商业模式对企业绩效的影响机理与实证研究——基于商业生态系统视角

以商业生态系统为研究视角,利用结构方程模型对企业商业模式与企业绩效之间的关系进行实证分析.主要结论有:企业商业模式的中间影响者、直接影响者和直接驱动者对企业绩效有显著影响,但商业模式的稳定影响者对企业的财务绩效影响不明显,对企业的市场绩效有显著影响.此外,企业的市场绩效对企业的财务绩效有显著的正向影响.研究结果表明:要实现企业业务价值,提升企业绩效,一是要强化商业模式各要素之间的联系,二是要增强稳定影响者匹配性,三是要关注直接影响者,夯实竞争基础.     

第三方物流整合对绩效影响:企业特征的调节效应的实证研究

本文研究第三方物流整合对企业绩效的影响以及企业特征的权变效应,通过对130家物流外包企业的问卷调查数据的实证分析发现第三方物流整合促进企业绩效提高,并且这种促进作用受到企业特征(企业规模、年龄、所有制结构、行业)的影响。企业规模越大,第三方物流整合对运营绩效的促进作用越明显;企业年龄越大,第三方物流整合对财务绩效的影响越小;本土企业实现第三方物流整合对绩效的促进作用要明显优于外资企业;服务业企业实现第三方物流整合对绩效的促进效果比制造业更强。     

基于产权性质分析的碳绩效对财务绩效的影响研究

本文以2006年至2016年沪深两市的A股制造业上市公司为样本,通过行业碳排放量估算公司碳绩效,分析碳绩效对财务绩效的影响。研究发现:(1)国内的碳信息披露水平仍然很低,自愿披露企业不多且企业之间碳排放量披露标准不一致;(2)企业提高碳绩效水平有利于增加财务绩效,企业承担减排责任能够优化自身形象、改善与利益相关者的关系;(3)不同产权性质的企业碳绩效对财务绩效的影响存在差异,非国有企业碳绩效的提升更能显著提高财务绩效;(4)碳绩效对财务绩效的影响具有持续增长性,企业积极节能减排能够帮助其实现短期、长期的财务效益;(5)碳绩效与财务绩效会互相影响。     

行政垄断对铁路多经物流业绩效水平的影响研究

通过结构方程理论模型,研究行政垄断对铁路多经物流业绩效水平的影响。其中行政垄断为外生自变量,用级别、企业性质和管理关系三个指标来衡量。铁路多经物流业绩效水平为内生因变量,分别用人力绩效和财务绩效来衡量。通过LISREL8.5进行了验证性因子分析和结构方程检验。结果表明,行政垄断对人力绩效和财务绩效的影响均是负的,且均是显著的,其中人力绩效是-0.15,财务绩效是-0.3。人力绩效对财务绩效的影响是-0.05,也是显著的。     

绿色创业导向背景下新企业变革型领导转化为绩效的营销创新:理论模型与中国实证研究

变革型领导对组织绩效的影响一直是国内外学术界关注的焦点,本研究在相关研究的基础上,将营销创新作为中介变量,将绿色创业导向作为调节变量,并将营销创新划分为渐进式营销创新和突破式营销创新,构建了新企业变革型领导影响新企业绩效的理论模型,并对中国247个样本企业进行了实证研究。研究发现,绿色创业导向在新企业变革型领导与突破式营销创新间发挥着调节作用,变革型领导对新企业绩效有正向积极影响,突破式营销创新在其间发挥了完全中介作用,而渐进式营销创新却没有能发挥中介作用。该结论进一步丰富了变革型领导理论和绿色创业导向理论。     

基于因子分析的产学研协同创新绩效评价研究

创新是引领发展的第一动力,产学研协同创新是提高创新效率的有效途径.从绩效评价角度出发,选取我国31个省级行政区域,基于因子分析方法,构建产学研协同创新绩效评价体系,并实证分析了产学研协同对中国区域创新绩效的影响.研究表明:各省市产学研创新绩效协同度及创新绩效整体偏低;学研方创新能力和参与度占据主要作用:加大政府、企业与科研机构的合作对区域创新绩效产生积极影响.通过客观地衡量各区域产学研协同创新绩效水平,以期达到对多个创新主体间协同行动及其效应的科学观测与全面评价.     

高管部队经历提升了企业的创新效率吗?

高管的特殊经历会影响个人性格和行为方式,对其管理和决策具有重要影响。具有部队经历的高管会促进企业创新效率的提升吗?本文以2014-2017年为样本期间,选取全部A股上市公司作为研究对象,讨论高管部队经历对企业创新效率的影响。研究发现:第一,董事长、CEO的部队经历均显著提升了企业的创新效率;第二,具有部队经历的高管在面临激烈市场竞争的公司中任职,对企业创新效率的提升作用更加显著;第三,若CEO权力较大且无部队经历,则会制约具有部队经历的董事长对企业创新效率的促进作用。进一步研究发现:拥有部队经历高管的公司,其研发投入资本化比例显著高于其他公司,与提升企业创新效率的假设相一致。在使用倾向得分匹配和更换企业创新效率的计算方法后,结果依然稳健。本文的研究结论表明,高管部队经历对企业创新效率的提升具有显著效果,企业应充分发挥高管部队经历的积极作用。本文为企业创新效率的研究提供了新的思路和证据。     

基于供应链关系管理的中国第三方物流整合实证研究

本文利用130家物流用户企业的问卷调查数据,研究了物流用户企业与物流服务供应商之间的依赖关系对第三方物流整合及其企业绩效的影响。结果表明,第三方物流整合能够提高企业的财务绩效和运营绩效,而依赖关系对第三方物流整合有正向影响。此外,本文通过对比研究,分析了在不同所有制下,依赖关系对第三方物流整合作用的差异性.研究表明在中资企业中,第三方物流重要性对第三方物流整合有显著的正向影响;而外资企业中,替代不可获得性对第三方物流整合促进作用显著。     

专才还是通才?组织成员知识基础对创新绩效的影响

基于多主体仿真方法,构建了成员知识基础对创新绩效影响的动态仿真模型,分析了成员知识深度、知识宽度和知识交叠度对创新绩效的内在作用机理,解答了组织应该选择什么样的人、以及不同的人如何影响组织创新这两个重要问题。研究结果表明,知识宽度对创新绩效有积极效应,而知识深度的效应依赖于知识宽度与知识交叠度的交互影响。其中,知识宽度较低时,知识深度存在消极影响。知识宽度较高时,知识深度对创新绩效存在倒U型影响。知识宽度中等时,成员所拥有的优势知识是否重复至关重要。当优势知识均匀分布时,知识深度呈现积极效应;当优势知识高度重复时,不同领域的知识难以被融会贯通,知识深度的积极效应转变成消极效应。总体来说,兼具知识宽度和知识深度的T型人才最有利于提高创新绩效。此外,在专业型人才队伍中适当引入通用型人才,能够在多数情况下保证组织的最优表现。     

考虑消费者偏好的绿色供应链补贴绩效研究

为了提高绿色供应链绩效,政府会给与零售商绿色产品补贴,制造商会给与零售商绿色推广补贴.基于Stackelberg博弈分析由制造商和零售商构成的二级供应链,探究考虑消费者绿色偏好下绿色产品补贴和绿色推广补贴对供应链绩效的影响.研究发现,补贴对于产品绿色度与利润都具有正向的促进作用,消费者偏好不高或产品绿色化系数低时,适合采用绿色产品补贴;消费者偏好较高或绿色推广效率较高时,适合采用绿色推广补贴.绿色产品补贴作为供应链外部补贴,调节能力是有限的;而绿色推广补贴作为供应链内部补贴,能产生更高绩效.     

Capacity switching options under rivalry and uncertainty

Deregulated infrastructure industries exhibit stiff competition for market share. Firms may be able to limit the effects of competition by launching new projects in stages. Using a two-stage real options model, we explore the value of such flexibility. We first demonstrate that the value of investing in a sequential manner for a monopolist is positive but decreases with uncertainty. Next, we find that a typical duopoly firm’s value relative to a monopolist’s decreases with uncertainty as long as the loss in market share is high. Intriguingly, this result is reversed for a low loss in market share. We finally show that this loss in value is reduced if a firm invests in a sequential manner and specify the conditions under which sequential capacity expansion is more valuable for a duopolist firm than for a monopolist.     

Price and quality competition: The effect of differentiation and vertical integration

This paper studies an instance of price and quality competition between firms as seen in the recent Internet market. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. Characterizing this competition from a microeconomic viewpoint, we consider two possible business strategies that firms can utilize to overcome the competition—the differentiation and the vertical integration with another complementary firm. We show an interesting result not seen in the well-known Bertrand price competition: not only does the differentiation always increase the firms’ profits, but also it can increase the consumer’s welfare in a quality-sensitive market. We further derive that under some mild conditions the monopolistic vertical integration that excludes the combination-purchase with a competitor’s product is beneficial for both the integrated firm and its consumers.     

A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers’ loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers’ price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers’ sensitivity as well as lower consumers’ loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms’ equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm’s profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.     

A continuous knapsack problem with separable convex utilities: Approximation algorithms and applications

We study a continuous knapsack problem with separable convex utilities. We show that the problem is NP-hard, and provide two simple algorithms that have worst-case performance guarantees. We consider as an application a novel subsidy allocation problem in the presence of market competition, subject to a budget constraint and upper bounds on the amount allocated to each firm, where the objective is to minimize the market price of a good.     

Global facility network design in the presence of competition

We study the facility network design problem for a global firm that is a monopolist seller in its domestic market but faces local competition in its foreign market. The global firm produces in the face of demand and exchange rate uncertainty but can postpone localization and distribution of the output until after uncertainties are resolved. The competitor in the foreign market, however, enjoys the flexibility of postponing all production activities until after uncertainties are resolved. The two firms engage in an ex-post Cournot competition in the foreign market. We consider three potential network configurations for the global firm. Under a linear demand function, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition that one of the three networks is the global firm’s optimal choice, and explore how the presence of foreign competition affects the sensitivity of the global firm’s design to various cost parameters and market uncertainties.     

Optimal quoting of delivery time by a third party logistics provider: The impact of shipment consolidation and temporal pricing schemes

Increased competition in business environments requires that firms provide not only quality but also timely service with minimal cost. Offering a delivery-time guarantee may increase the demand for a product or service, or allow the firm to charge a price premium. This paper investigates the effects of different pricing schemes for a Third Party Logistics (3PL) provider. The 3PL tenders a consolidated load to a carrier that line-hauls over a certain origin–destination lane. In a price- and time-sensitive logistics market, we derive the optimal quotations that should be made for price and delivery-time, with the objective of maximizing the profit rate of the 3PL provider. We propose four easy-to-use temporal pricing schemes, and derive the corresponding optimal length of shipment consolidation cycles and the prices. Depending on the logistics market parameters, we show that charging according to an order’s time of arrival is not necessarily the best pricing scheme. Various managerial insights and numerical examples with sensitivity analysis are provided.     

Organizational strategy and tacit collusion in oligopoly with agency

We study a model that integrates organizational structure and agency withdynamic price competition in oligopoly. Workers in different levels of the organizational structure have asymmetric information and heterogeneous objectives; i.e., there are agency conflicts within the firm. The organizational strategy of the firm is to determinesequentially the decision power relating to price and non-price competition instruments at each level. We examine the equilibrium organizational and competitive strategy of firms in a duopoly, and characterize the extent of noncooperative tacit collusion (with respect to price and non-price competition) that is feasible. We identify two sets of sufficient conditions that guarantee, (i) the monopoly solution is sustainable at any discount factor (rate of impatience of the workers), or (ii) the monopoly solution is not sustainable for any level of the discount factor. Interestingly, tacit collusion may be feasible when either the agency problem is non-existentor very severe; i.e., firm profits in equilibrium may be non-monotone in the extent of the agency conflict. Our analysis indicates that intrafirm learning and agency will have a stronger impact on feasible tacit collusion in markets where non-price competition plays a strong role. Moreover, there is an intimate connection between the firm's organizational strategy and the extent of tacit collusion with the (industry) business cycle.     

Equilibrium two-part cost structures

We consider an oligopolistic product market in which two competing firms instead of paying a competitive input price choose a two-part tariff. Costs for the input are divided up into upfront fixed costs independent of the output level and reductions in marginal costs. We explore under which competitive settings will such a two-part cost structure correspond to equilibrium behavior in a two stage game. We find that firms in a static model do have an incentive to choose a two-part cost structure when competition in the product market is not too strong and oligopoly rents can be shifted form the rival to the own firm. In a dynamic market when firms use Markov strategies competition is so intense that there are no rents to be shifted and firms do not benefit from two-part cost structures.     

A new venture's optimal entry time

We formulate a model of the decision of when a new venture should enter the market based on the uncertain evolution over time of environmental volatility and market competition. We characterize the performance-maximizing time to enter the market, and show how this entry time is affected by changes in the business environment. By further focusing our modeling assumptions, we are able to translate our time-based criteria into environmental terms and propose that management set a target environment level that must be met before entering the market. We also demonstrate that management should adjust this target over time to respond to changes in the business context. This modeling feature is important because it allows for a better assessment of when to enter a market based on future performances. We translate the model's theoretical insights into testable propositions, and explore possible ways to operationalize these for empirical testing.     

Optimal warranties,reliabilities and prices for durable goods in an oligopoly

This paper addresses the problem of durable goods manufacturers in an oligopoly seeking optimal values for three decision variables: product warranty, reliability and price. Each firm seeks a warranty-reliability-price combination that maximizes expected profit subject to quite general constraints on the firm's decision variables. Warranty serves as a signal of product reliability, which is not observable by consumers. We present a game-theoretic model of warranty-reliability-price competition in such a market and examine Nash equilibria for this game. We show that under fairly general assumptions each firm can optimally set its warranty and reliability independently of price and competitors' actions. In addition, we show that optimal warranties and reliabilities are complementary, and we explore the impact of different market factors on the optimal warranty and reliability. Finally, we show that optimal warranties are longer and products more reliable when consumers are risk averse.