共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 78 毫秒
1.
2.
本文研究了非合作-合作双型博弈模型求解的问题.首先利用于α-CIS值,求解非合作-合作双型博弈中的合作博弈阶段,再对非合作博弈阶段求其纯策略纳什均衡,获得了基于α-CIS值的双型博弈的一种新的求解方法.推广了原始双型博弈模型的求解方法并证明其可行性. 相似文献
3.
4.
本文研究了一类连续博弈解的存在性及稳定性.利用BNN动力学理论和方法,将演化博弈论中的几个经典例子:鹰-鸽博弈、协调博弈和猜硬币博弈转化为连续型支付函数的连续博弈后,获得了鹰-鸽连续博弈的Nash平衡点是演化稳定和连续稳定的,推广了文献[8]中关于演化博弈Nash平衡点及稳定性结果. 相似文献
5.
研究了在包含一个供应商和两个零售商的供应链中的广告博弈协调问题.将该问题构造为一个两层次的博弈:供应商与零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈以及零售商之间的合作博弈.供应商作为整个供应链上的主导者,拥有产品批发价和零售价的决策权,而零售商则通过在当地市场上的广告促销投入来影响需求,进而影响整个供应链的收益.研究发现,供应商可以通过简单地设定适当的批发价来影响零售商的广告促销投入,从而使得整个供应链实现最大收益. 相似文献
6.
宏观经济政策之间的协调及其调控收益的分配实际上可看做n人合作博弈.通过构造宏观政策组合的二人TU博弈模型,分析了政策组合的调控力度、收益及其分配比例值的相互关系,并重新构建政策组合调控总收益的特征函数,把宏观政策协调的二人TU博弈分析依次扩展至n人TU博弈情形和NTU博弈情形,给出相应的政策调控收益分配的Shapley值,提出确定宏观政策组合中各项政策调控的参与力度的具体办法,有效地解释了加强政策协调配合的宏观调控精神,对宏观调控实践具有一定的指导意义. 相似文献
7.
8.
基于和谐发展的政府主管部门与旅游开发商博弈分析 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:3
在构建和谐旅游的过程中,政府主管部门与旅游开发商之间在面对公共资源的保护与监督方面存在着博弈关系。通过对其静态博弈模型和动态博弈模型的分析研究,认为在构建和谐旅游的过程中,博弈各方参与人应该共同合作,严格履行各自职责,统筹各种社会资源,综合解决社会协调发展问题。 相似文献
9.
矩阵博弈的胜利度和“僵局” 总被引:17,自引:4,他引:13
矩阵博弈又称有限对抗博弈,而对抗博弈的结果必是一方胜利,失败或双方和局,本首先给出胜利、失败和和局的数学模型,接着给出描述胜利程度的概念-胜利度并讨论了胜利度的几个简单性质,依此分析了传统矩阵博弈出现“僵局”的原因并指出排除“僵局”的方法。 相似文献
10.
11.
三人博弈问题的模型和一种解法的修正 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
简要叙述了三个擂台赛博弈问题,指出解法[1]的错误所在,其一是将无限延伸的博弈树以有限的形式看待,其二是概率计算过程与结果错误,提出一种新的解法,并比较了结果的大小。 相似文献
12.
This note enlarges the literature on convex fuzzy games with new characterizing properties of such games besides the increasing
average marginal return property, namely: the monotonicity of the first partial derivatives, the directional convexity and
forC
2-functions the non-negativity of the second order partial derivatives. 相似文献
13.
We will introduce the notation of the generalized reduced game to unify the representations for maximal subclasses of the classes of essential games (superadditive games and convex games) that are closed under reduction in the sense of Sobolev (1975), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), and Moulin (1985), respectively. 相似文献
14.
15.
We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.This research was partly funded by the College Engineering, Ohio State University. 相似文献
16.
Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Rodica Brânzei Vito Fragnelli Stef Tijs 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2002,55(1):93-106
17.
18.
We examine the connections between a novel class of multi-person stopping games with redistribution of payoffs and multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs in discrete- and continuous-time frameworks. Our goal is to provide an essential extension of classic results for two-player stopping games (Dynkin games) to the multi-player framework. We show the link between certain multi-period m-player stopping games and a new kind of m-dimensional reflected BSDEs. The existence and uniqueness of a solution to continuous-time reflected BSDEs are established. Continuous-time redistribution games are constructed with the help of reflected BSDEs and a characterization of the value of such stopping games is provided. 相似文献
19.
约束商品经营者做虚假广告的两种博弈分析 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
广告是消费者了解商品的种类、价格和性能的重要信息途径 ,也是商品经营者重要的营销手段 .但是 ,目前社会上存在着商品经营者做虚假广告以追求超额利润的现象 .本文从政府监督部门与商品经营者之间、消费者与商品经营者之间的关系出发 ,对约束经营者做虚假广告作出博弈分析 ,并进一步讨论了消费者和经营者的多阶段 (无限次重复 )博弈等情况 相似文献