Nonlinear mobility continuity equations and generalized displacement convexity

We consider the geometry of the space of Borel measures endowed with a distance that is defined by generalizing the dynamical formulation of the Wasserstein distance to concave, nonlinear mobilities. We investigate the energy landscape of internal, potential, and interaction energies. For the internal energy, we give an explicit sufficient condition for geodesic convexity which generalizes the condition of McCann. We take an eulerian approach that does not require global information on the geodesics. As by-product, we obtain existence, stability, and contraction results for the semigroup obtained by solving the homogeneous Neumann boundary value problem for a nonlinear diffusion equation in a convex bounded domain. For the potential energy and the interaction energy, we present a nonrigorous argument indicating that they are not displacement semiconvex.     

Pareto optimality,anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems

Generalized location problems withn agents are considered, who each report a point inm-dimensional Euclidean space. A solution assigns a compromise point to thesen points, and the individual utilities for this compromise point are equal to the negatives of the Euclidean distances to the individual positions. Form = 2 andn odd, it is shown that a solution is Pareto optimal, anonymous, and strategy-proof if, and only if, it is obtained by taking the coordinatewise median with respect to a pair of orthogonal axes. Further, for all other situations withm2, such a solution does not exist. A few results concerning other solution properties, as well as different utility functions, are discussed.Supported by a grant from the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven University.     

Generalized median solutions,strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms

Generalized location problems withn agents are considered, who each report a point inm-dimensional Euclidean space. A solution assigns a compromise point to thesen points, and the individual utilities for this compromise point are equal to the negatives of the distances to the individual positions. These distances are measured by a given strictly convex norm, common to all agents. Form=2, it is shown that if a Pareto optimal, strategy-proof and anonymous solution exists, thenn must be odd, and the solution is obtained by taking the median coordinatewise, where the coordinates refer to a basis that is orthogonal with respect to the given norm. Furthermore, in that case (m=2) such a solution always exists. Form > 2, existence of a solution depends on the norm.Supported by a grant from the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven University.     

Category-measure duality: convexity,midpoint convexity and Berz sublinearity

Category-measure duality concerns applications of Baire-category methods that have measure-theoretic analogues. The set-theoretic axiom needed in connection with the Baire category theorem is the Axiom of Dependent Choice, DC rather than the Axiom of Choice, AC. Berz used the Hahn–Banach theorem over \({\mathbb {Q}}\) to prove that the graph of a measurable sublinear function that is \({\mathbb {Q}}_{+}\)-homogeneous consists of two half-lines through the origin. We give a category form of the Berz theorem. Our proof is simpler than that of the classical measure-theoretic Berz theorem, our result contains Berz’s theorem rather than simply being an analogue of it, and we use only DC rather than AC. Furthermore, the category form easily generalizes: the graph of a Baire sublinear function defined on a Banach space is a cone. The results are seen to be of automatic-continuity type. We use Christensen Haar null sets to extend the category approach beyond the locally compact setting where Haar measure exists. We extend Berz’s result from Euclidean to Banach spaces, and beyond. Passing from sublinearity to convexity, we extend the Bernstein–Doetsch theorem and related continuity results, allowing our conditions to be ‘local’—holding off some exceptional set.     

Weakly unimodal domains,anti-exchange properties,and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules

It is shown that simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule on any rich weakly unimodal domain of an idempotent interval space are equivalent properties if that space satisfies interval anti-exchange, a basic property also shared by a large class of convex geometries including–but not reducing to–trees and Euclidean convex spaces. Therefore, strategy-proof location problems in a vast class of networks fall under the scope of that proposition.It is also established that a much weaker minimalanti-exchangeproperty is necessary to ensure equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness in that setting. An immediate corollary to that result is that such equivalence fails to hold both in certain median interval spaces including those induced by bounded distributive lattices that are not chains, and in certain non-median interval spaces including those induced by partial cubes that are not trees.Thus, it turns out that anti-exchange properties of the relevant interval space provide a powerful general common principle that explains the varying relationship between simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules for rich weakly unimodal domains across different interval spaces, both median and non-median.     

One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

Suppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an election from s alone to t alone, by changing her vote from P _v to P￠_v{P^\prime_{v}} . A voting rule F{\mathcal{F}} is two-way monotonic if such an effect is only possible when v moves t from below s (according to P _v to above s (according to P￠_v{P^\prime_{v}} . One-way monotonicity is the strictly weaker requirement forbidding this effect when v makes the opposite switch, by moving s from below t to above t. Two-way monotonicity is very strong—equivalent over any domain to strategy proofness. One-way monotonicity holds for all sensible voting rules, a broad class including the scoring rules, but no Condorcet extension for four or more alternatives is one-way monotonic. These monotonicities have interpretations in terms of strategy-proofness. For a one-way monotonic rule F{\mathcal{F}} , each manipulation is paired with a positive response, in which F{\mathcal{F}} offers the pivotal voter a strictly better result when she votes sincerely.     

Filtrations,values and voting discipline

Replication and condensation of games are shown to be partially reciprocal procedures, in which partnerships play an important role. Two extensions are studied: filtrations, that form partial replications by introducing any given set of partnerships while the quotient game is kept invariant, and partial condensations; they inherit full compatibility properties. The weighted Shapley value and the coalitional value, respectively associated with these procedures, are shown to exhibit some kind of parallelism, and their behavior under both extensions is also studied. When applied to simple games these values give a measure of the effect of voting discipline within parliamentary bodies. Some final examples, including two Spanish regional parliaments, illustrate both stable and unstable situations.     

Committees,sequential voting and transparency

We propose a model of sequential voting in committees, where members use their individual votes to signal high efficiency in their bid to become re-appointed. Transparency precludes efficient information aggregation, and thus decreases the utility of the principal in the first period; it may be beneficial to her in the second period. Under transparency, equilibria under sequential voting always differ from those under simultaneous voting and may lead to more or less efficient information aggregation.     

Bernstein-type operators,convexity and Lipschitz classes

In the present paper we extend previous results about the monotonicity of Bernstein-type operators relative to convex functions and about the preservation of Lipschitz classes.     

Monge properties,discrete convexity and applications

Starting from Monge’s mass transportation problem we review the role Monge properties play in optimization. In particular we discuss transportation problems whose cost functions fulfill a Monge property, Monge sequences, algebraic Monge properties, the recognition of permuted Monge arrays and multidimensional Monge arrays and the connections between Monge properties and discrete convexity. Finally we discuss Prékopa’s recent approach using Monge arrays in bounding multivariate probability distribution functions.     

Convexifactors,generalized convexity and vector optimization

In this article we study a recently introduced notion of non-smooth analysis, namely convexifactors. We study some properties of the convexifactors and introduce two new chain rules. A new notion of non-smooth pseudoconvex function is introduced and its properties are studied in terms of convexifactors. We also present some optimality conditions for vector minimization in terms of convexifactors.     

Decompositions of continuity and complete continuity

We introduce the notions of δ-t-sets, δ_β-t-sets, δ-B-continuity and δ_β -B-continuity and obtain decompositions of continuity and complete continuity.     

Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

We consider the problem of allocating houses to agents when monetary compensations are not allowed. We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness. I am very much indebted to William Thomson for his invaluable suggestions.