代理人在职消费对动态多任务激励契约的影响

将代理人的在职消费行为引入到动态多任务委托代理框架中,构造了代理人在职消费行为下的两阶段多任务模型,分析了代理人在职消费行为对动态多任务激励契约的影响.研究结果表明:一是任务为两阶段时,无论代理人有无在职消费行为,代理人的努力程度随着时间均呈上升趋势,这就表明当委托人在设计契约时,如果委托人期望代理人在第一阶段的努力水平不低于第二阶段的努力水平,就需要适当提高第一阶段的业绩薪酬系数;二是代理人在职消费自利行为并不一定会提高自身的努力程度,需要依据在职消费行为对绩效的影响情形来具体分析;三是在两阶段内,代理人存在在职消费时,委托人可适当降低业绩薪酬系数.     

基于二层规划模型满意度的委托代理问题求解

主要基于二层规划问题研究非对称信息条件下的委托代理问题,分析委托人如何设计最优激励契约来与代理人达到双赢决策策略.具体思路如下:考虑到代理人对自身利益的追求,将代理人的效益函数与委托人的效益函数放置同一层构成双目标上层问题进行讨论,然后从不同权重条件下的弱有效解序列中寻找使得委托人和代理人都可接受的满意契约,实现双方共赢的目的.     

在有限执行假设下对最优契约的扩展模型研究

本文运用违约保证金条款改进了代理人事前报酬契约；在契约有限执行的假设下，扩展了代理人的逆向选择模型，并运用扩展逆向选择模型分析了改进后的最优报酬契约。文章指出，改进后的最优报酬契约严格优于委托人为防范代理人违约而被迫采用的非负参与性约束条件下的最优报酬契约。     

具有竞争关系的多参与人委托代理问题研究

针对多委托人一多代理人委托代理问题,本文在多委托人之间和多代理人之间均存在竞争关系情形下,建立了非对称信息委托代理模型.分析表明,代理人努力水平对其产出的作用越敏感,代理人和委托人都越愿意付出更多努力;当委托人业务能力高低对代理人的影响较敏感时,委托人更愿意花心思去提高业务能力;委托一代理关系中的任何一方竞争过于激烈时会被处于委托一代理关系中的另一方利用.     

一种基于随机信息测评的多项任务委托代理均衡对策方法

由于信息的不对称,导致可观测信息的综合测评指数是多维随机变量,参照HolmstromMilgrom(1991)模型的基本框架,建立代理人承担n项任务时均衡对策模型,得出最优解.同时进一步探讨了委托人对代理人承担的一部分任务努力程度不可测,一部分任务努力程度间接可测,一部分任务努力程度完全可测的情形,在不失一般性的前提下就代理人承担三项任务时,运用相关系数分析其任务之间的相关性对替代性任务和互补性任务中最优分享系数的影响.结果表明,委托人在制定绩效工资方案时,要均衡考虑风险态度、激励成本和测评方差才能达到期望效果.     

信息成本、博弈规则与经济效率:兼议国有资产运营的制度选择

本文假设委托人或监督人能够以一定成本收集信息从而能依一定概率观察到影响委托人报酬的生产力水平 ,研究了存在信息传递成本的多委托人模型、零信息传递成本的多委托人模型和委托人 -监督人 -代理人模型 ,比较了不同的博弈规则或制度安排在均衡状态下的信息分布与经济体效率 .本文的研究结论表明 ,给定委托人或监督人的信息成本与信息处理能力 ,博弈规则是决定信息分布与经济体效率的关键因素 .存在信息传递成本时 ,由于坐便车行为 ,信息分布的不对称程度最为严重 ,也具有最低的效率 .零信息传递成本的多委托人模型中 ,信息不对称程度最弱 ,并且在很弱的条件下具有最高的效率 .委托人 -监督人 -代理人模型中 ,仅当监督人具有充分低的信息收集成本和充分高的信息处理能力时 ,才有可能具有较高的效率 .就本文的模型所支持的结论而言 ,国有企业的公司制改造 ,并降低资本市场传递与处理信息的成本 ,是更富于效率的一种制度安排 .相反 ,由于作为监督者的国有资产管理部门并不佣有产权 ,它没有足够的动机去认真履行监督职责 ,同时 ,诱导监督者其不与代理人串通作弊的成本之高昂 ,都将进一步降低这种制度安排下国有资产运营的效率 .     

基于委托代理模型的岗位竞聘问题的研究

将委托代理模型引入岗位竞聘问题中,并在两阶段委托代理模型中引入审核机制,首先建立了岗位竞聘问题的单阶段委托代理模型,然后通过建立两阶段的委托代理模型来促使代理人讲真话,最后引入事前审核机制进一步优化岗位竞聘问题.分析表明契约本身具有鉴别代理人类型的功能,但要在契约签订之后才显现出来,在契约签订之前进行审核可以以一定的概率显示代理人真实类型,但需要支付一定的成本,委托人需要进行利益权衡选择审核与否.     

考虑长短期努力的过度自信代理人激励机制

以相对净收益为标准设计代理人薪酬契约,同时考虑代理人过度自信及长短期努力水平,并区分长短期努力的冲突性与非冲突性,分别建立非货币效用计量模型和代理人最优激励模型,探索各项因素对代理人努力水平及业绩分享比例的影响。研究发现如下几点主要结论:第一,垄断行业代理人努力水平远远低于竞争性行业,且行业垄断程度越高,代理人努力水平越低。第二,行业垄断盈余比例与业绩分享比例之间的关系受委托人与代理人过度自信程度影响,当代理人过度自信系数高于委托人时,行业垄断程度越高,业绩分享比例越大,反之结论相反。第三,代理人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越高;委托人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越低。第四,代理人努力水平与边际非货币收益正相关,与边际非货币成本呈负向变化关系。     

阶梯激励合约下代理人行为与合约激励效果

基于委托代理理论研究了阶梯激励合约下的代理人行为,并从委托人角度探讨了最优合约设计的问题。在一般市场需求分布和代理人效用函数下,代理人的效用可能是其努力水平的双峰函数,且存在一个阈值使得当合约绩效奖励超过该阈值时,代理人的努力水平“跳跃式”增加。通过比较阶梯激励合约与其他两类激励合约发现,当代理人是风险厌恶型且代理人的产出完全依赖于其努力水平,委托人总是更偏好阶梯激励合约。     

基于双边风险厌恶及存在监督的委托-代理模型研究

研究了委托人与代理人双边风险厌恶及存在监督情形下的委托-代理问题.结论表明非对称信息下最优风险分担系数是委托人风险厌恶程度的递增函数,是代理人风险厌恶程度的递减函数,代理人努力水平是其风险厌恶程度的递减函数.监督措施的存在提高了对代理人的激励强度.     

Framing contingencies in contracts

This paper develops a contracting model in which the principal frames the contract when the agent is unaware of some contingencies, yet is aware that she may be unaware. We call the contract vague if the agent is still unaware of some contingencies after understanding the contract. We show that the optimal contract is vague if and only if the principal exploits the agent. Applying the model to an insurance problem, we show the insuree is free from exploitation if she slightly underestimates the unforeseen calamities. In a contracting problem, whenever the contractor is unaware of the force majeure event, she is exploited by the employer.     

虚拟第三方下供应链激励协调

为了解决供应商隐藏成本信息、销售商隐藏努力行动所引起的逆向选择和道德风险问题,文章基于委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为协调主体,分别站在供应商和销售商的角度,通过设计合适的契约激励销售商努力工作和供应商“说真话”。研究结果表明,当供应链中只有道德风险存在时,可以通过如(16)式的契约(其中契约参数λ∈[0,1])实现供应链的完美协调;但是,当供应链中不仅仅存在道德风险还存在逆向选择时,该契约参数不再是区间[0,1]上任意的值,而是与供应链交易量q及供应商的生产成本c相关的定值(满足(29)式),此时的供应链才能实现协调;在该契约下,为获得更多的利益,供应商更有动机降低自身生产成本,销售商也更有积极性提高努力水平,从而实现“双赢”。最后,通过数值算例对模型进行了应用分析。     

动态多任务双边道德风险契约研究

针对管理活动的动态性与多任务性的特点,将解聘补偿与解聘倾向引入动态多任务契约设计中,构建了基于解聘补偿的动态多任务双边道德风险契约。通过数理推导分析的方法给出了最优契约设计,声誉效应和棘轮效应的度量,探讨了解聘倾向对于契约设计的影响。结果表明解聘倾向的引入对于委托人的道德风险约束是有效的,但是对于代理人的道德风险约束则取决于声誉效应与棘轮效应的大小。在第2期契约中,解聘倾向对固定支付的影响取决于代理人保留收入与解聘补偿的差额。而第1期的契约设计要受到解聘补偿,声誉效应与棘轮效应三者的综合影响。任务关联性对契约设计影响以及相应的实证分析是未来的研究方向。     

Entry and exit of service providers under cost uncertainty: a real options approach

From a real options perspective, this paper examines a service provider's entry and exit decisions toward two types of service outsourcing contracts under service transaction cost uncertainties. Specifically, for a service contract with a flexible duration, the service provider has an option to terminate the contract at any time point by paying a pre-determined exit penalty. For a contract with a fixed-duration, the service provider is obligated to deliver services for a pre-determined period of time. Under this framework, this study seeks to derive the transaction cost conditions that trigger the service provider’s exercise of entry and exit options. Furthermore, via analytical and numerical examinations, this study also uncovers how service transaction cost uncertainty and other business factors (eg, exit penalty and contract duration) influence the service provider’s entry and exit decisions as well as the choice of contract type (ie, fixed-duration versus flexible-duration).     

Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard

Within the class dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms, we show that there exists an optimal contracting mechanism for the principal for a version of the incomplete information principal-agent problem in which several agents compete for a contract and the principal selects an agent via a contract auction. In our auction model, we assume that the principal and the agents are risk averse, and we allow for uncountably many agent types. We also assume that the principal's probability measure over type profiles in such that correlation between agent's types is possible. Thus, we do not require that agents' types be independently distributed. Finally, we impose limited liability constraints upon the set of contracts. Due to the nature of the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, the existence problem is nonstandard and novel existence arguments are required. We prove existence using a measurable selection result and a new notion of compactness called K-compactness.     

基于解聘补偿的股权激励模型研究

传统的委托代理模型存在激励的短期性与道德风险的单边性两方面的问题．通过引入解聘补偿机制,建立并分析了信息完全对称和不完全对称两种情况下的股权激励模型,研究了委托人解聘倾向对股权激励合同设计的影响机制．研究结果表明：在初始合同中引入解聘补偿,不仅可以有效缓解委托人的道德风险,而且可以进一步提升代理人的工作努力程度．     

Inequity aversion in a joint economic lot sizing environment with asymmetric holding cost information

Screening contracts (or ‘menu of contracts’) are frequently used for aligning the incentives in supply chains with private information. In this context, it is assumed that all supply chain parties are strictly (expected) profit-maximizing. However, previous empirical work shows that this is a critical assumption. In fact, it seems that inequity adverse subjects are willing to invest money for achieving higher relative payoffs. Interestingly, the classical approach to design incentive compatible mechanisms gives the agent cheap leeway to increase relative pecuniary payoffs and thereby achieving more equitable profit allocations, because the agent is left (almost) indifferent between two contract alternatives. In other words, we argue (and actually observe in laboratory experiments) that this classical approach of contract design allows the agent to achieve more equitable outcomes at low cost. Since the agent’s better relative performance solely stems from reducing the principal’s payoffs, we observe a substantial negative impact on the overall supply chain performance. The present work relaxes the assumption of the profit-maximizing buyer (agent) in a serial supply chain for a lot sizing framework with asymmetrically distributed holding cost information and deterministic end-customer demand. The study provides researchers and managers an approach on how to account for disadvantageous inequity aversion (ie, the agent suffers from profits being lower than the principals profits) by designing a contract that anticipates such behaviour while providing a solution method for the resulting non-linear mathematical program. We denote the resulting contract as ‘behavioural robust’, since it limits the inefficiency losses that result if agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion instead of being strictly profit-maximizing. A numerical study compares the advantages of the ‘behavioural robust’ contract against the classical screening contract. The results highlight that supply chain performance losses can be substantially reduced under the behavioural robust contract.     

具有私人信息的道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约分析

本文对存在的不对称信息的环境下的具有私人信息道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约问题进行了详细的讨论,并得出一些有新意的结论.此讨论问题的方法很值得推荐和推广,特别是在最优激励合同中,比如投资激励,管理机制中的激励,销售激励,保险激励等合同的设计,都可以借鉴此方法来研究和分析.     

Getting on Top of Oneself: Comments on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Self-Expression</Emphasis>

This paper is a critical review of Mitchell Green’s Self-Expression. The principal focus is on Green’s contention that all expression is at route, a form of signalling by an agent or by some mechanism of the organism which has been evolutionary selected for signalling. Starting from the idea that in some but not all expression an agent seeks to express his or her self, I question the centrality of communication to the idea of expression.