共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Christian Piller 《Acta Analytica》2006,21(2):87-102
I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not
be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker
notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason
for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s
general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles. 相似文献
2.
Vojko Strahovnik 《Acta Analytica》2004,19(33):189-208
The problem of aesthetic principles and that of the nature of aesthetic reasons get confronted. If aesthetic reasons play
an important role in our aesthetic evaluations and judgments, then both some general aesthetic principles and rules could
support them (aesthetic generalism) or again their nature may be particularistic (aesthetic particularism). A recent argument
in support of aesthetic generalism as proposed by Oliver Conolly and Bashshar Haydar is presented and criticized for its misapprehension
of particularism. Their position of irreversible aesthetic generalism is questioned. Aesthetic particularism is restated by
the help of proposals by Jonathan Dancy’s version of moral particularism. 相似文献
3.
Manuel Hernández-Iglesias 《Acta Analytica》2006,21(2):71-86
This paper is a defence of a holistic version of the generalist view of moral reasoning based on prima facie principles. In Section 1 I summarise Dancy’s arguments for particularism. Then I argue that particularism goes against strong intuitions regarding reasoning in general (Section 2), fails to account for the asymmetry of reasons (Section 3) and to make sense of compunction and moral imbecility (Section 4). I conclude (Section 5) that a holistic generalism is the right view of moral reasoning. Then I discuss Dancy’s objections to it. I argue that Dancy’s appeal to default reasons is philosophically equivalent to a holistic version of generalism, and hence incompatible with particularism (Section 6) and that his resistance to accept holistic generalism is the result of a foundationalist view of reasoning (Section 7). As an alternative to foundationalism I defend an Aristotelian dialectical view of moral reasoning. 相似文献
4.
James O. Young 《Acta Analytica》2002,17(2):121-132
The correspondence theory of truth holds that each true sentence corresponds to a discrete fact. Donald Davidson and others
have argued (using an argument that has come to be known as the slingshot) that this theory is mistaken, since all true sentences
correspond to the same “Great Fact.” The argument is designed to show that by substituting logically equivalent sentences
and coreferring terms for each other in the context of sentences of the form ‘P corresponds to the fact that P’ every true
sentence can be shown to correspond to the same facts as every other true sentence. The claim is that all substitution of
logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms takes place salva veritate. I argue that the substitution of coreferring terms in this context need not preserve truth. The slingshot fails to refute
the correspondence theory. 相似文献
5.
Benedict Smith 《Acta Analytica》2006,21(2):12-29
According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature
of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles
in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a ‘perceptual’
metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of
atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred
account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our
moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities. 相似文献
6.
Anders Strand 《Metaphysica》2007,8(1):61-78
In his latest book Physicalism, or Something near Enough, Jaegwon Kim argues that his version of functional reductionism is the most promising way for saving mental causation. I argue, on the other hand, that there is an internal tension in his position: Functional reductionism does not save mental causation if Kim’s own supervenience argument is sound. My line of reasoning has the following steps: (1) I discuss the supervenience argument and I explain how it motivates Kim’s functional reductionism; (2) I present what I call immense multiple realization, which says that macro-properties are immensely multiply realized in determinate micro-based properties; (3) on that background I argue that functional reductionism leads to a specified kind of irrealism for mental properties. Assuming that such irrealism is part of Kim’s view, which Kim himself seems to acknowledge, I argue that Kim’s position gets the counterfactual dependencies between macro-causal relata wrong. Consequently, his position does not give a conservative account of mental causation. I end the paper by discussing some alternative moves that Kim seems to find viable in his latest book. I argue on the assumption that the supervenience argument is sound, so the discussion provides further reasons to critically reevaluate that argument because it generalizes in deeply problematic ways. 相似文献
7.
Ferenc Huoranszki 《Acta Analytica》2002,17(1):79-102
Argument for fatalism attempts to prove that free choice is a logical or conceptual impossibility. The paper argues that the first two premises of the argument are sound: propositions are either true or false and they have their truth-value eternally. But the claim that from the fatalistic premises with the introduction of some innocent further premise dire consequences follow as regards to the possibility of free choice is false. The introduced premise, which establishes the connection between the first two premises (which are about the nature of propositions) and the concept of free choice is not innocent. It creates the impression that the truth of certain propositions can somehow determine the occurrence of certain events. But no proposition can have such an effect since the counterfactuals “If proposition P were true, event E would happen” does not say anything about determination. The argument for fatalism is, however, not a boring sophism. It does reveal something about the nature of propositional representation. It shows that each proposition represents necessarily the fact what it represents, i.e. it shows that propositions have their truth conditions non-contingently. But from this nothing follows as regards to the contingent nature of the facts represented. On the bases of the first two premises of the argument for fatalism we cannot infer to the impossibility of free choice. The argument for fatalism should not be interpreted as an attempt to prove on purely logical or conceptual grounds that we do not have the ability to influence future events by our choices. But it could be used to show something about the nature of propositional representation. 相似文献
8.
Nenad Miščević 《Acta Analytica》2006,21(1):4-32
The paper examines three tenets of Dancy's meta-ethics, finds them incompatible, and proposes a response-dependentist (or response-dispositional) solution. The first tenet is the central importance of thick concepts and properties. The second is that such concepts essentially involve response(s) of observers, which Dancy interprets in a way that fits the pattern of context-dependent resultance: thick concepts are well suited for the particularist grounding of moral theory. However, and this is the third tenet, in his earlier paper (1986) Dancy forcefully argues against response-dispositional accounts of moral concepts and properties. The present paper argues that an anti-dispositional view is incompatible with the first two points concerning thick concepts. If thick concepts and properties are paramount and ubiquitous in moral thought and reality, and if they are essentially tied to human responses, then anti-dispositionalism is false. Dancy himself avoids obvious contradiction by characterizing thick items (concepts) differently from the usual characterization of response-dependent items. Actions that satisfy thick concepts do so in virtue of meriting a determinate response. The (non-reductionist) response-dependentist usually puts it slightly differently: such actions satisfy a given moral concepts in virtue of eliciting a merited response. I have argued at length that this tenuous difference in formulation is too weak to support a relevant difference in rebus. If the argument is right, Dancy is implicitly committed to a kind of response-dependentism. Finally, the particularist should embrace thick concepts and properties, and reject anti-dispositionalism. However, this would bring back the analogy with color and other secondary qualities. Since there are ceteris paribus laws governing such properties, the analogy suggests that moral properties might also be best accounted for by a ceteris paribus, or hedged account, a compromise between traditional generalism and the particularism of Dancy's variety. 相似文献
9.
Julien Beillard 《Metaphysica》2010,11(2):181-190
Nulty proposes a “Davidsonian” argument for metaphysical pluralism, the thesis that there are (or could be) many actual worlds, which appeals to the possibility of alien forms of triangulation. I dispute Nulty’s reading of Davidson on two important points: Davidson’s attack on the notion of a conceptual scheme is not, as Nulty thinks, directed at pluralism, and his understanding of the notions of objective truth and reality is at odds with the conception needed for Nulty’s argument. I also show that the pluralist argument fails on its own terms as it requires an assimilation of worlds to worldviews. But there is much of value in Nulty’s paper despite these important flaws. When the confusions are cleared up, we are left with an intriguing and novel line of argument for conceptual relativism. 相似文献
10.
Alastair Norcross 《Acta Analytica》2005,20(2):80-90
If, as I have argued elsewhere, consequentialism is not fundamentally concerned with such staples of moral theory as rightness, duty, obligation, moral requirements, goodness (as applied to actions), and harm, what, if anything, does it have to say about such notions? While such notions have no part to play at the deepest level of the theory, they may nonetheless be of practical significance. By way of explanation I provide a linguistic contextualist account of these notions. A contextualist approach to all these notions makes room for them in ordinary moral discourse, but it also illustrates why there is no room for them at the level of fundamental moral theory. If the truth value of a judgment that an action is right or good varies according to the context in which it is made, then rightness or goodness can no more be properties of actions themselves than thisness or hereness can be properties of things or locations themselves. 相似文献
11.
Warren Shrader 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(3):257-271
This paper is an investigation into the nature of physicalism as well as to the possibility of formulating physicalism as
a supervenience thesis. First, I review the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizes physicalism.
Second, I briefly survey the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or, in some cases, as necessary
and sufficient) for physicalism. Third, I analyze the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded
upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson claims the supervenience thesis is both necessary and sufficient for physicalism; Witmer has
proposed a different interpretation of one of the Jackson’s key notions and has suggested an amended supervenience thesis
that is, if not sufficient, at least necessary for physicalism. However, I will argue that neither Jackson’s nor Witmer’s
supervenience theses as stated are necessary for physicalism.
相似文献
Warren ShraderEmail: |
12.
Jorn Sonderholm 《Metaphysica》2011,12(1):45-50
Jeff Wisdom has recently defended the proposition that any view of moral supervenience worth its salt must incorporate a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Let us call the proposition defended by Wisdom “p.” In this paper, I try to show that Wisdom has offered no good reasons for accepting p. My argumentative strategy proceeds along two separate tracks. First, I try to show that the thought experiment Wisdom employs in order to underwrite p does not offer the intended support for the proposition. Secondly, I try to show that even if the problems with the thought experiment in question are ignored, there is at least one other reason for thinking that Wisdom has not offered a convincing argument in favor of p. 相似文献
13.
14.
The idea that truth is the aim of justification is one that is often defended by theorists who uphold different views about the nature of epistemic justification. Despite its prevalence, however, it is not quite clear how one is to cash out the metaphor that justification aims at truth. Some theorists, for example, have objected that the thesis would leave no room for justified false beliefs and unjustified true beliefs. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for justification to aim at truth using the recently revived idea of difference-making according to which facts often make a difference to other facts. It will be argued that, thus understood, the thesis can illuminate a number of controversial debates in epistemology and that, given its explanatory power, it has a lot to recommend it. 相似文献
15.
Clayton Littlejohn 《Acta Analytica》2013,28(2):145-159
If evidence is propositional, is one’s evidence limited to true propositions or might false propositions constitute evidence? In this paper, I consider three recent attempts to show that there can be ‘false evidence,’ and argue that each of these attempts fails. The evidence for the thesis that evidence consists of truths is much stronger than the evidence offered in support of the theoretical assumptions that people have relied on to argue against this thesis. While I shall not defend the view that evidence is propositional, I shall defend the view that any propositional evidence must be true. 相似文献
16.
Timothy J. Nulty 《Metaphysica》2009,10(1):123-134
Davidson’s 1974 argument denying the possibility of incommensurable conceptual schemes is widely interpreted as entailing a denial of metaphysical pluralism. Speakers may group objects differently or have different beliefs about the world, but there is just one world. I argue there is tension arising from three aspects of Davidson’s philosophy: (1) the 1974 argument against conceptual schemes; (2) Davidson’s more recent emphasis on primitive triangulation as a necessary condition for thought and language; and (3) Davidson’s semantic approach to metaphysics, what he calls ‘the method of truth in metaphysics’. After elucidating the tension, I argue the tension can be resolved while preserving at least two major tenets of Davidson’s philosophy: (1) conceptual schemes do not carve an uninterpreted reality into different worlds and (2) truth is objective and non-epistemic. I argue Davidson is implicitly committed to a plurality of worlds. 相似文献
17.
Anthony Everett 《Acta Analytica》2014,29(2):181-194
In a number of places Mark Sainsbury has recently developed an attractive irrealist account of fiction and intentionality, on which there are no fictional objects or exotic intentional entities. A central component of his account is an ambitious argument, which aims to establish that the truth of intensional transitives such as “I think about Holmes” and “Alexander feared Zeus” does not require the existence of fictional or intentional objects. It would be good news indeed for the irrealist if Sainsbury’s argument worked. However, I argue that Sainsbury’s argument fails. I conclude by considering how Sainsbury’s irrealist might explain our intuitions about such sentences, drawing upon another component of Sainsbury’s irrealism. 相似文献
18.
Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According
to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order,
domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the
multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle
disjunction of its realization bases. This consequence undermines the alethic functionalists’ non-deflationary ambitions.
A plausible response to Kim’s argument fails to carry over to alethic functionalism on account of significant differences
between alethic functionalism and psychological functionalism. Lynch’s revised view in his book Truth as One and Many (2009) fails to answer our challenge. The upshot is that, while mental functionalism may survive Kim’s argument, it mortally wounds
functionalism about truth. 相似文献
19.
Ryan Christensen 《Metaphysica》2011,12(1):31-43
Formal theories, as in logic and mathematics, are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Philosophical theories, like scientific theories, are often far less formal. There are many axiomatic theories of the truth predicate for certain formal languages; on analogy with these, some philosophers (most notably Paul Horwich) have proposed axiomatic theories of the property of truth. Though in many ways similar to logical theories, axiomatic theories of truth must be different in several nontrivial ways. I explore what an axiomatic theory of truth would look like. Because Horwich’s is the most prominent, I examine his theory and argue that it fails as a theory of truth. Such a theory is adequate if, given a suitable base theory, every fact about truth is a consequence of the axioms of the theory. I show, using an argument analogous to Gödel’s incompleteness proofs, that no axiomatic theory of truth could ever be adequate. I also argue that a certain class of generalizations cannot be consequences of the theory. 相似文献
20.
Particularism renders the options for a sound moral epistemology few and the prospects dim. One leading approach treats basic
knowledge of particular cases as derivable from an a priori moral principle and a posteriori knowledge of the contingent non-moral
facts to which the principle applies. Particularists must forgo this approach because it requires principles. Yet a purely
a posteriori moral epistemology is also implausible, especially when combined with particularism. Particularists such as Jonathan
Dancy are thus led to the view that our basic moral knowledge is a priori knowledge of contingent moral facts. We argue that
this epistemology is unsound. While some cases of a priori knowledge of (even deeply) contingent facts may be defensible,
they are not sufficient for particularist purposes. Moreover, neither Dancy’s appeal to the distinction between positive and
negative dependence nor his discussion of intuitive examples provides sufficient support for this epistemology. 相似文献