基于网络商盟的信任交易管理机制研究

如何建立有效的信任交易管理机制是网络交易信任管理中的一个重要问题。在分析现有网络信任交易机制局限性的基础上,根据网络交易信任问题的特点和现实社会中商业联盟的特性,提出一种基于网络商盟的信任交易管理机制,建立事前防范,事中协调,事后惩罚三位一体的欺诈约束机制,保障网络交易的安全性。本研究有效解决三方面问题：1）解决新注册用户难以开展业务的问题;2）有效防止会员通过变换身份进行欺诈;3）降低网络交易平台仲裁的工作量。采用博弈理论分析该机制下的交易方行为,可以证明诚信交易是长期博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡策略。     

基于泛激励控制线的多阶段信息集结方法

针对时序动态综合评价中多阶段评价信息集结问题,给出了一种基于泛激励控制线的集结方法,该方法能很好地刻画决策者对于被评价对象发展的预期,并在处理过程中实施"控制与激励"的双重管理手段,因而体现出明显的决策意图。实践中长期使用该方法,可对被评价对象的持续科学的发展行为产生良性诱导。最后,用一个算例验证了方法的有效性。     

电子采购中具有语言评价信息的交易匹配问题研究

针对电子采购中具有语言评价信息的买方与卖方交易匹配问题,提出了一种决策分析方法.首先,给出了电子采购中基于电子中介的买方与卖方交易匹配的问题描述;然后在此基础上,将买方与卖方给出的具有语言评价信息的效率矩阵转化为二元语义形式,考虑以买方与卖方双方满意度最大为目标构建了多目标优化模型,根据二元语义的自身特点将模型进行转化,并最终转化为单目标线性规划模型进行求解来得到交易匹配结果;最后,通过电子采购中交易匹配的实例分析说明了本文给出方法的可行性和实用性.     

基于均线交易系统的非特定时间动态VaR研究

为使交易产生稳定持续的收益, 使用基于一定交易规则的交易系统进行交易成为越来越多的投资者和投资机构使用的方法。如能把VaR引入交易系统,进行风险管理,将具有重要的意义。本文以5-60日均线交易系统为研究对象,建立了非特定时间动态VaR模型。经过检验,验证了模型的准确性。在基于模型进行交易策略优化后,得出了有意义的结果。本文使VaR在非特定时间度量方面实现了应用,研究结果对交易系统的风险控制,具有较大的应用价值。     

三角形分布的双方叫价拍卖模型在电力交易中的应用

在完全开放的双边电力市场下,大用户直接购电问题已成为我国电力改革的重大课题.研究发电公司和大用户如何建立有效的报价策略具有十分重要的理论和实践价值.将发电公司看成卖方,将买电代理看成买方,针对卖方的成本和买方的估计是私有信息,并服从区间(0,1)上的三角形分布,建立了基于三角形分布的双方叫价拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型,并得到了预期的均衡结果.通过一个数值例子与基于均匀分布的经典双方叫价拍卖模型进行比较.结果表明:建立的双方叫价拍卖模型在电力交易拍卖中的应用,能够提供更为准确的理论预期结果,具有更为现实的指导意义.     

基于前景理论的信息敏感型电子废弃物回收演化博弈分析

为破解不完全信息下信息敏感型电子废弃物的回收困境,文章基于前景理论构建了由政府、消费者和回收商组成的演化博弈模型,探讨了影响系统博弈策略的主要因素.结果表明,政府加大监管力度可促进回收市场规范化;消费者负面信誉评价对非正规回收商具有导向性,高负面信誉评价激励非正规回收商规范化形成;回收过程中,消费者若遭受信息泄露损失,便趋向于不信任策略,且信息泄露损失越大不信任程度越深;前景理论中的损失规避系数和损失感知价值敏感系数,对于消费者和回收商的策略均有影响,而收益感知价值敏感系数对两者策略几乎无影响,说明决策者在博弈中更注重规避损失.     

基于超短线文本和价量信息的股票及股指期货预测综述

超短线交易指交易频率较高、持仓时间较短的交易行为.在超短线环境下,.财务数据等低频信息难有发挥空间,基本面分析方法失效;股票和股指期货价格变化具有很强的非线性特征,不同的股票及股指期货之间相互交叉影响并构成一个复杂网络,传统的技术分析方法难以适应复杂多变的超短线环境.梳理了基于时间序列模型、随机占优模型、深度学习模型、...     

考虑声誉效应的网络众包参与者行为博弈模型及仿真分析

为了控制网络众包交易的风险,以网络众包平台中的发包方和接包方为研究对象,基于微分博弈方法建立了网络众包交易中参与者行为的博弈模型,研究了发包方和接包方在合作和非合作两种情形下的策略选择。本文研究发现在声誉效应满足特定阈值的条件时,合作博弈情形下众包系统的总收益更大;而且,发包方和接包方违约控制的收益及努力程度更大。在网络众包平台的违约罚金超过特定阈值时,随时间推移发包方和接包方违约控制的努力程度逐渐提高,实现帕累托改进。本文结合猪八戒网、InnoCentive等网络众包平台的众包交易机制,采用数值分析对博弈模型的求解结果进行模拟。对于网络众包平台来说,可以通过建立有效的信用评价机制,将信用评价或声誉纳入众包交易定价,引导参与者约束自身行为。     

基于客户信用度的物流配送车辆路径问题研究

针对当前城市物流配送过程中普遍存在的客户中途取消订单、无故退换货等交易违约问题,引入客户信用度的测度方法。根据客户历史交易违约数据计算客户信用值,并转化求解客户信用度,构建了包含车辆配送成本、租赁成本以及违反时间窗惩罚成本的配送路径优化模型。设计了一种遗传(GA)-禁忌搜索(TS)混合算法进行模型求解,在算法过程中应用精英保留策略进行循环迭代寻优。结合重庆某外卖物流配送网络的实例数据,验证了模型和算法的有效性和可行性。实验结果给出了不同服务策略下的物流配送调度方案,并进行了基于客户信用度的客户配送服务序列调整比较和敏感度分析。研究表明客户信用等级的合理划分可以有效降低物流配送成本和提高客户服务水平。     

确定性需求连续生产模型下的最优保理融资策略

保理是融资机构基于供应链上下游企业之间实际发生交易而给予供应链卖方企业的一种短期融资。基于连续生产模型研究了资金约束制造商的最优保理融资策略。考虑保理时间决策对融资成本和需求损失的影响,比较了固定期保理和即时保理两种策略下制造商的利润。研究发现,固定期保理策略下的最优保理时间随着其边际利润的增加而提前,而随着保理费率上升、应收款账期延长、自有资金增加而延迟。数值研究结果发现,保理商最优保理费率随着应收账款账期延长而降低。     

Modeling first bid in retail secondary market online auctions: A Bayesian approach

We propose a Bayesian framework to model bid placement time in retail secondary market online business‐to‐business auctions. In doing so, we propose a Bayesian beta regression model to predict the first bidder and time to first bid, and a dynamic probit model to analyze participation. In our development, we consider both auction‐specific and bidder‐specific explanatory variables. While we primarily focus on the predictive performance of the models, we also discuss how auction features and bidders' heterogeneity could affect the bid timings, as well as auction participation. We illustrate the implementation of our models by applying to actual auction data and discuss additional insights provided by the Bayesian approach, which can benefit auctioneers.     

An option-theoretic model of a reputation network

This paper constructs a new theory of social networks based on reputation. The model assumes that reputation is an asset and that individuals connect by buying options on the reputation of others. In networking, individuals construct portfolios of call options to leverage the reputations of others and put options to hedge the connections with others. A network then consists of portfolios of reputation options. The option model confers advantages not present in existing models. First, the payoff to connecting is the payoff on a portfolio of reputation options. Second, the network forms as individuals take option positions; the network evolves as individuals adjust those positions. Third, networking strategies become option strategies. The model allows for insights into network structure, the price of connecting and the value of connecting.     

Evolutionary stability of auction and supply chain contracting: An analysis based on disintermediation in the Indian tea supply chains

The purpose of this paper is to show that evolutionary stable market equilibrium is achievable through complete disintermediation of auctioneers if the option of bargaining-based supply chain contracting exists. The paper analyzes the evolutionary dynamics of a market that caters both the scopes of auction-intermediation and supply chain contracting to a set of homogeneous buyers and sellers. The motivation of this work developed from the contradiction between the theoretical framework of Lu and McAfee (1996) that identifies auction to be evolutionary stable over bargaining and the real instance of sustained disintermediation of auctioneers in the world’s largest tea industry in India where supply chain contracting is the other option of trading.     

C2C模式下卖家信誉建立与提升策略研究

当前信誉已成为电子商务发展中不可回避的问题.C2C模式下,信誉是交易进行的基础,它直接关系着交易的安全有效.从卖家收益的视角出发,运用博弈理论分析了C2C模式下卖家信誉的演化过程,提出了惩罚和信任两种策略的适用条件.结果表明对于新进入的卖家,发表承诺和买方的惩罚能够促使其建立信誉,而对于已具有一定信誉值的卖家而言,买家的充分的信任和积极评价将是其维持和提升信誉的动力来源.     

An improved public goods game model with reputation effect on the spatial lattices

How to model the evolution of cooperation within the population is an important and interdisciplinary issue across the academia. In this paper, we propose an improved public goods game model with reputation effect on spatial lattices to investigate the evolution of cooperation regarding the allocation of public resources. In our model, we modify the individual utility or fitness as a product of the present payoff and reputation-related power function, and strategy update adopts a Fermi-like probability function during the game evolution. Meanwhile, for an interaction between a pair of partners, the reputation of a cooperative agent will be accrued beyond two units, but the defective player will decrease his reputation by one unit. Extensive Monte Carlo numerical simulations indicate the introduction of reputation will foster the formation of cooperative clusters, and greatly enhance the level of public cooperation on the spatial lattices. The larger reputation factor leads to the higher cooperation level since the reputation effect will be enormously embedded into the utility evaluation under this scenario. The current results are vastly beneficial to understand the persistence and emergence of cooperation among many natural, social and synthetic systems, and also provide some useful suggestions to devise the feasible social governance measures and modes for the public resources or affairs.     

Modeling Reputation Management System on Online C2C Market

This paper discusses the effectiveness of sharing information concerning the reputations of buyers and sellers making online transactions in a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) market. We developed a computer simulation model that describes online transactions with a reputation management system that shares information concerning the reputations of consumers. The model takes an agent-based approach in which agents' actions are based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma. No model exists to analyze C2C markets even though there are many case studies concerning the effectiveness of sharing reputation information among participants in a market. The simulation results revealed that a positive reputation system can be more effective than a negative reputation system for an online transaction, even though the negative one can work for a traditional transaction. The result should be an important consideration when designing practical reputation management systems for online transactions.     

An adaptive evaluation mechanism for online traders

Economic agents in electronic markets generally consider reputation to be a significant factor in selecting trading partners. Most traditional online businesses publish reputation profile for traders that reflect average of the ratings received in previous transactions. Because of the importance of these ratings, there is an incentive for traders to partake in strategic behavior (for example shilling) to artificially inflate their rating. It is therefore important for an online business to be able to provide a robust estimate of a trader’s reputation that is not easily affected by strategic behavior or noisy ratings. This paper proposes such an adaptive ratings-based reputation model. The model is based on a trader’s transaction history, witness testimony, and other weighting factors. Learning is integrated to make the ratings model adaptive and robust in a dynamic environment. To validate the proposed model and to demonstrate the significance of its constructs, a multi-agent system is built to simulate the interactions among buyers and sellers in an electronic marketplace. The performance of the proposed model is compared to that of the reputation model used in most online marketplaces like Amazon, and to Huynh’s model proposed in the literature.     

考虑声誉效应的众包竞赛动态激励机制研究

将声誉效应引入众包竞赛的激励机制可以促使接包方为考虑未来绩效收益而提高当前努力。建立并求解了显性和隐性声誉效应下连续两个任务阶段的动态激励模型,探讨了显性声誉修正系数、隐性声誉系数以及参赛者数量对激励效果的影响,并与无声誉激励机制进行了对比。研究表明,声誉激励机制通过单位绩效激励强度和固定奖励水平两条途径起作用,增大隐性声誉系数有助于提高每个任务阶段的努力程度,显性声誉不确定性则会降低第2任务阶段的努力程度;各种条件下实施声誉激励对第1任务阶段中的努力程度和单位绩效奖励的影响存在不确定性;参赛者数量的增加有助于弱化第1任务阶段中棘轮效应,但也会降低声誉激励机制对努力程度的正向价值,扩大声誉激励机制对单位绩效奖励的负向价值。     

传统节会的声誉溢出效应:基于Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson声誉模型

中国经济繁荣带来传统节会复苏,但是传统节会市场的鱼龙混杂导致传统节会声誉参差不齐,该现象引起了政府部门的重视和学术界的关注.现有文献侧重于对节会概念、意义、文化层面的讨论,缺乏对节会声誉问题的研究,因此本文参考Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson声誉模型,在四个基本假设基础上建立了传统节会的声誉模型,分析了传统节会的声誉溢出效应及均衡条件.研究发现:第一,参与者认为传统节会承办方的声誉越好,承办方选择不欺骗参与者的概率就越大,承办方建立声誉的积极性也就越高;第二,一旦承办方出现欺骗参与者的行为,参与者就会认为其是弱承办方,在下一期承办方会失去参与者的信任,从而失去长期获利的机会;第三,无论是强承办方还是弱承办方,不去欺骗参与者才是最优选择,此时承办方和参与者可以实现合作共赢,这是一种更有效率的文化旅游发展模式.因此,文章提出了建立传统节会声誉评价制度与信息公开制度、加强对传统节会的监管以及完善相关法律法规的政策建议.     

服务型制造企业开放式服务创新的声誉激励模型

在服务型制造企业开放式服务创新的过程中, 为了激励合作企业参与服务创新, 将公平理论引入到声誉激励机制设计中, 考虑合作企业的公平偏好程度、服务创新能力系数、知识转移能力系数、耐心系数等参数, 运用委托代理理论, 建立声誉激励模型, 并对模型进行求解和数值仿真, 得出相应的研究结论和管理启示。研究表明:当合作企业是风险规避的, 在完全信息情况下, 合作企业的公平偏好程度系数与声誉激励系数正相关;在不完全信息情况下, 合作企业的公平偏好程度系数对声誉激励系数的影响不显著;无论是否考虑合作企业的公平偏好, 合作企业的努力水平、服务创新能力系数、知识转移能力系数、耐心系数与声誉激励系数正相关;合作企业的努力成本系数、风险规避系数、产出分享系数、外部环境变量的方差与声誉激励系数负相关。