排序问题中优化准则关于基本参数的正则性及其应用

本文提出了优化准则关于加工时间、准备时间、应交工时间的正则性，利用这种正则性对寻找参数可控排序问题中的有效值、有效解给出了一直观算法，并指出对一些具体的参数可控排序问题，其有效值、有效解的寻找可通过对这一直观算法加以具体化而得．文中还对平均流程问题给出了这样一个具体化算法．     

兼顾效益和成功率的区间数决策矩阵的一种综合排序方法

目前的区间数的决策矩阵排序方法都只根据效益型准则进行的,而没有考虑到方案实施的成功率这个重要准则。本文提出了区间数的可行度概念,在此基础上给出了基于可行度的区间数决策矩阵的排序方法;然后提出了一种兼顾效益和成功率的区间数决策矩阵排序的综合评价方法,该方法能融合多方面的决策信息。文中给出了一个实例说明本法的有效性和可行性。     

带有资源分配和恶化工件的单机多任务排序问题研究

研究了带有公共交货期的单机多任务排序问题,考虑了两种不同的资源分配函数和位置相关恶化效应函数,目标是找到一个排序和共同的交货期,使得提前、拖期、交货期和资源成本最小,设计了多项式时间算法.针对一个特殊情形,给出了更有效的算法.     

模糊数双指标排序的结构元方法

针对现有模糊数排序存在的一些问题,提出了双指标的模糊数排序方法。给出了模糊数隶属函数与其单调变换函数相互转化方法。定义波动数与特征数两个指标,利用这两个指标对模糊数进行排序,并给出了排序原则。该方法可以对各种模糊数进行排序,通过该排序原则常能够简化计算,同时,一定程度上能够弥补一些排序方法不能反映模糊数"波动"情况的问题。通过算例对比分析,本文的方法求解简单,并具有广泛适用性。     

关于同顺序m×n排序问题消去法的两点注记

本文对[1,2]中指出的一类同顺序m×n排序问题有关的消去法提出两点注记。这里补充提出了一种不涉及下界计算并且检验方法简单的消去准则,同时,对[2]中给出的下界B(S…S′)的算法做了改进,从而使下界B(S…S′)的估值精度有所提高。 一、一个消去准则 首先说明,文中运用的术语和记号除特殊说明外均与[2]的定义相同,不再另述。 同顺序m×n排序问题是指:设有n个零件J_1,J_2,…,J_n和m台机床M_1,M_2,     

一种基于序区间偏好信息的群决策分析方法

针对序区间偏好信息的群决策方案排序问题,本文提出了一种新的分析方法.首先,给出了序区间的有关定义及其性质;然后,通过定义专家群体判断关于方案在排序位置的期望可能度和专家群体判断关于方案的数学期望值,给出了序区间偏好信息的群决策方案排序方法.最后,通过一个算例说明了本文提出的分析方法。     

基于区间梯形二型犹豫模糊数的多准则决策方法及其在工程决策中的应用

针对犹豫语言决策问题,提出了基于区间梯形二型犹豫模糊数的多准则决策方法。首先,给出了区间梯形二型模糊数的定义。然后,构建了区间梯形二型犹豫模糊数的期望值和贴近度函数。在此基础上,建立了区间梯形二型犹豫模糊数的排序模型,并提出了基于该排序模型的区间梯形二型犹豫模糊多准则决策方法。最后,通过工程决策实例论证了该方法的有效性和可行性。     

一种基于蒙特卡罗模拟的群体协商评价方法及其应用

针对综合评价中不同专家(或利益相关者)对属性权重看法不一致的情况,提出了一种蒙特卡罗模拟的群体协商评价方法。文章首先给出了一种专家影响力的确定方法;然后对各属性下专家的非一致性意见进行协商集结,得出属性权重的协商区间;最后在权重协商区间确定的基础上,利用蒙特卡罗模拟的方式来计算方案的优先排序概率,据此对方案进行排序,并给出了一个排序可信度的概念。文章最后给出了一个应用例。     

基于垂直距离的直线拟合

在分析传统的直线拟合基础上,提出基于垂直距离的直线拟合问题.针对3种准则,给出了3个模型.对于使残差的平方和为最小准则,经过推导得到一个精确结果.     

三角模糊数互补判断矩阵排序的目标规划法

针对决策者以三角模糊数互补判断矩阵形式给出的多目标决策问题.给出三角模糊数加性一致性互补判断矩阵的判定定理.利用该定理基于最小偏差建立一个目标规划模型而解得三角模糊数互补判断矩阵的权重向量,从而使用三角模糊数排序公式对方案排序,提出了基于目标规划的三角模糊数互补判断矩阵排序法.最后,将模型与方法应用于项目投资决策中.     

Drop out monotonic rules for sequencing situations

This note introduces a new monotonicity property for sequencing situations. A sequencing rule is called drop out monotonic if no player will be worse off whenever one of the players decides to drop out of the queue before processing starts. This intuitively appealing property turns out to be very strong: we show that there is at most one rule satisfying both stability and drop out monotonicity. For the standard model of linear cost functions, the existence of this rule is established.     

Sequencing Games with Slack Due Windows and Group Technology Considerations

We study sequencing situations in which the customers are initially sequenced to be served by a single server. We consider both slack due windows and group technology simultaneously. We introduce two division rules to divide among the customers the cost saving from resequencing the customers to follow the optimal sequence and characterize the rules axiomatically. Applying cooperative game theory to analyze the sequencing games corresponding to the sequencing situations, we use the theory’s solution concepts to solve the games.     

Cost allocation in the Chinese postman problem

This paper considers a cost allocation problem that arises from a delivery problem associated with the Chinese postman problem (CPP). A delivery problem is described by a connected undirected graph in which each edge belongs to a different player, a cost function on the edges of this graph and a fixed vertex which is referred to as the post office. Assume that the post office is providing some service to the players. The nature of this service, which can be thought of as mail delivery, requires that a server will travel along the edges of the graph and returns to the post office. The cost allocation problem is concerned with the cost of providing the service to all players. A specific cost allocation rule is introduced and characterized. Further, the class of delivery problems gives rise to a new class of cooperative combinatorial optimization games called delivery games. It is shown that the outcome of the allocation rule with respect to a bridge-connected Euler graph is a core element of the corresponding delivery game.     

A vertex oriented approach to the equal remaining obligations rule for minimum cost spanning tree situations

In this paper, we consider spanning tree situations, where players want to be connected to a source as cheap as possible. These situations involve the construction of a spanning tree with the minimum cost as well as the allocation of the cost of this minimum cost spanning tree among its users in a fair way. Feltkamp, Muto and Tijs 1994 introduced the equal remaining obligations rule to solve the cost allocation problem in these situations. Recently, it has been shown that the equal remaining obligations rule satisfies many appealing properties and can be obtained with different approaches. In this paper, we provide a new approach to obtain the equal remaining obligations rule. Specifically, we show that the equal remaining obligations rule can be obtained as the average of the cost allocations provided by a vertex oriented construct-and-charge procedure for each order of players.     

Games on fuzzy communication structures with Choquet players

Myerson (1977) used graph-theoretic ideas to analyze cooperation structures in games. In his model, he considered the players in a cooperative game as vertices of a graph, which undirected edges defined their communication possibilities. He modified the initial games taking into account the graph and he established a fair allocation rule based on applying the Shapley value to the modified game. Now, we consider a fuzzy graph to introduce leveled communications. In this paper players play in a particular cooperative way: they are always interested first in the biggest feasible coalition and second in the greatest level (Choquet players). We propose a modified game for this situation and a rule of the Myerson kind.     

具有学习效应的排序对策

建立了具有学习效应的排序对策模型,在这类排序对策中,工件的实际加工时间不再是常数,而是关于工件位置的递减幂函数。当所有工件的正常加工时间相等时,松弛可行顺序的条件,相应的排序对策是均衡的,但不一定是凸对策。     

Sequencing games with repeated players

Two classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations. In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player’s cost function is linear with respect to the maximum completion time of his jobs, whereas in min-RP sequencing situations the cost functions are linear with respect to the minimum completion times. For both classes, following explicit procedures to go from the initial processing order to an optimal order for the coalition of all players, equal gain splitting rules are defined. It is shown that these rules lead to core elements of the associated RP sequencing games. Moreover, it is seen that min-RP sequencing games are convex. We thank two referees for their valuable suggestions for improvement. Financial support for P. Calleja has been given by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER under grant SEJ2005-02443/ECON, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through a BE grant from AGAUR and grant 2005SGR00984.     

Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., one-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (Eur J Oper Res 40:344–351, 1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.     

A linear proportional effort allocation rule

This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules in network games. Like the solution theory in cooperative games of how the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition is distributed among a set of players, this new class of allocation rules focuses on the distribution of the dividend of each network. The dividend of each network is allocated in proportion to some measure of each player’s effort, which is called an effort function. With linearity of the allocation rules, an allocation rule is specified by the effort functions. These types of allocation rules are called linear proportional effort allocation rules. Two famous allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value, belong to this class of allocation rules. In this study, we provide a unifying approach to define the two aforementioned values. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic analysis of this class of allocation rules, and axiomatize the Myerson value, the position value, and their non-symmetric generalizations in terms of effort functions. We propose a new allocation rule in network games that also belongs to this class of allocation rules.     

Sequencing games

Sequencing situations with linear cost functions are considered. A division rule for the cost savings is introduced and characterized axiomatically. Cooperative game theory is applied to analyse these situations and expressions for division rules induced by solution concepts from cooperative game theory are derived.