共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 78 毫秒
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针对原复制动态建立过程的缺陷,通过引入强度系数,使博弈参与者采取不同策略时更显得相互依赖,体现出不同策略被采用的变化情况,扩展了进化博弈论的框架.针对均有两个策略的两个博弈参与者,研究分析了扩展后复制动态的稳定性,对以后科学管理具有重要指导意义. 相似文献
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在危机管理和冲突分析中,力量对等冲突方之间的相互威慑是否具有稳定性问题,一直存在疑义。本文基于进化博弈论视野,给出了直接求解3×3和4×4鹰—鸽博弈扩展模型进化稳定策略ESS(EvolutionaryStableStrategy)的方法,画出了3×3鹰—鸽扩展博弈的相位图,得出了威慑策略是进化稳定策略的结论,从而对上述问题进行了有说服力的解释。 相似文献
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《数学的实践与认识》2015,(19)
以进化博弈论为分析工具,对当前农村社会化服务组织进行分析和实验模拟.通过研究得出一些科学有用的结论并提出具有参考价值的政策建议,以促进农村社会化服务组织健康稳定的发展. 相似文献
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通过建立一般情况下的两人进化博弈模型,给出了系统均衡点对应的矩阵行列式和迹表达式的经济含义,分析了16种典型情形下的进化稳定策略,详细讨论了均衡点稳定性分析结果所对应的博弈双方决策过程,从策略权衡的视角揭示了策略选择的内在机制。研究结果表明:不同策略前提下的相对净支付决定了系统的进化稳定策略,对方的策略选择以及自身可选策略的支付比较是影响博弈主体策略选择的两个基本要素,博弈主体会趋向于选择在对方策略既定下能够带来更大支付的策略。最后以环境治理中地方政府与企业以及地方政府之间的博弈关系为例,从对称博弈和非对称博弈两方面阐明了本文所构建模型在政策设计中的应用价值:针对不同案例,只要明确了两人博弈的支付矩阵,就可以通过计算相对净支付确定博弈双方的行为演化规律和稳定策略,从而简化计算过程,更加直接和更为便捷地为政策设计提供理论参考。 相似文献
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为研究航空公司和机票代理人之间的博弈过程,在分析航空公司和代理人在不同策略下各自的得益基础上,建立了静态博弈模型,并运用演化博弈理论对航空公司的机票直销策略选择与代理人策略选择的互动机制进行了分析.博弈分析结果显示,航空公司和代理商在以下情况时存在进化稳定策略:当代理销售成本高于直销成本时,航空公司会加大直销力度;而航空公司的直销策略比较强势时,当代理商抵制策略的概率会大大增加;航空公司缓和推进直销时,代理会也会采取缓和策略. 相似文献
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Studies of e-collaboration from a game-theoretical perspective are practically nonexistent. This article contributes to filling this gap by focusing on the strategic interaction between players as they decide whether and how much to collaborate with each other. We use evolutionary game theory to make predictions about a two-person e-collaboration game. More specifically, we extend the traditional Prisoners’ Dilemma and Snowdrift game theory notions to discrete-strategy e-collaboration games, by explicitly including social punishments into the players’ payoff functions. We also introduce continuous-strategy e-collaboration games with both complete and incomplete information. Finally, we provide two generic dynamic programming models for e-collaboration games with media selection. 相似文献
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We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.This research was partly funded by the College Engineering, Ohio State University. 相似文献
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Competition Among Conventions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A convention can be seen as a way of resolving a coordination problem. If different conventions exist in various geographical, social or other entities (called &;201C;groups&;201D;) and if there is some mobility between these groups, which conventions, if any, will emerge as the successful ones? A simple evolutionary process is suggested and it is shown that the process converges to a Nash equilibrium for all games satisfying weak acyclity. Further, if the process converges, it converges to an efficient convention for all games in which the Pareto optimal symmetric equilibria are strict. Hence, the paper presents an explanation for the endogenous evolution of efficiency. In contrast to most recent studies in evolutionary game theory, the conclusions do not rely on random &;201C;mutations&;201D;. Instead, the driving force is the tendency of players to have increased interaction with member of their own group (viscosity). 相似文献
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We analyze the learning behavior of a Simple Genetic Algorithm in symmetric 3 × 3 Strategic-Form-Games. In cases of contests within one population and also between two populations the behavior of the SGA is compared with the behavior of the replicator dynamics and is analyzed with respect to equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory. Furthermore conservative non-adaptive strings are added to the population which lead to convergence to an equilibrium even in “GA-deceptive” games where the equilibrium can not be reached by GAs using only selection and crossover. 相似文献
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本文研究匹配合作对策模型的核心稳定性。基于线性规划对偶理论和图论的相关知识,我们首先证明了匹配对策有稳定核心当且仅当其基础二部图有完美匹配。其次我们讨论了几个与核心稳定性密切相关的性质(核心的包容性、对策的精确性和可扩性)并证明了它们的等价性。基于这些结果,我们还讨论了相应问题的算法。 相似文献
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基于累积前景理论的联盟企业知识转移演化博弈分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
知识转移过程是一个复杂的博弈过程,演化博弈论可以很好地解释转移主体行为。考虑到传统的演化博弈模型不能对知识转移主体非理性心理因素及风险偏好问题进行有效解释,本文将累积前景理论与演化博弈相结合,运用前景价值函数完善支付矩阵的部分参数,分析博弈模型的演化稳定策略。通过仿真模拟得出如下结论:知识转移存在两个演化稳定策略;转移策略由直接收益、转移成本及前景损益等因素决定;转移方的风险损失对转移策略影响较大,而接收方潜在收入对知识转移策略影响较小。 相似文献
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以往对演化博弈的研究都假设个体从博弈中获得的支付是确定的并以精确的数来表示。然而由于受环境中各种不确定因素的影响,个体博弈时所获得的支付并不是一个精确的数值,而需要用一个模糊数来表示。本文研究模糊支付下2×2的对称博弈, 利用模糊数的运算, 分析具有模糊支付的有限种群Moran过程演化动态。在弱选择下以梯形模糊数和三角模糊数表示博弈支付,计算策略的模糊扎根概率,分析自然选择有利于策略扎根及策略成为模糊演化稳定策略的条件。将经典博弈推广到模糊环境中丰富了演化博弈理论,更具有现实意义。 相似文献
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P. L. Yu 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》1979,27(1):147-166
The paradigm of decision dynamics (Ref. 1) is used to describe the decision dynamics involving more than one decision-maker. The framework supplied in this paper is different from traditional game theory or differential games. Traditional simplicity assumptions are replaced by a more complicated, but more realistic, setting. Although many mathematically beautiful results in traditional game theory or differential games have disappeared in second-order games, the more realistic setting of the latter does make it easier for the decision-makers to find agood decision. Concepts of time optimality and time stability, and their necessary and/or sufficient conditions are described. Unconventional concepts of strategies and uncertainty involved in gaming phenomena are discussed. A highlight of the paper is a systematic discussion on reframing tactics of gaming situations, which do not exist in the context of traditional game theory or differential games. Various research topics are discussed at the end of the paper. 相似文献