不确定参数下群体博弈均衡的存在性与通有稳定性

本文在已知不确定参数变化范围的假设下,研究了不确定参数下群体博弈均衡的存在性与通有稳定性.首先,基于经典非合作博弈NS均衡概念提出了不确定参数下群体博弈NS均衡的定义;其次,在支付函数连续性与凸性的一定假设下,利用Ky Fan不等式证明了均衡的存在性;最后,给出了不确定参数下群体博弈模型NS均衡集通有稳定性的相关结论,运用Fort引理证明了在Baire分类的意义下,当支付函数发生扰动时,大多数不确定参数下群体博弈的NS均衡点集都是稳定的.     

广义强向量拟均衡问题解集的通有稳定性

研究广义强向量拟均衡问题(GSVQEP)解集的通有稳定性.在约束集值映射满足一定连续与目标映射是锥-真拟凸的集值映射条件下,证明了广义强向量拟均衡问题构成的空间M中,在Baire分类意义下,广义强向量拟均衡问题解集是通有稳定的,且给出了空间M中对每个广义强向量拟均衡问题的解集至少存在一个本质连通区.     

可行策略对应的图像拓扑下广义博弈Nash平衡的稳定性

以往关于广义博弈Nash平衡的稳定性的研究,均利用可行策略映射之间的一致度量.现考虑在更弱的度量下,利用可行策略映射图像之间的Hausdorff距离定义度量.在此弱图像拓扑下,证明了广义博弈空间的完备性,以及Nash平衡映射的上半连续性和紧性,进而得到广义博弈Nash平衡的通有稳定性.即在Baire分类的意义下,大多数的广义博弈都是本质的.     

集值映射的Nash平衡点集的通有稳定性

本文讨论了集值映射的Nash平衡点的存在及平衡点集的通有稳定性,得到大多数的集值映射的Nash平衡点集是稳定的。     

利他扰动与Nash均衡点集的利他稳定性

引入了一个新的利他扰动.定义了KyFan点集的利他本质集,进一步证明在此扰动下,KyFan点集的利他本质连通区的存在性.证明了满足一定条件的n人非合作博弈中,Nash均衡点集至少存在一个利他本质连通区,而且Nash均衡点集的每一个本质集必是利他稳定集,Nash均衡点集的本质连通区也是利他本质集连通区.     

广义向量似变分不等式解集的通有稳定性

本文首先得到广义向量似变分不等式问题的解的存在性定理,然后利用UＳＣＯ映射的性质（见ＴａｎＫＫ（ｅｔａｌ）（１９９５））,讨论广义向量似变分不等式的解集的通有稳定性,得到大多数（拓扑意义下）广义向量似变分不等式问题的解集是稳定的．     

基于拓扑博弈的集值映射的通有锥度量连续性

本文利用拓扑博弈的方法,研究了非紧值锥C度量半连续集值映射的通有锥C度量连续性问题,证明了从拟完备空间到线性度量空间的锥C度量上(下)半连续集值映射具有通有锥C度量连续性,利用锥C度量半连续性给出了拓扑空间为Baire空间的充分条件,结果包含了经典的关于紧值集值映射的Fort定理等相关结果.     

向量参变量的约束集族最大元的通有稳定性

利用集值映射方法定义约束广义最大元,在约束条件和向量参变量意义下,讨论了约束最大元映射、向量参数扰动时,特别是约束条件受到扰动时,向量参变量的约束集族最大元的通有稳定性,在最广的扰动下,获得了通有稳定性定理.     

对称集值向量拟均衡问题解集的稳定性

本文研究了对称集值向量拟均衡问题解集的稳定性.证明了在约束映射满足一定连续性与目标映射是锥-恰当拟凸的集值映射条件下,对称集值向量拟均衡问题的解集是稳定的,还证明了每个对称集值向量拟均衡问题的解集至少存在一个本质连通区.     

图象拓扑下的Ky Fan引理解集的本质连通区及其在对策论上的应用

本文在集值映射的图象拓扑意义下,证明了赋范线性空间中的Ky Fan引理的解集的本质连通区的存在性,由此得到一类对策的Nash平衡点集的本质连通区的存在性.     

不确定性下的一主多从博弈及其ε-平衡稳定性分析

本文对主从博弈以及不确定性等问题进行研究,建立了不确定性下的一主多从博弈模型,并利用极大值定理证明了该模型均衡点的存在性。对于不确定性下的一主多从博弈的均衡点问题建立了有限理性模型,进而得到其均衡点的稳定性,即结构稳定以及对ε-平衡是鲁棒的。     

On the stability of the solution for multiobjective generalized games with the payoffs perturbed

This paper studies the stability of weakly Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibrium for multiobjective generalized games with the payoff perturbed. Using a simple characterization of the weakly Pareto-Nash solution, we obtain a generic continuous result concerning weakly Pareto-Nash solution mapping. Examples are given to show that Pareto-Nash equilibrium mapping is neither upper semicontinuous nor lower semicontinuous. Through seeking the sub-mapping, we prove that most multiobjective generalized games have at least one essential Pareto-Nash solution.     

信息集广义多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性和稳定性

首先把信息集的概念引入到多目标博弈, 建立了信息集广义多目标博弈模型, 并指出了信息集广义多目标博弈以广义多目标博弈、广义n人非合作博弈、一般n人非合作博弈为特例, 然后用Fan-Glicksberg不动点定理证明了信息集广义多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性, 最后在本质解和强本质解的意义下, 分别研究了信息集广义多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的通有稳定性和强本质连通区的存在性.     

Population uncertainty and Poisson games

A general class of models is developed for analyzing games with population uncertainty. Within this general class, a special class of Poisson games is defined. It is shown that Poisson games are uniquely characterized by properties of independent actions and environmental equivalence. The general definition of equilibrium for games with population uncertainty is formulated, and it is shown that the equilibria of Poisson games are invariant under payoff-irrelevant type splitting. An example of a large voting game is discussed, to illustrate the advantages of using a Poisson game model for large games. Received December 1995/Revised version July 1997     

Non-additive anonymous games

This paper introduces a class of non-additive anonymous games where agents are assumed to be uncertain (in the sense of Knight) about opponents’ strategies and about the initial distribution over players’ characteristics in the game. We model uncertainty by non-additive measures or capacities and prove the Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence theorem for this class of games. Equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized under milder conditions than in the case of additive games. In particular, it is not required for the space characteristics to be atomless under capacities. The set-valued map of the Cournot–Nash equilibria is upper-semicontinuous as a function of initial beliefs of the players for non-additive anonymous games.     

On dominance core and stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games

Abstract

The allocation problem of rewards or costs is a central question for individuals and organizations contemplating cooperation under uncertainty. The involvement of uncertainty in cooperative games is motivated by the real world where noise in observation and experimental design, incomplete information and further vagueness in preference structures and decision-making play an important role. The theory of cooperative ellipsoidal games provides a new game theoretical angle and suitable tools for answering this question. In this paper, some solution concepts using ellipsoids, namely the ellipsoidal imputation set, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets for cooperative ellipsoidal games, are introduced and studied. The main results contained in the paper are the relations between the ellipsoidal core, the ellipsoidal dominance core and the ellipsoidal stable sets of such a game.     

Infinite-Horizon Stochastic Differential Games with Branching Payoffs

In this paper, we consider infinite-horizon stochastic differential games with an autonomous structure and steady branching payoffs. While the introduction of additional stochastic elements via branching payoffs offers a fruitful alternative to modeling game situations under uncertainty, the solution to such a problem is not known. A theorem on the characterization of a Nash equilibrium solution for this kind of games is presented. An application in renewable resource extraction is provided to illustrate the solution mechanism.     

Cooperative interval games: a survey

The (re)distribution of collective gains and costs is a central question for individuals and organizations contemplating cooperation under uncertainty. The theory of cooperative interval games provides a new game theoretical angle and suitable tools for answering this question. This survey aims to briefly present the state-of-the-art in this young field of research, discusses how the model of cooperative interval games extends the cooperative game theory literature, and reviews its existing and potential applications in economic and operations research situations with interval data.     

Singular mean-field control games

This article studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field two-players stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions the optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected Skorohod problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Motivations are given as optimal harvesting of stochastic mean-field systems, optimal irreversible investments under uncertainty and mean-field singular investment games. In particular, a simple singular mean-field investment game is studied, where the Nash equilibrium exists but is not unique.     

Robust game theory

We present a distribution-free model of incomplete-information games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our ``robust game' model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi's Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative distribution-free equilibrium concept, which we call ``robust-optimization equilibrium,' to that of the ex post equilibrium. We prove that the robust-optimization equilibria of an incomplete-information game subsume the ex post equilibria of the game and are, unlike the latter, guaranteed to exist when the game is finite and has bounded payoff uncertainty set. For arbitrary robust finite games with bounded polyhedral payoff uncertainty sets, we show that we can compute a robust-optimization equilibrium by methods analogous to those for identifying a Nash equilibrium of a finite game with complete information. In addition, we present computational results. The research of the author was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and by the Singapore-MIT Alliance. The research of the author was partially supported by the Singapore-MIT Alliance.