共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Julia Tanner 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(4):337-347
The fact that humans have a special relationship to each other insofar as they belong in the same species is often taken to
be a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals, one which justifies a greater moral status for all humans, regardless of their individual capacities. I give some reasons why this kind of relationship is not an appropriate
ground for differential treatment of humans and nonhumans. I then argue that even if relationships do matter morally species
membership cannot justify a difference in moral status. This has important implications because it removes one barrier to
giving animals greater moral status.
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Julia TannerEmail: |
2.
Steffen Borge 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(2):149-154
In this paper I argue against a criticism by Matthew Weiner to Grice’s thesis that cancellability is a necessary condition
for conversational implicature. I argue that the purported counterexamples fail because the supposed failed cancellation in
the cases Weiner presents is not meant as a cancellation but as a reinforcement of the implicature. I moreover point out that
there are special situations in which the supposed cancellation may really work as a cancellation.
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Steffen BorgeEmail: |
3.
Clayton Littlejohn 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(2):127-137
In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable
spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall identify where it goes wrong. In turn,
I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about
the possibility of inversion.
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Clayton LittlejohnEmail: |
4.
Javier Kalhat 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(2):161-176
In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes
modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality.
I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular,
I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.
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Javier KalhatEmail: |
5.
István Aranyosi 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(1):1-10
In his latest book, Roy Sorensen offers a solution to a puzzle he put forward in an earlier article -The Disappearing Act.
The puzzle involves various question about how the causal theory perception is to be applied to the case of seeing shadows.
Sorensen argues that the puzzle should be taken as bringing out a new way of seeing shadows. I point out a problem for Sorensen’s
solution, and offer and defend an alternative view, according to which the puzzle is to be interpreted as showing a new way
of seeing objects, in virtue of their contrast with light.
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István AranyosiEmail: Email: |
6.
Xiaoqiang Han 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(1):33-42
The aim of this paper is to explain how the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux must be rejected, while the notion of flux
should and can be preserved. Against the reductionist account of subjectless change, a modern version of the Heraclitean doctrine
advocated by revisionist metaphysics, I argue that (1) the idea of subjectless change is one that can and should be formulated
in the established conceptual framework, and (2) subjectlessness is a feature that most aptly characterizes material changes.
In essence, I seek to provide a proper accommodation for the notion of flux in a conceptual framework that is traditionally
understood (or rather misunderstood) as decidedly excluding it.
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Xiaoqiang HanEmail: |
7.
Michael McDermott 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(4):333-335
In this note I discuss what seems to be a new kind of counterexample to Lewis’s account of counterfactuals. A coin is to be
tossed twice. I bet on ‘Two heads’, and I win. Common sense says that (1) is false. But Lewis’s theory says that it is true.
(1) If at least one head had come up, I would have won.
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Michael McDermottEmail: |
8.
Richard Garner 《Applied Categorical Structures》2009,17(3):247-285
The small object argument is a transfinite construction which, starting from a set of maps in a category, generates a weak
factorisation system on that category. As useful as it is, the small object argument has some problematic aspects: it possesses
no universal property; it does not converge; and it does not seem to be related to other transfinite constructions occurring
in categorical algebra. In this paper, we give an “algebraic” refinement of the small object argument, cast in terms of Grandis
and Tholen’s natural weak factorisation systems, which rectifies each of these three deficiencies.
相似文献
Richard GarnerEmail: |
9.
Wayne D. Riggs 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(1):1-8
It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance
of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational
belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not
obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it looks
as though there are circumstances in which a range of possible weightings of the two goals are all equally epistemically rational.
相似文献
Wayne D. RiggsEmail: |
10.
Charlie Pelling 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(3):169-182
According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties,
and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has recently argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience
provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck’s argument, I explain why I think that
Bill Brewer’s conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which
I myself endorse. My argument turns on the fact that both Heck, in constructing his objection to conceptualism, and Brewer,
in responding to it, miss a crucial distinction between perceptual demonstrative concepts of objects, on the one hand, and
perceptual demonstrative concepts of properties, on the other.
相似文献
Charlie PellingEmail: |
11.
Nic Damnjanovic 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(2):113-126
In several publications Graeme Forbes has developed and defended one of the strongest arguments for essentialism about biological
origins. I attempt to show that there are deep, as yet unrecognized, problems with this argument. The problems with Forbes’s
argument suggest that a range of other arguments for various forms of origin essentialism are also likely to be flawed, and
that we should abandon the seemingly plausible general metaphysical thesis that concrete entities that share all intrinsic
properties are identical.
相似文献
Nic DamnjanovicEmail: |
12.
Kelly Becker 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(1):17-31
Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based
on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible
with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception
of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
相似文献
Kelly BeckerEmail: |
13.
Georg Spielthenner 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(2):139-153
In this paper my primary aim is to present a logical system of practical reasoning that can be used to assess the validity
of practical arguments, that is, arguments with a practical judgment as conclusion. I begin with a critical evaluation of
other approaches to this issue and argue that they are inadequate. On the basis of these considerations, I explain in Sect.
2 the informal conception of practical validity and introduce in Sect. 3 the logical system P, which is an extension of propositional logic and can be used to assess the validity of a wide range of practical arguments.
In the last section, I apply this system to some examples of practical reasoning in order to demonstrate how it can be used
in practice.
相似文献
Georg SpielthennerEmail: |
14.
Kristie Miller 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(1):69-89
There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are
not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically
innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.
相似文献
Kristie MillerEmail: |
15.
Pavel Materna 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(1):69-90
If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective
procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that
the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.
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Pavel MaternaEmail: |
16.
Jesper Kallestrup 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(3):155-171
Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They
also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that
belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads
to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue
that once we carefully distinguish closure principles from transmission principles, and epistemic consequences from epistemic
preconditions, neither version of this objection succeeds.
相似文献
Jesper KallestrupEmail: |
17.
Nikolaj Nottelman 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(2):105-124
In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered
in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed
against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed
against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments offered in favor of the ‘conceptual impossibility’ of performing
such actions fail without exception. If we are to argue against doxastic voluntarism we are better off by resorting to more
modest means.
相似文献
Nikolaj NottelmanEmail: |
18.
Wayne A. Davis 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(3):207-231
According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions
in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for
a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition
theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental.
They individuate the propositions and thoughts containing them, which in turn individuate the propositional attitudes that
are relations to those propositions or thoughts.
相似文献
Wayne A. DavisEmail: |
19.
Michael P. Wolf 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(3):207-222
Causal theories of reference in the philosophy of language and philosophy of science have suggested that it could resolve
lingering worries about incommensurability between theoretical claims in different paradigms, to borrow Kuhn’s terms. If we
co-refer throughout different paradigms, then the problems of incommensurability are greatly diminished, according to causal
theorists. I argue that assuring ourselves of that sort of constancy of reference will require comparable sorts of cross-paradigm
affinities, and thus provides us with no special relief on this problem. Suggestions on how to think about rigid designation
across paradigms are included.
相似文献
Michael P. WolfEmail: |
20.
Claudio de Almeida 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(4):301-319
It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”)
can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental
intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.
相似文献
Claudio de AlmeidaEmail: |