Moore-paradoxical Assertion,Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief

I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.     

A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the Sceptic

Crispin Wright argues that John McDowell’s use of disjunctivism to respond to the sceptic misses the point of the sceptic’s argument, for disjunctivism is a thesis about the differing metaphysical natures of veridical and nonveridical experiences, whereas the sceptic’s point is that our beliefs are unjustified because veridical and nonveridical experiences can be phenomenally indistinguishable. In this paper, I argue that McDowell is responsive to the sceptic’s focus on phenomenology, for the point of McDowell’s response is that it is the phenomenal character of experience that makes the belief in disjunctivism rational, and thereby also makes rational the anti-sceptical belief that, other things being equal, the world is the way it appears.     

Justification,Justifying, and Leite’s Localism

In a series of papers, Adam Leite has developed a novel view of justification tied to being able to responsibly justify a belief. Leite touts his view as (i) faithful to our ordinary practice of justifying beliefs, (ii) providing a novel response to an epistemological problem of the infinite regress, and (iii) resolving the “persistent interlocutor” problem. Though I find elements of Leite’s view of being able to justify a belief promising, I hold that there are several problems afflicting the overall picture of justification. In this paper, I argue that despite its ambitions, Leite’s view fails to solve the persistent interlocutor problem and does not avoid a vicious regress.     

Possibly v. actually the case: Davidson’s omniscient interpreter at twenty

The publication of Davidson 2001, anthologizing articles from the 1980s and 1990s, encourages reconsidering arguments contained in them. One such argument is Davidson’s omniscient-interpreter argument (‘OIA’) in Davidson 1983. The OIA allegedly establishes that it is necessary that most beliefs are true. Thus the omniscient interpreter, revived in 2001 and now 20 years old, was born to answer the skeptic. In Part I of this paper, I consider charges that the OIA establishes only that it is possible that most beliefs are true; if correct, then it is also possibly the case that most beliefs are false—the skeptic’s very position. Next, I consider two responses on Davidson’s behalf, showing that each fails. In Part II, I show that the OIA establishes neither that it is necessarily merely possibly but actually the case that most beliefs are true. I then conclude that this is enough to answer the skeptic.     

Non-Realist Cognitivism,Truth and Objectivity

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that (i) normative judgments are beliefs; (ii) that some normative beliefs are true; (iii) that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and (iv) that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit’s theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.     

Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces

Bonanno (Logics and the foundations of game and decision theory, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2008) provides an epistemic characterization for the solution concept of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles (IDIP) by embedding strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs in non-probabilistic epistemic models which are built on Kripke frames. In this paper, we will follow the event-based approach to epistemic game theory and supplement strategic games with type space models, where each type is associated with a preference relation on the state space. In such a framework, IDIP can be characterized by the conditions that at least one player has correct beliefs about the state of the world and that there is common belief that every player is rational, has correct beliefs about the state of the world and has strictly monotone preferences. Moreover, we shall compare the epistemic motivations for IDIP and its mixed strategy variant known as strong rationalizability (SR). Presuppose the above conditions. Whenever there is also common belief that players’ preferences are representable by some expected utility function IDIP still applies. But if there is common belief that players’ preferences are representable by some expected payoff function, then SR results.     

Probabilism,entropies and strictly proper scoring rules

Accuracy arguments are the en vogue route in epistemic justifications of probabilism and further norms governing rational belief. These arguments often depend on the fact that the employed inaccuracy measure is strictly proper. I argue controversially that it is ill-advised to assume that the employed inaccuracy measures are strictly proper and that strictly proper statistical scoring rules are a more natural class of measures of inaccuracy. Building on work in belief elicitation I show how strictly proper statistical scoring rules can be used to give an epistemic justification of probabilism.An agent's evidence does not play any role in these justifications of probabilism. Principles demanding the maximisation of a generalised entropy depend on the agent's evidence. In the second part of the paper I show how to simultaneously justify probabilism and such a principle. I also investigate scoring rules which have traditionally been linked with entropies.     

Rethinking common belief,revision, and backward induction

Whether rationality and common belief in rationality jointly entail the backward inductive outcome in centipede games has long been debated. Stalnaker’s compelling negative argument appeals to the AGM belief revision postulates to argue that off-path moves may be rational, given the revisions they may prompt. I counter that the structure of common belief and the principles of AGM justify an additional assumption about revision. I then prove that, given my proposed constraint, for all finite, n-player, extensive form, perfect information games with a unique backward inductive solution, if there is initial common belief in rationality, then backward induction is guaranteed.     

Kronecker’s density theorem and irrational numbers in constructive reverse mathematics

To prove Kronecker’s density theorem in Bishop-style constructive analysis one needs to define an irrational number as a real number that is bounded away from each rational number. In fact, once one understands “irrational” merely as “not rational”, then the theorem becomes equivalent to Markov’s principle. To see this we undertake a systematic classification, in the vein of constructive reverse mathematics, of logical combinations of “rational” and “irrational” as predicates of real numbers.     

Supply chain coordination with downstream operating costs: Coordination and investment to improve downstream operating efficiency

There are many conceptualizations and formalizations of decision making. In this paper we compare classical decision theory with qualitative decision theory, knowledge-based systems and belief–desire–intention models developed in artificial intelligence and agent theory. They all contain representations of information and motivation. Examples of informational attitudes are probability distributions, qualitative abstractions of probabilities, knowledge, and beliefs. Examples of motivational attitudes are utility functions, qualitative abstractions of utilities, goals, and desires. Each of them encodes a set of alternatives to be chosen from. This ranges from a small predetermined set, a set of decision variables, through logical formulas, to branches of a tree representing events through time. Moreover, they have a way of formulating how a decision is made. Classical and qualitative decision theory focus on the optimal decisions represented by a decision rule. Knowledge-based systems and belief–desire–intention models focus on an alternative conceptualization to formalize decision making, inspired by cognitive notions like belief, desire, goal and intention. Relations among these concepts express an agent type, which constrains the deliberation process. We also consider the relation between decision processes and intentions, and the relation between game theory and norms and commitments.     

Topological structures of complex belief systems

The concepts of substantive beliefs and derived beliefs are defined, a set of substantive beliefs S like open set and the neighborhood of an element substantive belief. A semantic operation of conjunction is defined with a structure of an Abelian group. Mathematical structures exist such as poset beliefs and join‐semilattttice beliefs. A metric space of beliefs and the distance of belief depending on the believer are defined. The concepts of closed and opened ball are defined. S′ is defined as subgroup of the metric space of beliefs Σ and S′ is a totally limited set. The term s is defined (substantive belief) in terms of closing of S′. It is deduced that Σ is paracompact due to Stone's Theorem. The pseudometric space of beliefs is defined to show how the metric of the nonbelieving subject has a topological space like a nonmaterial abstract ideal space formed in the mind of the believing subject, fulfilling the conditions of Kuratowski axioms of closure. To establish patterns of materialization of beliefs we are going to consider that these have defined mathematical structures. This will allow us to understand better cultural processes of text, architecture, norms, and education that are forms or the materialization of an ideology. This materialization is the conversion by means of certain mathematical correspondences, of an abstract set whose elements are beliefs or ideas, in an impure set whose elements are material or energetic. Text is a materialization of ideology. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 19: 46–62, 2013     

A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief

Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of dispositions. In this article, I provide a blind-spot argument against these accounts. The core idea of the argument is that beliefs having the form [p and it is not manifestly believed that p] cannot be manifestly believed. This means that one cannot manifest such beliefs in one’s assertions, conscious thoughts, actions, behaviours, or any other type of activity. However, if beliefs are sets of dispositions, they must be manifestable in some way. Therefore, according to my argument, beliefs are not sets of dispositions. The argument is defended against some possible objections.     

Expressing and Describing Experiences. A Case of Showing Versus Saying

Experiences are interpreted as conscious mental occurrences that are of phenomenal character. There is already a kind of (weak) intentionality involved with this phenomenal interpretation. A stricter conception of experiences distinguishes between purely phenomenal experiences and intentional experiences in a narrow sense. Wittgenstein’s account of psychological (experiential) verbs is taken over: Usually, expressing mental states verbally is not describing them. According to this, “I believe” can be seen as an expression of one’s own belief, but not as an expression of a belief about one’s belief. Hence, the utterance “I believe it is raining” shows that I believe that it is raining, although it is not said by these words that I believe that it is raining. Thinking thoughts such as “I believe it is raining, but it is not raining” (a variant of Moore’s paradox) is an absurdity between what is already said by silently uttering “It is not raining” and what is shown by silently uttering “I believe it is raining.” The paper agrees with a main result of Wittgenstein’s considerations of Moore’s paradox, namely the view that logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions—besides a logic of propositions, there is, for example, a logic of assertions and of imperatives, respectively.     

Moore’s Paradox,Truth and Accuracy

G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better explanation of the absurdity both in assertion and in belief that avoids our four objections.     

Pritchard,Revisionism and Warranted Assertability

Against contextualism, Duncan Pritchard has argued that conversational pragmatics give rise to an argument in favour of invariantist neo-Mooreanism. More specifically, he argues that when we conjoin a Moorean view with a warranted assertability manoeuvre, we can satisfy our pre-theoretical intuitions (which are decidedly invariantist), whereas contextualists cannot. In the following paper, I challenge Pritchard’s argument and contend that he is too quick to declare victory for invariantism, for not only does the WAM he employs appear to be ad hoc vis-à-vis DeRose’s plausible criteria, but it also seems to have very implausible pragmatic implications when subjected to close scrutiny.     

Content essentialism

The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, I then point out that a “sexy” conclusion that is sometimes drawn from Putnam-Burge-style externalist arguments, namely that our mental states are not in our heads, presupposes content essentialism — which suggests that the view is not entirely trivial. Moreover, it seems intuitively that physicalists should reject the view: If beliefs are physical states, how could they have their propositional contents essentially? I distinguish three readings of the title question. Content essentialism does seem fairly obvious on the first two, but not so on the third. I argue that the common-sense argument mentioned earlier presupposes one of the first two readings but fails to apply to the third, on which ‘belief’ refers to belief-state tokens. That’s because ordinary belief individuation is silent about belief-state tokens. Token physicalists, I suggest, should indeed reject content essentialism about belief-state tokens. What about token dualists? One might think they ought to embrace content essentialism about belief-state tokens. I end with puzzling why this should be so.     

Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment

According to a recent view, known as the 'pragmatic encroachment' thesis, an agent’s non-truth-related factors are relevant to the epistemic status of her beliefs. In particular, in addition to truth-related factors, practical factors are said to be relevant to the question whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Despite the intuitive appeal of the thesis, however, it is puzzling how practical factors can impact the truth-related factors that ground the epistemic status of one's beliefs. In this paper, I will distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of the way in which practical factors are said to be thus relevant. Their differences are explicated in terms of the nature and the extent to which practical factors are said to impact the epistemic status of one's beliefs. I begin by considering a strong version of the thesis that suggests principles according to which the practical rationality of one's actions is a necessary condition on knowledge and justification. Having noted an inadequacy in the formulation of such principles, the arguments in their support are subsequently stated and criticized. Finally, I identify two modest versions of the thesis of pragmatic encroachment and argue that they, too, fail to explain how practical factors can bear on the epistemic status of one's beliefs.     

Pure Cognitivism and Beyond

The article begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are always beliefs, never desires. The article next argues that Dancy’s argument for his position is flawed. On the one hand, it is not true that desire always comes with motivation in the agent; on the other, even if this was the case, it would still not follow that desire is identical with the state of being motivated. When this negative work is done, the article turns to some positive, albeit admittedly tentative remarks about what sort of cognitivist theory of motivation one should endorse. The aim at this point is not to present a brand new theory, but rather to sketch an alternative that stems from what Dancy himself says and is in line with many of his endorsed commitments in other areas. In this way, by moving beyond Pure Cognitivism, the paper sketches a different, but still ‘Dancyesque’ theory of motivation.