Parity and ruin in a stochastic game

We study an elementary two-player card game where in each round players compare cards and the holder of the card with the smaller value wins. Using the rate equations approach, we treat the stochastic version of the game in which cards are drawn randomly. We obtain an exact solution for arbitrary initial conditions. In general, the game approaches a steady state where the card value densities of the two players are proportional to each other. The leading small value behavior of the initial densities determines the corresponding proportionality constant, while the next correction governs the asymptotic time dependence. The relaxation toward the steady state exhibits a rich behavior, e.g., it may be algebraically slow or exponentially fast. Moreover, in ruin situations where one player eventually wins all cards, the game may even end in a finite time. Received 24 August 2001 and Received in final form 12 November 2001     

Heritability promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games

Heritability is ubiquitous within most real biological or social systems. A heritable trait is most simply an offspring’s trait that resembles the parent’s corresponding trait, which can be fitness, strategy, or the way of strategy adoption for evolutionary games. Here we study the effects of heritability on the evolution of spatial public goods games. In our model, the fitness of players is determined by the payoffs from the current interactions and their history. Based on extensive simulations, we find that the density of cooperators is enhanced by increasing the heritability of players over a wide range of the multiplication factor. We attribute the enhancement of cooperation to the inherited fitness that stabilizes the fitness of players, and thus prevents the expansion of defectors effectively.     

Methods for detrending success metrics to account for inflationary and deflationary factors*

Time-dependent economic, technological, and social factors can artificially inflate or deflate quantitative measures for career success. Here we develop and test a statistical method for normalizing career success metrics across time dependent factors. In particular, this method addresses the long standing question: how do we compare the career achievements of professional athletes from different historical eras? Developing an objective approach will be of particular importance over the next decade as major league baseball (MLB) players from the “steroids era” become eligible for Hall of Fame induction. Some experts are calling for asterisks (*) to be placed next to the career statistics of athletes found guilty of using performance enhancing drugs (PED). Here we address this issue, as well as the general problem of comparing statistics from distinct eras, by detrending the seasonal statistics of professional baseball players. We detrend player statistics by normalizing achievements to seasonal averages, which accounts for changes in relative player ability resulting from a range of factors. Our methods are general, and can be extended to various arenas of competition where time-dependent factors play a key role. For five statistical categories, we compare the probability density function (pdf) of detrended career statistics to the pdf of raw career statistics calculated for all player careers in the 90-year period 1920–2009. We find that the functional form of these pdfs is stationary under detrending. This stationarity implies that the statistical regularity observed in the right-skewed distributions for longevity and success in professional sports arises from both the wide range of intrinsic talent among athletes and the underlying nature of competition. We fit the pdfs for career success by the Gamma distribution in order to calculate objective benchmarks based on extreme statistics which can be used for the identification of extraordinary careers.     

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

We study a spatial Prisoner’s dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner’s Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor’s strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.     

The Polarization of the Coupling Strength of Interdependent Networks Stimulates Cooperation

We introduce a mixed network coupling mechanism and study its effects on how cooperation evolves in interdependent networks. This mechanism allows some players (conservative-driven) to establish a fixed-strength coupling, while other players (radical-driven) adjust their coupling strength through the evolution of strategy. By means of numerical simulation, a hump-like relationship between the level of cooperation and conservative participant density is revealed. Interestingly, interspecies interactions stimulate polarization of the coupling strength of radical-driven players, promoting cooperation between two types of players. We thus demonstrate that a simple mixed network coupling mechanism substantially expands the scope of cooperation among structured populations.     

Mutually-antagonistic interactions in baseball networks

We formulate the head-to-head matchups between Major League Baseball pitchers and batters from 1954 to 2008 as a bipartite network of mutually-antagonistic interactions. We consider both the full network and single-season networks, which exhibit structural changes over time. We find interesting structure in the networks and examine their sensitivity to baseball’s rule changes. We then study a biased random walk on the matchup networks as a simple and transparent way to (1) compare the performance of players who competed under different conditions and (2) include information about which particular players a given player has faced. We find that a player’s position in the network does not correlate with his placement in the random walker ranking. However, network position does have a substantial effect on the robustness of ranking placement to changes in head-to-head matchups.     

Network formation under linking constraints

We study the effects of linking constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. An exogenous “link-constraining system” specifies the admissible links. It is assumed that each player may initiate links only with players within a specified set of players, thus restricting the feasible strategies and networks. In this setting, we examine the impact of such constraints on stable/efficient architectures and on dynamics.     

Coevolution of game and network structure with adjustable linking

Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, in the real world, social interaction could change the relationship among people. And the change of social structure will also affect people’s strategies. We build a coevolution model of prisoner’s dilemma game and network structure to study the dynamic interaction in the real world. Differing from other coevolution models, players rewire their network connections according to the density of cooperation and other players’ payoffs. We use a parameter α to control the effect of payoff in the process of rewiring. Based on the asynchronous update rule and Monte Carlo simulation, we find that, when players prefer to rewire their links to those who are richer, the temptation can increase the cooperation density.     

Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictive impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.     

Continuous-Variable Quantum Secret Sharing Based on Thermal Terahertz Sources in Inter-Satellite Wireless Links

We propose a continuous-variable quantum secret sharing (CVQSS) scheme based on thermal terahertz (THz) sources in inter-satellite wireless links (THz-CVQSS). In this scheme, firstly, each player locally preforms Gaussian modulation to prepare a thermal THz state, and then couples it into a circulating spatiotemporal mode using a highly asymmetric beam splitter. At the end, the dealer measures the quadrature components of the received spatiotemporal mode through performing the heterodyne detection to share secure keys with all the players of a group. This design enables that the key can be recovered only by the whole group players’ knowledge in cooperation and neither a single player nor any subset of the players in the group can recover the key correctly. We analyze both the security and the performance of THz-CVQSS in inter-satellite links. Results show that a long-distance inter-satellite THz-CVQSS scheme with multiple players is feasible. This work will provide an effective way for building an inter-satellite quantum communication network.     

Quantum repeated games

In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners' dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well. We find a quantum version of this repeated game where the players decide to cooperate in the first stage while knowing that both will defect in the second.     

Constrained information minority game: How was the night at El Farol?

We introduce a variation of the El Farol Game in which the only players who surely know the outcome of the last turn of the game are those who actually attended the bar. Other players may receive this information with reduced probability. This information can be transmitted by another player who actually attended the bar in the last turn of the game or from the media. We show that since this game is not organized around the socially optimal point, arbitrage opportunities may arise. Therefore, we study how these opportunities can be exploited by an agent. An interesting application of this model is the market of goods being auctioned, such as cars being repossessed. The results obtained here seem to closely reflect the dynamics of this market in Brazil.     

Successful strategies in repeated minority games

The minority game is an important example of a non-cooperative n-person game, which can be applied on different situations with social and economic contexts. We analysed the minority game as an elementary traffic scenario in which human participants had to choose 100 times between a road A and a road B. In each period, the road, which was chosen by the minority of players won. At first view, there seems to be no outstandingly advisable strategy for the participants to enhance their payoffs because both roads have the same properties. However, an important observation is that the number of road changes of a participant is negatively correlated to his/her cumulative payoff. On average, subjects with high numbers of road changes received less money than participants who stoically chose the same road. Furthermore one could increase the coordination of the players by providing the players distribution on both roads in the last period.     

Quantum Russian roulette

We quantize the gamble known as Russian roulette and we study it in two versions for two- and three-persons when: (i) players use a fully loaded quantum gun; (ii) the quantum gun has only one quantum bullet.     

Dynamical spin-glass-like behavior in an evolutionary game

We study a new evolutionary game, where players are tempted to take part by the premium, but compete for being the first who take a specific move. Those, who manage to escape the bulk of players, are the winners. While for large premium the game is very similar to the Minority game studied earlier, significant new behavior, reminiscent of spin glasses is observed for premium below certain level.     

Quantum strategies in moving frames

We investigate quantum strategies in moving frames by considering Prisoners' Dilemma and propose four thresholds of γ for two players to determine their Nash Equilibria. We find that the relativistic operations could enhance or diminish the quantum features of the game for different players who move in different directions relative to the arbiter.     

Oscillation in Evolution of Cooperation for Addressing Climate Change

Climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resource. All countries of the world should take action to deal with climate change. However, such an action is actually a game process where each country chooses to cooperate or defect under constrained condition. Here we study the group behavior of countries in dealing with climate change. In our study, the countries of the world are considered as players who are distributed on an assumed spatial network. A new evolution rule is proposed to model the game processamong the players. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that under constrained condition, the local psychology of players possibly results in the formation of local group. Some local and global oscillations can be found where part or all of the players change their choices periodically.     

To cooperate or to defect? Altruism and reputation

The basic difficulty in cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also on the co-player’s reputation. We find that players with positive altruism cooperate and meet cooperation. In this approach, payoffs are not relevant.     

Uncertainty of cooperation in random scale-free networks

We study the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where the players are located on the nodes of a random scale-free network. The prisoner’s dilemma game is a powerful tool and has been used for the study of mutual trust and cooperation among individuals in structured populations. We vary the structure of the network and the payoff values for the game, and show that the specific conditions can greatly influence the outcome of the game. A variety of behaviors are reproduced and the percentage of cooperating agents fluctuates significantly, even in the absence of irrational behavior. For example, the steady state of the game may be a configuration where either cooperators or defectors dominate, while in many cases the solution fluctuates between these two limiting behaviors.     

Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

We study evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks. During the co-evolution process, interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability $p$ or update their strategies with probability $1-p$ depending on their payoffs. Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy. Interestingly, the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of $p$ via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics. Finally, the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation. Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals' behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.