Multivariate Moran process with Lotka-Volterra phenomenology

For a population with any given number of types, we construct a new multivariate Moran process with frequency-dependent selection and establish, analytically, a correspondence to equilibrium Lotka-Volterra phenomenology. This correspondence, on the one hand, allows us to infer the phenomenology of our Moran process based on much simpler Lokta-Volterra phenomenology and, on the other, allows us to study Lotka-Volterra dynamics within the finite populations of a Moran process. Applications to community ecology, population genetics, and evolutionary game theory are discussed.     

Cyclic dominance and biodiversity in well-mixed populations

Coevolutionary dynamics is investigated in chemical catalysis, biological evolution, social and economic systems. The dynamics of these systems can be analyzed within the unifying framework of evolutionary game theory. In this Letter, we show that even in well-mixed finite populations, where the dynamics is inherently stochastic, biodiversity is possible with three cyclic-dominant strategies. We show how the interplay of evolutionary dynamics, discreteness of the population, and the nature of the interactions influences the coexistence of strategies. We calculate a critical population size above which coexistence is likely.     

Some Analytical Properties of the Model for Stochastic Evolutionary Games in Finite Populations with Non-uniform Interaction Rate

Traditional evolutionary games assume uniform interaction rate, which means that the rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. But in some systems, especially biological systems, the players interact with each other discriminately. Taylor and Nowak (2006) were the first to establish the corresponding non-uniform interaction rate model by allowing the interaction rates to depend on strategies. Their model is based on replicator dynamics which assumes an infinite size population. But in reality, the number of individuals in the population is always finite, and there will be some random interference in the individuals' strategy selection process. Therefore, it is more practical to establish the corresponding stochastic evolutionary model in finite populations. In fact, the analysis of evolutionary games in a finite size population is more difficult. Just as Taylor and Nowak said in the outlook section of their paper, "The analysis of non-uniform interaction rates should be extended to stochastic game dynamics of finite populations." In this paper, we are exactly doing this work. We extend Taylor and Nowak's model from infinite to finite case, especially focusing on the influence of non-uniform connection characteristics on the evolutionary stable state of the system. We model the strategy evolutionary process of the population by a continuous ergodic Markov process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we can give the evolutionary stable state of the system. We make a complete classification of the symmetric 2×2 games. For each case game, the corresponding limit distribution of the Markov-based process is given when noise intensity is small enough. In contrast with most literatures in evolutionary games using the simulation method, all our results obtained are analytical. Especially, in the dominant-case game, coexistence of the two strategies may become evolutionary stable states in our model. This result can be used to explain the emergence of cooperation in the Prisoner is Dilemma Games to some extent. Some specific examples are given to illustrate our results.     

Global Migration Can Lead to Stronger Spatial Selection than Local Migration

The outcome of evolutionary processes depends on population structure. It is well known that mobility plays an important role in affecting evolutionary dynamics in group structured populations. But it is largely unknown whether global or local migration leads to stronger spatial selection and would therefore favor to a larger extent the evolution of cooperation. To address this issue, we quantify the impacts of these two migration patterns on the evolutionary competition of two strategies in a finite island model. Global migration means that individuals can migrate from any one island to any other island. Local migration means that individuals can only migrate between islands that are nearest neighbors; we study a simple geometry where islands are arranged on a one-dimensional, regular cycle. We derive general results for weak selection and large population size. Our key parameters are: the number of islands, the migration rate and the mutation rate. Surprisingly, our comparative analysis reveals that global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration for a wide range of parameter conditions. Our work provides useful insights into understanding how different mobility patterns affect evolutionary processes.     

Speed of adaptation in structured populations

Adaptation of populations takes place with the occurrence and subsequent fixation of mutations that confer some selective advantage to the individuals which acquire it. For this reason, the study of the process of fixation of advantageous mutations has a long history in the population genetics literature. Particularly, the previous investigations aimed to find out the main evolutionary forces affecting the strength of natural selection in the populations. In the current work, we investigate the dynamics of fixation of beneficial mutations in a subdivided population. The subpopulations (demes) can exchange migrants among their neighbors, in a migration network which is assumed to have either a random graph or a scale-free topology. We have observed that the migration rate drastically affects the dynamics of mutation fixation, despite of the fact that the probability of fixation is invariant on the migration rate, accordingly to Maruyama's conjecture. In addition, we have noticed a topological dependence of the adaptive evolution of the population when clonal interference becomes effective.     

Modeling and analyzing of botnet interactions

The dynamics of interacting botnets and the effects of the strategies selected by interacting botnet owners on the spread of botnets remain unclear. As a result, in this paper, we present a botnet interaction model, obtained by coupling a fast evolutionary game dynamics to a slow population dynamics model, in which two botnet types are considered. We analyze the fast evolutionary game model and obtain two stable equilibria. Additionally, we substitute them into the complete model and get two reduced models. Such models allow us to study the effects of strategies selected by botnet owners. Analysis of the models shows that when all owners adopt the cooperative strategy both types of botnets can survive with much lower contact rates. However, while they choose the competitive strategy one type of botnet will become extinct and the other will persist with a lower infection rate. The equilibrium conditions of the evolutionary game model, which can guide us in designing effective counter-botnet methods, are also obtained.     

Cooperation and community structure in social networks

Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society. One way of studying these important phenomena is by using simplified models of individual behavior under conflicting situations such as evolutionary game theory. Starting from the observation that individuals interact through networks of acquaintances, we study the evolution of cooperation on model and real social networks through well known paradigmatic games. Using a new payoff scheme which leaves replicator dynamics invariant, we find that cooperation is sustainable in such networks, even in the difficult case of the prisoner’s dilemma. The evolution and stability of cooperation implies the condensation of game strategies into the existing community structures of the social network in which clusters of cooperators survive thanks to their higher connectivity towards other fellow cooperators.     

Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations

Traditionally, frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics is described by deterministic replicator dynamics assuming implicitly infinite population sizes. Only recently have stochastic processes been introduced to study evolutionary dynamics in finite populations. However, the relationship between deterministic and stochastic approaches remained unclear. Here we solve this problem by explicitly considering large populations. In particular, we identify different microscopic stochastic processes that lead to the standard or the adjusted replicator dynamics. Moreover, differences on the individual level can lead to qualitatively different dynamics in asymmetric conflicts and, depending on the population size, can even invert the direction of the evolutionary process.     

Evolutionary games in a generalized Moran process with arbitrary selection strength and mutation

By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals' payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when ε is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the 'Hawk--Dove' game and the 'Coordinate' game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.     

Effects of expectation and noise on evolutionary games

Considering the difference between the actual and expected payoffs, we bring a stochastic learning updating rule into an evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma game and the Snowdrift game on scale-free networks, and then investigate how the expectation level A and environmental noise κ influence cooperative behavior. Interestingly, numerical results show that the mechanism of promoting cooperation exhibits a resonance-like fashion including the coaction of A, κ and the payoff parameters. High cooperator frequency is induced by some optimal parameter regions. The variation of time series has also been investigated. This work could be of particular interest in the evolutionary game dynamics of biological and social systems.     

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.(i) The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.(ii)Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the "C+P" states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.(iii) When the system chooses"C+P" states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the "P" strategy in the "C+P" states.     

Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wright-FisherProcess with Noise

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright-Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2$\times $2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player's rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner's dilemma games (PDG) and the snowdrift games (SG). We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.     

Self-organized cooperative behavior and critical penalty in an evolving population

The emergence of cooperation and the effectiveness of penalties among competing agents are studied via a model of evolutionary game incorporating adaptive behavior and penalties for illegal acts. For initially identical agents, a phase diagram is obtained via an analytic approach, with results in good agreement with numerical simulations. The results show that there exists a critical penalty for achieving a completely honest population and a sufficiently well-behaved initial population requires no penalty. Self-organized segregation to extreme actions emerges in the dynamics for a system with uniformly distributed initial tendencies for cooperation. After training, the penalty can be relaxed without ruining the adapted cooperative behavior. Results of our model in a population taking on the form of a 2D square lattice are also reported.     

Fixation Times in Deme Structured,Finite Populations with Rare Migration

Population structure affects both the outcome and the speed of evolutionary dynamics. Here we consider a finite population that is divided into subpopulations called demes. The dynamics within the demes are stochastic and frequency-dependent. Individuals can adopt one of two strategic types, \(A\) or \(B\) . The fitness of each individual is determined by interactions with other individuals in the same deme. With small probability, proportional to fitness, individuals migrate to other demes. The outcome of these dynamics has been studied earlier by analyzing the fixation probability of a single mutant in an otherwise homogeneous population. These results give only a partial picture of the dynamics, because the time when fixation occurs can be exceedingly large. In this paper, we study the impact of deme structures on the speed of evolution. We derive analytical approximations of fixation times in the limit of rare migration and rare mutation. In this limit, the conditional fixation time of a single \(A\) mutant in a \(B\) population is the same as that of a single \(B\) in an \(A\) population. For the prisoner’s dilemma game, simulation results fit very well with our analytical predictions and demonstrate that fixation takes place in a moderate amount of time as compared to the expected waiting time until a mutant successfully invades and fixates. The simulations also confirm that the conditional fixation time of a single cooperator is indeed the same as that of a single defector.     

Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

We study evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks. During the co-evolution process, interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability $p$ or update their strategies with probability $1-p$ depending on their payoffs. Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy. Interestingly, the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of $p$ via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics. Finally, the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation. Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals' behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.     

Statistical physics of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with memory-aware agents

We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatialgames, with ‘memory-aware’ agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. Inparticular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma, as it constitutes anemblematic example of a game whose Nash equilibrium is defection. Previous investigationsshowed that, under opportune conditions, it is possible to reach, in the evolutionaryPrisoner’s Dilemma, an equilibrium of cooperation. Notably, it seems that mechanisms likemotion may lead a population to become cooperative. In the proposed model, we map agentsto particles of a gas so that, on varying the system temperature, they randomly move. Indoing so, we are able to identify a relation between the temperature and the finalequilibrium of the population, explaining how it is possible to break the classical Nashequilibrium in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma when considering agents able to increasetheir payoff over time. Moreover, we introduce a formalism to study order-disorder phasetransitions in these dynamics. As result, we highlight that the proposed model allows toexplain analytically how a population, whose interactions are based on the Prisoner’sDilemma, can reach an equilibrium far from the expected one; opening also the way todefine a direct link between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics.     

Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games

Why would natural selection favor the prevalence of cooperation within the groups of selfish individuals? A fruitful framework to address this question is evolutionary game theory, the essence of which is captured in the so-called social dilemmas. Such dilemmas have sparked the development of a variety of mathematical approaches to assess the conditions under which cooperation evolves. Furthermore, borrowing from statistical physics and network science, the research of the evolutionary game dynamics has been enriched with phenomena such as pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organization. Numerous advances in understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior over the last few decades have recently been distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity. However, when social viscosity is introduced into a population via any of the reciprocity mechanisms, the existing scaling parameters for the dilemma strength do not yield a unique answer as to how the evolutionary dynamics should unfold. Motivated by this problem, we review the developments that led to the present state of affairs, highlight the accompanying pitfalls, and propose new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength. We prove universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters. A similar result is shown to hold for the fixation probability of the different strategies in a finite, well-mixed population. Furthermore, by means of numerical simulations, the same scaling parameters are shown to be effective even if the evolution of cooperation is considered on the spatial networks (with the exception of highly heterogeneous setups). We close the discussion by suggesting promising directions for future research including (i) how to handle the dilemma strength in the context of co-evolution and (ii) where to seek opportunities for applying the game theoretical approach with meaningful impact.     

On coordination and continuous hawk-dove games on small-world networks

It is argued that small-world networks are more suitable than ordinary graphs in modelling the diffusion of a concept (e.g. a technology, a disease, a tradition, ...). The coordination game with two strategies is studied on small-world networks, and it is shown that the time needed for a concept to dominate almost all of the network is of order , where N is the number of vertices. This result is different from regular graphs and from a result obtained by Young. The reason for the difference is explained. Continuous hawk-dove game is defined and a corresponding dynamical system is derived. Its steady state and stability are studied. Replicator dynamics for continuous hawk-dove game is derived without the concept of population. The resulting finite difference equation is studied. Finally continuous hawk-dove is simulated on small-world networks using Nash updating rule. The system is 2-cyclic for all the studied range. Received 8 July 2000 and Received in final form 23 July 2000     

Static and evolutionary quantum public goods games

We apply the continuous-variable quantization scheme to quantize public goods game and find that new pure strategy Nash equilibria emerge in the static case. Furthermore, in the evolutionary public goods game, entanglement can also contribute to the persistence of cooperation under various population structures without altruism, voluntary participation, and punishment.