Relating and extending semantical approaches to possibilistic reasoning

Two main semantical approaches to possibilistic reasoning with classical propositions have been proposed in the literature. Namely, Dubois-Prade's approach known as possibilistic logic, whose semantics is based on a preference ordering in the set of possible worlds, and Ruspini's approach that we redefine and call similarity logic, which relies on the notion of similarity or resemblance between worlds. In this article we put into relation both approaches, and it is shown that the monotonic fragment of possibilistic logic can be semantically embedded into similarity logic. Furthermore, to extend possibilistic reasoning to deal with fuzzy propositions, a semantical reasoning framework, called fuzzy truth-valued logic, is also introduced and proved to capture the semantics of both possibilistic and similarity logics.     

Sémantique de type Kripke d'un système logique basé sur un ensemble ordonné fini

In order to modelize the reasoning of intelligent agents represented by a poset T, H. Rasiowa introduced logic systems called “Approximation Logics”. In these systems the use of a set of constants constitutes a fundamental tool. We have introduced in [8] a logic system called without this kind of constants but limited to the case that T is a finite poset. We have proved a completeness result for this system w.r.t. an algebraic semantics. We introduce in this paper a Kripke‐style semantics for a subsystem of for which there existes a deduction theorem. The set of “possible worldsr is enriched by a family of functions indexed by the elements of T and satisfying some conditions. We prove a completeness result for system with respect to this Kripke semantics and define a finite Kripke structure that characterizes the propositional fragment of logic . We introduce a reational semantics (found by E. Orlowska) which has the advantage to allow an interpretation of the propositionnal logic using only binary relations. We treat also the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem of the propositional fragment of logic .     

The Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski embedding for infinitary intuitionistic logic and its extensions

The Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski embedding allows to view intuitionistic logic through the lenses of modal logic. In this work, an extension of the modal embedding to infinitary intuitionistic logic is introduced. First, a neighborhood semantics for a family of axiomatically presented infinitary modal logics is given and soundness and completeness are proved via the method of canonical models. The semantics is then exploited to obtain a labelled sequent calculus with good structural properties. Next, soundness and faithfulness of the embedding are established by transfinite induction on the height of derivations: the proof is obtained directly without resorting to non-constructive principles. Finally, the modal embedding is employed in order to relate classical, intuitionistic and modal derivability in infinitary logic extended with axioms.     

Arithmetical realizability and basic logic

Absolute arithmetical realizability of predicate formulas is introduced. It is proved that the intuitionistic logic is not correct with this semantics, but the basic logic is correct.     

A simple logic for reasoning about incomplete knowledge

The semantics of modal logics for reasoning about belief or knowledge is often described in terms of accessibility relations, which is too expressive to account for mere epistemic states of an agent. This paper proposes a simple logic whose atoms express epistemic attitudes about formulae expressed in another basic propositional language, and that allows for conjunctions, disjunctions and negations of belief or knowledge statements. It allows an agent to reason about what is known about the beliefs held by another agent. This simple epistemic logic borrows its syntax and axioms from the modal logic KD. It uses only a fragment of the S5 language, which makes it a two-tiered propositional logic rather than as an extension thereof. Its semantics is given in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of mutually exclusive propositional interpretations. Our approach offers a logical grounding to uncertainty theories like possibility theory and belief functions. In fact, we define the most basic logic for possibility theory as shown by a completeness proof that does not rely on accessibility relations.     

Modal Multilattice Logic

A modal extension of multilattice logic, called modal multilattice logic, is introduced as a Gentzen-type sequent calculus \(\hbox {MML}_n\). Theorems for embedding \(\hbox {MML}_n\) into a Gentzen-type sequent calculus S4C (an extended S4-modal logic) and vice versa are proved. The cut-elimination theorem for \(\hbox {MML}_n\) is shown. A Kripke semantics for \(\hbox {MML}_n\) is introduced, and the completeness theorem with respect to this semantics is proved. Moreover, the duality principle is proved as a characteristic property of \(\hbox {MML}_n\).     

Sémantique algébrique ďun système logique basé sur un ensemble ordonné fini

In order to modelize the reasoning of an intelligent agent represented by a poset T, H. Rasiowa introduced logic systems called “Approximation Logics”. In these systems a set of constants constitutes a fundamental tool. In this papers, we consider logic systems called L′_T without this kind of constants but limited to the case where T is a finite poset. We prove a weak deduction theorem. We introduce also an algebraic semantics using Hey ting algebra with operators. To prove the completeness theorem of the L′_T system with respect to the algebraic semantics, we use the method of H. Rasiowa and R. Sikorski for first order logic. In the propositional case, a corollary allows us to assert that it is decidable to know “if a propositional formula is valid”. We study also certain relations between the L′_T logic and the intuitionistic and classical logics.     

A framework for reasoning under uncertainty based on non-deterministic distance semantics

In this paper, we introduce a general and modular framework for formalizing reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent information. Our framework is composed of non-deterministic semantic structures and distance-based considerations. This combination leads to a variety of entailment relations that can be used for reasoning about non-deterministic phenomena and are inconsistency-tolerant. We investigate the basic properties of these entailments, as well as some of their computational aspects, and demonstrate their usefulness in the context of model-based diagnostic systems.     

Separation logic and logics with team semantics

Separation logic is a successful logical system for formal reasoning about programs that mutate their data structures. Team semantics, on the other side, is the basis of modern logics of dependence and independence. Separation logic and team semantics have been introduced with quite different motivations, and are investigated by research communities with rather different backgrounds and objectives. Nevertheless, there are obvious similarities between these formalisms. Both separation logic and logics with team semantics involve the manipulation of second-order objects, such as heaps and teams, by first-order syntax without reference to second-order variables. Moreover, these semantical objects are closely related; it is for instance obvious that a heap can be seen as a team, and the separating conjunction of separation logic is (essentially) the same as the team-semantical disjunction. Based on such similarities, the possible connections between separation logic and team semantics have been raised as a question at several occasions, and lead to informal discussions between these research communities. The objective of this paper is to make this connection precise, and to study its potential but also its obstacles and limitations.     

标准序列逻辑系统S_3中公式的概率真度理论

利用势为3的非均匀概率空间的无穷乘积在三值标准序列逻辑系统中引入了公式的概率真度概念,证明了全体公式的概率真度值之集在[0,1]中没有孤立点;利用概率真度定义了概率相似度和伪距离,进而建立了概率逻辑度量空间,证明了该空间中没有孤立点,为三值命题的近似推理理论提供了一种可能的框架.     

An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under the two assumptions that (i) the agent’s reasoning process is in accordance with the model but (ii) the agent does not reflect on these reasoning processes. For such a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the definition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all valid statements of the model. The key to my alternative semantic approach is the extension of the method of truth tables, first introduced for the propositional logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. In my syntactic approach I define an epistemic logic–consisting of the classical calculus of propositional logic plus two knowledge axioms–that does not include the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach. The difference between my approach and existing knowledge models is illustrated in a game-theoretic application concerning the epistemic justification of iterative solution concepts.     

A spatial modal logic with a location interpretation

A spatial modal logic (SML) is introduced as an extension of the modal logic S4 with the addition of certain spatial operators. A sound and complete Kripke semantics with a natural space (or location) interpretation is obtained for SML. The finite model property with respect to the semantics for SML and the cut‐elimination theorem for a modified subsystem of SML are also presented. (© 2005 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Logic of agreement: Foundations,semantic system and proof theory

In this paper a multi-valued propositional logic — logic of agreement — in terms of its model theory and inference system is presented. This formal system is the natural consequence of a new way to approach concepts as commonsense knowledge, uncertainty and approximate reasoning — the point of view of agreement. Particularly, it is discussed a possible extension of the Classical Theory of Sets based on the idea that, instead of trying to conceptualize sets as “fuzzy” or “vague” entities, it is more adequate to define membership as the result of a partial agreement among a group of individual agents. Furthermore, it is shown that the concept of agreement provides a framework for the development of a formal and sound explanation for concepts (e.g. fuzzy sets) which lack formal semantics. According to the definition of agreement, an individual agent agrees or not with the fact that an object possesses a certain property. A clear distinction is then established, between an individual agent — to whom deciding whether an element belongs to a set is just a yes or no matter — and a commonsensical agent — the one who interprets the knowledge shared by a certain group of people. Finally, the logic of agreement is presented and discussed. As it is assumed the existence of several individual agents, the semantic system is based on the perspective that each individual agent defines her/his own conceptualization of reality. So the semantics of the logic of agreement can be seen as being similar to a semantics of possible worlds, one for each individual agent. The proof theory is an extension of a natural deduction system, using supported formulas and incorporating only inference rules. Moreover, the soundness and completeness of the logic of agreement are also presented.     

Constructive agents

Brouwer’s ideas of construction, proof, and inquiry in mathematics are more widely applicable. On a well-known philosophical view, intuitionistic logic is a general account of meaning and reasoning for natural language and epistemology. In this brief discussion piece, I go one step further, and discuss how intuitionistic semantics fits with information update and belief revision in agency. In the process, I define a number of new logical systems that give rise to several open problems.     

An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under the two assumptions that (i) the agent’s reasoning process is in accordance with the model but (ii) the agent does not reflect on these reasoning processes. For such a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the definition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all valid statements of the model. The key to my alternative semantic approach is the extension of the method of truth tables, first introduced for the propositional logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. In my syntactic approach I define an epistemic logic–consisting of the classical calculus of propositional logic plus two knowledge axioms–that does not include the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach. The difference between my approach and existing knowledge models is illustrated in a game-theoretic application concerning the epistemic justification of iterative solution concepts.     

n值Lukasiewicz命题逻辑系统中公式的随机真度及近似推理

利用赋值集的随机化方法,在n值Lukasiewicz命题逻辑系统中引入公式的随机真度,证明了随机真度的MP规则、HS规则及交推理规则;同时引入公式间的随机相似度和随机伪距离,建立了随机逻辑度量空间,推导出随机相似度的若干性质,证明了随机逻辑度量空间中逻辑运算的连续性;并在随机逻辑度量空间中提出了三种不同类型的近似推理模式,证明了三种近似推理模式的等价性.     

States on commutative basic algebras

The paper deals with states on commutative basic algebras that are a non-associative generalization of MV-algebras or, in other words, the algebraic semantics for a fuzzy logic which generalizes the ?ukasiewicz logic in that the conjunction is not associative. States are defined in the same way as Mundici's states on MV-algebras as normalized finitely additive [0,1]-valued functions, and some results analogous to the results that are known from MV-algebras are proved.