An explicit basis for the admissible inference rules in the Gödel-Löb logic <Emphasis Type="Italic">GL</Emphasis>

We describe an explicit basis for the admissible inference rules in the Gödel-Löb logic. The basis consists of a sequence of inference rules in infinitely many variables. Inference rules in the reduced form play an important role in this study. Alongside a basis for the admissible rules we obtain a basis for the quasi-identities of the countable rank free algebra in the Gödel-Löb logic.     

An explicit basis for the admissible inference rules of the modal logics extending <Emphasis Type="Italic">S</Emphasis>4.1 And <Emphasis Type="Italic">Grz</Emphasis>

We study bases for the admissible inference rules in a broad class of modal logics. We construct an explicit basis for all admissible rules in the logics S4.1, Grz, and their extensions whose number is at least countable. The resulting basis consists of an infinite sequence of rules in a concise and simple form. In the case of a logic of finite width a basis for all admissible rules consists of a finite sequence of rules.     

An Inheritance Criterion for the Admissible Inference Rules of K4

We give a criterion for inheritance of the admissible inference rules of the modal logic K4 by the finitely approximable modal logics extending K4. We give a negative solution to the question of inheritance of the admissible rules of K4 by tabular logics. We exhibit a series of examples of modal logics which inherit or fail to inherit the admissible inference rules of K4.     

Construction of an Explicit Basis for Rules Admissible in Modal System S4

We find an explicit basis for all admissible rules of the modal logic S4. Our basis consists of an infinite sequence of rules which have compact and simple, readable form and depend on increasing set of variables. This gives a basis for all quasi‐identities valid in the free modal algebra ℱ_S4(ω) of countable rank.     

On the rules of intermediate logics

If the Visser rules are admissible for an intermediate logic, they form a basis for the admissible rules of the logic. How to characterize the admissible rules of intermediate logics for which not all of the Visser rules are admissible is not known. In this paper we give a brief overview of results on admissible rules in the context of intermediate logics. We apply these results to some well-known intermediate logics. We provide natural examples of logics for which the Visser rule are derivable, admissible but nonderivable, or not admissible. Supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF under projects P16264 and P16539.     

Describing a Basis in Semireduced Form for Inference Rules of Intuitionistic Logic

It is shown that a set of all rules in semireduced form whose premises satisfy a collection of specific conditions form a basis for all rules admissible in IPC. The conditions specified are quite natural, and many of them show up as properties of maximal theories in the canonical Kripke model for IPC. Besides, a similar basis is constructed for rules admissible in the superintuitionistic logic KC, a logic of the weak law of the excluded middle.     

An explicit basis for admissible inference rules in table modal logics of width 2

We construct an explicit finite basis for admissible inference rules in an arbitrary modal logic of width 2 extending the logic Grz. Translated from Algebra i Logika, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 122–148, January–February, 2009.     

On Finite Model Property for Admissible Rules

Our investigation is concerned with the finite model property (fmp) with respect to admissible rules. We establish general sufficient conditions for absence of fmp w. r. t. admissibility which are applicable to modal logics containing K4: Theorem 3.1 says that no logic λ containing K4 with the co-cover property and of width > 2 has fmp w. r. t. admissibility. Surprisingly many, if not to say all, important modal logics of width > 2 are within the scope of this theorem–K4 itself, S4, GL, K4.1, K4.2, S4.1, S4.2, GL.2, etc. Thus the situation is completely opposite to the case of the ordinary fmp–the absolute majority of important logics have fmp, but not with respect to admissibility. As regards logics of width ≤ 2, there exists a zone for fmp w. r. t. admissibility. It is shown (Theorem 4.3) that all modal logics A of width ≤ 2 extending S4 which are not sub-logics of three special tabular logics (which is equipotent to all these λ extend a certain subframe logic defined over S4 by omission of four special frames) have fmp w.r.t. admissibility.     

Preservativity logic: An analogue of interpretability logic for constructive theories

In this paper we study the modal behavior of Σ‐preservativity, an extension of provability which is equivalent to interpretability for classical superarithmetical theories. We explain the connection between the principles of this logic and some well‐known properties of HA, like the disjunction property and its admissible rules. We show that the intuitionistic modal logic given by the preservativity principles of HA known so far, is complete with respect to a certain class of frames.     

On unification and admissible rules in Gabbay–de Jongh logics

In this paper we study the admissible rules of intermediate logics. We establish some general results on extensions of models and sets of formulas. These general results are then employed to provide a basis for the admissible rules of the Gabbay–de Jongh logics and to show that these logics have finitary unification type.     

Table admissible inference rules

A recursive basis of inference rules is described which are instantaneously admissible in all table (residually finite) logics extending one of the logics Int and Grz. A rather simple semantic criterion is derived to determine whether a given inference rule is admissible in all table superintuitionistic logics, and the relationship is established between admissibility of a rule in all table (residually finite) superintuitionistic logics and its truth values in Int. Translated from Algebra i Logika, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 400–414, May–June, 2009.     

Characterizing Belnap's Logic via De Morgan's Laws

The aim of this paper is technically to study Belnap's four-valued sentential logic (see [2]). First, we obtain a Gentzen-style axiomatization of this logic that contains no structural rules while all they are still admissible in the Gentzen system what is proved with using some algebraic tools. Further, the mentioned logic is proved to be the least closure operator on the set of {Λ, V, ?}-formulas satisfying Tarski's conditions for classical conjunction and disjunction together with De Morgan's laws for negation. It is also proved that Belnap's logic is the only sentential logic satisfying the above-mentioned conditions together with Anderson-Belnap's Variable-Sharing Property. Finally, we obtain a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic. As a consequence, we obtain a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of Priest's logic of paradox (see [12]).     

Decidability of the Admissibility Problem for Inference Rules in Some <Emphasis Type="Italic">S</Emphasis>5<Subscript>t</Subscript>-Logics

We examine some many-modal logics extending S5_t, t ∈ N, for decidability w.r.t. admissibility of inference rules, and for the logics in question, we prove an algorithmic criterion determining whether the inference rules in them are admissible.__________Translated from Algebra i Logika, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 438–458, July–August, 2005.     

Finite bases with respect to admissibility for modal logics of width 2

It is proved that every finitely approximable and residually finite modal logic of depth 2 over K4 has a finite basis of admissible inference rules. This, in particular, implies that every finitely approximable residually finite modal logic of depth at most 2 is finitely based w.r.t. admissibility. (Among logics in a larger depth or width, there are logics which do not have a finite, or even independent, basis of admissible rules of inference.) Translated fromAlgebra i Logika, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 436–455, July–August 1999.     

A Criterion for Admissibility of Inference Rules in Some Class of S4-Logics Without the Branching Property

We consider a finitely approximable modal S4-logic without the branching property. Although Rybakov's criterion is inapplicable, using his method we manage to obtain an algorithmic criterion for admissibility of inference rules in a given logic.     

Realisability for infinitary intuitionistic set theory

We introduce a realisability semantics for infinitary intuitionistic set theory that is based on Ordinal Turing Machines (OTMs). We show that our notion of OTM-realisability is sound with respect to certain systems of infinitary intuitionistic logic, and that all axioms of infinitary Kripke-Platek set theory are realised. Finally, we use a variant of our notion of realisability to show that the propositional admissible rules of (finitary) intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory are exactly the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic.     

Admissibility and refutation: some characterisations of intermediate logics

Refutation systems are formal systems for inferring the falsity of formulae. These systems can, in particular, be used to syntactically characterise logics. In this paper, we explore the close connection between refutation systems and admissible rules. We develop technical machinery to construct refutation systems, employing techniques from the study of admissible rules. Concretely, we provide a refutation system for the intermediate logics of bounded branching, known as the Gabbay–de Jongh logics. We show that this gives a characterisation of these logics in terms of their admissible rules. To illustrate the technique, we also provide a refutation system for Medvedev’s logic.     

Cut-Elimination Theorem for the Logic of Constant Domains

The logic CD is an intermediate logic (stronger than intuitionistic logic and weaker than classical logic) which exactly corresponds to the Kripke models with constant domains. It is known that the logic CD has a Gentzen-type formulation called LD (which is same as LK except that (→) and (?–) rules are replaced by the corresponding intuitionistic rules) and that the cut-elimination theorem does not hold for LD . In this paper we present a modification of LD and prove the cut-elimination theorem for it. Moreover we prove a “weak” version of cut-elimination theorem for LD , saying that all “cuts” except some special forms can be eliminated from a proof in LD . From these cut-elimination theorems we obtain some corollaries on syntactical properties of CD : fragments collapsing into intuitionistic logic. Harrop disjunction and existence properties, and a fact on the number of logical symbols in the axiom of CD . Mathematics Subject Classification : 03B55. 03F05.