Equivalence constants for certain matrix norms II

We give an almost complete solution of a problem posed by Klaus and Li [A.-L. Klaus, C.-K. Li, Isometries for the vector (p, q) norm and the induced (p, q) norm, Linear and Multilinear Algebra 38 (1995) 315–332]. Klaus and Li’s problem, which arose during their investigations of isometries, was to relate the Frobenius (or Hilbert–Schmidt) norm of a matrix to various operator norms of that matrix. Our methods are based on earlier work of Feng [B.Q. Feng, Equivalence constants for certain matrix norms, Linear Algebra Appl. 374 (2003) 247–253] and Tonge [A. Tonge, Equivalence constants for matrix norms: a problem of Goldberg, Linear Algebra Appl. 306 (2000) 1–13], but introduce as a new ingredient some techniques developed by Hardy and Littlewood [G.H. Hardy, J.E. Littlewood, Bilinear forms bounded in space [p, q], Quart. J. Math. (Oxford) 5 (1934) 241–254].     

A characterization on n-critical economical generalized tic-tac-toe games

There is a so called generalized tic-tac-toe game playing on a finite set X with winning sets A₁, A₂,…, A_m. Two players, F and S, take in turn a previous untaken vertex of X, with F going first. The one who takes all the vertices of some winning set first wins the game. Erd s and Selfridge proved that if |A₁|=|A₂|==|A_m|=n and m<2ⁿ⁻¹, then the game is a draw. This result is best possible in the sense that once m=2ⁿ⁻¹, then there is a family A₁, A₂,…, A_m so that F can win. In this paper we characterize all those sets A₁,…, A_2n−1 so that F can win in exactly n moves. We also get similar result in the biased games.     

A note on feedback cyclicity of C[Y]

Let (A,B) be an n-dimensional linear system with 2-inputs over C[Y], the ring of polynomials in one-variable over the field of complex numbers. We prove the feedback cyclicity of (A,B) under certain conditions on their entries and deduce that (A,B) is feedback cyclic in an exceptional case left open in W. Schmale [Linear Algebra Appl. 275–276 (1998) 551–562].     

Game sentences and ultrapowers

We prove that if is a model of size at most [kappa], λ^[kappa] = λ, and a game sentence of length 2^λ is true in a 2^λ-saturated model ≡ , then player has a winning strategy for a related game in some ultrapower Π_D of . The moves in the new game are taken in the cartesian power ^λA, and the ultrafilter D over λ must be chosen after the game is played. By taking advantage of the expressive power of game sentences, we obtain several applications showing the existence of ultrapowers with certain properties. In each case, it was previously known that such ultrapowers exist under the assumption of the GCH, and we get them without the GCH.     

On the construction of most reliable networks

The construction of most reliable networks is investigated. In particular, the study of restricted edge connectivity shows that general Harary graphs are max λ–min m_i for all i=λ, λ+1,…,2λ−3. As a consequence, this implies that for each pair of positive integers n and e, there is a graph of n vertices and e edges that is max λ–min m_i for all i=λ,λ+1,…,2λ−3. General Harary graphs that are max λ–min m_i for all i=λ,λ+1,…,2λ−2 are also constructed.     

Superfast algorithms for Cauchy-like matrix computations and extensions

An effective algorithm of [M. Morf, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1974; in: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on ASSP, IEEE Computer Society Press, Silver Spring, MD, 1980, pp. 954–959; R.R. Bitmead and B.D.O. Anderson, Linear Algebra Appl. 34 (1980) 103–116] computes the solution to a strongly nonsingular Toeplitz or Toeplitz-like linear system , a short displacement generator for the inverse T⁻¹ of T, and det T. We extend this algorithm to the similar computations with n×n Cauchy and Cauchy-like matrices. Recursive triangular factorization of such a matrix can be computed by our algorithm at the cost of executing O(nr²log³ n) arithmetic operations, where r is the scaling rank of the input Cauchy-like matrix C (r=1 if C is a Cauchy matrix). Consequently, the same cost bound applies to the computation of the determinant of C, a short scaling generator of C⁻¹, and the solution to a nonsingular linear system of n equations with such a matrix C. (Our algorithm does not use the reduction to Toeplitz-like computations.) We also relax the assumptions of strong nonsingularity and even nonsingularity of the input not only for the computations in the field of complex or real numbers, but even, where the algorithm runs in an arbitrary field. We achieve this by using randomization, and we also show a certain improvement of the respective algorithm by Kaltofen for Toeplitz-like computations in an arbitrary field. Our subject has close correlation to rational tangential (matrix) interpolation under passivity condition (e.g., to Nevanlinna–Pick tangential interpolation problems) and has further impact on the decoding of algebraic codes.     

An evolutionary game theoretic perspective on e-collaboration: The collaboration effort and media relativeness

Studies of e-collaboration from a game-theoretical perspective are practically nonexistent. This article contributes to filling this gap by focusing on the strategic interaction between players as they decide whether and how much to collaborate with each other. We use evolutionary game theory to make predictions about a two-person e-collaboration game. More specifically, we extend the traditional Prisoners’ Dilemma and Snowdrift game theory notions to discrete-strategy e-collaboration games, by explicitly including social punishments into the players’ payoff functions. We also introduce continuous-strategy e-collaboration games with both complete and incomplete information. Finally, we provide two generic dynamic programming models for e-collaboration games with media selection.     

On polyhedral retracts and compactifications of locally symmetric spaces

The results in this paper are based on a previously constructed exhaustion of a locally symmetric space V=ΓX by Riemannian polyhedra, i.e., compact submanifolds with corners: V=_s0V(s). We show that the interior of every polyhedron V(s) is homeomorphic to V. The universal covering space X(s) of V(s) is quasi-isometric to the discrete group Γ. It can be written as the complement of a Γ-invariant union of horoballs in X (which in general have intersections giving rise to the corners). This yields exponential isoperimetric inequalities for Γπ₁(V(s)). We also discuss the relation of this compactification of V with the Borel–Serre compactification.     

On L(d,1)-labelings of graphs

Given a graph G and a positive integer d, an L(d,1)-labeling of G is a function f that assigns to each vertex of G a non-negative integer such that if two vertices u and v are adjacent, then |f(u)−f(v)|d; if u and v are not adjacent but there is a two-edge path between them, then |f(u)−f(v)|1. The L(d,1)-number of G, λ_d(G), is defined as the minimum m such that there is an L(d,1)-labeling f of G with f(V){0,1,2,…,m}. Motivated by the channel assignment problem introduced by Hale (Proc. IEEE 68 (1980) 1497–1514), the L(2,1)-labeling and the L(1,1)-labeling (as d=2 and 1, respectively) have been studied extensively in the past decade. This article extends the study to all positive integers d. We prove that λ_d(G)Δ²+(d−1)Δ for any graph G with maximum degree Δ. Different lower and upper bounds of λ_d(G) for some families of graphs including trees and chordal graphs are presented. In particular, we show that the lower and the upper bounds for trees are both attainable, and the upper bound for chordal graphs can be improved for several subclasses of chordal graphs.     

Computational analysis of supersonic turbulent boundary layers over rough surfaces using the k–ω and the stress–ω models

The influence of surface roughness in the prediction of the mean flow and turbulent properties of a high-speed supersonic (M = 2.7, Re/m = 2 × 10⁷) turbulent boundary layer flow over a flat plate is numerically investigated. In particular, the performance of the k–ω and stress–ω turbulence models is evaluated against the available experimental data. Even though the performance of these models have been proven satisfactory in the computation of incompressible boundary layer flow over rough surfaces, their validity for high-speed compressible has not been investigated yet. It is observed from this study that, for smooth surface, both k–ω and stress–ω models perform very well in predicting the mean flow and turbulence quantities in supersonic flow. For rough surfaces, both models matched the experimental data fairly well for lower roughness heights but performed unsatisfactorily for higher roughness conditions. Overall the performance of the k–ω model is better than the stress–ω model. The stress–ω model does not show any strong advantages to make up for the extra computational cost associated with it. The predictions indicate that the ω boundary conditions at the wall in both models, especially the stress–ω model, need to be refined and reconsidered to include the geometric factor for supersonic flow over surfaces with large roughness values.     

On stochastic programmed design of strategies in a differential game

A differential game /1–17/ is analyzed, in which the strategies form controls on the basis of information on the motion's history. The computation of this game's value is discussed, as also is the construction of optimal strategies on the basis of auxiliary programmed constructions which contain an artificially introduced random element. Thus, a method of stochastic programmed design, proposed in /18,19/ for differential games, is examined here from a certain general viewpoint.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-Person Second-Order Games: A Paradigm Shift in Game Theory

In this paper, we present a new approach to n-person games based on the Habitual domain theory. Unlike the traditional game theory models, the constructed model captures the fact that the underlying changes in the psychological aspects and mind states of the players over the arriving events are the key factors, which determine the dynamic process of coalition formation. We introduce two new concepts of solution for games: strategically stable mind profile and structurally stable mind profile. The theory introduced in this paper overcomes the dichotomy of non-cooperative/cooperative games, prevailing in the existing game theory, which makes game theory more applicable to real-world game situations.     

On index of total boundedness of (strictly) o-bounded groups

Let G be a metrizable topological group. Denote by itb(G) the smallest cardinality of a cover of G by totally bounded subsets of G. A group G is defined to be σ-bounded if itb(G)₀. The group G is called o-bounded if for every sequence (U_n)_nω of neighborhoods of the identity in G there exists a sequence (F_n)_nω of finite subsets in G such that G=_nωF_n·U_n; G is called strictly o-bounded (respectively OF-determined) if the second player (respectively one of the players) has a winning strategy in the following game OF: two players, I and II, choose at every step n an open neighborhood U_n of the identity in G and a finite subset F_n of G, respectively. The player II wins if G=_nωF_n·U_n.

For a second countable group G the following results are proven. . If G is strictly o-bounded, then itb(G)₁ and G is σ-bounded or meager. If the space G is analytic, then the group is OF-determined and satisfies . G is σ-bounded if it is strictly o-bounded and one of the following conditions holds: (i) G is analytic; (ii) ; (iii) (MA+¬CH) holds; (iv) analytic games are determined; (v) there exists a measurable cardinal. Also we show that under (MA) every non-locally compact Polish Abelian divisible group contains a Baire o-bounded OF-undetermined subgroup.     

Two Game Models for Cooperation with Implicit Noncooperation

We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.This research was partly funded by the College Engineering, Ohio State University.     

Solution of a roulette-type ruin problem—a correction to: a rule of thumb (not only) for gamblers

In the paper we derive a closed form formula for a probability of success in a roulette-type game. The player begins the game having j chips and plays one chip at a time. In each game, he either wins w chips with probability p or loses his chip with probability 1−p. The game terminates when the player loses all his fortune or when his capital reaches, or exceeds level C. The present solution rectifies the incorrect one, presented in Section 3 of Kozek (Stochastic Process Appl. 55 (I) (1995) 169).     

Some algebraic constructions in rational homotopy theory

In this note we describe constructions in the category of differential graded commutative algebras over the rational numbers Q which are analogs of the space F(X, Y) of continuous maps of X to Y, the component F(X, Y,ƒ) containing ƒ ε F(X, Y), fibrations, induced fibrations, the space Γ(π) of sections of a fibration π: E → X, and the component Γ(π,σ) containing σ ε Γ (π). As a focus, we address the problem of expressing π^*(F(X, Y, ƒ)) = Hom(π_*(F(X,Y, ƒ)),Q) in terms of differential graded algebra models for X and Y.     

Games with Ordered Outcomes

We present a brief review of the most important concepts and results concerning games in which the goal structure is formalized by binary relations called preference relations. The main part of the work is devoted to games with ordered outcomes, i.e., game-theoretic models in which preference relations of players are given by partial orders on the set of outcomes. We discuss both antagonistic games and n-person games with ordered outcomes. Optimal solutions in games with ordered outcomes are strategies of players, situations, or outcomes of the game. In the paper, we consider noncooperative and certain cooperative solutions. Special attention is paid to an extension of the order on the set of probabilistic measures since this question is substantial for constructing the mixed extension of the game with ordered outcomes. The review covers works published from 1953 until now.     

A value for multichoice games

A multichoice game is a generalization of a cooperative TU game in which each player has several activity levels. We study the solution for these games proposed by Van Den Nouweland et al. (1995) [Van Den Nouweland, A., Potters, J., Tijs, S., Zarzuelo, J.M., 1995. Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games. ZOR-Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 41, 289–311]. We show that this solution applied to the discrete cost sharing model coincides with the Aumann-Shapley method proposed by Moulin (1995) [Moulin, H., 1995. On additive methods to share joint costs. The Japanese Economic Review 46, 303–332]. Also, we show that the Aumann-Shapley value for continuum games can be obtained as the limit of multichoice values for admissible convergence sequences of multichoice games. Finally, we characterize this solution by using the axioms of balanced contributions and efficiency.     

Construction of a game''s value in certain fixed-time differential games

A procedure is given for the construction of a maximal μ-stable bridge /1/ in a fixed-time nonstationary game. A procedure is suggested for the construction of the game's value for two classes of fixed-time games. Examples are presented.     

Some results on integral sum graphs

Let Z denote the set of all integers. The integral sum graph of a finite subset S of Z is the graph (S,E) with vertex set S and edge set E such that for u,vS, uvE if and only if u+vS. A graph G is called an integral sum graph if it is isomorphic to the integral sum graph of some finite subset S of Z. The integral sum number of a given graph G, denoted by ζ(G), is the smallest number of isolated vertices which when added to G result in an integral sum graph. Let x denote the least integer not less than the real x. In this paper, we (i) determine the value of ζ(K_n−E(K_r)) for r2n/3−1, (ii) obtain a lower bound for ζ(K_n−E(K_r)) when 2r<2n/3−1 and n5, showing by construction that the bound is sharp when r=2, and (iii) determine the value of ζ(K_r,r) for r2. These results provide partial solutions to two problems posed by Harary (Discrete Math. 124 (1994) 101–108). Finally, we furnish a counterexample to a result on the sum number of K_r,s given by Hartsfiedl and Smyth (Graphs and Matrices, R. Rees (Ed.), Marcel, Dekker, New York, 1992, pp. 205–211).