共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 171 毫秒
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文章对合作博弈理论进行了研究,结合比例分配以及联盟形成过程,提出了比例分离解的概念.该解首先利用给定权重,基于回报率递减划分大联盟,得到了大联盟的适配划分,随后由适配划分确定的加入顺序对划分联盟的边际贡献按比例分配.然后,基于最高回报一致性对比例分离解的公理刻画进行了研究,得到了3个刻画定理.最后,将新的解概念应用到区域经济一体化问题中,建立了经济协同博弈模型,并以长三角地区为例,分析了该区域经济协同发展的贡献情况和发展规划. 相似文献
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针对由单一供应商和三个相互竞争零售商组成的两层分销供应链系统,在三种不同的博弈框架下,采用合作博弈论中短视的Nash稳定性概念与远视的最大一致集(LCS)概念研究了供应商与不同零售商联盟间的定价博弈,分别讨论了不同类型零售商联盟的稳定性。发现不论是在供应商处于领导地位,还是在零售商处于领导地位的市场中,当竞争强度较弱时,大联盟不是短视零售商联盟的稳定结构,却有可能是远视零售商联盟的稳定结构;当竞争强度较强时,则无论是短视零售商还是远视零售商都以大联盟为稳定结构,但是,在供应商处于领导地位的市场中,远视零售商形成大联盟的阈值较高;在供应商和零售商地位相同的市场中,大联盟则是远视零售商和短视零售商共同的稳定结构。 相似文献
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合作对策中,联盟的形成过程是联盟一切活动的基础,直接影响着合作的稳定性与可持续发展。本文在分析局中人心理,情感,现实等因素对联盟形成所产生影响的基础上,首先定义了主观偏好标度值量化了心理、情感等因素,定义了收益分配函数将现实因素量化,构建了综合匹配函数作为局中人选择合作伙伴的一个序标准,通过定义匹配请求、交互匹配、直接交互匹配等概念,构建了基于匹配序的联盟形成决策模型,并证明了在特定情况下直接交互匹配的存在必然性。其次,给出了基于匹配序的联盟形成方法步骤,演化了大联盟的形成过程。最后通过具体实例验证了该决策方法的有效性与合理性。结果表明,该方法能有效的形成一系列可行且稳定的联盟结构,能快速演化联盟的形成过程,为有效解决联盟形成问题奠定了良好基础。 相似文献
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供应链中多供应商与单零售商的利益分配问题研究 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
本文利用合作博弈的方法,研究了“多供应商-单零售商”组成的供应链中成员的合作及利益分配问题。由于供应链中所有成员之间相互竞争时产生的利益是无效率的,供应链成员只有合作形成大联盟才能保证整体和成员局部利益更优。本文分析了大联盟的可行性,给出了相应的稳定利益分配方案。结果表明,零售商加入由供应商组成的“协作”联盟,是实现供应链各方利益最优化的有效途径。 相似文献
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提出了求解一维连续型动态规划问题的自创算法----离散近似迭代法,并结合双收敛方法求解多维连续型动态规划问题. 该算法的基本思路为:在给定其它状态向
量序列的基础上,每次对一个状态变量序列进行离散近似迭代,并找出该状态变量的最优序列,直到所有状态向量序列都检查完.当模型为非凸非凹动态规划时,
证明了该算法的收敛性.当模型为凸动态规划时,证明了该算法的线性收敛性. 最后,以一个具体算例验证了该模型和算法的有效性. 相似文献
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By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate
licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold
in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms.
We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of
licensees that maximizes licensees’ total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining
set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor’s revenue is
uniquely determined.
The authors wish to thank the chief editor, anonymous referees, and participants in the 10th DC (Japan), the 3rd ICMA, and
the 17th Stony Brook conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are extended to Ryo Kawasaki for editing English.
They are partially supported by the MEXT Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program, Grant-in-Aid 18730517 (Watanabe), and Grant-in-Aid
16310107 (Muto). 相似文献
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Luc Doyen 《Mathematical Social Sciences》2012,63(1):57-64
It is well known that the lack of cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights into the complex balance between coalition structures, resource states or dynamics and the agent heterogeneity necessary to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and exploited common stock dynamics. The extent to which cooperation promotes sustainability is examined. Our results suggest that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resources, the most efficient user plays the role of veto player. 相似文献
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It is shown that for convex games the bargaining set? 1 (i) (for the grand coalition) coincides with the core. Moreover, it is proved that the kernel (for the grand coalition) of convex games consists of a unique point which coincides with the nucleolus of the game. 相似文献
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Meca et al. (2004) studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common item decide to cooperate and make joint orders with the EOQ policy. In this paper, we extend their model to the situation where retailer’s delay in payments is permitted by the supplier. We introduce the corresponding inventory game with permissible delay in payments, and prove that its core is nonempty. Then, a core allocation rule is proposed which can be reached through population monotonic allocation scheme. Under this allocation rule, the grand coalition is shown to be stable from a farsighted point of view. 相似文献
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Dr. W. W. Sharkey 《International Journal of Game Theory》1982,11(3-4):175-182
A payoff vector in ann-person cooperative game is said to be acceptable if no coalition can improve upon it. The core of a game consists of all acceptable vectors which are feasible for the grand coalition. The core is said to be large if for every acceptable vectory there is a vectorx in the core withx?y. This paper examines the class of games with large cores. 相似文献
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Zhixin Liu 《Operations Research Letters》2009,37(4):225-229
This paper provides complexity results and develops optimal algorithms for core membership and emptiness tests of the bin packing game. Our algorithms find the maximum surplus profit, the least integer core value, and the minimum value required by the grand coalition for the existence of an integer core allocation. 相似文献
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J. R. G. van Gellekom J. A. M. Potters J. H. Reijnierse 《International Journal of Game Theory》1999,28(2):211-227
An important open problem in the theory of TU-games is to determine whether a game has a stable core (Von Neumann-Morgenstern
solution (1944)). This seems to be a rather difficult combinatorial problem. There are many sufficient conditions for core-stability.
Convexity is probably the best known of these properties. Other properties implying stability of the core are subconvexity
and largeness of the core (two properties introduced by Sharkey (1982)) and a property that we have baptized extendability
and is introduced by Kikuta and Shapley (1986). These last three properties have a feature in common: if we start with an
arbitrary TU-game and increase only the value of the grand coalition, these properties arise at some moment and are kept if
we go on with increasing the value of the grand coalition. We call such properties prosperity properties. In this paper we investigate the relations between several prosperity properties and their relation with core-stability.
By counter examples we show that all the prosperity properties we consider are different.
Received: June 1998/Revised version: December 1998 相似文献
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Tamás Solymosi 《International Journal of Game Theory》2002,31(1):1-11
It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set ℳi
1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced
games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set ℳi
1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person
case. We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides
with the bargaining set ℳi
1. Our discussion employs a generalization of balancedness to games with coalition structures.
Received: August 2001/Revised version: April 2002 相似文献