Direction monotonicity for a rational Bézier curve

The monotonicity of a rational Bézier curve, usually related to an explicit function,is determined by the used coordinate system. However, the shape of the curve is independent of the coordinate system. To meet the affine invariant property, a kind of generalized monotonicity, called direction monotonicity, is introduced for rational Bézier curves. The direction monotonicity is applied to both planar and space curves and to both Cartesian and affine coordinate systems, and it includes the traditional monotonicity as a subcase. By means of it,proper affine coordinate systems may be chosen to make some rational Bézier curves monotonic.Direction monotonic interpolation may be realized for some of the traditionally nonmonotonic data as well.     

One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

Suppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an election from s alone to t alone, by changing her vote from P _v to P￠_v{P^\prime_{v}} . A voting rule F{\mathcal{F}} is two-way monotonic if such an effect is only possible when v moves t from below s (according to P _v to above s (according to P￠_v{P^\prime_{v}} . One-way monotonicity is the strictly weaker requirement forbidding this effect when v makes the opposite switch, by moving s from below t to above t. Two-way monotonicity is very strong—equivalent over any domain to strategy proofness. One-way monotonicity holds for all sensible voting rules, a broad class including the scoring rules, but no Condorcet extension for four or more alternatives is one-way monotonic. These monotonicities have interpretations in terms of strategy-proofness. For a one-way monotonic rule F{\mathcal{F}} , each manipulation is paired with a positive response, in which F{\mathcal{F}} offers the pivotal voter a strictly better result when she votes sincerely.     

一些特殊函数的完全单调性

欧拉Gamma函数是一种非常重要的函数,在数学的许多分支以及物理、工程等学科中都有着十分重要的作用.而完全单调性以及对数完全单调性是Gamma函数的重要性质.主要证明了一些包含Gamma函数和Psi函数在内的特殊函数的完全单调性和对数完全单调性,并由此推出了一些重要的不等式.     

Preference aggregation and DEA: An analysis of the methods proposed to discriminate efficient candidates

There are different ways to allow the voters to express their preferences on a set of candidates. In ranked voting systems, each voter selects a subset of the candidates and ranks them in order of preference. A well-known class of these voting systems are scoring rules, where fixed scores are assigned to the different ranks and the candidates with the highest score are the winners. One of the most important issues in this context is the choice of the scoring vector, since the winning candidate can vary according to the scores used. To avoid this problem, Cook and Kress [W.D. Cook, M. Kress, A data envelopment model for aggregating preference rankings, Management Science 36 (11) (1990) 1302–1310], using a DEA/AR model, proposed to assess each candidate with the most favorable scoring vector for him/her. However, the use of this procedure often causes several candidates to be efficient, i.e., they achieve the maximum score. For this reason, several methods to discriminate among efficient candidates have been proposed. The aim of this paper is to analyze and show some drawbacks of these methods.     

The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity

It is a well-known fact that in some economic environments, non-bossiness and monotonicity are interrelated. In this paper, we have presented a new domain-richness condition called weak monotonic closedness, on which non-bossiness in conjunction with individual monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity. Moreover, by applying our main result to several types of economies, we have obtained characterizations in terms of non-bossiness.     

An energy-minimization framework for monotonic cubic spline interpolation

This paper describes the use of cubic splines for interpolating monotonic data sets. Interpolating cubic splines are popular for fitting data because they use low-order polynomials and have C² continuity, a property that permits them to satisfy a desirable smoothness constraint. Unfortunately, that same constraint often violates another desirable property: monotonicity. It is possible for a set of monotonically increasing (or decreasing) data points to yield a curve that is not monotonic, i.e., the spline may oscillate. In such cases, it is necessary to sacrifice some smoothness in order to preserve monotonicity.The goal of this work is to determine the smoothest possible curve that passes through its control points while simultaneously satisfying the monotonicity constraint. We first describe a set of conditions that form the basis of the monotonic cubic spline interpolation algorithm presented in this paper. The conditions are simplified and consolidated to yield a fast method for determining monotonicity. This result is applied within an energy minimization framework to yield linear and nonlinear optimization-based methods. We consider various energy measures for the optimization objective functions. Comparisons among the different techniques are given, and superior monotonic C² cubic spline interpolation results are presented. Extensions to shape preserving splines and data smoothing are described.     

On the choice of special Pareto points

Abstract

We propose two strategies for choosing Pareto solutions of constrained multiobjective optimization problems. The first one, for general problems, furnishes balanced optima, i.e. feasible points that, in some sense, have the closest image to the vector whose coordinates are the objective components infima. It consists of solving a single scalar-valued problem, whose objective requires the use of a monotonic function which can be chosen within a large class of functions. The second one, for practical problems for which there is a preference among the objective’s components to be minimized, gives us points that satisfy this order criterion. The procedure requires the sequential minimization of all these functions. We also study other special Pareto solutions, the sub-balanced points, which are a generalization of the balanced optima.     

Multiple-issue bargaining and axiomatic solutions

We study two-person, multiple-issue bargaining problems and identify four procedures by which the bargaining may take place. Drawing on some logic from non-cooperative game theory, we propose axioms which relate the outcomes of the procedures. We also promote a weak monotonicity axiom on solutions, called issue-by-issue monotonicity, which is geared toward multiple-issue bargaining. Our main result concerns the relationship between a sequential bargaining procedure — with the rule that agreements are implemented only after all issues are resolved — and global bargaining (in which all issues are negotiated simultaneously). If a bargaining solution predicts the same outcome with these two procedures, then we say that it satisfiesagenda independence. We prove that a solution satisfies axioms of efficiency, symmetry, scale invariance, issue-by-issue monotonicity, and agenda independence if and only if it is the Nash solution. This result provides new intuition for Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. Among other results, we show that a solution is invariant to all four of the procedures and satisfies efficiency and symmetry if and only if it is the utilitarian solution with equal weights. We comment on the results of other authors who address multiple-issue bargaining.     

An interactive dynamic programming approach to multicriteria discrete programming

Several interactive schemes for solving multicriteria discrete programming problems are developed under a dynamic programming framework. It is assumed that the decision maker's preference structure satisfies the conditions of transitivity, monotonicity, and nonsatiation. Hybrid procedures are also structured by including branch and bound ideas into the recursions. Initial computational results are offered.     

Bounds on Malapportionment

Uniformly sized constituencies give voters similar influence on election outcomes. When constituencies are set up, seats are allocated to the administrative units, such as states or counties, using apportionment methods. According to the impossibility result of Balinski and Young, none of the methods satisfying basic monotonicity properties assign a rounded proportional number of seats (the Hare-quota). We study the malapportionment of constituencies and provide a simple bound as a function of the house size for an important class of divisor methods, a popular, monotonic family of techniques.     

Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core

We characterize a monotonic core solution defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core solutions for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the per capita nucleolus is not monotonic.     

Monotonicity and convexity properties of matrix Riccati equations

Using a Fréchet-derivative-based approach some monotonicity,convexity/concavity and comparison results concerning strictlyunmixed solutions of continuous- and discrete-time algebraicRiccati equations are obtained; it turns out that these solutionsare isolated and smooth functions of the input data. Similarly,it is proved that the solutions of initial value problems forboth Riccati differential and difference equations are smoothand monotonic functions of the input data and of the initial value. They are also convex or concave functions with respectto certain matrix coefficients.     

Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting

I consider a model in which imperfectly informed voters with common interests participate in a multicandidate election decided by either plurality rule or a runoff. Prior to the election, each voter receives a private signal corresponding to the candidate the voter thinks is best. Voters are relatively more likely to think a given candidate is best if the candidate is a relatively better candidate. I show that there is a sequence of equilibrium strategies for the voters such that, as the number of voters goes to infinity, the probability that the best candidate is elected goes to 1. I further show that all candidates receive significant vote shares in any equilibrium in which information fully aggregates under plurality rule and that voters do at least as well when the election is decided by a runoff as they do when the election is decided by plurality rule.     

Universality in two‐dimensional enhancement percolation

We consider a type of dependent percolation introduced in 2 , where it is shown that certain “enhancements” of independent (Bernoulli) percolation, called essential, make the percolation critical probability strictly smaller. In this study we first prove that, for two‐dimensional enhancements with a natural monotonicity property, being essential is also a necessary condition to shift the critical point. We then show that (some) critical exponents and the scaling limit of crossing probabilities of a two‐dimensional percolation process are unchanged if the process is subjected to a monotonic enhancement that is not essential. This proves a form of universality for all dependent percolation models obtained via a monotonic enhancement (of Bernoulli percolation) that does not shift the critical point. For the case of site percolation on the triangular lattice, we also prove a stronger form of universality by showing that the full scaling limit 12 , 13 is not affected by any monotonic enhancement that does not shift the critical point. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Random Struct. Alg., 2008     

Mills' ratio: Monotonicity patterns and functional inequalities

In this paper we study the monotonicity properties of some functions involving the Mills' ratio of the standard normal law. From these we deduce some new functional inequalities involving the Mills' ratio, and we show that the Mills' ratio is strictly completely monotonic. At the end of this paper we present some Turán-type inequalities for Mills' ratio.     

Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism

Kojima and Ünver (forthcoming) are the first to characterize the class of mechanisms coinciding with the Boston mechanism for some priority order. By mildly strengthening their central axiom, we are able to pin down the Boston mechanism outcome for every priority order. Our main result shows that a mechanism is outcome equivalent to the Boston mechanism at every priority if and only if it respects both preference rankings and priorities and satisfies individual rationality for schools. In environments where each student is acceptable to every school, respecting both preference rankings and priorities is enough to characterize the Boston mechanism.     

An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections

We report the results of elections conducted in a laboratory setting, modelled on a threecandidate example due to Borda. By paying subjects conditionally on election outcomes, we create electorates with (publicly) known preferences. We compare the results of experiments with and without non-binding pre-election polls under plurality rule, approval voting, and Borda rule. We also refer to a theory of voting “equilibria,” which makes sharp predictions concerning individual voter behavior and election outcomes. We find that Condorcet losers occasionally win regardless of the voting rule or presence of polls. Duverger's law (which asserts the predominance of two candidates) appears to hold under plurality rule, but close three-way races often arise under approval voting and Borda rule. Voters appear to poll and vote strategically. In elections, voters usually cast votes that are consistent with some strategic equilibrium. By the end of an election series, most votes are consistent with a single equilibrium, although that equilibrium varies by experimental group and voting rule.     

In-betweenness,a geometrical monotonicity property for operator means

We introduce the notions of in-betweenness and monotonicity with respect to a metric for operator means. These notions can be seen as generalising their natural counterpart for scalar means, and as a relaxation of the notion of geodesity. We exhibit two classes of non-trivial means that are monotonic with respect to the Euclidean metric. We also show that all Kubo–Ando means are monotonic with respect to the trace metric, which is the natural metric for the geometric mean.     

Optimality of monotonic policies for two-action Markovian decision processes,with applications to control of queues with delayed information

We consider a discrete-time Markov decision process with a partially ordered state space and two feasible control actions in each state. Our goal is to find general conditions, which are satisfied in a broad class of applications to control of queues, under which an optimal control policy is monotonic. An advantage of our approach is that it easily extends to problems with both information and action delays, which are common in applications to high-speed communication networks, among others. The transition probabilities are stochastically monotone and the one-stage reward submodular. We further assume that transitions from different states are coupled, in the sense that the state after a transition is distributed as a deterministic function of the current state and two random variables, one of which is controllable and the other uncontrollable. Finally, we make a monotonicity assumption about the sample-path effect of a pairwise switch of the actions in consecutive stages. Using induction on the horizon length, we demonstrate that optimal policies for the finite- and infinite-horizon discounted problems are monotonic. We apply these results to a single queueing facility with control of arrivals and/or services, under very general conditions. In this case, our results imply that an optimal control policy has threshold form. Finally, we show how monotonicity of an optimal policy extends in a natural way to problems with information and/or action delay, including delays of more than one time unit. Specifically, we show that, if a problem without delay satisfies our sufficient conditions for monotonicity of an optimal policy, then the same problem with information and/or action delay also has monotonic (e.g., threshold) optimal policies.     

Interval static analysis of multi-cracked beams with uncertain size and position of cracks

This paper deals with beams under static loads, in presence of multiple cracks with uncertain parameters. The crack is modelled as a linearly-elastic rotational spring and, following a non-probabilistic approach, both stiffness and position of the spring are taken as uncertain-but-bounded parameters.A novel approach is proposed to compute the bounds of the response. The key idea is a preliminary monotonicity test, which evaluates sensitivity functions of the beam response with respect to the separate variation of every uncertain parameter within the pertinent interval. Next, two alternative procedures calculate lower and upper bounds of the response. If the response is monotonic with respect to all the uncertain parameters, the bounds are calculated by a straightforward sensitivity-based method making use of the sensitivity functions built in the monotonicity test. In contrast, if the response is not monotonic with respect to even one parameter only, the bounds are evaluated via a global optimization technique. The presented approach applies for every response function and the implementation takes advantage of closed analytical forms for all response variables and related sensitivity functions.Numerical results prove efficiency and robustness of the approach, which provides very accurate bounds even for large uncertainties, avoiding the computational effort required by the vertex method and Monte Carlo simulation.