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1.
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys benefits upon a bilateral agreement. To address the strategic implications of stakeholders over negotiations, we consider a model where two bargainers interact in the presence of a third party that (a) can transfer a share of her benefits to the bargainers but cannot receive a share of the bilateral surplus, and (b) while she may not participate in all periods of the negotiation, she cannot remain entirely inhibited. Our main findings are:(1) the stakeholder’s (reverse) liquidity constraint implies the existence of a multiplicity of stationary subgame perfect equilibria that include outcomes with very asymmetric bilateral agreements, and (2) the partial participation of the stakeholder may be the source of severe inefficiency 相似文献
2.
We study two-person, multiple-issue bargaining problems and identify four procedures by which the bargaining may take place. Drawing on some logic from non-cooperative game theory, we propose axioms which relate the outcomes of the procedures. We also promote a weak monotonicity axiom on solutions, called issue-by-issue monotonicity, which is geared toward multiple-issue bargaining. Our main result concerns the relationship between a sequential bargaining procedure — with the rule that agreements are implemented only after all issues are resolved — and global bargaining (in which all issues are negotiated simultaneously). If a bargaining solution predicts the same outcome with these two procedures, then we say that it satisfiesagenda independence. We prove that a solution satisfies axioms of efficiency, symmetry, scale invariance, issue-by-issue monotonicity, and agenda independence if and only if it is the Nash solution. This result provides new intuition for Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. Among other results, we show that a solution is invariant to all four of the procedures and satisfies efficiency and symmetry if and only if it is the utilitarian solution with equal weights. We comment on the results of other authors who address multiple-issue bargaining. 相似文献
3.
This paper examines the role communication between players might serve in enabling them to reach an agreement on the future
play of a repeated game. The property of the communication process that we focus on is the amount of time it takes to complete.
We characterize the effects of such communication processes indirectly by determining the set of agreements they may yield.
A weak and a strong criterion are introduced to describe sets of agreements that are “stable” in the sense that players would
follow the current agreement and not seek to reach a new agreement. We show that as players become extremely patient, strongly
stable sets converge to Pareto efficient singletons. We apply the stability criteria to Prisoner’s Dilemmas and show how the
unique strongly stable set reflects asymmetries in the players’ stage-game payoffs. Finally, we model the communication process
as a Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining game and demonstrate that the resulting agreements help characterize the strongly
stable set for a general class of communication mechanisms.
Received January 1998/final version June 1999 相似文献
4.
By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate
licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold
in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms.
We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of
licensees that maximizes licensees’ total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining
set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor’s revenue is
uniquely determined.
The authors wish to thank the chief editor, anonymous referees, and participants in the 10th DC (Japan), the 3rd ICMA, and
the 17th Stony Brook conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are extended to Ryo Kawasaki for editing English.
They are partially supported by the MEXT Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program, Grant-in-Aid 18730517 (Watanabe), and Grant-in-Aid
16310107 (Muto). 相似文献
5.
Antoni Calvó-Armengol 《International Journal of Game Theory》2002,30(4):503-515
This paper analyzes the optimal selection of a bargaining partner when communication among players is restricted by an exogenously
given graph. If players are equally patient, bargaining agreements are immune to players' locations, and the selection of
a bargaining partner is not an issue. In contrast, when players differ in their discount factors, both location and impatience
matter for bilateral agreements and partner selection becomes an issue. We show that selecting the most impatient neighbor
is an equilibrium strategy whenever two players having a common neighbor share their most impatient neighbor. This condition
is always satisfied by stratified graphs with no more than three strata. In the absence of this condition, cyclically-stratified graphs with no more than three strata also admit this equilibrium selection rule.
Received: November 2000/Final version: January 2002 相似文献
6.
We consider a complete-information multilateral bargaining game in which a single buyer negotiates with two heterogeneous sellers selling perfect complementary units. While bilateral negotiations take place through a sequence of offers and counteroffers, the bargaining order is exogenously given. We solve for the conditions under which (a) the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first and (b) efficient (inefficient) outcomes emerge for the two bargaining orders. We find that the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first whenever the players are relatively impatient or the sellers are sufficiently heterogeneous. We show that there exists a unique efficient outcome when the buyer negotiates first with the lower-valuation seller and the sellers are sufficiently heterogeneous; however, significant delay in reaching agreements may arise when they are not. In case the buyer bargains with the higher-valuation seller first, an inefficient outcome is shown to exist even when players are extremely impatient. 相似文献
7.
Milan Horniaček 《International Journal of Game Theory》2008,37(2):235-249
We analyze conditions under which negotiated agreements are efficient from the point of view of every possible coalition of
negotiators. The negotiators have lexicographic preferences over agreements they reach. Their utility is the first criterion.
The coalition reaching an agreement is the second criterion. In the analyzed non-cooperative discrete time bargaining game
Γ the players bargain about the choice from the sets of utility vectors feasible for coalitions in a given NTU game (N, V). If Γ has a Markov perfect equilibrium, then the set of equilibrium utility vectors in Markov perfect equilibria in it equals
the core of (N, V).
I thank an anonymous referee, an anonymous Associate Editor, and the Editor for their comments that helped me to improve the
paper. The research reported in this paper was supported by the Grant VEGA 1/1223/04 of the Ministry of Education of the Slovak
Republic. 相似文献
8.
《European Journal of Operational Research》2006,174(1):404-426
This study presents an interactive airline network design procedure to facilitate bargaining interactions necessitated by international code-share alliance agreements. Code sharing involves partner airlines individually maximizing their own profits, while mutually considering overall profitability, traffic gains, and quality benefits for the markets in which they cooperate with their partners. This study uses a reference point method to solve the interactive multiobjective programming model, to support the bargaining interactions between two partner-airlines in an alliance negotiation. The impact of the code-share alliance network on market demand, alliance partners’ costs and profits, and levels of service are also discussed. A case study demonstrates the feasibility of applying the proposed models and elucidates how interactive multiobjective programming models may be applied to determine flight frequencies for airline code-share alliance networks. The results of this study provide ways by which alliance airlines can evaluate iteratively the output and profits of the alliance members under code-share alliance agreements. 相似文献
9.
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account,
don’t have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining
game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513–518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered by Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement
concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations; in particular, we consider the extension to multicriteria games
of the Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (see Selten in Int. J. Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) and prove that perfect Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria exist and properly refine both the perfect equilibria
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria. 相似文献
10.
We study a bargaining procedure of coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players’ preferences depend solely
on the coalition they belong to. We provide an example of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium,
and a necessary and sufficient condition for existence. We show that when the game is totally stable (the game and all its
restrictions have a nonempty core), there always exists a no-delay equilibrium generating core outcomes. Other equilibria
exhibiting delay or resulting in unstable outcomes can also exist. If the core of the hedonic game and its restrictions always
consist of a single point, we show that the bargaining game admits a unique stationary perfect equilibrium, resulting in the
immediate formation of the core coalition structure. 相似文献
11.
In this paper, we deal with Aubin cores and bargaining sets in convex cooperative fuzzy games. We first give a simple and
direct proof to the well-known result (proved by Branzei et al. (Fuzzy Sets Syst 139:267–281, 2003)) that for a convex cooperative
fuzzy game v, its Aubin core C(v) coincides with its crisp core C
cr
(v). We then introduce the concept of bargaining sets for cooperative fuzzy games and prove that for a continuous convex cooperative
fuzzy game v, its bargaining set coincides with its Aubin core, which extends a well-known result by Maschler et al. for classical cooperative
games to cooperative fuzzy games. We also show that some results proved by Shapley (Int J Game Theory 1:11–26, 1971) for classical
decomposable convex cooperative games can be extended to convex cooperative fuzzy games. 相似文献
12.
Two important issues in distributive bargaining theory are, first, the conditions under which a negotiation breakdown occurs,
and second, what and how source of parties’ bargaining powers influences the properties of a possible agreement. Research
based on classic Nash’s demand game has explored both questions by sophisticating the original game a lot. As an attempt to
deal with both issues under a simpler framework, we propose a modification of the Nash demand game in which bargainers suffer
negative externalities proportional to the share of the surplus captured by their rival. It is shown that the negotiator experiencing
a relatively high externality level has greater bargaining power and thus, appropriates a larger proportion of the surplus
at stake. However, if externality levels are sufficiently high, bargaining powers become incompatible and a negotiation breakdown
emerges from the bargaining process. We compare our results with the previous literature, and argue that they can be especially
relevant in negotiations held under highly polarized environments. 相似文献
13.
Diane J. Reyniers 《International Journal of Game Theory》2000,29(2):165-176
In this paper we consider the effect of the `impatience ratio' I (of the worker discount factor to the firm discount factor)
on the preferences of the players between two bargaining schemes in an asymmetric information wage bargaining context. The
firm has private information about the worker's value and the worker makes wage demands. In the contact bargaining scheme,
a wage demand which is accepted in one period is binding for all future periods (and hence the bargaining ends after acceptance
of a wage demand). In the repeated bargaining scheme, the parties continue to bargain irrespective of whether the worker has
been hired or not, and any accepted wage demand is only valid for the period in which it was accepted. We establish the following
results under the assumption that the worker's value is uniformly distributed on an interval: When the firm is more patient
than the worker (I<1) both parties prefer contract bargaining, and when the worker is more patient than the firm (I >1) both prefer repeated bargaining. For any value of I, the preferred type of bargaining gives the lower unemployment.
The work of Bae has already shown that when players are equally patient (I=1) the players are indifferent between the two schemes, regardless of the distribution of the worker's value. This paper
shows that Bae's indifference result (Bae, 1991) cannot be extended to unequally patient players.
Received: December 1996/Final version: October 1998 相似文献
14.
Tamás Solymosi 《International Journal of Game Theory》2002,31(1):1-11
It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set ℳi
1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced
games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set ℳi
1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person
case. We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides
with the bargaining set ℳi
1. Our discussion employs a generalization of balancedness to games with coalition structures.
Received: August 2001/Revised version: April 2002 相似文献
15.
P. Jean-Jacques Herings Arkadi Predtetchinski 《International Journal of Game Theory》2012,41(2):301-323
This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-St?hl bargaining model to the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining protocol is natural and has as its main feature that the players’
shares in the surplus are determined sequentially rather than simultaneously. The protocol also assumes orderly voting, a
restriction on the order in which players respond to a proposal. The bargaining protocol requires unanimous agreement for
proposals to be implemented. Unlike all existing bargaining protocols with unanimous agreement, the resulting game has unique
subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for any value of the discount factor. The result builds on the analysis of so-called
one-dimensional bargaining problems. We show that also one-dimensional bargaining problems have unique subgame perfect equilibrium
utilities for any value of the discount factor. 相似文献
16.
Francesc Carreras 《TOP》2009,17(1):70-84
We study here the protectionist role of blocking coalitions in a voting game. More precisely, we first present necessary properties
that a family of coalitions must satisfy in order to be the blocking family of some game and show that they are sufficient
conditions too. Furthermore, a procedure to determine all games having a given blocking family is provided. With regard to
uniqueness and multiplicity, (a) the blocking families that univocally determine the game are characterized by means of a
separation condition, and (b) it is shown that in the nonseparating case at least three games share each nonempty blocking
family, and an upper bound is given for the number of such games. Some numerical examples illustrate our results. Finally,
power indices related to the blocking structure are discussed.
Research partially supported by Grant SGR 2005–00651 of the Catalonia Government and Grant MTM 2006–06064 of the Education
and Science Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund. 相似文献
17.
18.
Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez 《International Journal of Game Theory》2008,37(3):439-456
This paper, presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a stag-hunt game. A novel contribution
of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not fixed exogenously,
but results from bargaining. We analyze the model both in a static and a dynamic setting. Whereas the static game has multiplicity
of equilibria, we show that only one is stochastically stable.
This is a revised version of Chapter 1 of my Ph.D. Thesis presented at Universidad de Alicante. A previous version of this
paper circulated with the title “Network Formation and Coordination: Bargaining the Division of Link Costs” (IVIE WP-AD 2002-27).
I am indebted to Fernando Vega-Redondo for many helpful conversations, suggestions and encouragement. I am grateful to Julio
González-Díaz, Antonio J. Morales, Ascensión Andina-Díaz and the Associate Editor for valuable suggestions. I also thank Jordi
Brandts, Antonio Cabrales, Angel Hernando, Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Christoph Kuzmics, Ana Lozano-Vivas, Paola Manzini,
Juan Mora, Efe Ok, Juana Santamaría-García and José A. Silva for their comments. I gratefully acknowledge the hospitality
of New York University, where part of this research was carried out, and the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of
Education (ref. BEC2002-02852). 相似文献
19.
Guillermo Owen Ines Lindner Scott L. Feld Bernard Grofman Leonard Ray 《International Journal of Game Theory》2006,35(1):111-128
We offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. We look for
a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of
the smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition. We claim that such a set of weights provides an a priori measure of a weighted voter’s bribeworthiness or market value. After introducing our model, we provide a characterization result for this model and show its links to other bargaining
model approaches in the literature. Then we offer some limit results showing that, with certain reasonable conditions on the
distributions of weights, as the size of the voting body increases, the values of bribeworthiness we calculate will approach
both the weights themselves and the Banzhaf scores for the weighted voting game. We also show that, even for relatively small
groups using weighted voting, such as the membership of the European Council of Ministers (and its predecessors) 1958–2003,
similarities among the usual a priori power scores, bribeworthiness/market value, and the weights themselves, will be quite strong. 相似文献
20.
The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically
determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution
first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin,
pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative
infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related
to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in
this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining
problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement
point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s
alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty
is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159,
1992) also implements the L-Nash solution. 相似文献