共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Professor A. Kats 《International Journal of Game Theory》1974,3(4):251-260
A class of non-cooperative games is discussed in which one player (“the monopolist”) by choosing his strategy restricts the other players to subsets of their strategy sets. Examples of such games in various fields are given. In particular it is shown that some very important economic situations fall within this class of games. A solution concept is defined and sufficient conditions for its existence are derived. The question of the advantages a player derives from being a monopolist is raised and conditions are derived for him to benefit from being a monopolist. 相似文献
2.
Elżbieta Z. Ferenstein 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2007,66(3):531-544
We study nonzero-sum stopping games with randomized stopping strategies. The existence of Nash equilibrium and ɛ-equilibrium
strategies are discussed under various assumptions on players random payoffs and utility functions dependent on the observed
discrete time Markov process. Then we will present a model of a market game in which randomized stopping times are involved.
The model is a mixture of a stochastic game and stopping game.
Research supported by grant PBZ-KBN-016/P03/99. 相似文献
3.
《Optimization》2012,61(1-2):235-250
This paper analyzes the existence of equilibrium for a class of market games in which agents are allowed to follow different patterns of behaviour, including cases where the strategy sets are neither compact nor convex. Agent’s behaviour is modelled in terms of “inverse reply correspondences” (mappings that associate to each agent’s strategy those outcomes that she finds acceptable). Sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to exist are provided 相似文献
4.
M. Amarante F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci L. Montrucchio 《International Journal of Game Theory》2006,34(3):399-424
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley (Values of non-atomic games, 1974), and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy et al. (Int J Game Theory 28:1–14, 1999). We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our findings. 相似文献
5.
Dr. K. Kikuta 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》1983,27(1):137-140
It is shown that each game in a class of zero-monotonic games is a market game. 相似文献
6.
Professor L. J. Billera Professor R. E. Bixby 《International Journal of Game Theory》1973,2(1):253-261
The class of games without side payments obtainable from markets having finitely many commodities and continuous concave utility functions is considered. It is first shown that each of these so-called market games is totally balanced, for a reasonable generalization of the idea of a balanced side payment game. It is then shown that among polyhedral games (i.e., games for which each (V(S) is a polyhedron), this property characterizes the market games. 相似文献
7.
Consider a game in which resources may be combined to produce products of known values. For linear production processes, the game may be characterized by a family of linear programs. It is shown that appropriately defined market prices for the resources coincide with the set of optimal dual solutions to one of these linear programs. This result generalizes and unifies the known cases in game theory, in which the core of a game coincides with the set of dual optimal solutions to a corresponding master linear programming problem.Based on working papers by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1982) and Granot (1983). The work was motivated by an application, reported in Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1983), supported by the US EPA.Research was partially supported by the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada Grant A4181. 相似文献
8.
Professor Y. Tauman 《International Journal of Game Theory》1981,10(3-4):155-162
We prove the existence of a (unique) Aumann-Shapley value on the space on non-atomic gamesQ n generated byn-handed glove games. (These are the minima ofn non-atomic mutually singular probability measures.) It is also shown that this value can be extended to a value on the smallest space containingQ n andpNA. 相似文献
9.
10.
The competitive outcomes of an economic system are known, under quite general conditions, always to lie in the core of the associated cooperative game. It is shown here that every “market game” (i.e., one that arises from an exchange economy with money) can be represented by a “direct market” whose competitive outcomes completely fill up the core. It is also shown that it can be represented by a market having any given core outcome as itsunique competitive outcome, or, more generally, having any given compact convex subset of the core as its full set of competitive outcomes. 相似文献
11.
P. Legros 《International Journal of Game Theory》1987,16(1):1-14
This paper gives a simple algorithm for computing the nucleolus of bilateral markets with two complementary commodities. 相似文献
12.
13.
In this work we study oligopoly models in which firms adopt decision mechanisms based on best response techniques with different rationality degrees. Firms are also assumed to face resource or financial constraints in adjusting their production levels, so that, from time to time, they can only increase or decrease their strategy by a bounded quantity. We consider different families of oligopolies of generic sizes, characterized by heterogeneous compositions with respect to the rationality degrees of firms. We analytically study the local stability of the equilibrium depending on the oligopoly size and composition and through numerical simulations we investigate the possible dynamics arising when trajectories do not converge toward the equilibrium. We show that in this case complex dynamics can arise, and this is due to both the loss of stability of the equilibrium and to the emergence of multiple attractors, with the stable steady state coexisting with a different, periodic or chaotic, attractor. In particular, we show that multistability phenomena occur when the overall degree of rationality of the oligopoly is increased. Finally, we investigate the effect of non-convergent dynamics on the realized profits. 相似文献
14.
We consider an extension of glove markets, called T-markets, characterize a family of weighted allocation rules, and define
related cooperative games. For the class of T-market games we introduce a new solution concept called the type monotonic allocation
scheme. It turns out that the nucleolus and the τ-value generate the same type monotonic allocation scheme with nice extra properties.
Initial research for this paper was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund grant OTKA T030945. The authors thank
Ruud Hendrickx for his valuable comments. Research of T. Solymosi was also supported in part by OTKA grant T046194. 相似文献
15.
Antonio Jiménez-Martínez 《International Journal of Game Theory》2014,43(2):455-485
This paper considers two-player quadratic games to examine the relation between strategic interactions in actions and in information decisions. We analyze the role of external effects and of the relative intensities with which the players’ actions interact with the uncertain payoff-relevant parameter. We show that, under some conditions on the quadratic preferences, information choices become substitutes when actions are sufficiently complementary. When attention is restricted to beauty contest games, our results contrast qualitatively with the case studied by Hellwig and Veldkamp (Review of Economic Studies, 76(1)223–251, 2009), where the set of players is a continuum. 相似文献
16.
17.
Marilda Sotomayor 《International Journal of Game Theory》2010,39(1-2):237-248
Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player. 相似文献
18.
In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game. 相似文献
19.
Sigal Leviatan 《International Journal of Game Theory》2003,31(3):383-410
The consistent value is an extension of the Shapley value to the class of games with non-transferable utility.? In this paper,
the consistent value will be characterized for market games with a continuum of players of two types. We will show that for
such games the consistent value need not belong to the core, and provide conditions under which there is equivalence between
the two concepts.
Received: October 1998
RID="*"
ID="*" This thesis was completed under the supervision of Professor Sergiu Hart, The Center for Rationality and Interactive
Decision Theory, Department of Mathematics, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank
Professor Hart for introducing me to this area of research, for his help and guidance, and, especially, for all his patience.? I
would also like to thank Michael Borns for improving the style, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 相似文献
20.
In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results. 相似文献