On solving generalized Nash equilibrium problems via optimization

This paper deals with the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), i.e. a noncooperative game in which the strategy set of each player, as well as his payoff function, depends on the strategies of all players. We consider an equivalent optimization reformulation of GNEP using a regularized Nikaido–Isoda function so that solutions of GNEP coincide with global minima of the optimization problem. We then propose a derivative-free descent type method with inexact line search to solve the equivalent optimization problem and we prove that our algorithm is globally convergent. The convergence analysis is not based on conditions guaranteeing that every stationary point of the optimization problem is a solution of GNEP. Finally, we present the performance of our algorithm on some examples.     

Gap Function Approach to the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem

We consider an optimization reformulation approach for the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) that uses the regularized gap function of a quasi-variational inequality (QVI). The regularized gap function for QVI is in general not differentiable, but only directionally differentiable. Moreover, a simple condition has yet to be established, under which any stationary point of the regularized gap function solves the QVI. We tackle these issues for the GNEP in which the shared constraints are given by linear equalities, while the individual constraints are given by convex inequalities. First, we formulate the minimization problem involving the regularized gap function and show the equivalence to GNEP. Next, we establish the differentiability of the regularized gap function and show that any stationary point of the minimization problem solves the original GNEP under some suitable assumptions. Then, by using a barrier technique, we propose an algorithm that sequentially solves minimization problems obtained from GNEPs with the shared equality constraints only. Further, we discuss the case of shared inequality constraints and present an algorithm that utilizes the transformation of the inequality constraints to equality constraints by means of slack variables. We present some results of numerical experiments to illustrate the proposed approach.     

求解广义纳什均衡问题的指数型惩罚函数方法

本文利用指数型惩罚函数部分地惩罚耦合约束,从而将广义纳什均衡问题(GNEP)的求解转化为求解一系列光滑的惩罚纳什均衡问题 (NEP)。我们证明了若光滑的惩罚NEP序列的解序列的聚点处EMFCQ成立,则此聚点是 GNEP的一个解。进一步,我们把惩罚 NEP的KKT条件转化为一个非光滑方程系统,然后应用带有 Armijo 线搜索的半光滑牛顿法来求解此系统。最后,数值结果表明我们的指数型惩罚函数方法是有效的。     

Optimization reformulations of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem using regularized indicator Nikaidô–Isoda function

In this paper, we extend the literature by adapting the Nikaidô–Isoda function as an indicator function termed as regularized indicator Nikaidô–Isoda function, and this is demonstrated to guarantee existence of a solution. Using this function, we present two constrained optimization reformulations of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP for short). The first reformulation characterizes all the solutions of GNEP as global minima of the optimization problem. Later this approach is modified to obtain the second optimization reformulation whose global minima characterize the normalized Nash equilibria. Some numerical results are also included to illustrate the behaviour of the optimization reformulations.     

Nonsmooth optimization reformulations of player convex generalized Nash equilibrium problems

Using a regularized Nikaido-Isoda function, we present a (nonsmooth) constrained optimization reformulation of the player convex generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Further we give an unconstrained reformulation of a large subclass of player convex GNEPs which, in particular, includes the jointly convex GNEPs. Both approaches characterize all solutions of a GNEP as minima of optimization problems. The smoothness properties of these optimization problems are discussed in detail, and it is shown that the corresponding objective functions are continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable under mild assumptions. Some numerical results based on the unconstrained optimization reformulation being applied to player convex GNEPs are also included.     

惩罚框架下求解广义Nash均衡问题的分解算法

广义Nash均衡问题(GNEP),是非合作博弈论中一类重要的问题,它在经济学、管理科学和交通规划等领域有着广泛的应用.本文主要提出一种新的惩罚算法来求解一般的广义Nash均衡问题,并根据罚函数的特殊结构,采用交替方向法求解子问题.在一定的条件下,本文证明新算法的全局收敛性.多个数值例子的试验结果表明算法是可行的,并且是有效的.     

Parametrized variational inequality approaches to generalized Nash equilibrium problems with shared constraints

We consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), in which each player’s strategy set may depend on the rivals’ strategies through shared constraints. A practical approach to solving this problem that has received increasing attention lately entails solving a related variational inequality (VI). From the viewpoint of game theory, it is important to find as many GNEs as possible, if not all of them. We propose two types of parametrized VIs related to the GNEP, one price-directed and the other resource-directed. We show that these parametrized VIs inherit the monotonicity properties of the original VI and, under mild constraint qualifications, their solutions yield all GNEs. We propose strategies to sample in the parameter spaces and show, through numerical experiments on benchmark examples, that the GNEs found by the parametrized VI approaches are widely distributed over the GNE set.     

On Intrinsic Complexity of Nash Equilibrium Problems and Bilevel Optimization

In this article we study generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP) and bilevel optimization side by side. This perspective comes from the crucial fact that both problems heavily depend on parametric issues. Observing the intrinsic complexity of GNEP and bilevel optimization, we emphasize that it originates from unavoidable degeneracies occurring in parametric optimization. Under intrinsic complexity, we understand the involved geometrical complexity of Nash equilibria and bilevel feasible sets, such as the appearance of kinks and boundary points, non-closedness, discontinuity and bifurcation effects. The main goal is to illustrate the complexity of those problems originating from parametric optimization and singularity theory. By taking the study of singularities in parametric optimization into account, the structural analysis of Nash equilibria and bilevel feasible sets is performed. For GNEPs, the number of players’ common constraints becomes crucial. In fact, for GNEPs without common constraints and for classical NEPs we show that—generically—all Nash equilibria are jointly nondegenerate Karush–Kuhn–Tucker points. Consequently, they are isolated. However, in presence of common constraints Nash equilibria will constitute a higher dimensional set. In bilevel optimization, we describe the global structure of the bilevel feasible set in case of a one-dimensional leader’s variable. We point out that the typical discontinuities of the leader’s objective function will be caused by follower’s singularities. The latter phenomenon occurs independently of the viewpoint of the optimistic or pessimistic approach. In case of higher dimensions, optimistic and pessimistic approaches are discussed with respect to possible bifurcation of the follower’s solutions.     

An improved two-step method for solving generalized Nash equilibrium problems

The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a noncooperative game in which the strategy set of each player, as well as his payoff function, depend on the rival players strategies. As a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), the GNEP has recently drawn much attention due to its capability of modeling a number of interesting conflict situations in, for example, an electricity market and an international pollution control. In this paper, we propose an improved two-step (a prediction step and a correction step) method for solving the quasi-variational inequality (QVI) formulation of the GNEP. Per iteration, we first do a projection onto the feasible set defined by the current iterate (prediction) to get a trial point; then, we perform another projection step (correction) to obtain the new iterate. Under certain assumptions, we prove the global convergence of the new algorithm. We also present some numerical results to illustrate the ability of our method, which indicate that our method outperforms the most recent projection-like methods of Zhang et al. (2010).     

Sufficient conditions to compute any solution of a quasivariational inequality via a variational inequality

We define the concept of reproducible map and show that, whenever the constraint map defining the quasivariational inequality (QVI) is reproducible then one can characterize the whole solution set of the QVI as a union of solution sets of some variational inequalities (VI). By exploiting this property, we give sufficient conditions to compute any solution of a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) by solving a suitable VI. Finally, we define the class of pseudo-Nash equilibrium problems, which are (not necessarily convex) GNEPs whose solutions can be computed by solving suitable Nash equilibrium problems.     

A Penalty Approach for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem

The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP),in which both the utility function and the strategy space of each player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players.This problem has been used to model various problems in applications.However,the convergent solution algorithms are extremely scare in the literature.In this paper,we present an incremental penalty method for the GNEP,and show that a solution of the GNEP can be found by solving a sequence of smooth NEPs.We then apply the semismooth Newton method with Armijo line search to solve latter problems and provide some results of numerical experiments to illustrate the proposed approach.     

Perturbation approach to generalized Nash equilibrium problems with shared constraints

This paper aims to consider an application of conjugate duality in convex optimization to the generalized Nash equilibrium problems with shared constraints and nonsmooth cost functions. Sufficient optimality conditions for the problems regarding to players are rewritten as inclusion problems and the maximal monotonicity of set-valued mappings generated by the subdifferentials of functions from data of GNEP is proved. Moreover, some assertions dealing with solutions to GNEP are obtained and applications of splitting algorithms to the oligopolistic market equilibrium models are presented.     

Restricted generalized Nash equilibria and controlled penalty algorithm

The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem, in which each player’s strategy set may depend on the rival players’ strategies. The GNEP has recently drawn much attention because of its capability of modeling a number of interesting conflict situations in, for example, an electricity market and an international pollution control. However, a GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many solutions, and it is not a trivial matter to choose a meaningful solution from those equilibria. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First we present an incremental penalty method for the broad class of GNEPs and show that it can find a GNE under suitable conditions. Next, we formally define the restricted GNE for the GNEPs with shared constraints and propose a controlled penalty method, which includes the incremental penalty method as a subprocedure, to compute a restricted GNE. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the proposed approach.     

一类多个下层的双层规划问题

本文研究了一类多个下层的双层规划问题.利用文[1]有关理论与方法,获得了该类多下层双层规划问题与一类广义纳什均衡问题的联系,然后通过寻找该广义纳什均衡问题的均衡点求解该双层规划问题.同时给出了一种求解此类广义纳什均衡问题的算法,并进行了一定的理论分析与数值计算.     

Constrained mountain pass algorithm for the numerical solution of semilinear elliptic problems

Summary. A new numerical algorithm for solving semilinear elliptic problems is presented. A variational formulation is used and critical points of a C¹-functional subject to a constraint given by a level set of another C¹-functional (or an intersection of such level sets of finitely many functionals) are sought. First, constrained local minima are looked for, then constrained mountain pass points. The approach is based on the deformation lemma and the mountain pass theorem in a constrained setting. Several examples are given showing new numerical solutions in various applications.Mathematics Subject Classification (2000):35J20, 65N99The author would like to thank the referee for helpful comments in particular on Section 4.     

On orthogonal linear ℓ1 approximation

Summary The problem is considered of orthogonal ₁ fitting of discrete data. Local best approximations are characterized and the question of the robustness of these solutions is considered. An algorithm for the problem is presented, along with numerical results of its application to some data sets.     

Dynamic programming algorithms for the bi-objective integer knapsack problem

This paper presents two new dynamic programming (DP) algorithms to find the exact Pareto frontier for the bi-objective integer knapsack problem. First, a property of the traditional DP algorithm for the multi-objective integer knapsack problem is identified. The first algorithm is developed by directly using the property. The second algorithm is a hybrid DP approach using the concept of the bound sets. The property is used in conjunction with the bound sets. Next, the numerical experiments showed that a promising partial solution can be sometimes discarded if the solutions of the linear relaxation for the subproblem associated with the partial solution are directly used to estimate an upper bound set. It means that the upper bound set is underestimated. Then, an extended upper bound set is proposed on the basis of the set of linear relaxation solutions. The efficiency of the hybrid algorithm is improved by tightening the proposed upper bound set. The numerical results obtained from different types of bi-objective instances show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.     

How Many Comparisons Does Quicksort Use?

We examine the probability distribution of the number of comparisons needed by the Quicksort sorting algorithm, where probability arises due to the items being in random order. We develop a general class of distributions for the permutation of the items to be sorted which includes the uniform distribution on permutations as a special case. For this general class, the distribution of the number of comparisons is given by the solution of a simple recurrence relation. We provide an exact solution of the recurrence for very small n. We show that the solution can be approximated asymptotically by the solution of a "quadratic" operator equation. We exhibit three numerical solutions to the operator equation for two different distributions on permutations from the general class. We also exhibit numerical solutions for the case in which the algorithm is modified so that arrays are partitioned by the median-of-three selected items rather than by a single selected item.     

Time-harmonic response of transversely isotropic and layered poroelastic half-spaces under general buried loads

A semi-analytical method is developed for solving the dynamic response of transversely isotropic, multilayered, and poroelastic half-spaces with different surface hydraulic conditions and subjected to time-harmonic vertical and horizontal loads buried in the layered half-space. The coupled governing equations of motion are presented in details in terms of the Biot's poroelastodynamic theory via the (u,p) formulation. The cylindrical system of vector functions is introduced to express the unknown primary quantities so that the coupled governing partial differential equations can be reduced and separated into two sets of first-order ordinary differential equations (i.e., the LM- and N-types). A recursive relation for the expansion coefficients among different layers is established by virtue of the stable and efficient dual variable and position method. Making use of the boundary and interface conditions, the fundamental solutions are obtained in terms of the vector-function system. The corresponding physical-domain solutions are then derived via an accurate semi-infinite integral algorithm. The developed fundamental solutions are carefully checked with existing solutions, and numerical examples are further presented to demonstrate the effect of material anisotropy, loading depth, material layering, and surface hydraulic condition on the dynamic response, which should be useful to design engineers. These solutions could be further served as benchmarks for future numerical methods.     

Linear estimates of accuracy for approximate solutions of inverse problems

In this paper, we explore the question of which non-linear inverse problems, which are solved by a selected regularization method, may have so-called linear a priori accuracy estimates – that is, the accuracy of corresponding approximate solutions linearly depends on the error level of the data. In particular, we prove that if such a linear estimate exists, then the inverse problem under consideration is well posed, according to Tikhonov. For linear inverse problems, we find that the existence of linear estimates lead to, under some assumptions, the well-posedness (according to Tikhonov) on the whole space of solutions. Moreover, we consider a method for solving inverse problems with guaranteed linear estimates, called the residual method on the correctness set (RMCS). The linear a priori estimates of absolute and relative accuracy for the RMCS are presented, as well as analogous a posteriori estimates. A numerical illustration of obtaining linear a priori estimates for appropriate parametric sets of solutions using RMCS is given in comparison with Tikhonov regularization. The a posteriori estimates are calculated on these parametric sets as well.