Linear systems with a quadratic integral

It is shown that a linear system of n differential equations with constant coefficients, at least one of whose integrals is a non-degenerate quadratic form, may be reduced to a canonical system of Hamiltonian equations. In particular, n is even and the phase flow preserves the standard measure; if the index of the quadratic integral is odd, the trivial solution is unstable, and so on. For the case n = 4 the stability conditions are given a geometrical form. The general results are used to investigate small oscillations of non-holonomic systems, and also the problem of the stability of invariant manifolds of non-linear systems that have Morse functions as integrals.     

Linear complementarity and discounted switching controller stochastic games

The class of discounted switching controller stochastic games can be solved in one step by a linear complementarity program (LCP). Following the proof of this technical result is a discussion of a special formulation and initialization of a standard LCP pivoting algorithm which has, in numerical experiments, always terminated in a complementary solution. That the LCP algorithm as formulated always finds a complementary solution has not yet been proven, but these theoretical and experimental results have the potential to provide an alternative proof of the ordered field property for these games. Numerical experimentation with the reformulated LCP is reviewed.     

Linear Volterra backward stochastic integral equations

We present an explicit solution triplet $(Y,Z,K)$ to the backward stochastic Volterra integral equation (BSVIE) of linear type, driven by a Brownian motion and a compensated Poisson random measure. The process $Y$ is expressed by an integral whose kernel is explicitly given. The processes $Z$ and $K$ are expressed by Hida–Malliavin derivatives involving $Y$.     

Perfect information stochastic games and related classes

Forn-person perfect information stochastic games and forn-person stochastic games with Additive Rewards and Additive Transitions (ARAT) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average ε-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentioned, and algorithms to compute equilibria are pointed out.     

Mean-field type forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations and related stochastic differential games

We study a kind of partial information non-zero sum differential games of mean-field backward doubly stochastic differential equations, in which the coefficient contains not only the state process but also its marginal distribution, and the cost functional is also of mean-field type. It is required that the control is adapted to a sub-filtration of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motions. We establish a necessary condition in the form of maximum principle and a verification theorem, which is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point. We use the theoretical results to deal with a partial information linear-quadratic (LQ) game, and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium point for our LQ game problem by virtue of the unique solvability of mean-field forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equation.     

Backward stochastic Volterra integral equations and some related problems

Backward stochastic Volterra integral equations (BSVIEs, for short) are introduced. The existence and uniqueness of adapted solutions are established. A duality principle between linear BSVIEs and (forward) stochastic Volterra integral equations is obtained. As applications of the duality principle, a comparison theorem is proved for the adapted solutions of BSVIEs, and a Pontryagin type maximum principle is established for an optimal control of stochastic integral equations.     

BSDEs with random default time and related zero-sum stochastic differential games

In this Note we are concerned with backward stochastic differential equations with random default time. The equations are driven by Brownian motion as well as a mutually independent martingale appearing in a defaultable setting. We show that these equations have unique solutions and a comparison theorem for their solutions. As an application, we get a saddle-point strategy for the related zero-sum stochastic differential game problem.     

Linear differential pursuit games with integral constraints in the presence of delay

Problems involving linear differential pursuit games were studied by many authors; their work served as a basis for studying pursuit problems in linear differential games with integral constraints. In the present paper, we obtain sufficient conditions for the solvability of linear pursuit problems with integral constraints on the control of the players in the presence of delay.     

On the numerical solution of stochastic quadratic integral equations via operational matrix method

In this paper, stochastic operational matrix of integration based on delta functions is applied to obtain the numerical solution of linear and nonlinear stochastic quadratic integral equations (SQIEs) that appear in modelling of many real problems. An important advantage of this method is that it dose not need any integration to compute the constant coefficients. Also, this method can be utilized to solve both linear and nonlinear problems. By using stochastic operational matrix of integration together collocation points, solving linear and nonlinear SQIEs converts to solve a nonlinear system of algebraic equations, which can be solved by using Newton's numerical method. Moreover, the error analysis is established by using some theorems. Also, it is proved that the rate of convergence of the suggested method is O(h²). Finally, this method is applied to solve some illustrative examples including linear and nonlinear SQIEs. Numerical experiments confirm the good accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method.     

On stochastic games

In this paper, we consider the stochastic games of Shapley, when the state and action spaces are all infinite. We prove that, under certain conditions, the stochastic game has a value and that both players have optimal strategies.Part of this research was supported by NSF grant. The authors are indebted to L. S. Shapley for the useful discussions on this and related topics. The authors thank the referee for pointing out an ambiguity in the formulation of Lemma 2.4 in an earlier draft of this article.     

BM-Algebras and related topics

Some connections between BM-algebras and its related topics are studied. It is proved that the class of medial BH-algebras coincides with the class of BM-algebras. Moreover, the congruence lattice of a BM-algebra is investigated.     

Small perturbations and stochastic games

The purpose of this note is to apply results from the theory of Markov chains with rare transitions to stochastic games. The results obtained here are used in the proof of existence of equilibrium payoffs in two-player stochastic games.     

Linear-quadratic generalized Stackelberg games with jump-diffusion processes and related forward-backward stochastic differential equations

A kind of linear-quadratic Stackelberg games with the multilevel hierarchy driven by both Brownian motion and Poisson processes is considered. The Stackelberg equilibrium is presented by linear forward-backward stochastic differential equations(FBSDEs) with Poisson processes(FBSDEPs) in a closed form. By the continuity method, the unique solvability of FBSDEPs with a multilevel self-similar domination-monotonicity structure is obtained.     

Linear-quadratic stochastic pursuit-evasion games

A linear-quadratic differential game in which the system state is affected by disturbance and both players have access to different measurements is solved. The problem is first converted to an optimization problem in infinite-dimensional state space and then solved using standard techniques. For convenience, L ₂-white noise instead of Wiener process setup is used.     

Two-person zero-sum stochastic games

Two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces are considered. The expected average payoff criterion is introduced. In the special case of single controller games it is shown that the optimal stationary policies and the value of the game can be obtained from the optimal solutions to a pair of dual programs. For multichain structures, a decomposition algorithm is given which produces such optimal stationary policies for both players. In the case of both players controlling the transitions, a generalized game is obtained, the solution of which gives the optimal policies.     

Non-cooperative stochastic dominance games

A non-cooperative stochastic dominance game is a non-cooperative game in which the only knowledge about the players' preferences and risk attitudes is presumed to be their preference orders on the set ofn-tuples of pure strategies. Stochastic dominance equilibria are defined in terms of mixed strategies for the players that are efficient in the stochastic dominance sense against the strategies of the other players. It is shown that the set of SD equilibria equals all Nash equilibria that can be obtained from combinations of utility functions that are consistent with the players' known preference orders. The latter part of the paper looks at antagonistic stochastic dominance games in which some combination of consistent utility functions is zero-sum over then-tuples of pure strategies.     

Quadratic integral games and causal synthesis

The game problem for an input-output system governed by a Volterra integral equation with respect to a quadratic performance functional is an untouched open problem. In this paper, it is studied by a new approach called projection causality. The main result is the causal synthesis which provides a causal feedback implementation of the optimal strategies in the saddle point sense. The linear feedback operator is determined by the solution of a Fredholm integral operator equation, which is independent of data functions and control functions. Two application examples are included. The first one is quadratic differential games of a linear system with arbitrary finite delays in the state variable and control variables. The second is the standard linear-quadratic differential games, for which it is proved that the causal synthesis can be reduced to a known result where the feedback operator is determined by the solution of a differential Riccati operator equation.