我们采用集值映射的观点.为此推广了经典的算子与Hammerstein算子到集值映射,并发展了集值映射的Leray-Schauder度理论;与已有的集值映射理论不同,现在处理的是映射串(定     

Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model

We develop a game-theoretic model of two-candidate competition over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of other participants. The players consist of the voters and the candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and candidates alike) observe contemporaneous poll data broken-down by various subgroups of the population.The results of the paper give conditions on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) extracts all information.     

Local bifurcation from characteristic values with finite multiplicity and its application to axisymmetric buckled states of a thin spherical shell

The purpose of this paper is to study bifurcation points of the equation T(v) = L(λ,v) + M(λ,v), (λ,v) ? Λ × D in Banach spaces, where for any fixed λ ? Λ, T, L(λ,·) are linear mappings and M(λ,·) is a nonlinear mapping of higher order, M(λ,0) = 0 for all λ ? Λ. We assume that λ is a characteristic value of the pair (T, L) such that the mapping T – L(λ ,·) is Fredholm with nullity p and index s, p > s ? 0. We shall find some sufficient conditions to show that (λ ,0) is a bifurcation point of the above equation. The results obtained will be used to consider bifurcation points of the axisymmetric buckling of a thin spherical shell subjected to a uniform compressive force consisting of a pair of coupled non-linear ordinary differential equations of second order.     

Majority decisions when abstention is possible

Suppose that we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential “voters.” The question is, what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? For the problem as stated, a complete characterization was given in Shelah (2009) [7], but here we allow voters to abstain. Aside from the trivial case, the possible families of (partial) choice functions break into three cases in terms of the functions that can be generated by majority decision. In one of these, cycles along the lines of Condorcet’s paradox are avoided. In another, all partial choice functions can be represented.     

Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences

The Young’s Consistency property means that when some candidates are chosen as winners by two disjoint electorates, those and only those candidates are chosen in the aggregated electorate. We define two new properties requiring that, when a candidate x is elected in a situation and a new electorate is added for which x is a very good candidate, x will remain elected. These properties, weaker than Young’s Consistency, lead to new impossibility results strengthening the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet Voting Correspondences. Also we adapt the Young and Levenglick result to the k-choice voting function context.     

Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter

We provide a stochastic electoral model of the US Presidential election where candidates take differences across states into account when developing their policy platforms and advertising campaigns. Candidates understand the political and economic differences that exist across states and voters care about candidates’ policies relative to their ideals, about the frequency of candidates’ advertising messages relative to their ideal message frequency, their campaign tolerance level, and vote taking into account their perceptions of candidates’ traits and competencies with their vote also depending on their sociodemographic characteristics. In the local Nash equilibrium, candidates give maximal weight to undecided voters and swing states and little weight to committed voters and states. These endogenous weights pin down candidates’ campaign and depend on the probability with which voters choose each candidate which depends on candidates’ policies and advertising campaigns. Weights vary across candidates’ policy and ad campaigns, reflecting the importance voters in each state give to the two dimensions and the variation in voters’ preferences across states.     

Probabilities of dominant candidates based on first-place votes

Suppose each of an odd number n of voters has a strict preference order on the three ‘candidates’ in {1,2,3} and votes for his most preferred candidate on a plurality ballot. Assume that a voter who votes for i is equally likely to have ijk and ikj as his preference order when {i,j,k} = {1,2,3}.Fix an integer m between $\text{1}\text{2}$(n + 1) and n inclusive. Then, given that n_i of the n voters vote for i, let f_m(n₁,n₂,n₃) be the probability that one of the three candidates is preferred by m or more voters to each of the other two.This paper examines the behavior of f_m over the lattice points in L_n, the set of triples of non-negative integers that sum to n. It identifies the regions in L_n where f_m is 1 and where f_m is 0, then shows that f_m(a,b + 1, c)>f_m(a + 1,b,c) whenever a + b + c + 1 = n, a≤c≤b, a<c<m and c≤n ? m. These results are used to partially identify the points in L_n where f_m is minimized subject to f_m>0. It is shown that at least two of the n_i are equal at minimizing points.     

Condorcet domains of tiling type

A Condorcet domain (CD) is a collection of linear orders on a set of candidates satisfying the following property: for any choice of preferences of voters from this collection, a simple majority rule does not yield cycles. We propose a method of constructing “large” CDs by use of rhombus tiling diagrams and explain that this method unifies several constructions of CDs known earlier. Finally, we show that three conjectures on the maximal sizes of those CDs are, in fact, equivalent and provide a counterexample to them.     

Some estimates of the norm of solutions of nonlinear elliptic eigenvalue problems

We obtain estimates on the possible growth or decay rates as λ → 0 of sup |u^λ|, where uλ ? O satisfies the nonlinear elliptic boundary value problen Lu_λ = λ f(x,u_λ) in a bounded domain subject to homogensous Dirichlet boundary conditions. The estimates generalize existing results by allowing f(x,O) ≠ 0. The analysis is based on integration by parts and Sobolev inequalitie.