A two-period game of a closed-loop supply chain

We consider a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) game where a remanufacturer appropriates of the returns’ residual value and decides whether to exclusively manage the end-of-use product collection or to outsource it to either a retailer or a third-service provider (3P). We determine that the manufacturer outsources the product collection only when an outsourcee performs environmentally and operationally better. On the outsourcees side there is always an economic convenience in managing the product returns process exclusively, independently of returns rewards and operational performance. When outsourcing is convenient, a manufacturer always chooses a retailer if the outsourcees show equal performance. Overall, the manufacturer is more sensitive to environmental performance than to operational perfomance. Finally, there exists only a small region inside which outsouring the collection process contributes to the triple bottom line.     

The economics of a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing

This study deals with joint decisions on pricing and production lot-sizing in a closed-loop supply chain consisting of manufacturing and remanufacturing operations. This study emphasizes the economic analysis of this hybrid system with substitution between the new and the remanufactured versions of the same product. We develop analytical models under a newsvendor framework bearing the following questions in mind. Can a hybrid system operate cost-effectively? Can it outperform the manufacturing-only system? If yes, to what extent and under what conditions? If not, what are the key factors that cause underperformance? This study formulates a multi-variable optimization problem and performs mathematical and numerical analysis. Results show that the hybrid system does not outperform the manufacturing-only system under a generic setting, but achieves better performance under conditions with a higher degree of substitution and/or a lower remanufacturing cost. In this scenario, participating in remanufacturing is not only an issue of environmental responsibility, but a profit-boosting option.     

Reverse channel decisions for a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain

This article reports the results of a study that explores the decisions of reverse channel choice in a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain. Specifically, a manufacturer produces new products by using original components or by remanufacturing used products and wholesales the new products to the retailer who then sells them to the consumers. The used products are collected by the manufacturer or the retailer or a third party. The primary goal of this paper is to investigate the implications of three different used-product collection modes on the decisions of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the third party, and on their own profits in the expected value model. By using game theory and fuzzy theory, the firms optimal strategies are obtained.     

Towards integration: a revenue-sharing contract in a supply chain

Email: zhaoqiong.qin{at}erau.edu Received on 31 May 2006. Accepted on 11 December 2006. This paper deals with the problem of a revenue-sharing contractadopted in a supply chain involving one supplier and one retailerwith short life-cycle products. Under this contract, the retailercan obtain the product from the supplier at a discounted pricewhile as a compensation, the retailer must share his revenuewith the supplier at a certain revenue-sharing rate, say r (0 r 1), where r represents the portion of the revenue to bekept by the retailer. We use a two-stage (Stackelberg) gameto model the problem, where one player is the game's leaderand the other the game's follower. Our ultimate objective isto maximize the overall supply chain's total profit, and toshow the effects of salvage revenue and the revenue-sharingrate on transfer cost rate, profit of the supplier and retailerand the overall supply chain's total profit while upholdingthe individual components’ incentives. Our analysis exhibitsthat the case in which salvage revenue is not shared is preferredand the computational results to explore the effects of therevenue-sharing rate lead to many managerial insights regardingthe leader of the game.     

Dual-channel closed-loop supply chain with government consumption-subsidy

The government has been acting as an important role in the formation and operation of closed-loop supply chain. This paper focuses on how consumption-subsidy influences dual-channel closed-loop supply chain. After introducing government consumption-subsidy program and dual-channel closed-loop supply chain, the paper analyzes the channel members’ decisions before and after the government-funded program performance, respectively. Finally, influence of consumption-subsidy has been considered from the consumers, the scale of closed-loop supply chain and the enterprises perspectives, which provides an important basis for our propositions. The key propositions of the paper are listed as follows: All the consumers that purchase the new products are beneficiaries of the government consumption-subsidy in varying degrees; the consumption-subsidy is conducive to the expansion of closed-loop supply chain; both the manufacturer and the retailer are beneficiaries of the consumption-subsidy, while the e-tailer benefits or not is uncertain.     

Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry

This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer’s private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer’s optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members.     

A coordinating contract for transshipment in a two-company supply chain

We study a supply chain with two independent companies producing an identical product and cooperating through transshipment. Previous studies of this chain show that only under certain conditions, linear transshipment prices could be found that induce the companies to choose the first best production quantities. Moreover, even if such transshipment prices do exist, they result in a unique division of total expected profit and thus they cannot accommodate arbitrary divisions of the profit. Using the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, we derive coordinating transshipment prices that always give rise to a coordinating contract for the chain. This contract relies on an implicit pricing mechanism.     

Capacitated dynamic lot sizing problems in closed-loop supply chain

In this paper, we address the capacitated dynamic lot sizing problem arising in closed-loop supply chain where returned products are collected from customers. These returned products can either be disposed or be remanufactured to be sold as new ones again; hence the market demands can be satisfied by either newly produced products or remanufactured ones. The capacities of production, disposal and remanufacturing are limited, and backlogging is not allowed. A general model of this problem is formulated, and several useful properties of the problem are characterized when cost functions are concave. Moreover, this problem is analyzed and solved to optimality using dynamic programming algorithms under different scenarios. It is shown that the problem with only disposal or remanufacturing can be converted into a traditional capacitated lot sizing problem and be solved by a polynomial algorithm if the capacities are constant. A pseudo-polynomial algorithm is proposed for the problem with both capacitated disposal and remanufacturing. The problem with capacitated production and remanufacturing and the problem with uncapacitated production and capacitated remanufacturing are also analyzed and solved. Through numerical experiments we show that the proposed algorithms perform well when solving problems of practical sizes. From the experimental results also indicates that it is worthwhile to expand the remanufacturing capacity only when returned products exist in a relatively long planning horizon, and production capacities have little effect on the remanufacturing plan when the demand is mainly satisfied by the production.     

Robust environmental closed-loop supply chain design under uncertainty

With the fast developments in product remanufacturing to improve economic and environmental performance, an environmental closed-loop supply (ECLSC) chain is important for enterprises' competitiveness. In this paper, a robust ECLSC network is investigated which includes multiple plants, collection centers, demand zones, and products, and consists of both forward and reverse supply chains. First, a robust multi-objective mixed integer nonlinear programming model is proposed to deal with ECLSC considering two conflicting objectives simultaneously, as well as the uncertain nature of the supply chain. Cost parameters of the supply chain and demand fluctuations are subject to uncertainty. The first objective function aims to minimize the economical cost and the second objective function is to minimize the environmental influence. Then, the proposed model is solved as a single-objective mixed integer programming model applying the LP-metrics method. Finally, numerical example has been presented to test the model. The results indicate that the proposed model is applicable in practice.     

Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

This paper investigates a wholesale-price contract of supply chain under the endogenous information structure. This supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer during the selling season. The retailer does not know his selling cost but can spend resources to acquire information. The supplier offers a contract, which induces the retailer to gather information and generate more production orders with beta costs. We find that there exists an upper bound of the information gathering cost such that the supplier induces the retailer to gather information. The increasing cost of information gathering may decrease the order quantity and wholesale price. Moreover, the cost beta has an impact on the expected profits of the two parties. With the increasing cost of information gathering, the supplier’s expected profit is reduced, while that of the retailer becomes ambiguous in terms of the distribution function and the interval of selling cost information. Finally, a numerical example is presented to explain the main results.     

An optimization model for traceable closed-loop supply chain networks

In this paper, a new non-linear mixed-integer mathematical programming problem is proposed to model a stochastic multi-product closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The radio frequency identification (RFID) system is implemented in the supply chain to decrease product losses and the overall lead time of transportation while computing the profit derived from internet and conventional sales. The resulting traceable CLSC improves upon the existing literature by allowing us to: (1) boost the incorporation of traceability assumptions in mathematical programming problems so as to enhance the efficiency and visibility of a supply chain, (2) analyze the strategic effects that different internet sale formats have on customers’ evaluations and acquisition choices, and (3) account for the environmental and socio-economical dimension by explicitly formalizing employment-based incomes as part of the profit function. Two meta-heuristic algorithms are introduced to solve the proposed optimization problem, namely, the greedy randomized adaptive search procedure (GRASP) and particle swarm optimization (PSO). Twelve test problems of different sizes are generated and solved using these algorithms. The computational results show that GRASP outperforms PSO in terms of both profit and CPU time values. Finally, a case study in the network marketing industry is presented and managerial implications outlined to show the validity of the proposed model and shed more light on its practical implications.     

Quality uncertainty and quality-compensation contract for supply chain coordination

Many firms often face quality problems, even though quality improvement has long been a competitive imperative for performance enhancement. When suppliers are the sources of quality problems, prior literature has focused on sustaining a buyer’s competitiveness given the suppliers’ quality uncertainty. Surprisingly, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to quality uncertainty from a coordination perspective. On the other hand, the literature on channel coordination has not considered quality uncertainty in designing a contract of alliance. We bridge the gap between these two streams of literature by explicitly considering quality uncertainty in a coordination framework. In contrast to the coordination literature, we show that channel integration may result in smaller order quantity and less accurate inspection than in a decentralized supply chain if product quality is uncertain. We examine the two most extensively discussed contracts for coordination, buybacks and revenue-sharing, in the presence of quality uncertainty, and find that these two contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain. We then propose a new scheme, the quality-compensation contract, in which the manufacturer compensates the retailer for defective products that are inadvertently sold to consumers, and analytically show that the contract fully coordinates the supply chain.     

Pricing and strategy selection in a closed-loop supply chain under demand and return rate uncertainty

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) decision-making involves many uncertainties, which makes the decision-making process more complex and diversified. This study considered a two-stage CLSC consisting of an original manufacturer and a third-party recycler. Without any government policy support, considering the effects of market demand, product return rate, and consumer perceived value, a CLSC decision model based on market demand with a [0,1] distribution was established. The model analyzes three situations—a manufacturer monopoly, the Cournot duopoly game, and the Stackelberg competition game—and solves them. The optimal values of decision variables such as optimal pricing, market demand, and all parties’ profits in the CLSC are obtained, and a strict mathematical proof is given. Through the model-solving process, the effects of product return rate and consumer perceived value on decision variables are analyzed; then, the profit allocation between the original manufacturer and the third-party recycler under different cooperation modes is analyzed. In addition, the four combinations of competition and cooperation are analyzed based on game theory. The Nash equilibrium solution and Pareto optimal solution of the four modes are analyzed by drawing a bimatrix Nash equilibrium table. The results indicate that the cooperation–cooperation mode is difficult to produce automatically, and government policy guidance and support are often needed to achieve Pareto optimality. Finally, a numerical example is given to validate the proposed model. In this way, the proposed model provides reliable theoretical support for the decision-making of both sides in a CLSC.

     

An incentive model for closed-loop supply chain under the EPR law

Motivated by the collection outsourcing phenomena under Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), this paper studies a contract design problem for a manufacturer who consigns the used product collection to a collector, while the manufacturer only has incomplete information on the collector's cost. On the basis of the incentive theory, optimal contracts are developed to minimize the cost and satisfy the collection constraints prescribed by EPR. Properties of the contract parameters are derived, and issues such as information rent and information value are also explored. The impacts of EPR are analysed by comparing whether or not EPR law is implemented, and more managerial insights are further obtained through numerical examples.     

Nonlinear modeling and performance analysis of a closed-loop supply chain in the presence of stochastic noise

ABSTRACT

We study four-echelon supply chains consisting of manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer and customer with recovery center as hybrid recycling channels. In order to gain a larger market share, the retailer often takes the sales as a decision-making variable. For this purpose, in this supply chain, the retailer limits the forecast of market demand in future periods with expected logic. It also manages demand by leveraging prices and choosing market. In this paper, first, we investigate the state-space model of this supply chain system and examine the effect of complex dynamic and stochastic noise on the bullwhip effect. We analytically prove that this factor leads to the bullwhip effect. So, first, we filtered the information between nodes with extended Kalman filter after which we regulated the destructive effects of the bullwhip phenomenon by designing a non-linear quadratic Gaussian optimal controller. Eventually, the simulation results indicate the efficiency of the proposed method.     

A facility location model for global closed-loop supply chain network design

Forward and reverse supply chains form a closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model is proposed for a closed-loop supply chain network by considering global factors, including exchange rates and customs duties. The model is a multi-objective mixed-integer linear programming model under uncertain demand. A solution approach based on fuzzy programming is developed for solving the optimization problem. The model is then applied in a network, which is located in Southwestern Ontario, Canada. A sensitivity analysis is provided to validate the model. This model considers global factors, multi-objectives, and uncertainty simultaneously in a closed-loop supply chain network.     

Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract under random demand

In this paper, we are concerned with the coordinating quantity decision problem in a supply chain contract. The supply chain contract is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer to meet the random demand of a single product with a short lifecycle. Our analysis show that the retailer expects to obtain higher profit under proper ordering policies, which can also maximize the expected profit of the supply chain. The manufacturer may induce the retailer to order the coordinated quantity by adjusting the unit return price. As a result, the supply chain is expected to achieve the optimal expected profit.     

A robust optimization approach to closed-loop supply chain network design under uncertainty

The concern about significant changes in the business environment (such as customer demands and transportation costs) has spurred an interest in designing scalable and robust supply chains. This paper proposes a robust optimization model for handling the inherent uncertainty of input data in a closed-loop supply chain network design problem. First, a deterministic mixed-integer linear programming model is developed for designing a closed-loop supply chain network. Then, the robust counterpart of the proposed mixed-integer linear programming model is presented by using the recent extensions in robust optimization theory. Finally, to assess the robustness of the solutions obtained by the novel robust optimization model, they are compared to those generated by the deterministic mixed-integer linear programming model in a number of realizations under different test problems.     

Trade credit contract with limited liability in the supply chain with budget constraints

The paper investigates the impacts of trade credit (i.e., open account payment) and limited liability on the performance of a two-level supply chain with budget constraints. It shows that limited liability accounts for the reason why the retailer with a lower initial budget initiates a higher ordering level under trade credit contract. Furthermore, this paper finds that trade credit contract could create value in a supply chain with budget constraints, and partly coordinate the supply chain.