DYNAMIC SUPPLY FROM COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE: WATER DIVERSIONS FROM THE GREAT LAKES

For many purposes, the five Great Lakes can be classified as an open access resource since there is no well-defined system of property rights governing these water uses in the lakes. Yet the Great Lakes Charter and the Water Resources Act of 1966 establish regulations concerning the diversion of water out of the basin. Thus, for interbasin water diversions the Great Lakes is more like a common property resource with rules governing such transfers. Moreover, water diversion decisions are interconnected since withdrawing water from one point may affect water levels in the entire lake system. This, in turn, can adversely affect hydropower production and commercial navigation. Contributing to the complexity of the problem are the eight U.S. states, two Canadian provinces and two federal governments which are involved in Great Lakes management. Game theory is used to describe this situation. Several games are constructed to describe different market structures. Of particular interest is the number of players who participate in the game, as well as the expectations they hold. Open-loop (where players commit themselves to future actions) and closed-loop (where players do not commit themselves to future actions) are compared for the ten players game (eight states and two provinces), two players game (U.S. and Canada) and one player game (a social planner's solution). The open-loop game is shown to ignore part of the externalities involved, and thus can underestimate the social loss caused by diversions from the lakes.     

MODELING COMMON PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AS A DYNAMIC CONTRACT

Common property ownership is modeled as a joint wealth maximizing egalitarian share contract. Two-stage differential games are developed for various types of common property in order to examine the incentives inherent in common property regimes. Cases in which group members contract over just membership size and cases in which members contract over both group size and resource investment are considered. Envelope methods in optimal control theory are used to generate some comparative statics predictions about the value of the contracts which define property rights to a capital stock.     

HUMAN FERTILITY DECISIONS AND COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT. In rural areas of developing countries, parental decisions on number of offspring may be made on the basis of the role of children in harvesting local common property renewable resources. It has been argued that this may lead to a cycle of human over‐population and resource over‐exploitation. To investigate the plausibility of this argument, we present a discrete dynamic model with two state variables representing human population level N and resource stock level S. The model is similar to one given by Nerlove and Meyer but differs in several important respects. It is assumed that, in each over‐lapping generation of parents and children, parents decide how many children to have based on their resulting share of the local resource harvest and the costs associated with child‐rearing. Using simulation and analytical methods, the long term steady state population and resource stock levels for this dynamic noncooperative game are contrasted with the steady state when parental fertility decisions are made in a cooperative manner.     

“STRAGEDY” OF THE COMMONS

This paper computes open loop and subgame perfect Nash equilibria for an infinite horizon, common property resource model with congestion and stock externalities. The model permits the comparison of the game-theoretic approach and the traditional commons literature, which preceded the widespread recognition of the games, because the underlying assumptions are equivalent. With access to the commons restricted, the subgame perfect equilibrium captures the inefficiency associated with the strategic scramble to capture the resource reserves the open loop does not. Under sole ownership, the two equilibrium concepts coincide with the surplus maximizing extraction policy. In free access, the extraction strategies under both equilibrium concepts coincide with complete rent dissipation.     

MODELS FOR COOPERATION AND CONSPIRACY IN FISHERIES: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Fisheries regulation is considered necessary to counteract the effects of competitive forces which can lead to a “tragedy of the commons”. Yet management initiatives have often failed because they did not take into account competitive responses of fishing enterprises. In particular, open access fisheries provide strong incentives for the development of excessive harvesting capacity. This in turn leads to harvesting that is concentrated in space and time, with adverse effects on both the resource and markets. A coalition of fishermen, such as a fishermen's cooperative, has interests similar to those of a sole owner, and thus would be expected to produce more efficient behaviour. In practice, however, fishermen's cooperatives seldom persist. Game theory is used to explore relationships between the coalition structure of the industry, economic variables, and regulation. The models are based loosely on a purse seine fishery for herring. The results suggest that the potential to form stable coalitions is affected by changes in price and harvest. Changes in regulation also affect stability of coalitions. When interpreted in the light of historical changes in the herring fishery, these results suggest that industry may not accept regulations which do not permit formation of stable coalitions.     

两类二元函数芽的一个共同性质及其应用

本文主要研究二元C~∞函数芽环中函数芽的性质问题.利用Mather有限决定性定理和C~∞函数的右等价关系,获得了带有任意4次至k次齐次多项式p_i(x,y),q_i(x,y)(i=4,5,···,k)k k的两类函数芽f_1=x~2y+sum from i=4 to k(p_i(x,y)),f_2=xy~2+sum from i=4 to k(q_i(x,y))(k≥5)的一个共同性质:若M_2~k?M_2J(f_j)(j=1,2)且f_1,f_2的轨道切空间的余维分布均为c_i=1(i=4,5,···,k-1),则对这里的i,p_i(x,y)中xy~(i-1),yi的系数和q_i(x,y)中x~(i-1)y,x~i的系数均为零.最后,利用该性质,给出了f_1,f_2和一类余维数为7的二元函数芽的标准形式.     

一个宽容交货超前延误单机排序问题

此文考虑下述排序问题（P）：有n个工件需在同一台机器上加工,对各工件有一共同的宽容交货期。若一工件在此宽容期前完工则为一超前工件,若在此宽容期后完工则为一延误工件,要求适当安排一加工方式和宽容交货期的位置使加权超前延误工件数量小。文中证得（P）是NP-hard的,并给出一伪多项式时间的分枝状精确算法,这也就可以认为它是一般意义下的NP-hard问题而不是强NP-hard问题。     

RISK-BASED MULTIATTRIBUTE DECISION-MAKING IN PROPERTY AND WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT. Determining best management systems for properties and evaluating their sustainability at the watershed scale are useful and important aspects of integrated watershed management. Multiattribute decision-making (MADM) is very useful for modeling the selection of best management systems for properties in a watershed. This paper reviews four MADM approaches including utility theory, surrogate worth tradeoff, free iterative search and stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDWF). Emphasis is on determining how the first three methods could be used to determine the best (most preferred) combinations of attributes and associated management systems for a property. An application of the expected utility method with risk neutral preferences is presented in which farmer's preferences for five attributes are used to rank five farming systems for an agricultural watershed in Missouri. A framework is presented for assessing the sustainability of the best management systems for all properties in a watershed and the cost-effectiveness of policies for enhancing sustainable resource management at the watershed scale.     

NONMALLEABLE CAPITAL AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF A NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE

Using a discrete-time model with nonmallable and durable capital embodied in a two-period recovery profile, we determine the efficient allocation of a nonrenewable resource and compare it with the corresponding Hotelling allocation for which capital is malleable. Depending on the recovery profile, efficient prices can rise strictly monotonically over time, rise in a stairwise fashion or rise in a sawtooth fashion around a rising price trend. Except for the sawtooth rise, this price behavior requires faster exhaustion than when capital is malleable, implying that the nonmalleability and durability of capital should not be ignored in nonrenewable resource models.     

NONMARKET RESOURCE VALUATION: A BILEVEL OPTIMIZATION APPROACH

The social value of a common property/open access resource is in general different from the value attributed by individual users. Therefore, public intervention in the form of prices, quotas and marketable licenses has often been necessary to prevent overexploitation of such resources. This paper addresses the pricing issue. The existing mathematical programming studies in the resource economics literature suggest using the shadow price information obtained from an aggregate model where the sum of net returns to individual users and the management authority is maximized. When the policy maker's objective takes a different form, however, the shadow price strategy may result in a socially suboptimum or infeasible resource utilization. A bilevel optimization approach is proposed in this paper where the price of the resource is introduced as a policy variable and the optimizing behavior of individual users is considered as an explicit constraint in a global optimization problem. An empirical application of the proposed approach to the steady state management of a large scale irrigation system is presented.     

THE ANALYTIC KREIN-MILMAN PROPERTY IN BANACH SPACES

In[1],A.V.BuknvalovandA.A.Danilevichhaveintroducedtheanalyticcordon--NikodylllpropertyincompleXBanacllspacesastheanalyticallalogueoftilewellknowllRadoll-NikodylllpropertyconcerningtherealgeometricalstrllcturesofBanachspaces.LetXbeacomplexBanachspace,XissaidtohavetheanalyticRadon--Nikodymproperty(analyticRNP,illshort)ifforeveryuniformlyboundedanalyticfunctiollffromtheopenunitdiscDofCwitllvaluesinX,f:D~X,fhasradiallimitsa.e.onthetornsT=={e*':0E[0,Zx]}illX,tllisllleallsthatfora.e.e6[0,…     

COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A DYNAMICAL MODEL OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Abstract In this paper, we propose a model describing the commercial exploitation of a common renewable resource by a population of strategically interacting agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the payoff of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. The partition of the players into two groups, defectors and cooperators, results from the players' choices, so it is not predetermined. This partition is decided as a Nash equilibrium of a static game. It is shown that different types of players can exist in an equilibrium; more precisely, depending on the parameter values such as resource stock, cost, and so on, there might be equilibria only with defectors, cooperators, or with a combination of cooperators and defectors. In any case the total harvest depends on the renewable resource stock, so it influences agents' positions. It is assumed that at each time period the agents harvest according to Nash equilibrium, which can be combined with a dynamic model describing the evolution of fish population. A complete analysis of the equilibria is presented and their stability is analysed. The effect of the different Nash equilibria on the stability of the fish stock, showing that full cooperation is the most stable case, is examined.     

TWO INFORMATIONAL ISSUES IN RESOURCE MODELING

Neither the pattern of future resource demand nor the level of available supply is known with any great certainty. This paper quantifies the uncertainty in key demand and supply elements for the California Redwood Industry. The paper then shows that the loss to imperfect information about available supply is not very large.     

Rudin性质与拟Z-连续Domain

对一般子集系统 Z,引入了 Rudin性质,给出了它的映射式刻划,作为拟连续偏序集和Z-连续偏序集的公共推广,引入了拟Z-连续Domain的概念,讨论了拟Z-连续Domain的基本性质,特别地,给出了 Rudin性质及其映射式刻划在拟 Z-连续Domain方面的若干应用,将关于拟连续偏序集的主要结果推广至了拟 Z-连续 Domain情形。     

由两点确定的具凸包性和保凸性的三次有理Bézier曲线

１．引言 在文［１］中,本文作者探讨了当控制多边形为凸时,过控制多边形内部任意给定两点的三次有理 Ｂéｚｉｅｒ曲线的存在唯一性问题,给出了这样的曲线存在的充要条件并证明了其若存在则是唯一的,还给出了其权因子的计算式．但由两点确定的三次有理 Ｂｚｉｅｒ曲线的权因子不一定非负,从而不能保证曲线具凸包性和保凸性,而无论从理论还是实用角度看,曲线的这两个性质都是很重要的． 本文从如下方面进一步深化［１］的论题：当凸控制多边形内部两点 ｐ１, ｐ２满足什么条件时,过Ｐ１,Ｐ２两点的三次有理 Ｂéｚｉｅｒ曲线不仅…     

OPTIMAL INVESTMENT IN THE PROTECTION OF A VULNERABLE BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE

It is assumed that the probability of destruction of a biological asset by natural hazards can be reduced through investment in protection. Specifically a model, in which the hazard rate depends on both the age of the asset and the accumulated invested protection capital, is assumed. The protection capital depreciates through time and its effectiveness in reducing the hazard rate is subject to diminishing returns. It is shown how the investment schedule to maximize the expected net present value of the asset can be determined using the methods of deterministic optimal control, with the survival probability regarded as a state variable. The optimal investment pattern involves “bang-bang-singular” control. A numerical scheme for determining jointly the optimal investment policy and the optimal harvest (or replacement) age is outlined and a numerical example involving forest fire protection is given.     

广义正定矩阵及其性质

In this paper,we got some new results of generalized real positive definite matrices,particularly gave its spectral property and determinant inequalities.     

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER''S DILEMMA

Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play-ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner's dilemma. In this article, a pref-erence parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player's degree of egoism and altruism (preference). Then, a game-theoretic dynamical model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how prefer-ence influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results: egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.     

软对策论及其创新

传统对策论虽已取得巨大发展，但仍存在某些不足，软对策论就是在对它的某些假定进行修正和扩展的基础上提出的。该理论引入了情绪和非理性等因素，使对策模型更加接近于社会实际。     

具有连续参数齐次随机场的线性预测与马氏性

本文研究了具有连续参数齐次随机场的3个类型的线性预测问题和两个类型的马氏性问题,并用这3个类型的预测问题的研究结果及[1]的方法,求出了这两个类型的马氏性问题具有马氏性的充分条件和充分必要条件.且深化了[1]中结果.