Rational Abandonment from Tele-Queues: Nonlinear Waiting Costs with Heterogeneous Preferences

We consider the modelling of abandonment from a queueing system by impatient customers. Within the proposed model, customers act rationally to maximise a utility function that weights service utility against expected waiting cost. Customers are heterogeneous, in the sense that their utility function parameters may vary across the customer population. The queue is assumed invisible to waiting customers, who do not obtain any information regarding their standing in the queue during their waiting period. Such circumstances apply, for example, in telephone centers or other remote service facilities, to which we refer as tele-queues. We analyse this decision model within a multi-server queue with impatient customers, and seek to characterise the Nash equilibria of this system. These equilibria may be viewed as stable operating points of the system, and determine the customer abandonment profile along with other system-wide performance measures. We provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and suggest procedures for its computation. We also suggest a notion of an equilibrium based on sub-optimal decisions, the myopic equilibrium, which enjoys favourable analytical properties. Some concrete examples are provided to illustrate the modelling approach and analysis. The present paper supplements previous ones which were restricted to linear waiting costs or homogeneous customer population.     

Player splitting in extensive form games

By a player splitting we mean a mechanism that distributes the information sets of a player among so-called agents. A player splitting is called independent if each path in the game tree contains at most one agent of every player. Following Mertens (1989), a solution is said to have the player splitting property if, roughly speaking, the solution of an extensive form game does not change by applying independent player splittings. We show that Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, Kohlberg-Mertens stable sets and Mertens stable sets have the player splitting property. An example is given to show that the proper equilibrium concept does not satisfy the player splitting property. Next, we give a definition of invariance under (general) player splittings which is an extension of the player splitting property to the situation where we also allow for dependent player splittings. We come to the conclusion that, for any given dependent player splitting, each of the above solutions is not invariant under this player splitting. The results are used to give several characterizations of the class of independent player splittings and the class of single appearance structures by means of invariance of solution concepts under player splittings. Received: December 1996/Revised Version: January 2000     

Heterogeneous information lags and evolutionary stability

We investigate the effect of information lags in discrete time evolutionary game dynamics on symmetric games. At the end of each period, some players obtain information about the distribution of strategies among the entire population. They update their strategies according to this information. In contrast to the previous literature (e.g., Tao and Wang (1997)) where large delays lead to instability, we show that the relationship between information lags and the stability of equilibria is not “monotonic.” In anti-coordination games under smoothed best-response dynamics, a small probability of delay can stabilize the equilibrium, while a large probability can destabilize it.     

The design of a Tort law to control accidents

In this paper we analyse a two-stage game involving the government and n agents who engage in a single activity (driving). The government establishes the legal policy setting and the agents proceed to play a non-cooperative game of incomplete information with a risk of accident in which their behavioral strategy is their level of care. We examine the Nash-equilibrium conditions for single-activity accidents between heterogeneous agents, ‘good’ drivers or ‘bad’ drivers allowing a variable damage function and a liability rule defined on the cube. The relative desirability for society of alternative equilibria and the conditions under which they can obtain are discussed. The constraints which circumscribe the ability of the government to induce an equilibrium involving careful driving are demonstrated. It transpires that when the proportion of good drivers increases, it becomes more difficult to sustain a careful equilibrium whereas an equilibrium of reckless behavior becomes easier to sustain. Various extensions of the models are also presented.     

Capacity and price setting for dispersed,time-sensitive customer segments

We consider joint pricing and capacity decisions for a facility serving heterogeneous consumers that span a continuous range of locations, and are sensitive to time delays. Within this context, we analyze two contrasting service strategies: segmentation and pooling. Consumer segments differ with respect to their reservation prices and time sensitivities, and are dispersed over a single distance dimension. The firm serves these consumers using a process that we initially model as an M/M/1 queuing system. We analyze profit-maximizing price and capacity levels for a monopolist, and contrast the optimal segmentation and pooling policies. We find that when consumers are time sensitive, and can expect queuing delays at the firm’s facility (due to random arrival and service times), then scale economies from pooling can outweigh segmentation benefits. Yet, segmentation outperforms pooling when consumer segments differ substantively, in which case the firm can use capacity as a lever to price discriminate between the segments. Moreover, by contrasting a dedicated-services strategy, which directly targets specific segments and serves them separately, with the alternative of allowing consumers to self-select, we find that self-selection has a moderate negative influence on profits. We also examine the profit impact of employing alternative queuing systems, and find that a hybrid strategy based on a prioritized queuing discipline, that combines elements of segmentation (by offering different waiting times) and pooling (by sharing capacity across consumer segments), can outperform both the pure segmentation and pooling strategies.     

Many-valued relation algebras

We introduce MV-relation algebras (MVRAs) and distributive MV-relation algebras (DMVRAs), many-valued generalizations of classical relation algebras and study some of their arithmetical properties. We provide corresponding notions of group relation algebra and complex algebra and generalize some results about them from the classical case. For this, we work with more general structures than MVRAs and DMVRAs, by replacing the MV part with a BL-algebra, obtaining what we call fuzzy relation algebras and distributive fuzzy relation algebras.Dedicated to the Memory of Wim BlokReceived February 12, 2003; accepted in final form October 15, 2004.This revised version was published online in August 2005 with a corrected cover date.     

Declining valuations in sequential auctions

We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining.Received June 2004We are grateful to Christian Groh, Wolfgang Köhler and Benny Moldovanu for helpful suggestions. Financial support from the German Science Foundation through SFB 504 and SFB/TR 15 at the University of Mannheim and the University of Bonn is gratefully acknowledged.     

A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate

We introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of the estate is endogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions. There are two investment alternatives: investing in a company (risky asset) and depositing money into a savings account (risk-free asset). Bankruptcy is possible only for the risky asset. We define a game between agents each of which aims to maximize his expected payoff by choosing an investment alternative and a company management which aims to maximize profits by choosing a bankruptcy rule. Our agents are differentiated by their incomes. We consider three most prominent bankruptcy rules in our base model: the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that only the proportional rule is a part of any pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in income distribution in the economy and can be extended to a larger set of bankruptcy rules and multiple types. However, extension to multiple company framework with competition leads to equilibria where the noncooperative support for the proportional rule disappears.     

A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles

It is shown that no solution concept that selects sequentially rational (perfect, proper, persistent, or members of some stable set of) equilibria satisfies the following consistency property. Suppose that in every solution of the game G, player i's action is a, and denote by G ^a the game in which player i is restricted to choose a. Then some player j≠i has an action c that is used with positive probability in both some solution of G and some solution of G ^a. This result illustrates a conflict between a mild consistency condition and sequential rationality. Received: January 2001/Final version: April 2002     

The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning

We extend agency theory to incorporate bounded rationality of both principals and agents. In this study we define a simple version of the principal-agent game and examine it using object-oriented computer simulation. Player learning is simulated with a genetic algorithm model. Our results show that players of incentive games in highly uncertain environments may take on defensive strategies. These defensive strategies lead to equilibria which are inferior to Nash equilibria. If agents are risk averse, the principal may not be able to provide enough monetary compensation to encourage them to take risks. But principals may be able to improve system performance by identifying good performers and facilitating information exchange among agents.The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.     

Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions

In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy exists, it is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to bidder's information field; if the dominant strategy is used, other bidders cannot make a profit. Final version November 2001     

To pool or not to pool in hospitals: a theoretical and practical comparison for a radiotherapy outpatient department

This paper examines whether urgent and regular patients waiting for a consultation at a radiotherapy outpatient department should be pooled or not. Both queuing theory and discrete event simulation were applied to a realistic case study. The theoretical approach shows that pooling is not always beneficial with regard to the waiting times of urgent patients. Furthermore, the practical approach indicates that the separation of queues may require less capacity to meet the waiting time performance target for urgent as well as regular patients. The results seem to be of general interest for hospitals.     

A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings

We reconsider the model used by Serrano and Yosha (1993) who were interested in information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We prove that there exists an additional equilibrium not detected in the original paper and show that this equilibrium is characterized by incomplete revelation of information which was not the case of the other already identified equilibria of the model.     

The newsvendor’s optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers

We consider a newsvendor who earns a revenue from the sales of her product to end users as well as from multiple advertisers paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions of a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertisers have private information about their willingness to pay. We focus on the impact of the number of advertisers on the newsvendor’s optimal decisions. We find that regardless of the number of advertisers, the newsvendor may exclude advertisers with a low willingness to pay and distort the price and inventory from their system-efficient levels to screen the advertisers. Moreover, the newsvendor’s decision to exclude an advertiser is based exclusively on that advertiser’s characteristics, and the newsvendor’s optimal decision thus reveals independence among the advertisers. Nonetheless, the profits of the newsvendor and the advertisers also display network effects as both increase in the number of advertisers. Finally, our numerical results show that the newsvendor prefers an equivalent single advertiser to multiple advertisers due to the pooling effect.     

An a posteriori error estimator for anisotropic refinement

Summary. Besides an algorithm for local refinement, an a posteriori error estimator is the basic tool of every adaptive finite element method. Using information generated by such an error estimator the refinement of the grid is controlled. For 2nd order elliptic problems we present an error estimator for anisotropically refined grids, like -d cuboidal and 3-d prismatic grids, that gives correct information about the size of the error; additionally it generates information about the direction into which some element has to be refined to reduce the error in a proper way. Numerical examples are presented for 2-d rectangular and 3-d prismatic grids. Received March 15, 1994 / Revised version received June 3, 1994     

A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information

We propose a two-person game-theoretical model to study information sharing decisions at an interim stage when information is incomplete. The two agents have pieces of private information about the state of nature, and that information is improved by combining the pieces. Agents are both senders and receivers of information. There is an institutional arrangement that fixes a transfer of wealth from an agent who lies about her private information. In our model, we show that (1) there is a positive relation between information revelation and the amount of the transfers, and (2) information revelation has a collective action structure, in particular, the incentives of an agent to reveal decrease with respect to the amount of information disclosed by the other.     

Interactions between government and firms: a differential game approach

In this paper we study an extended version of the model described in Gradus (J. Econ. 81:1092–1109, 1989) in order to determine the optimal taxation policy of a government and its effects on the stock of capital goods growth as a result of the activity developed by firms. It is shown that, by introducing a wealth tax, there exists an optimal wealth tax rate for which the open-loop/feedback Nash/Stackelberg equilibria coincide, maximizing the payments for both agents (government and firms), so that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium becomes both time consistent and subgame perfect. Partially supported by MEC (Spain) Grants MTM2006-13468, BMF2002-03493 and project ‘Ingenio Mathematica (i-MATH)’ No. CSD2006-00032 (Consolider-Ingenio 2010).     

On the adaptive coupling of FEM and BEM in 2–d–elasticity

Summary. This paper concerns the combination of the finite element method (FEM) and the boundary element method (BEM) using the symmetric coupling. As a model problem in two dimensions we consider the Hencky material (a certain nonlinear elastic material) in a bounded domain with Navier–Lamé differential equation in the unbounded complementary domain. Using some boundary integral operators the problem is rewritten such that the Galerkin procedure leads to a FEM/BEM coupling and quasi–optimally convergent discrete solutions. Beside this a priori information we derive an a posteriori error estimate which allows (up to a constant factor) the error control in the energy norm. Since information about the singularities of the solution is not available a priori in many situation and having in mind the goal of an automatic mesh–refinement we state adaptive algorithms for the –version of the FEM/BEM–coupling. Illustrating numerical results are included. Received April 15, 1994 / Revised version received January 8, 1996     

Protests and reputation

Protests take place for a variety of reasons. In this paper we focus on protests that have a well defined objective that is in conflict with the objectives of the government. Hence the success or failure of a protest movement depends crucially on how the government responds. We assume that government types are private information so that governments have an interest in building a reputation to deter protestors. We extend the standard reputation framework to one where potential protesters in the domestic jurisdiction are competing in a common market with protestors of a foreign jurisdiction, resulting in a situation where domestic governments care about the decisions of foreign governments. We derive conditions under which an equilibrium with “contagion” in protests might exist: protests that start in one jurisdiction spread to others. Finally we use our results to interpret the Fuel tax protests in France and England that took place in 2000 as well as the three successive pro-democracy revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.     

Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities

The paper presents a model of an exchange economy with indivisible goods and money. There are a finite number of agents, each one initially endowed with a certain amount of money and at most one indivisible good. Each agent is assumed to have no use for more than one indivisible good. It is proved that the core of the economy is nonempty. If utility functions are increasing in money, and if the initial resources in money are in some sense “sufficient” the core allocations coincide with the competitive equilibrium allocations. With restrictions on the set of feasible allocations, the same model is used to prove the existence of stable solutions in the generalized “marriage problem”. However it is shown that, even if money enters the model, these solutions cannot generally be obtained as competitive equilibria.