Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies

We investigate farsighted stable sets in a class of strategic games with dominant punishment strategies. In this class of games, each player has a strategy that uniformly minimizes the other players’ payoffs for any given strategies chosen by these other players. We particularly investigate a special class of farsighted stable sets, each of which consists of strategy profiles yielding a single payoff vector. We call such a farsighted stable set as a single-payoff farsighted stable set. We propose a concept called an inclusive set that completely characterizes single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies. We also show that the set of payoff vectors yielded by single-payoff farsighted stable sets is closely related to the strict \(\alpha \)-core in a strategic game. Furthermore, we apply the results to strategic games where each player has two strategies and strategic games associated with some market models.     

A game locating a needle in a square haystack

The following hider-seeker zero-sum game is considered. The hider hides a needle of length , in the closed unit square, and the seeker tries to locate it by shooting in a straight line across the square. The payoff to the seeker is 1 if he hits the needle and 0 otherwise.A solution of the game is obtained when or whena lies in either of the intervals and ; in addition, it is shown that, whenn is a positive integer anda=1/n, the value of the game is 1/2n. The properties of the solutions are in marked contrast to those for the analogous game over the closed unit disc, which the authors solved in a previous paper, and suggest that a complete solution may well be difficult. It is also shown that every member of a whole class of haystack games has a value.     

A note on correlated equilibrium

The set of correlated equilibria for a bimatrix game is a closed, bounded, convex set containing the set of Nash equilibria. We show that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is an extreme point of the above convex set. We also give an example to show that this result is not true in the payoff space, i.e. there are games where no Nash equilibrium payoff is an extreme point of the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs.     

Formulating an <Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-person noncooperative game as a tensor complementarity problem

In this paper, we consider a class of n-person noncooperative games, where the utility function of every player is given by a homogeneous polynomial defined by the payoff tensor of that player, which is a natural extension of the bimatrix game where the utility function of every player is given by a quadratic form defined by the payoff matrix of that player. We will call such a problem the multilinear game. We reformulate the multilinear game as a tensor complementarity problem, a generalization of the linear complementarity problem; and show that finding a Nash equilibrium point of the multilinear game is equivalent to finding a solution of the resulted tensor complementarity problem. Especially, we present an explicit relationship between the solutions of the multilinear game and the tensor complementarity problem, which builds a bridge between these two classes of problems. We also apply a smoothing-type algorithm to solve the resulted tensor complementarity problem and give some preliminary numerical results for solving the multilinear games.     

Robust game theory

We present a distribution-free model of incomplete-information games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our ``robust game' model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi's Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative distribution-free equilibrium concept, which we call ``robust-optimization equilibrium,' to that of the ex post equilibrium. We prove that the robust-optimization equilibria of an incomplete-information game subsume the ex post equilibria of the game and are, unlike the latter, guaranteed to exist when the game is finite and has bounded payoff uncertainty set. For arbitrary robust finite games with bounded polyhedral payoff uncertainty sets, we show that we can compute a robust-optimization equilibrium by methods analogous to those for identifying a Nash equilibrium of a finite game with complete information. In addition, we present computational results. The research of the author was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and by the Singapore-MIT Alliance. The research of the author was partially supported by the Singapore-MIT Alliance.     

Variational inequality formulation for the games with random payoffs

We consider an n-player non-cooperative game with random payoffs and continuous strategy set for each player. The random payoffs of each player are defined using a finite dimensional random vector. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. We first consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player does not depend on the strategies of other players. If a random vector defining the payoffs of each player follows a multivariate elliptically symmetric distribution, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria using the solution set of a variational inequality (VI) problem. Next, we consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player is defined by a shared constraint set. In this case, we show that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium for elliptically symmetric distributed payoffs. Under certain conditions, we characterize the set of a generalized Nash equilibria using the solution set of a VI problem. As an application, the random payoff games arising from electricity market are studied under chance-constrained game framework.     

Fall back equilibrium for 2 \times n bimatrix games

In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for $2 \times n$ bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do this we reformulate the existing characterizations for these three equilibrium concepts by the use of refinement-specific subgames.     

Quitting games – An example

Quitting games are multi-player sequential games in which, at every stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; each player i then receives a payoff r _S ⁱ, which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero.? We exhibit a four-player quitting game, where the “simplest” equilibrium is periodic with period two. We argue that this implies that all known methods to prove existence of an equilibrium payoff in multi-player stochastic games are therefore bound to fail in general, and provide some geometric intuition for this phenomenon. Received: October 2001     

Nonrandomized strategy equilibria in noncooperative stochastic games with additive transition and reward structure

In this paper, we study a discounted noncooperative stochastic game with an abstract measurable state space, compact metric action spaces of players, and additive transition and reward structure in the sense of Himmelberget al. (Ref. 1) and Parthasarathy (Ref. 2). We also assume that the transition law of the game is absolutely continuous with respect to some probability distributionp of the initial state and together with the reward functions of players satisfies certain continuity conditions. We prove that such a game has an equilibrium stationary point, which extends a result of Parthasarathy from Ref. 2, where the action spaces of players are assumed to be finite sets. Moreover, we show that our game has a nonrandomized (- )-equilibrium stationary point for each >0, provided that the probability distributionp is nonatomic. The latter result is a new existence theorem.     

Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint–Shubik conjecture

This paper revisits the total bandwagon property (TBP) introduced by Kandori and Rob (Games Econ Behav 22:30–60, 1998). With this property, we characterize the class of two-player symmetric \(n\times n\) games, showing that a game has TBP if and only if the game has \(2^{n}-1\) symmetric Nash equilibria. We extend this result to bimatrix games by generalizing TBP. This sheds light on the (wrong) conjecture of Quint and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 26:353–359, 1997) that any nondegenerate \(n\times n\) bimatrix game has at most \(2^{n}-1\) Nash equilibria. We also provide an equilibrium selection criterion to two subclasses of games with TBP.     

Pure strategy Nash equilibria and the probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players

We consider the set of all m×n bimatrix games with ordinal payoffs. We show that on the subset E of such games possessing at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, both players prefer the role of leader to that of follower in the corresponding Stackelberg games. This preference is in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance by leader payoffs of follower payoffs. It follows easily that on the complement of E, the follower’s role is preferred in the same sense. Thus we see a tendency for leadership preference to obtain in the presence of multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in the underlying game.     

On the set of proper equilibria of a bimatrix game

In this paper it is proved that the set of proper equilibria of a bimatrix game is the finite union of polytopes. To that purpose we split up the strategy space of each player into a finite number of equivalence classes and consider for a given >0 the set of all -proper pairs within the cartesian product of two equivalence classes. If this set is non-empty, its closure is a polytope. By considering this polytope as goes to zero, we obtain a (Myerson) set of proper equilibria. A Myerson set appears to be a polytope.     

Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games

The noncooperative multi-leader-follower game can be formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem where each player solves a nonconvex mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. Two major deficiencies exist with such a formulation: One is that the resulting Nash equilibrium may not exist, due to the nonconvexity in each players problem; the other is that such a nonconvex Nash game is computationally intractable. In order to obtain a viable formulation that is amenable to practical solution, we introduce a class of remedial models for the multi-leader-follower game that can be formulated as generalized Nash games with convexified strategy sets. In turn, a game of the latter kind can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality for whose solution we develop an iterative penalty method. We establish the convergence of the method, which involves solving a sequence of penalized variational inequalities, under a set of modest assumptions. We also discuss some oligopolistic competition models in electric power markets that lead to multi-leader-follower games.Jong-Shi Pang: The work of this authors research was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant CCR-0098013 and ECS-0080577 and by the Office of Naval Research under grant N00014-02-1-0286.Masao Fukushima: The work of this authors research was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports of Japan.     

大博弈中Nash均衡的存在性

研究了具有任意多个局中人的非合作博弈(大博弈)中Nash均衡的存在性.将1969年Ma的截口定理推广得到新的截口定理.用这个新的截口定理进一步证明了:1)大博弈中Nash均衡的存在性;2)纯策略集为紧度量空间而且支付函数为连续函数时,连续大博弈中混合策略Nash均衡的存在性.并且存在性定理推出了2010年Salonen的结果,即此研究结果较Salonen的结论更具普遍意义.     

Distributionally robust chance-constrained games: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium

We consider an n-player finite strategic game. The payoff vector of each player is a random vector whose distribution is not completely known. We assume that the distribution of a random payoff vector of each player belongs to a distributional uncertainty set. We define a distributionally robust chance-constrained game using worst-case chance constraint. We consider two types of distributional uncertainty sets. We show the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a distributionally robust chance-constrained game corresponding to both types of distributional uncertainty sets. For each case, we show a one-to-one correspondence between a Nash equilibrium of a game and a global maximum of a certain mathematical program.     

Directed graphical structure,Nash equilibrium,and potential games

This paper considers the directed graphical structure of a game, called influence structure, where a directed edge from player $i$ to player $j$ indicates that player $i$ may be able to affect $j$’s payoff via his unilateral change of strategies. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of games having a directed graph in terms of the structure of that graph. We also discuss the relationship between the structure of graphs and potential games.     

Reductions of interval noncooperative games

Noncooperative games of a finite number of persons with interval-valued payoff functions are considered. The concept of an equilibrium situation is introduced. A reduction of such games to deterministic noncooperative games is proposed. Properties of the reduced games are discussed. Interval antagonistic and bimatrix games are examined, and illustrative examples are considered.     

Perturbation theory for games in normal form and stochastic games

In this paper, the effect on values and optimal strategies of perturbations of game parameters (payoff function, transition probability function, and discount factor) is studied for the class of zero-sum games in normal form and for the class of stationary, discounted, two-person, zero-sum stochastic games.A main result is that, under certain conditions, the value depends on these parameters in a pointwise Lipschitz continuous way and that the sets of -optimal strategies for both players are upper semicontinuous multifunctions of the game parameters.Extensions to general-sum games and nonstationary stochastic games are also indicated.     

Stationary,completely mixed and symmetric optimal and equilibrium strategies in stochastic games

In this paper, we address various types of two-person stochastic games—both zero-sum and nonzero-sum, discounted and undiscounted. In particular, we address different aspects of stochastic games, namely: (1) When is a two-person stochastic game completely mixed? (2) Can we identify classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optimal strategies? (3) When does a two-person stochastic game possess symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies? Firstly, we provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions under which certain classes of discounted and undiscounted stochastic games are completely mixed. In particular, we show that, if a discounted zero-sum switching control stochastic game with symmetric payoff matrices has a completely mixed stationary optimal strategy, then the stochastic game is completely mixed if and only if the matrix games restricted to states are all completely mixed. Secondly, we identify certain classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optima under specific conditions for individual payoff matrices and transition probabilities. Thirdly, we provide sufficient conditions for discounted as well as certain classes of undiscounted stochastic games to have symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies—namely, transitions are symmetric and the payoff matrices of one player are the transpose of those of the other. We also provide a sufficient condition for the stochastic game to have a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. We also provide examples to show the sharpness of our results.     

Evolutionary games and matching rules

This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of \(n\ge 2\) individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.