Stationary perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts

This paper characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining model with characteristic functions, and provides strategic foundations of some cooperative solution concepts such as the core, the bargaining set and the kernel. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that a linear programming formulation successfully characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of our bargaining game. We suggest a linear programming formulation as an algorithm for the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of a class of n-person noncooperative games. Second, utilizing the linear programming formulation, we show that stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of n-person noncooperative games provide strategic foundations for the bargaining set and the kernel.     

Constrainedn-person games

The usual properties of a characteristic function game were derived byvon Neumann andMorgenstern from the properties of a game in normal form. In this paper we give a linear programming principle for the calculation of the characteristic function. The principle is a direct application ofCharnes' linear programming method for the calculation of the optimal strategies and the value of a two-person zero-sum game. The linear programming principle gives another method for proving the standard properties of a characteristic function when it is derived from a game in normal form. Using an idea originated byCharnes for two person games, we develop the concept of a constrainedn-person game as a simple, practical extension of ann-person game. However the characteristic function for a constrainedn-person game may not satisfy properties, such as superadditivity, usually associated with a characteristic function.     

Generalizedk-quota solutions for (N,k) games

A generalization of quota solutions presented byShapley [1953] andKalisch [1959] is investigated for some classes ofn-person games. A new type of solution is obtained for symmetric games as a consequence.     

Perfect information stochastic games and related classes

Forn-person perfect information stochastic games and forn-person stochastic games with Additive Rewards and Additive Transitions (ARAT) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average ε-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentioned, and algorithms to compute equilibria are pointed out.     

Values of games without side payments

A value forn-person games without side payments is given which coincides with theShapley value for games with side payments, and with theNash value for two-person games.     

Solution concepts ofk-convexn-person games

For any positive integersk andn, the subclass ofk-convexn-person games is considered. In casek=n, we are dealing with convexn-person games. Three characterizations ofk-convexn-person games, formulated in terms of the core and certain adapted marginal worth vectors, are given. Further it is shown that fork-convexn-person games the intersection of the (pre)kernel with the core consists of a unique point (namely the nucleolus), but that the (pre)kernel may contain points outside the core. For certain 1-convex and 2-convexn-person games the part of the bargaining set outside the core is even disconnected with the core. The Shapley value of ank-convexn-person game can be expressed in terms of the extreme points of the core and a correction-vector whenever the game satisfies a certain symmetric condition. Finally, theτ-value of ank-convexn-person game is given.     

Existence of equilibrium pairs in continuous games

It is shown that all continuous two-person general-sum games over the square have equilibrium pairs of mixed strategy. A slight extension of Helly's Second Theorem, which may be of some slight interest in its own right, is used. The result is then generalized to all continuousn-person games on the cube.     

On a dynamic theory for the kernel of ann-person game

In this paper, a dynamic theory for the kernel ofn-person games given byBillera is studied. In terms of the (bargaining) trajectories associated with a game (i.e. solutions to the differential equations defined by the theory), an equivalence relation is defined. The “consistency” of these equivalence classes is examined. Then, viewing the pre-kernel as the set of equilibrium points of this system of differential equations, some topological, geometric, symmetry and stability properties of the pre-kernel are given.     

Non-existence of super-additive solutions for 3-person games

The super-additive solution for 2-person Nash bargaining games (with constant threat) was defined axiomatically inPerles/Maschler [1981]. That paper contains also a study of its basic properties. In this paper we show that the axioms are incompatible even for 3-person unanimity games. This raises the problem of finding a satisfactory generalization of this solution concept to multi-person games.     

An associated maximization problem for two-person nonzero-sum separable games

It has been shown that two-person zero-sum separable games are associated with a maximization problem involving the cones and dual cones of the generalized moments of the players' mixed strategy sets. In this note it is observed that those results extend almost immediately to two-person nonzero-sum separable games, but that then-person extension does not follow except in a special case.     

The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments

This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of it is close to that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, more precisely, is based on their ‘standards of behavior’ interpretation of the stable set. This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. This paper provides the definition and considers certain general properties of our solution concept. Further we consider our solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes and several simple games with a continuum of players.     

A fuzzy approach to cooperative n-person games

The object of this paper is to provide a systematic treatment of bargaining procedures as a basis for negotiation. An innovative fuzzy logic approach to analyze n-person cooperative games is developed. A couple of indices, the Good Deal Index and the Counterpart Convenience Index are proposed to characterize the heuristic of bargaining and to provide a solution concept. The indices are examined theoretically and experimentally by analyzing three case studies. The results verify the validity of the approach.     

Conflict dissolution by reframing game payoffs using linear perturbations

Human beings have a prevailing drive to achieve their self-interest goals or equilibrium states, which may subsume their social interests. An ideal working environment or cooperative game situation would be one in which each participant or player maximizes his/her own interest while maximizing his/her contribution to the collective group interest. This paper addresses the feasibility, methods, and bounds for reframing a generaln-person game into an ideal game in which full cooperation or a targeted solution can be induced and maintained by the players' self-interest maximization. Criteria for good reframing are introduced. Monotonic games, self-interest cooperative and noncooperative games, and a decomposition theory of general games are also introduced to facilitate the study. It is shown that everyn-person game can be written as the sum of a self-interest cooperative game and a self-interest noncooperative game. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that full cooperation can be achieved by the players' self-interest maximization. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that a targeted solution can be obtained and maintained through the players' self-interest maximization.     

On coalition formation: a game-theoretical approach

This paper deals with the question of coalition formation inn-person cooperative games. Two abstract game models of coalition formation are proposed. We then study the core and the dynamic solution of these abstract games. These models assume that there is a rule governing the allocation of payoffs to each player in each coalition structure called a payoff solution concept. The predictions of these models are characterized for the special case of games with side payments using various payoff solution concepts such as the individually rational payoffs, the core, the Shapley value and the bargaining set M₁ ⁽ⁱ⁾. Some modifications of these models are also discussed.     

A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.     

Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information

This paper computes the Harsanyi-Selten solution for a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information where one player hastwo possible types while the other player has onlyone possible type. The actual computation procedure is also outlined.     

Switching surfaces inN-person differential games

Switching surfaces inN-person differential games are essentially similar to those encountered in optimal control and two-person, zero-sum differential games. The differences between the Nash noncooperative solution and the saddle-point solution are reflected in the dispersal surfaces. These are discussed through classification and construction procedures for switching surfaces. A simple example of a two-person, nonzero-sum game is considered. A complete solution of this game will be presented in a companion paper (Ref. 1).     

A note on the value of zero-sum sequential repeated games with incomplete information

We consider repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on both sides. If the one shot game is played sequentially, it is proved that the sequencev _n is monotonic,v _n being the value of then shot game. Moreover the speed of convergence is bounded byK/n, and this is the best bound.     

On equilibria in finite games

We are concerned with Nash equilibrium points forn-person games. It is proved that, given any real algebraic numberα, there exists a 3-person game with rational data which has a unique equilibrium point andα is the equilibrium payoff for some player. We also present a method which allows us to reduce an arbitraryn-person game to a 3-person one, so that a number of questions about generaln-person games can be reduced to consideration of the special 3-person case. Finally, a completely mixed game, where the equilibrium set is a manifold of dimension one, is constructed.     

Structure of equilibria inN-person non-cooperative games

Here we study the structure of Nash equilibrium points forN-person games. For two-person games we observe that exchangeability and convexity of the set of equilibrium points are synonymous. This is shown to be false even for three-person games. For completely mixed games we get the necessary inequality constraints on the number of pure strategies for the players. Whereas the equilibrium point is unique for completely mixed two-person games, we show that it is not true for three-person completely mixed game without some side conditions such as convexity on the equilibrium set. It is a curious fact that for the special three-person completely mixed game with two pure strategies for each player, the equilibrium point is unique; the proof of this involves some combinatorial arguments.