优势分析在组织行为学研究中的应用——组织公平与工作倦怠关系的实证研究

在组织行为学研究过程中经常需要确定各自变量的相对重要性,而优势分析则是提示不同自变量重要性的有效方法。本研究以程序公平、分配公平与工作倦怠的关系为例,详细介绍了如何采用优势分析来确定各自变量的相对重要性。结果表明,预测玩世不恭时,程序公平相对来说更重要,贡献了已解释方差的56.07%;预测情绪衰竭时,分配公平相对来说更重要,贡献了已解释方差的59.09%;预测成就感低落时,程序公平相对来说更重要,贡献了已解释方差的93.55%。     

组织公平对知识共享行为的影响及其对策研究——以河北省国有企业为例

员工间知识共享行为作为企业知识资源的积累和更新的重要来源为企业发展提供了动力源泉,另一方面员工间知识共享行为又受到组织环境、员工观念、技术环境等多方面制约。本文以河北省国有企业员工为研究对象,以组织公平为前因变量,组织嵌入为中介变量,知识共享行为为因变量构建理论模型,并且检验了三者之间的关系。研究结果显示:组织公平、组织嵌入对知识共享行为存在显著正向影响,其中组织嵌入在组织公平与知识共享行为之间存在部分中介作用。     

Persistent inequality and social relations: An intergenerational model

This paper studies the influence of individual social capital on the persistence of socioeconomic inequality. The set of social relations constitute a form of capital that provides the individual with a wide range of resources. Social capital interacts with other forms of capital, particularly with human capital, to enhance inequality. The overlapping-generations model proposed here focuses on the long-term investment processes in human and social capital. When these effects are considered, a society may end up divided into two groups. The first comprises people stuck in a trap of low intergenerational mobility resources. The second group includes people with increasing levels of education and social capital. Within the last group, income inequalities persist due to initial differences in social capital.     

Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency

Recent studies draw attention on the highly specialized capacity of human beings in recognizing altruists versus cheaters in social interactions. These results hint at the existence of specialized abilities that support discriminating behavior in strategic interactions. In this paper, we explore the implications of discriminating behavior in the study of the indirect evolutionary selection of selfish versus altruistic motivations in the context of generic 2×2 base games, and in particular for coordination and cooperation scenarios. We find that inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism can enforce under rather general conditions socially optimal outcomes, including cases where selfishness cannot, such as in prisoner’s dilemmas. Inequality seeking (Nietzschian) altruism in no case improves upon Rawlsian altruism in terms of social optimality of outcomes, and often does worse. In the cooperation scenario in particular, Nietzschean altruism never manages to implement the cooperative outcome. Under perfect discrimination, moreover, inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism often evolves at the expense of selfishness. These results suggest that the development of sophisticated discrimination abilities may be strongly adaptive in supporting fairness-oriented forms of pro-sociality in humans in the context of social dilemmas and coordination problems.     

The social impact in a high-risk community: A cellular automata model

This research examines the spread of criminal behavior and hard drug consumption using a mathematical approach called cellular automata (CA). This CA model is based on two behavioral concepts. Firstly, peer association impacts criminal involvement. Secondly, addiction can heighten criminal activity. The model incorporates four types of actors who interact in a high-risk social community and one intervention method. The actors exert a social influence on each other by encouraging or discouraging drug use and criminal behavior. The intervention method called Incapacitation has a probabilistic impact on the individuals in the model. The results identify the threshold where positive influences on a population reduce the number of high-rate offenders in the community. These results are discussed to further the knowledge about the social influences in a high-risk community and how these influences can effect decisions on offender management.     

Unanimous opinions in social influence networks

In this paper, I show that persons reach unanimous opinions even when they have different initial opinions and different social influences in social influence networks. Friedkin and Johnsen introduced a model of social influence networks, and identified conditions for initially diverse opinions to converge. However, they did not examine conditions of “unanimous” convergence. Hence, I provide sufficient conditions of such unanimous consensus by focusing on three typical but conflicting social influences: the equal influence, the influence of the lowest opinion, and no influence. I show that unanimous opinions occur even when persons have antagonistic social influences such as the equal influence and the influence of the lowest opinion. I also demonstrate that the most cooperative type is the equal influence, but the most central type is the no influence.     

Contractualism, Politics, and Morality

Rawls developed a contractualist theory of social justice and Scanlon attempted to extend the Rawlsian framework to develop a theory of rightness, or morality more generally. I argue that there are some good reasons to adopt a contractualist theory of social justice, but that it is a mistake to adopt a contractualist theory of rightness. I begin by illustrating the major shared features of Scanlon and Rawls’ theories. I then show that the justification for these features in Rawls’ theory, the centrality of cooperative fairness to social justice, cannot be used to defend their use in Scanlon’s. Finally, I argue that Scanlon has not provided an adequate alternative defense of these features, and show that they create problems when contractualists try to explain major features of our common-sense morality.     

基于微分变分不等式的多商品流网络动态模型

针对由多个制造商和多个零售商构成并且具有多商品流的供应链网络,建立了制造商、零售商之间从事微分Nash博弈的供应链网络动态模型.首先,在介绍微分变分不等式定义的基础上,利用微分变分不等式的方法建立了制造商、零售商以及供应链网络的均衡条件.然后,在正则条件下分析了供应链网络动态模型解的存在性条件.最后,利用数值算例验证了模型的合理性.     

Meritocratic and monopoly inequality: A computer simulation of income distribution

This paper explores the properties of a model of the distribution of income in which individual income is proportional to a multiplicative function of previous income, ability, chance, a ceiling factor determined by competition among members of an income class for resources held by members of other classes, and an additive factor summarizing effects of altruism and minimal subsistence. The behavior of the model is investigated by computer simulation for combinations of values of three model parameters representing the tendency of income to grow exponentially (the Monopoly effect), the weight of the ability factor (the meritocracy effect), and the weight of the ceiling factor resulting from competitive interactions. Steady state income distributions generated by the model are characterized by measures of income inequality, exchange mobility, elite stability, and meritocracy. Results suggest that for constant Monopoly effect, the effect of the meritocracy parameter on various aggregate outcomes is nonlinear, with a range over which greater returns to ability produce lower inequality, lower exchange mobility, greater elite stability and meritocracy, for constant returns to ability, a greater Monopoly effect generally produces greater inequality, more exchange mobility, less stability of the elite, and lower meritocracy. Results also reveal a nonlinear relationship between exchange mobility and inequality, with mobility decreasing to a minimum and then increasing again as inequality increases; a nonlinear but monotonic negative relationship between elite stability and inequality, with greater inequality, associated with less stability, and a nonlinear relationship between meritocracy and inequality, with meritocracy increasing at first with inequality at low inequality levels, reaching a maximum and then decreasing as inequality increases further. These findings are interpreted in relation to major stratification trends in the course of sociocultural evolution.     

智能家居创意空间系统知识协同行为的博弈分析

为明确智能家居创意空间系统知识协同行为实质,在研究其知识协同网络构成的基础上,考虑不同主体间协同行为的无限次重复博弈,构建知识协同行为的一般博弈模型,并利用演化博弈理论分别建立对称与非对称合作博弈模型,对系统中知识协同行为的演化过程进一步分析。研究表明,该系统运营知识资源的能力、激励强度以及协同主体知识协同运作获得的附加利益、合作次数是影响知识协同行为的关键因素;知识协同带来的纯收益与付出的初始成本是影响知识协同行为演化的重要参数。     

复杂装备研制协调超网络均衡与实现路径

复杂装备研制主体间呈现社会关系、合作关系、协调关系等网络关系,并且相互影响相互作用,其影响复杂装备研制的重要参数。为有效描述在资源环境约束下制造商和供应商的关系,探讨复杂装备研制协调机理与实现路径,本文利用超网络方法,设计了相互影响、相互作用的社会关系网络、协调网络和合作网络的复杂装备研制协调超网络,并将社会关系水平、协调度和合作水平作为超网络的3个决策变量,建立基于关系价值最大、协调成本最低、协调风险最小、合作收益最大、合作风险最小和成本最小等不同偏好下的多目标最优决策模型,构建了复杂装备研制超网络均衡模型,并利用其探讨超网络均衡和实现路径。     

零售商合作偏好下生鲜农产品供应链的政府补贴机制与优化策略

在零售商具有合作偏好行为的背景下,针对自然灾害影响产出的特性,设计基于“优先保证最大化社会福利的基础上促进农户增收”的灾害年的不同政府补贴政策,建立了政府、零售商和农户的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型.对比分析了政府的不同补贴政策以及零售商的合作偏好行为对政府的最优补贴率、零售商的最优收购价格、农户的最优生产投入量和三方利益的影响,并给出了政府的最优补贴政策。研究结果表明:(1)当零售商的合作偏好程度低于某一临界值,且“丰收年”发生的概率适中或偏高时,政府的最优补贴政策是对农户提供补贴;否则,政府的最优补贴政策是对零售商提供补贴;(2)政府的补贴政策可以实现政府、消费者和未受补贴方三方共赢的局面,但获补贴方不一定增收。     

合作联盟资源集成计划一种新方法

合作联盟里，资源集成计划往往是联盟成员群体谈判博弈的结果。本以两人博弈为例，对联盟的资源集成计划给出一个谈判博弈模型，能够较好地模仿和反映合作联盟资源整合计划的制订过程。     

The interpersonal diffusion mechanism of unethical behavior in groups: a social network perspective

Previous studies examining the impact of the unethical behavior of a group of colleagues on an individuals unethical behavior have typically employed social learning theory as a theoretical foundation. In this research, we extend these rich yet defective examinations by addressing the largely ignored relationship perspective. Drawing on the social network perspective, we posit that the structure of relationships significantly influences the process of unethical behavior diffusion. Consistent with the theoretically derived hypotheses, our agent-based model simulation results provide general support for our theoretical model: colleagues unethical behaviors positively affect an individuals unethical behaviors, and this influence is positively moderated by group network density, group network closeness centrality and group size. This paper also discusses theoretical contributions, practical values, limitations and directions for future research.     

An improved public goods game model with reputation effect on the spatial lattices

How to model the evolution of cooperation within the population is an important and interdisciplinary issue across the academia. In this paper, we propose an improved public goods game model with reputation effect on spatial lattices to investigate the evolution of cooperation regarding the allocation of public resources. In our model, we modify the individual utility or fitness as a product of the present payoff and reputation-related power function, and strategy update adopts a Fermi-like probability function during the game evolution. Meanwhile, for an interaction between a pair of partners, the reputation of a cooperative agent will be accrued beyond two units, but the defective player will decrease his reputation by one unit. Extensive Monte Carlo numerical simulations indicate the introduction of reputation will foster the formation of cooperative clusters, and greatly enhance the level of public cooperation on the spatial lattices. The larger reputation factor leads to the higher cooperation level since the reputation effect will be enormously embedded into the utility evaluation under this scenario. The current results are vastly beneficial to understand the persistence and emergence of cooperation among many natural, social and synthetic systems, and also provide some useful suggestions to devise the feasible social governance measures and modes for the public resources or affairs.     

市场机制和政府监管下新能源汽车产业合作创新演化博弈研究

节能和新能源汽车是解决能源、气候和环境问题的关键措施,越来越受各国政府的重视。本文基于演化博弈理论,从市场机制和政府监管两个方面分析了政产学研新能源汽车合作创新行为,首先通过建立博弈模型观察多个利益相关者的合作创新行为;再根据复制动态方程和演化稳定策略分析影响合作创新活动的动力因素。为验证理论计算的有效性进行了数值仿真,结果表明:在市场机制下政府补贴、违约金和收益分配系数对企业和学研机构开展新能源汽车合作创新的驱动效果明显,但作用机制不同;在政府监管下合理税率、行政处罚有利于促进新能源汽车合作创新的稳定性。此外,在新能源汽车合作过程中获得了额外的社会收益,这将增加政府参与新能源汽车合作创新活动的积极性,研究结果可以指导政产学研未来更好的决策。     

乡村振兴战略下农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈分析

农村人居环境整治是乡村振兴战略的重要内容,基于有限理性的演化博弈理论,构建了以地方政府、社会资本和农村居民为博弈主体的农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件分析了三方主体的初始意愿和政府规制对三方主体行为策略演化的影响。研究发现:(1)政府规制对农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作博弈系统演化的影响从大到小依次是:政府对社会资本的补贴资助、投机罚金、合作奖励和政府对农村居民的参与奖励。(2)与提高地方政府对社会资本的补贴资助力度和惩罚力度相比,提高地方政府的激励规制初始意愿更能促进农村人居环境整治PPP项目的顺利落地实施。(3)农村居民参与PPP项目的初始意愿的提升关键在于提高农村居民参与收益。最后,为促进PPP模式在农村环境治理领域的应用与发展和推动农村人居环境整治的可持续改善提出相应建议。     

图博弈的过程比例解

本文对具有图结构合作博弈（图博弈）进行了研究，采用比例原则和过程化分配方法，定义了比例分配过程，并对其性质进行了分析。随后，针对比例分配过程的超有效情况，运用等比例妥协的方式给出满足有效性的过程比例解，并研究了稳定性。最后，将比例分配过程与过程比例解应用到破产问题中，得到图博弈过程比例解与破产问题比例规则等价的结论。     

有限合作博弈的Shapley分配

以Myerson关于有限合作的图博弈模型为基础,结合经典合作博弈的相关结论,建立了有限合作博弈的Shapley分配,讨论了分配的相关性质.同时在支付函数满足链递增性的假设下,进一步研究了有限合作关系变化对收益分配的影响,给出了相关的研究结论.     

Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest

Nepotism has been the primary influence on political behavior throughout human history. Despite the spread of democracy in the 20th century, nepotistic regimes have hardly disappeared. Nepotism heavily influences political activity throughout the developing world, Middle East, and central Asia where family ties are essential for gaining access to power, state resources, and privileges. Rebelling against such nepotistic regimes is difficult and risky. RiskTaker is an agent-based model we developed for testing the influences of various social forces on risk taking behavior, including the formulation of rebellious coalitions. We use RiskTaker to examine the influence of nepotism on the distribution of wealth and social status. Nepotism heavily skews the distribution of wealth and status, leading to the formation of opposing coalitions and exacerbating social unrest.This paper was tied for Best Paper, NAACSOS (North American Association for Computational Social and Organizational Science) Annual Conference 2005, June 26–28, Notre Dame. Robert Sedlmeyer, Department of Computer Science, Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne provided programming for the RiskTaker model. Lawrence A. Kuznar is a professor of anthropology and director of the Decision Sciences and Theory Institute at Indiana University—Purdue University, Fort Wayne. He has conducted fieldwork among Aymara Indians in Andean Peru and the Navajo of the American southwest. His research interests include computer modeling, theories of risk taking and conflict, terrorism, social evolution, and scientific epistemology. He has authored articles in Ecological Economics (with W. Frederick), Current Anthropology, American Anthropologist, Mathematical Anthropology and Culture Theory and Journal of Anthropological Research, and published two books (Awatimarka Harcourt Brace, 1995 and Reclaiming a Scientific Anthropology Altamira Press, 1997) and two edited volumes. William Frederick has served as a faculty member in the departments of mathematical sciences and the department of computer sciences at Indiana University—Purdue University, Fort Wayne since 1979. His primary interests include mathematical modeling, game theory, and genetic algorithms.