凸对策核仁的非空性及合成凸对策核仁的单调性

本文给出了核仁与核及最小核心之间的关系 ,且证明了凸对策核仁的存在性和唯一性 ,证明了凸对策的合成对策仍是凸对策 .最后 ,我们讨论了合成凸对策的核仁不满足单调性 .     

模糊合作对策核心的公理化

本文主要研究模糊合作对策的核心,讨论了核心的限制非空性,个体合理性,递归对策性,逆递归对策,超可加性,反单调性,模性等性质.最后用限制非空性,个体合理性,递归对策性和超可加性等公理刻画了核心,证明了核心存在的唯一性。     

临界情况下模糊矩阵对策的性质

讨论临界情况下模糊矩阵对策的性抽，对模型问题各种情况给出了临界值c*的定义，证明了当d(f1,f2)＜ε≤c*时，模糊矩阵对策模型问题关于价值函数f1(x)、f2(x)具有连续依赖性和可调和性。     

网上平衡对策与流向对策值的存在性

在一个网络上可以赋以流量，网上每一个孤可以与一个Ｎ人对策的局中人相对应，有了这种对应之后，我们证明了任何一个可加性对策都是流向对策，且证明了如果Ｖ１，Ｖ２是流向对策，则ｍｉｍ｛Ｖ１，Ｖ２｝也是流向对策．在此基础上，我们证明了θ－全平衡对策是流向对策这一主要定理．最后，我们成功地构造了一个很简单的例子说明了此定理的逆命题不成立．这是其它文献［１，２，３，４］中都没有明确指出的结论．关于θ－全平衡对策与流向对策的关系．目前来看我们的结果是较好的结果［９］．     

广义特征函数下合作对策的т值

本文主要研究广义特征函数下的合作对策,并定义了广义特征函数下合作对策的Τ值,同时讨论了Τ值的个体合理性,哑元性和可替代性等性质.并用概率有效性,S均衡下的相对不变性和限制成比例性证明了Τ值的存在唯-性.最后,讨论了核心和Τ值的关系.特别地,广义特征函数下的合作对策的Τ值是经典合作对策的Τ值的推广.     

含两时滞捕食-被捕食系统的稳定性及分歧

本文研究一类含两相异时滞的捕食－被捕食系统的稳定性及分歧。首先，我们讨论两相异时滞对系统唯一正平衡点的稳定性的影响，通过对系数与时滞有关的特征方程的分析，建立了一种稳定性判别性。其次，将一个时滞看成分歧参数，而另一个看作固定参数，我们证明了该系统具有HOPF分歧特性。最后，我们讨论了分歧解的稳定性。     

一类双重退化抛物方程重整化解的稳定性

讨论了一类有双重退化性的抛物方程的Cauchy问题,并基于Kruzhkov技术,证明了重整化解的稳定性.     

集合对策中值的标准性与分配方案的单调性

本文介绍了合作对策中一种新的类型一集合对策，讨论了集合对策中三种分配方案的性质，证明了边缘贡献值和联盟力量值具有二人分配的标准性与分配方案的单调性，而共享边缘贡献值仅具有分配方案的单调性．     

区间合作对策核心存在性的进一步讨论

区间合作对策,是研究当联盟收益值为区间数情形时如何进行合理收益分配的数学模型。近年来,其解的存在性与合理性等问题引起了国内外专家的广泛关注。区间核心,是区间合作对策中一个非常稳定的集值解概念。本文首先针对区间核心的存在性进行深入的讨论,通过引入强非均衡,极小强均衡,模单调等概念,从不同角度给出判别区间核心存在性的充分条件。其次,通过引入相关参数,定义了广义区间核心,并给出定理讨论了区间核心与广义区间核心的存在关系。本文的结论将为进一步推动区间合作对策的发展,为解决区间不确定情形下的收益分配问题奠定理论基础。     

拟阵限制下合作对策解的传递性

Vincent Feltkamp研究了Shapley解和Banzhaf解的公理性．Bilbao等人又对拟阵限制下的Shapley解的性质进行了讨论．本文在此基础上主要研究了拟阵限制下的合作对策Shapley解，并利用传递性、交换性、概率有效性和P-哑元性等四条公理证明了拟阵限制下合作对策Shapley解的唯一性．进而证明了拟阵限制条件下简单对策Shapley解的唯一性．最后给出了拟阵限制下合作对策的Banzhaf解的唯一性定理．     

Assignment games with stable core

We prove that the core of an assignment game (a two-sided matching game with transferable utility as introduced by Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is stable (i.e., it is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern solution) if and only if there is a matching between the two types of players such that the corresponding entries in the underlying matrix are all row and column maximums. We identify other easily verifiable matrix properties and show their equivalence to various known sufficient conditions for core-stability. By these matrix characterizations we found that on the class of assignment games, largeness of the core, extendability and exactness of the game are all equivalent conditions, and strictly imply the stability of the core. In turn, convexity and subconvexity are equivalent, and strictly imply all aformentioned conditions. Final version: April 1, 2001     

Algorithms for core stability,core largeness,exactness, and extendability of flow games

We study core stability and some related properties of flow games defined on simple networks (all edge capacities are equal) from an algorithmic point of view. We first present a sufficient and necessary condition that can be tested efficiently for a simple flow game to have a stable core. We also prove the equivalence of the properties of core largeness, extendability, and exactness of simple flow games and provide an equivalent graph theoretic characterization which allows us to decide these properties in polynomial time.     

基于平均树值的无圈图博弈有效解

本文对无圈图博弈进行了研究,考虑了大联盟收益不小于各分支收益之和的情况。通过引入剩余公平分配性质,也就是任意两个分支联盟的平均支付变化相等,给出了一个基于平均树值的无圈图博弈有效解。同时,结合有效性和分支公平性对该有效解进行了刻画。特别地,若无圈图博弈满足超可加性时,证明了该有效解一定是核中的元素,说明此时的解是稳定的。最后,通过一案例分析了该有效解的特点,即越大的分支分得的剩余越多,并且关键参与者,也就是具有较大度的参与者可获得相对多的支付。     

A solitaire game played on 2-colored graphs

We introduce a solitaire game played on a graph. Initially one disk is placed at each vertex, one face green and the other red, oriented with either color facing up. Each move of the game consists of selecting a vertex whose disk shows green, flipping over the disks at neighboring vertices, and deleting the selected vertex. The game is won if all vertices are eliminated. We derive a simple parity-based necessary condition for winnability of a given game instance. By studying graph operations that construct new graphs from old ones, we obtain broad classes of graphs where this condition also suffices, thus characterizing the winnable games on such graphs. Concerning two familiar (but narrow) classes of graphs, we show that for trees a game is winnable if and only if the number of green vertices is odd, and for n-cubes a game is winnable if and only if the number of green vertices is even and not all vertices have the same color. We provide a linear-time algorithm for deciding winnability for games on maximal outerplanar graphs. We reduce the decision problem for winnability of a game on an arbitrary graph G to winnability of games on its blocks, and to winnability on homeomorphic images of G obtained by contracting edges at 2-valent vertices.     

边赋权图对策Myerson值的和分解

2003年,Gómez等在考虑社会网络中心性度量时,引入了对称对策上Myerson值的和分解概念,本文将这一概念推广到边赋权图对策上,给出了相应于边赋权图对策的组内Myerson值和组间Myerson值。其中边的权表示这条边的两个端点之间的直接通讯容量,组内Myerson值衡量了每个参与者来自它所在联盟的收益,而组间Myerson值评估了参与者作为其他参与者中介所获取的收益。本文侧重分析了边赋权图对策的组内Myerson值和组间Myerson值的权稳定性和广义稳定性, 并给出了这两类值的刻画。     

Computing solutions for matching games

A matching game is a cooperative game (N, v) defined on a graph G = (N, E) with an edge weighting w: E? \mathbb R₊{w: E\to {\mathbb R}_+}. The player set is N and the value of a coalition S í N{S \subseteq N} is defined as the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph induced by S. First we present an O(nm + n ² log n) algorithm that tests if the core of a matching game defined on a weighted graph with n vertices and m edges is nonempty and that computes a core member if the core is nonempty. This algorithm improves previous work based on the ellipsoid method and can also be used to compute stable solutions for instances of the stable roommates problem with payments. Second we show that the nucleolus of an n-player matching game with a nonempty core can be computed in O(n ⁴) time. This generalizes the corresponding result of Solymosi and Raghavan for assignment games. Third we prove that is NP-hard to determine an imputation with minimum number of blocking pairs, even for matching games with unit edge weights, whereas the problem of determining an imputation with minimum total blocking value is shown to be polynomial-time solvable for general matching games.     

偶匹配可扩性的极图问题(英文)

设G是含有完美匹配的简单图.称图G是偶匹配可扩的(BM-可扩的),如果G的每一个导出子图是偶图的匹配M都可以扩充为一个完美匹配.极图问题是图论的核心问题之一.本文将刻画极大偶匹配不可扩图,偶图图类和完全多部图图类中的极大偶匹配可扩图.     

图博弈的过程比例解

本文对具有图结构合作博弈（图博弈）进行了研究，采用比例原则和过程化分配方法，定义了比例分配过程，并对其性质进行了分析。随后，针对比例分配过程的超有效情况，运用等比例妥协的方式给出满足有效性的过程比例解，并研究了稳定性。最后，将比例分配过程与过程比例解应用到破产问题中，得到图博弈过程比例解与破产问题比例规则等价的结论。     

On the core of information graph games

This paper considers a subclass of minimum cost spanning tree games, called information graph games. It is proved that the core of these games can be described by a set of at most 2n — 1 linear constraints, wheren is the number of players. Furthermore, it is proved that each information graph game has an associated concave information graph game, which has the same core as the original game. Consequently, the set of extreme core allocations of an information graph game is characterized as the set of marginal allocation vectors of its associated concave game. Finally, it is proved that all extreme core allocations of an information graph game are marginal allocation vectors of the game itself, though not all marginal allocation vectors need to be core allocations.