On equilibrium points in bimatrix games

We discuss sensitivity of equilibrium points in bimatrix games depending on small variances (perturbations) of data. Applying implicit function theorem to a linear complementarity problem which is equivalent to the bimatrix game, we investigate sensitivity of equilibrium points with respect to the perturbation of parameters in the game. Namely, we provide the calculation of equilibrium points derivatives with respect to the parameters.     

Strictly perfect equilibrium points of bimatrix games

We consider the existence of strictly perfect equilibrium points for bimatrix games. We prove that an isolated and quasi-strong equilibrium point is strictly perfect. Our result shows that in a nondegenerate bimatrix game all equilibrium points are strictly perfect. Our proof is based on the labeling theory ofShapley [1974] for bimatrix games.     

Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points

We construct bimatrix games with prefixed equilibrium points in the mixed extension. The uniqueness conditions are studied and we obtain a wide class of games with unique arbitrary prefixed equilibrium points.     

Uniqueness of equilibrium points in bimatrix games

Bimatrix games are constructed having a given pair (x, y) as the unique equilibrium point within the class of all mixed strategy pairs whose nonzero components are the same as (resp., among) those of (x, y). In each case, necessary and sufficient conditions on (x, y) for the existence of such a game are obtained. All games having the first property are constructed. The work extends and complements recent (separate) works ofMillham [1972],Raghavan [1970] and the author. The methods and results are valid in the context of any ordered field.     

Fall back equilibrium

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.     

Fall back proper equilibrium

Proper equilibrium plays a prominent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment in which the players play a passive role is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper, we introduce a more active role for the players, leading to the refinement of fall back proper equilibrium.     

A generalization of the Nash equilibrium theorem on bimatrix games

In this article, we consider a two-person game in which the first player picks a row representative matrixM from a nonempty set $A$ ofm ×n matrices and a probability distributionx on {1,2,...,m} while the second player picks a column representative matrixN from a nonempty set ? ofm ×n matrices and a probability distribution y on 1,2,...,n. This leads to the respective costs ofx ^t My andx ^t Ny for these players. We establish the existence of an ?-equilibrium for this game under the assumption that $A$ and ? are bounded. When the sets $A$ and ? are compact in ?^mxn, the result yields an equilibrium state at which stage no player can decrease his cost by unilaterally changing his row/column selection and probability distribution. The result, when further specialized to singleton sets, reduces to the famous theorem of Nash on bimatrix games.     

Topological degree and number of Nash equilibrium points of bimatrix games

In this paper, using the topological degree, we give a new proof of a well-known result: the number of Nash equilibrium points of a nondegenerate bimatrix game is odd. The calculation of the topological degree allows the localization of the whole set of non-degenerate equilibrium points.     

On pure equilibria for bimatrix games

In Shapley (1964) several conditions are given for the existence of pure saddlepoints for a matrix game. In this paper we show that only a few of these conditions, when translated to the situation of a bimatrix game guarantee the existence of pure equilibria. Further, we associate with a bimatrix game a directed graph as well as a so-called binary game. If this graph has no cycles, then the bimatrix game in question has a pure equilibrium. It is shown that the binary game for a bimatrix game without a pure equilibrium possesses a fundamental subgame, which can be characterized by means of minimal cycles.     

Equilibrium solutions for multiobjective bimatrix games incorporating fuzzy goals

Equilibrium solutions in terms of the degree of attainment of a fuzzy goal for games in fuzzy and multiobjective environments are examined. We introduce a fuzzy goal for a payoff in order to incorporate ambiguity of human judgments and assume that a player tries to maximize his degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal. A fuzzy goal for a payoff and the equilibrium solution with respect to the degree of attainment of a fuzzy goal are defined. Two basic methods, one by weighting coefficients and the other by a minimum component, are employed to aggregate multiple fuzzy goals. When the membership functions are linear, computational methods for the equilibrium solutions are developed. It is shown that the equilibrium solutions are equal to the optimal solutions of mathematical programming problems in both cases. The relations between the equilibrium solutions for multiobjective bimatrix games incorporating fuzzy goals and the Pareto-optimal equilibrium solutions are considered.     

由 n×n 上三角Toeplitz矩阵所构成的 超循环矩阵族

在Feldman和Costakis所做的结果的基础上,进一步考虑了超循环算子族的一些问题,设Τ=(T_1,…,T_m)是一组由m个上三角Toeplitz复矩阵构成的矩阵组,给出了一个Τ是超循环的充分必要条件.     

Convergence conditions for the Brown-Robinson iterative method for bimatrix games

The article considers the convergence of the Brown-Robinson iterative method to find a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a bimatrix game. The known result on convergence to an equilibrium for a zero-sum game is generalized to a wider class of games that are reducible to zero-sum games by a composition of various transformations: addition of a constant to any column of the first-player payoff matrix; addition of a constant to any row in the second-player payoff matrix; multiplication of the payoff matrix by a positive constant α>0. Translated from Prikladnaya Matematika i Informatika, No. 2, pp. 69–83, 1999.     

Randomized Operators on {n\times n} Matrices and Applications

Some combinatorial and probabilistic estimates motivated by earlier works due to S. Kwapien and C. Schütt are proved. We study these estimates in the general setting of rearrangement invariant function and sequence spaces and identify the class of function spaces in which such estimates hold. We demonstrate the sharpness of our results and present some applications, one of which is an alternative proof of a familiar Raynaud–Schütt theorem describing symmetric subspaces in \({L_1}\).     

Learning algorithms for repeated bimatrix Nash games with incomplete information

The purpose of this paper is to study a particular recursive scheme for updating the actions of two players involved in a Nash game, who do not know the parameters of the game, so that the resulting costs and strategies converge to (or approach a neighborhood of) those that could be calculated in the known parameter case. We study this problem in the context of a matrix Nash game, where the elements of the matrices are unknown to both players. The essence of the contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it shows that learning algorithms which are known to work for zero-sum games or team problems can also perform well for Nash games. On the other hand, it shows that, if two players act without even knowing that they are involved in a game, but merely thinking that they try to maximize their output using the learning algorithm proposed, they end up being in Nash equilibrium.This research was supported in part by NSF Grant No. ECS-87-14777.     

The Nehari manifold approach for a class of n\times n nonlinear elliptic systems

In this paper, by analysis of the relationship between the Nehari manifold and fibering maps, we discuss the existence, multiplicity and nonexistence of positive weak solution for the $(p_1,p_2,\ldots ,p_n)$ -Laplacian systems with sign-changing weight functions.     

A New and Elegant Approach for Solving $$\varvec{n \times n}$$-Order Linear Fractional Differential Equations

The application of fractional differential equations (FDEs) in the fields of science and engineering are gradually increasing day by day during the last two decades. The solutions of linear systems of FDEs are of great importance. Several investigations are carried out on such systems using eigenvalue analysis or Laplace transform method. But both the methods have limitations, and as of now there are no methods for solving \(n \times n\)-order linear FDEs. In the present investigation, the issues of such difficulties are addressed, and the exact solutions of linear \(2 \times 2\)-order linear FDEs are presented by Laplace transform. We are unable to provide the exact solutions of such system of order \(n \times n\) by Laplace transform. To overcome this, we provide a new and elegant approach to find the approximate solutions of \(n \times n\)-order linear FDEs with the help of residual power series (RPS) method. The results thus obtained are verified by providing numerous examples.     

Mixed complementarity problems for robust optimization equilibrium in bimatrix game

In this paper, we investigate the bimatrix game using the robust optimization approach, in which each player may neither exactly estimate his opponent’s strategies nor evaluate his own cost matrix accurately while he may estimate a bounded uncertain set. We obtain computationally tractable robust formulations which turn to be linear programming problems and then solving a robust optimization equilibrium can be converted to solving a mixed complementarity problem under the l ₁ ∩ l _∞-norm. Some numerical results are presented to illustrate the behavior of the robust optimization equilibrium.