战略联盟的冲突问题研究

战略联盟为成员企业带来大量机遇的同时,也隐含着各种各样的冲突.通常,协商是解决冲突问题的有效方法,最终结局是在战略联盟伙伴之间实现一个最优策略.如果决策制定者了解解决冲突事件的整个演化过程,一个合理的结局将会实现.本文根据战略联盟冲突问题的特点,建立了冲突分析模型,并通过实例说明其应用.     

基于完备剩余格值逻辑的BCI-代数的三种模糊理想

通过完备剩余格值逻辑中一元模糊谓词，将经典BCI-代数中的p-理想、q-理想和a-理想进行重新刻画，引入了BCI-代数的l-值模糊p-理想、l-值模糊q-理想和l-值模糊a-理想的概念。利用完备剩余格值逻辑的语义方法，研究这三种l-值模糊理想的性质及关系，推广了经典模糊情形下相应的现有结论。     

具有停止损失再保险策略和最终值的扩散模型的最优分红与注资问题（英文）

本文研究了具有停止损失再保险和最终值的最优分红和融资策略问题.通过运用近似扩散和动态规划及构造次最优问题的方法,得到了解决一般最优问题所应符合的HJB方程和验证定理.假设有比例和固定交易费用以及在破产时刻产生最终值,得到了相应的最优值函数,最优分红策略,再保险策略以及融资策略.     

基于完备剩余格值逻辑的伪BCI-代数的不分明化理想

通过完备剩余格值逻辑中一元模糊谓词演算,将伪BCI-代数中的经典模糊理想、模糊p-理想、模糊结合理想、模糊q-理想和模糊a-理想进行重新刻画,引入了BCI-代数的l-值模糊理想、l-值模糊p-理想、l-值模糊结合理想、l-值模糊q-理想和l-值模糊a-理想的概念。利用完备剩余格值逻辑的语义方法,研究这几种l-值模糊理想的性质及关系。提供了l-值模糊理想成为l-值模糊p-理想(l-值模糊q-理想)的条件,研究了这些l-值模糊理想在交、同态映射和笛卡尔积运算下的不变性,推广了经典模糊情形下相应的现有结论。     

非对称心理压力下的低碳环境友好技术国际转移博弈研究

在全球积极应对和适应气候变化的背景下,研究了心理压力和信息条件因素对低碳环境友好技术(LCEFT)转让企业与受让企业决策行为的影响。通过引入对谈判区间、还价策略和不同心理压力的假设,构造了非对称信息下的LEFCT转移讨价还价博弈模型,深入分析了收益贴现参数、心理压力参数和谈判区间等因素对博弈双方报价策略、还价策略以及成交价格所产生的影响。研究表明,心理压力和信息条件都会直接影响博弈双方的报价策略、还价策略和最终的成交价格,并得出了不同信息条件下受让企业“见好就收”和“对半侃价”的还价策略。本文为受让企业在应对全球气候变化中面对不同的心理压力和信息条件所应采取何种还价策略提供了一定的决策支持。     

关于矩阵特征值问题向后误差分析的注记

本文研究实矩阵关于复近似特征对的范数型向后误差．在复扰动情形,这个问题已被Higham 等学者解决．本文研究实扰动情形．结果表明,通常情况下,两种情形差别不大,但在某些情形,二者可以相差很大．作为推广,我们还讨论了矩阵多项式的相应问题．文中的一个结果部分地解决了D．J．Higham和N．J．Higham 1999年提出的一个待解决的问题．     

亚纯函数的素函数乘积表示

本文解决了Gross等人提出的问题在亚纯函数时的相应情形,证明了任何一个亚纯函数都可表示为两个素亚纯函数的乘积。     

区间粗糙数多属性决策方法

针对属性值为区间粗糙数,属性权重部分已知和属性权重未知两种情形的多属性决策问题,本文利用灰色关联分析的思想方法,构建了一种区间粗糙数多属性决策方法。本文首先利用区间粗糙数的运算法则和期望值比较,确定最优理想方案和最劣理想方案,并基于灰色关联度分析方法构建了属性权重部分已知、属性权重未知两种情形的多目标优化模型,从而确定属性权重和属性权重表达式,进而获得各方案的综合评价值和方案排序。最后以一个实例验证模型的有效性与适用性。     

带相关风险的保险公司的最优分红和再保险问题

本文的研究对象是带两种相关风险业务的保险公司.本文用复合Poisson过程描述这两种风险;应用扩散逼近理论,建立了一个扩散逼近模型.利用动态再保险策略,公司可以降低其破产概率,同时通过给客户分红,公司可以保持竞争力.公司的目标是寻找最优策略和值函数来最大化期望折现分红.因为超额损失再保险策略优于比例再保险策略,所以,本文考虑公司的超额损失再保险及其分红问题.问题分两种情形讨论:分红率有界和分红率无界.在这两种情形下,本文最终得到了值函数和相应最优策略的具体表达式.     

数字经济时代云边协同系统服务机制演化博弈研究

在数字经济日新月异的时代背景下,云边协同为企业数字化转型提供了更高效、灵活、可靠的技术解决方案,受到了学界及业界的广泛关注。本文基于云边架构和演化博弈理论构建云边博弈模型,分析双方在各情形下的演化稳定策略,并针对存在两种演化稳定策略的情形,进一步分析影响其协同关系稳定的因素,最后通过数值仿真验证理论分析结果。研究表明,云边协同系统的最终演化方向取决于支付矩阵中各变量之间的关系,当系统存在多种演化结果时,初始状态会对演化结果产生重要影响,通过合理调整相关变量可以有效激励系统演化为理想状态,从而促进云边协同系统的长期稳定,更好地服务于企业数字化转型。     

Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators

We consider two final-offer arbitration procedures in the case where there is more than one arbitrator. Two players, labeled 1 and 2 and interpreted here as Labor and Management, respectively, are in dispute about an increase in the wage rate. They submit final offers to a Referee. There are N arbitrators. Each of the arbitrators has her own assessment and selects the offer which is closest to her assessment. After that each arbitrator informs the Referee about her decision. The Referee counts the votes and declares the player obtaining the most votes to be the winner. Under the second arbitration scheme, the Referee takes into account only the assessments which lie between the players’ offers. The game is modeled as a zero-sum game. The Nash equilibrium in this arbitration game is derived.     

Final-offer arbitration in major league baseball: A nonparametric analysis

This study extends the non-parametric methodology for empirical efficiency analysis to allow for a double frontier based on perspective and applies the model to final-offer arbitration in major league baseball. Arbitration eligible players perceive their worth relative to other players who earn more with no better performance. Owners, on the other hand, perceive a player's value relative to other players performing as well with lower salaries. The two different perspectives give rise to different perceived frontiers. The purpose of this paper is to analyze arbitration using this approach.     

基于酉几何的等概的具有仲裁的认证码的构造

具有仲裁的认证码既要防止敌手的欺骗,又要防止收入和发方的互相欺骗,本文给出一种由酉几何构造等概的具有仲的认证码的方法,并计算了有关参数,分析了各种攻击成功的概率。     

Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance

When an arbitrator lacks complete information about the dispute in question, he may have to turn to the disputants themselves to provide information. If they know how the information is to be used, they may have incentives to hide the truth. By using the players reports as checks on each other, a completely ignorant arbitrator of a dispute between two completely informed players can induce truthful revelation in the sense that the truth is a Nash equilibrium of the game which the arbitrator's decision process imposes on the players. Such a scheme may be used in conjunction with any one from a class of functions which select Pareto-optimal, individually-rational outcomes in two-person normal-form games.     

基于酉几何的具有仲裁的认证码的构造

具有仲裁的认证码即要防止敌手的欺骗,又要防止收方和发方的互相欺骗．本文给出一种由酉几何构造具有仲裁的认证码的方法,并计算了有关参娄,分析了各种攻击成功的概率。     

Control of arrivals and departures in a state-dependent input-output system

At each decision epoch, an offer for a unit to either enter or leave a system is received. These offers arrive according to a Poisson process. With each offer is associated a value revealed upon the arrival of the offer. The distribution of the value of the offer is given and is a function of what kind of offer is received (enter or leave). The decision to accept or reject and offer is allowed to depend on the current state and the current value received. The objective is to maximize the expected discounted difference between the sum of the accepted output offers and the sum of the accepted input offers. The key result of the paper that under various conditions, the decision to accept or reject an offer depends on whether or not its value is above or below, respectively, a critical value that depends on the state of the system.     

Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players’ decisions according to some optimality criterion. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the best choice problem are given. Several concepts of criteria for selecting a correlated equilibrium are used.     

Optimal stopping problem with double reservation value property

This paper considers an optimal stopping problem with uncertain recall probability where some recall cost must be paid to accept a past offer. Recall cost is an important factor leading to value deterioration of an offer. However, it is assumed in all the conventional models so far presented that the value of a past offer does not change with time, and its original value is guaranteed even if the past offer is recalled at any time in the future. In the model of this paper, the value of a past offer decreases due to the recall cost. The purpose of this paper is to propose a model with such a recall cost factor and uncertain recall probability, and to examine the properties of its optimal decision rule. One of the most distinctive results in this study is that the optimal decision rule may have a seemingly counter-intuitive property, called the DRV (Double Reservation Value) property: the critical point of whether or not to stop the search by accepting an offer is not a single entity. An interpretation of why the property may appear in this model will be given. Furthermore, this paper examines the necessary and sufficient conditions required for the property to appear, and demonstrates that the recall cost is an essential factor to the appearance of the property. To illustrate the importance of considering the recall cost factor and uncertain recall probability, this paper also provides some practical implications to a decision maker confronted with a problem of M&A (Merger & Acquisition), using an actual case of the Ford–Daewoo deal.     

A construction for t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration

Authentication codes with arbitration protect against deceptions from the transmitter and the receiver as well as that from the opponent. An authentication code with arbitration is t-fold perfect if the numbers of decoding rules and encoding rules meet the information-theoretic lower bounds. Pei (Message authentication codes (in Chinese). USCT, Hefei, 2009) pointed out that there has not yet been able to construct t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration for \(t > 2\) . In this paper, we define a new design, perfect strong strict restricted partially balanced t-design, and prove that the existence of perfect strong strict restricted partially balanced t-designs implies the existence of t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration. Further, we obtain some new infinite classes of t-fold perfect authentication codes with arbitration.     

The direct product of right congruences

In a number of earlier papers the study of the structure of semigroups has been approached by means of right congruences. Such an approach seems appropriate since a right congruence is one of the possible analogs of both the right ideal of a ring and the subgroup in a group. Each of these substructures plays a strong role in the study of the structure of their respective systems. In both the ring and the group the internal direct product is naturally, and effectively, defined. However, what such an internal direct product should be for two right congruences of a semigroup is not so clear. In this paper we will offer a possible definition and consider some of the consequences of it. We will also extend some of these results to automata.