The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences

Michael Dummett andRobin Farquharson [1961] provided a sufficient condition for ann-person simple majority game with ordinal preferences to have a nonempty core. In the present paper we generalize this result to an arbitrary proper simple game. It is proved that their condition is also sufficient for this game to have a nonempty core. Our proof of this theorem is much simpler than the proof given byDummett andFarquharson. Finally some applications of the theorem are presented.     

不确定偏好序下的双边匹配博弈

针对带有不确定偏好序的双边匹配问题,现有方法大都仅注重整体收益之和,忽略了参与人的个体收益以及在交互选择中的策略运用.基于最大满意度准则,给出不确定序下的收益（满意度）矩阵的推导过程;然后,从个体理性视角,结合矩阵博弈的思想构建一种兼顾整体和个体收益的博弈匹配优化模型,并证明模型最优解满足纳什均衡.最后,进一步探讨各种策略选择及其优劣分析.     

The generation of a social welfare function under ordinal preferences

Against the background of recent impossibility theorems, the paper establishes a number of rules for the formation of social preferences to ensure the generation of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function of the desired ‘individualistic’ form. It demonstrates that such welfare functions can indeed exist under conditions of simply ordinality of individual preferences and a lack of interpersonal comparability, for the general n-person case with only weak restrictions upon individual preferences. A valuable tool of social welfare theory for the single-profile case is therefore restored under a wide set of conditions. By examining Kemp and Ng's justification for their A3 condition in this context, we are able also to highlight a number of key differences between the conditions satisfied by many political constitutions and the requirements for achieving the positive existence of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. In particular the paper focusses here on the weighting systems on individual preferences that are consistent with generating an individualistic welfare function and examines the information content of individual ordinal preferences which must be utilized if the desired welfare function is to result.     

Strict and tolerant antidivision queries with ordinal layered preferences

In this paper, we are interested in taking preferences into account for a family of queries inspired by the antidivision. An antidivision query aims at retrieving the elements associated with none of the elements of a specified set of values. We suggest the introduction of preferences inside such queries with the following specificities: (i) the user gives his/her preferences in an ordinal way and (ii) the preferences apply to the divisor which is defined as a hierarchy of sets. Different uses of the hierarchy are investigated, which leads to queries conveying different semantics and the property of the result delivered is characterized. Furthermore, the case where a conjunctive stratified antidivision query returns an empty set of answers is dealt with, and an approach aimed at relaxing such queries is proposed.     

A simple game with a singular focal line

We propose a simple game whose solution contains a singular focal line, i.e., a focal line reached by optimal trajectories in a nontangential fashion. We also provide a discussion of how the optimal discriminating strategy can be approximated by a pure feedback.This work was prepared while the first author was visiting at INRIA-Sophia Antipolis, Valbonne, France.     

A simple differential game

Necessary conditions and sufficient conditions are employed to deduce optimal strategies for a simple differential game with state equationd ² x/dt ²=au+v,a = Const, |u|1, |v|1, fixed transfer time, and terminal miss distance as payoff.This work was supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract No. NAS 12–114.     

Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection from ordinal preferences

In several situations agents need to be assigned to activities on basis of their preferences, and each agent can take part in at most one activity. Often, the preferences of the agents do not depend only on the activity itself but also on the number of participants in the respective activity. In the setting we consider, the agents hence have preferences over pairs “(activity, group size)” including the possibility “do nothing”; in this work, these preferences are assumed to be strict orders. The task will be to find stable assignments of agents to activities, for different concepts of stability such as Nash or core stability, and Pareto optimal assignments respectively. In this respect, particular focus is laid on two natural special cases of agents’ preferences inherent in the considered model, namely increasing and decreasing preferences, where agents want to share an activity with as many (as few, respectively) agents as possible.     

Reconstructing a simple game from a uniparametric family of allocations

Several relationships between simple games and a particular type of solutions for cooperative games are studied in this paper. These solutions belong to the set of semivalues and they are related to a unique parameter that explicitly provides their weighting coefficients. Through the allocations offered by this family of solutions, so-called binomial semivalues, and also from their respective potentials, some characteristics of the simple games can be recovered. The paper analyzes the capacity of binomial semivalues to summarize the structure of simple games, and, moreover, a property of separation among simple games is given.     

A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution

It is proved that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. The proof makes a strong use of reduced games of cooperative games without side payments.     

Pure equilibria in a simple dynamic model of strategic market game

We present a discrete model of two-person constant-sum dynamic strategic market game. We show that for every value of discount factor the game with discounted rewards possesses a pure stationary strategy equilibrium. Optimal strategies have some useful properties, such as Lipschitz property and symmetry. We also show value of the game to be nondecreasing both in state and discount factor. Further, for some values of discount factor, exact form of optimal strategies is found. For β less than , there is an equilibrium such that players make large bids. For β close to 1, there is an equilibrium with small bids. Similar result is obtained for the long run average reward game.     

An exponential differential game which admits a simple Nash solution

This paper deals with a class ofN-person nonzero-sum differential games where the control variables enter into the state equations as well as the payoff functionals in an exponential way. Due to the structure of the game, Nash-optimal controls are easily determined. The equilibrium in open-loop controls is also a closed-loop equilibrium. An example of optimal exploitation of an exhaustible resource is presented.The helpful comments of Professor Y. C. Ho and Dipl. Ing. E. Dockner are gratefully acknowledged.     

Evasion from many pursuers in simple motion differential game with integral constraints

We study a two dimensional evasion differential game with several pursuers and one evader with integral constraints on control functions of players. Assuming that the total resource of the pursuers does not exceed that of the evader, we solve the game by presenting explicit strategy for the evader which guarantees evasion.     

Algorithmic decision rule using ordinal criteria importance coefficients with a first ordinal metric scale

An exact computational method is proposed for the preferability comparison of various solution variants in multicriteria problems with importance-ordered criteria using a common scale along which the growth of preferences slows down.     

A simple game to derive lognormal distribution

In the paper we present a simple game that students can play in the classroom. The game can be used to show that random variables can behave in an unexpected way: the expected mean can tend to zero or to infinity; the variance can tend to zero or to infinity. The game can also be used to introduce the lognormal distribution.     

Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium feedback for a simple nonzero-sum differential game

Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium feedback is established for a simple class nonzero-sum differential games on the line.     

Publicity vs. impact in nonprofit disclosures and donor preferences: a sequential game with one nonprofit organization and N donors

Charitable giving is one of the essential tasks of a properly functioning civil society. This task is greatly complicated by the lack of organizational transparency and by the information asymmetries that often exist between organizations and donors in the market for charitable donations. The disclosure of financial, performance, donor-relations, and fundraising-related data is thus an important tool for nonprofit organizations attempting to attract greater donations while boosting accountability and public trust. There are, however, varying payoffs associated with such disclosure depending on the nature of donor preferences and the relative openness and effectiveness of competing organizations. To help understand the interplay between nonprofit organizational disclosures and individual donations, we present a novel game-theoretic model of disclosure–donation interactions that incorporates the predominant forms of both donor preferences and “value-relevant” information.     

Rectangular products with ordinal factors

Let A and B be subspaces of an ordinal. It is proved that the product A×B is countably paracompact if and only if it is rectangular. Before this main result, we discuss several covering properties of products with one ordinal factor. In particular, for every paracompact space X, it is proved that the product X×A is paracompact if so is A.