Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change

We show that the value of a zero-sum Bayesian game is a Lipschitz continuous function of the players?? common prior belief with respect to the total variation metric on beliefs. This is unlike the case of general Bayesian games where lower semi-continuity of Bayesian equilibrium (BE) payoffs rests on the ??almost uniform?? convergence of conditional beliefs. We also show upper semi-continuity (USC) and approximate lower semi-continuity (ALSC) of the optimal strategy correspondence, and discuss ALSC of the BE correspondence in the context of zero-sum games. In particular, the interim BE correspondence is shown to be ALSC for some classes of information structures with highly non-uniform convergence of beliefs, that would not give rise to ALSC of BE in non-zero-sum games.     

基于时滞效应的随机微分投资与比例再保险博弈

金融市场不断发展,激烈的市场竞争使得相对绩效比较在保险机构的业绩评估中占据越来越重要的地位。考虑历史业绩对公司决策的影响,引入时滞效应,研究时滞效应对具有竞争关系公司之间最优投资策略和最优再保险策略的影响。运用随机最优控制和微分博弈理论,针对Cramér-Lundberg模型,得到了均衡投资和再保险策略,给出了值函数的显式解;然后进一步针对近似扩散过程,求得指数效用下均衡投资策略和比例再保险策略的显式表达。通过数值算例,分析了最优均衡策略随模型各重要参数的动态变化。结论显示:保险公司在决策时是否将时滞信息纳入考虑之中将大大影响其投资和再保险行为。保险公司考虑较早时间财富值越多,其投资再保险行为就表现得越趋向于保守和谨慎;与之相反,如果保险公司对行业间的竞争越看重,其投资再保险策略就越倾向于冒险和激进。     

考虑相互依赖性的信息系统安全投资及协调机制

考虑信息系统安全相互依赖情形下最优化信息系统连续时间安全投资水平是一个值得研究的问题。首先讨论了非合作博弈下信息系统安全投资的最优策略选择,在此基础上讨论了安全投资效率参数、黑客学习能力、传染风险对信息系统脆弱性及信息系统安全投资率的影响。其次,在推导出两企业在合作博弈情形下最优策略选择的基础上,对比两种情形下的博弈均衡结果,得出合作博弈下的投资水平高于非合作博弈下的投资水平。原因是两个企业的相互依赖关系隐含着企业投资的负外部性,从而导致企业投资不足。最后,构建一种双边支付激励机制消除企业投资不足问题,从而使企业达到合作博弈下的最优投资水平,提高两个企业的收益。     

Time-consistent investment strategy under partial information

This paper considers a mean–variance portfolio selection problem under partial information, that is, the investor can observe the risky asset price with random drift which is not directly observable in financial markets. Since the dynamic mean–variance portfolio selection problem is time inconsistent, to seek the time-consistent investment strategy, the optimization problem is formulated and tackled in a game theoretic framework. Closed-form expressions of the equilibrium investment strategy and the corresponding equilibrium value function under partial information are derived by solving an extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman system of equations. In addition, the results are also given under complete information, which are need for the partial information case. Furthermore, some numerical examples are presented to illustrate the derived equilibrium investment strategies and numerical sensitivity analysis is provided.     

Essential collections for equilibrium concepts

The aim of this study is to identify and characterize the parts of an extensive form game that are ??relevant?? to determining whether the outcome of a certain strategy profile is an equilibrium outcome. We formally define what we mean by ??relevant?? and refer to the associated collection of information sets as essential. We apply this idea to a number of classic equilibrium concepts and discuss some implications of our approach.     

Fictitious play with incomplete learning

In this paper, we consider a case that a game is played repeatedly in an incomplete learning process where each player updates his belief only in the learning periods rather than all the stages. For fictitious play process with incomplete learning, we discuss the absorbability of Nash equilibriums and the consistency of utilities in a finite game and discuss the convergence in a 2×2 game with an identical learning-period set. The main results for incomplete learning models are that, if it is uniformly played, a strict Nash equilibrium is absorbing in a fictitious play process; a fictitious play has the property of utility consistency if it exhibits infrequent switches and players learn frequently enough; a 2×2 game with an identical learning-period set has fictitious play property that any fictitious process for the game converges to equilibrium provided that players learn frequently enough.     

Heston随机波动率模型下带负债的投资组合博弈

本文研究了Heston随机波动模型下两个投资人之间的随机微分投资组合博弈问题。假设金融市场上存在价格过程服从常微分方程的无风险资产和价格过程服从Heston随机波动率模型的风险资产。该博弈问题被构造成两个效用最大化问题,每个投资者的目标是最大化终止时刻个人财富与竞争对手财富差的效用。首先,我们应用动态规划原理,得出了相应值函数所满足的HJB方程。然后,得到了在幂期望效用框架下非零和博弈的均衡投资策略和值函数的显式表达。最后,借助数值模拟,分析了模型中的参数对均衡投资策略和值函数的影响,从而为资产负债管理提供一定的理论指导。     

On three problems for sequences

If ξ∈ (0,1) and A=a_n, n?? is a sequence of real numbers define S_n(ξ,A)∶=Σ{a_k∶:k=[nξ]+1 to n}, n??, where [x] is the greatest integer less than or equal to x. In the theory of regularly varying sequences the problem arose to conclude from the convergence of the sequence S_n (ξ,A), n??, for all ξ in an appropriate set K of real numbers, that the sequence a_n, n??, converges to zero. It was shown that such a conclusion is possible if K={ξ,1?ξ} with ξ∈ (0,1) irrational. Then the following three questions were posed and will be answered in this paper:

1. does the convergence of S_n (ξ,A), n??, for a single irrational number ξ imply a_n→0.
2. does the convergence of S_n(ξ,A), n??, for finitely many rational numbers ξ∈ (0, 1) imply a_n→0.
3. does the convergence of S_n (ξ,A), n??, for all rational numbers ξ∈ (0,1) imply a_n→0?

     

Non-zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance and investment games with default risk

This paper investigates the implications of strategic interaction (i.e., competition) between two CARA insurers on their reinsurance-investment policies. The two insurers are concerned about their terminal wealth and the relative performance measured by the difference in their terminal wealth. The problem of finding optimal policies for both insurers is modelled as a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game. The reinsurance premium is calculated using the variance premium principle and the insurers can invest in a risk-free asset, a risky asset with Heston’s stochastic volatility and a defaultable corporate bond. We derive the Nash equilibrium reinsurance policy and investment policy explicitly for the game and prove the corresponding verification theorem. The equilibrium strategy indicates that the best response of each insurer to the competition is to mimic the strategy of its opponent. Consequently, either the reinsurance strategy or the investment strategy of an insurer with the relative performance concern is riskier than that without the concern. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the findings of this study.     

Nonzero-sum games for continuous-time Markov chains with unbounded transition and average payoff rates

This paper attempts to study two-person nonzero-sum games for denumerable continuous-time Markov chains determined by transition rates,with an expected average criterion.The transition rates are allowed to be unbounded,and the payoff functions may be unbounded from above and from below.We give suitable conditions under which the existence of a Nash equilibrium is ensured.More precisely,using the socalled "vanishing discount" approach,a Nash equilibrium for the average criterion is obtained as a limit point of a sequence of equilibrium strategies for the discounted criterion as the discount factors tend to zero.Our results are illustrated with a birth-and-death game.     

Unstable directions and fractal dimension for skew products with overlaps in fibers

A unique feature of smooth hyperbolic non-invertible maps is that of having different unstable directions corresponding to different prehistories of the same point. In this paper we construct a new class of examples of non-invertible hyperbolic skew products with thick fibers for which we prove that there exist uncountably many points in the locally maximal invariant set ?? (actually a Cantor set in each fiber), having different unstable directions corresponding to different prehistories; also we estimate the angle between such unstable directions. We discuss then the Hausdorff dimension of the fibers of ?? for these maps by employing the thickness of Cantor sets, the inverse pressure, and also by use of continuous bounds for the preimage counting function. We prove that in certain examples, there are uncountably many points in ?? with two preimages belonging to ??, as well as uncountably many points having only one preimage in ??. In the end we give examples which, also from the point of view of Hausdorff dimension, are far from being homeomorphisms on ??, as well as far from being constant-to-1 maps on ??.     

On the Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Problems of Distributed Computing

This paper studies two problems that arise in distributed computing. We deal with these problems from a game theoretical approach. We are interested in the convergence to the Nash equilibrium of algorithms based on the best reply strategy in a special case of linear costs. We present three specific types of algorithm that converge to the equilibrium. In our first model, composed of two processors, the convergence is established through monotonicity of the sequence of updates generated by each of the three algorithms. In the second model, made up of N processors, the convergence is due to the contraction of the algorithms.     

Extraproximal method for solving two-person saddle-point games

An equilibrium model is proposed for a two-person saddle-point game with partially coincident or conflicting interests. Meaningful interpretations of such a game are discussed. Three variants of the extraproximal method for finding an equilibrium point are proposed, and their convergence is proved.     

AN INTERNATIONAL MARINE POLLUTANT SINK IN AN ASYMMETRIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY GAME

Abstract A differential game with N countries as players is developed for the analysis of a marine resource with open access used by the countries as a pollutant sink and for production of an ecosystem good. Consumption, investment, abatement, and environmental research sectors may differ across countries. Under the assumption that property rights are well defined within the sovereignty of each country although there is a lack of enforcement in the international area, the game is solved for the feedback Nash equilibrium, using the Isaacs–Bellman dynamic programming technique, identifying the nonlinear feedback Nash flows of consumption, investment, harvest effort, abatement, and environmental research effort in each country, which is then compared to the Pareto optimal global solution.     

The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents?? utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.     

Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Regular–Singular Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

We consider a class of regular–singular stochastic differential games arising in the optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. The information available to the two players is asymmetric partial information and the control variable of each player consists of two components: regular control and singular control. We establish the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the saddle point of the zero-sum game. Then, as an application, these conditions are applied to an optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we generalize our results to the nonzero-sum regular–singular game with asymmetric information, and then the Nash equilibrium point is characterized.     

Spectral Asymptotics Revisited

We discuss two heuristic ideas concerning the spectrum of a Laplacian, and we give theorems and conjectures from the realms of manifolds, graphs and fractals that validate these heuristics. The first heuristic concerns Laplacians that do not have discrete spectra: here we discuss the notion of ??spectral mass?? closely related to the ??integrated density of states??, an average of the diagonal of the kernel of the spectral projection operator, and show that this can serve as a substitute for the eigenvalue counting function. The second heuristic is an ??asymptotic splitting law?? that describes the proportions of the spectrum that transforms according to the irreducible representations of a finite group that acts as a symmetry group of the Laplacian. For this to be valid we require the existence of a fundamental domain with relatively small boundary. We also give a version in the case that the symmetry group is a compact Lie group. Many of our results are reformulations of known results, and some are merely conjectures, but there is something to be gained by looking at them together with a unified perspective.     

ͨ������Ӱ���»������΢�ֲ��ĵ������ٱ��պ�Ͷ��

??Under inflation influence, this paper investigate a stochastic differential game with reinsurance and investment. Insurance company chose a strategy to minimizing the variance of the final wealth, and the financial markets as a game ``virtual hand' chosen a probability measure represents the economic ``environment' to maximize the variance of the final wealth. Through this double game between the insurance companies and the financial markets, get optimal portfolio strategies. When investing, we consider inflation, the method of dealing with inflation is: Firstly, the inflation is converted to the risky assets, and then constructs the wealth process. Through change the original based on the mean-variance criteria stochastic differential game into unrestricted cases, then application linear-quadratic control theory obtain optimal reinsurance strategy and investment strategy and optimal market strategy as well as the closed form expression of efficient frontier are obtained; finally get reinsurance strategy and optimal investment strategy and optimal market strategy as well as the closed form expression of efficient frontier for the original stochastic differential game.     

Time-consistent reinsurance and investment strategies for mean–variance insurer under partial information

In this paper, based on equilibrium control law proposed by Björk and Murgoci (2010), we study an optimal investment and reinsurance problem under partial information for insurer with mean–variance utility, where insurer’s risk aversion varies over time. Instead of treating this time-inconsistent problem as pre-committed, we aim to find time-consistent equilibrium strategy within a game theoretic framework. In particular, proportional reinsurance, acquiring new business, investing in financial market are available in the market. The surplus process of insurer is depicted by classical Lundberg model, and the financial market consists of one risk free asset and one risky asset with unobservable Markov-modulated regime switching drift process. By using reduction technique and solving a generalized extended HJB equation, we derive closed-form time-consistent investment–reinsurance strategy and corresponding value function. Moreover, we compare results under partial information with optimal investment–reinsurance strategy when Markov chain is observable. Finally, some numerical illustrations and sensitivity analysis are provided.     

Strict core fuzzy logics and quasi-witnessed models

In this paper we prove strong completeness of axiomatic extensions of first-order strict core fuzzy logics with the so-called quasi-witnessed axioms with respect to quasi-witnessed models. As a consequence we obtain strong completeness of Product Predicate Logic with respect to quasi-witnessed models, already proven by M.C. Laskowski and S. Malekpour in [19]. Finally we study similar problems for expansions with ??, define ??-quasi-witnessed axioms and prove that any axiomatic extension of a first-order strict core fuzzy logic, expanded with ??, and ??-quasi-witnessed axioms are complete with respect to ??-quasi-witnessed models.