Optimal contracts and the manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a supply chain with an inequity-averse retailer

Studies in the supply chain literature have typically focused on profit or revenue maximization and assumed that agents within the supply chain are self-interested and only care about their own monetary payoffs. Research in these areas, however, rarely considers an important phenomenon called inequity aversion in which the object pursued by agents within the supply chain is not only their own profit maximization but also the equity of profit allocation. In fact, when agents within a supply chain collaborate with each other to serve a market, the scheme of profit allocation between them usually plays a determinate role in cooperation. Taking into account the impact of agents’ behavior of inequity aversion on the coordination of the supply chain, this paper investigates the optimal contracts and the manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain. In this way, we obtain two interesting results: (1) the retailer’s equity aversion largely affects the manufacturer’s decision making, which is not always bad for the manufacturer; and (2) the retailer’s inequity aversion as well as the consumer’s price-sensitive coefficient plays a dominant role in the manufacturer’s decision making.     

Vendor managed inventory contracts – coordinating the supply chain while looking from the vendor’s perspective

The paper studies coordination of a supply chain when the inventory is managed by the vendor (VMI). We also provide a general mathematical framework that can be used to analyze contracts under both retailer managed inventory (RMI) and VMI. Using a simple newsvendor scenario with a single vendor and single retailer, we study five popular coordinating supply chain contracts: buyback, quantity flexibility, quantity discount, sales rebate, and revenue sharing contracts. We analyze the ability of these contracts to coordinate the supply chain under VMI when the vendor freely decides the quantity. We find that even though all of them coordinate under RMI, quantity flexibility and sales rebate contracts do not generally coordinate under VMI. Furthermore, buyback and revenue sharing contracts are equivalent. Hence, we propose two new contracts which coordinate under VMI (one of which coordinates under RMI too, provided a well-known assumption holds). Finally, we extend our analysis to consider multiple independent retailers with the vendor incurring linear or convex production cost, and show that our results are qualitatively unchanged.     

Retailer’s optimal CSR investment in closed-loop supply chains: the impacts of supply chain structure and channel power structure

4OR - This paper studies the retailer’s optimal corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment decisions in manufacturer-collecting closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). We establish a...     

Value of supplier’s capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain

In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the supplier is limited. Embedding the lack of information about the capacity of the supplier in the model, we aim to analyze the reaction of the retailers, compare it with the full-information case, and assess the value of information and the effects of information asymmetry using game theoretic analysis. In our numerical studies, we conclude that the value of information is highly dependent on the capacity conditions and estimates of the retailers, and having information is not necessarily beneficial to the retailers.     

Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.     

Seller’s optimal credit period and replenishment time in a supply chain with up-stream and down-stream trade credits

In practice, a supplier often offers its retailers a permissible delay period M to settle their unpaid accounts. Likewise, a retailer in turn offers another trade credit period N to its customers. The benefits of trade credit are not only to attract new buyers who consider it a type of price reduction, but also to provide a competitive strategy other than introduce permanent price reductions. On the other hand, the policy of granting credit terms adds an additional cost to the seller as well as an additional dimension of default risk. In this paper, we first incorporate the fact that trade credit has a positive impact on demand but negative impacts on costs and default risks to establish an economic order quantity model for the seller in a supply chain with up-stream and down-stream trade credits. Then we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain the optimal replenishment time and credit period for the seller. Finally, we use some numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical results.     

Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game

In this paper, we apply a sequential game to study the possibility of ‘contracts’ (or at least mutually beneficial arrangements) between a government and a terrorist group. We find equilibrium solutions for complete and incomplete information models, where the government defends and/or provides positive rent, and the terrorist group attacks. We also study the sensitivities of equilibria as a function of both players’ target valuations and preferences for rent. The contract option, if successful, may achieve (partial) attack deterrence, and significantly increase the payoffs not only for the government, but also for some types of terrorist groups. Our work thus provides some novel insights in combating terrorism.     

Vertical cooperative advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain: A game-theoretic approach

Manufacturers can increase the advertising expenditures of their retailers by bearing a fraction of the occurring costs within the framework of a vertical cooperative advertising program. We expand the existing research which deals with advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain contemporaneously. By means of game theory, four different relationships between the channel members are considered: Firstly, three non-cooperative games with either symmetrical distribution of power or asymmetrical distribution with one player being the leader in each case, and one cooperative game where both players tend to maximize the total profit. The latter is complemented by a bargaining model, which proposes a fair split of profit on the basis of the players’ risk attitude and bargaining power. Our main findings are as follows: (a) In contrast to previous analyses, we do not limit the ratio between manufacturer’s and retailer’s margin, which provides more general insights into the effects of the underlying distribution of power within the channel. (b) The highest total profit is gained when both players cooperate. This behavior puts also the customers in a better position, as it produces the lowest retail price as well as the highest advertising expenditures compared to the other configurations.     

Retailer or e-tailer? Strategic pricing and economic-lot-size decisions in a competitive supply chain with drop-shipping

Drop-shipping is an arrangement whereby an e-tailer, who does not hold inventories, processes orders and requests a manufacturer to ship products directly to the end customers. To explore the economic benefits of adopting drop-shipping distribution strategy in a competitive environment, we investigate the profitability and the efficiency of the drop-shipping channel as compared to the traditional channel. Specifically, we develop Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) games with pricing and lot-sizing decisions to examine the strategic interactions between a manufacturer and its retailer/e-tailer in the traditional/drop-shipping distribution channels. We identify conditions under which the drop-shipping channel profitably outperforms the traditional one. It is found that the economic interests of adopting drop-shipping distribution for the channel members may not always be consistent. There are cases where only the manufacture would favour drop-shipping. In this study, we also reveal that the inefficiency caused by lack of coordination in the traditional channel can be alleviated in the drop-shipping channel where the lot-sizing decision is made by the manufacturer.     

Building teachers’ expertise in understanding, assessing and developing children’s mathematical thinking: the power of task-based, one-to-one assessment interviews

In this paper, we outline the benefits to teachers’ expertise of the use of research-based, one-to-one assessment interviews in mathematics. Drawing upon our research and professional development work with teachers and students in primary and middle years in Australia and the research of others, we argue that the use of the interviews builds teacher expertise through enhancing teachers’ knowledge of individual and group understanding of mathematics, and also provides an understanding of typical learning paths in various mathematical domains. The use of such interviews also provides a model for teachers’ interactions and discussions with children, building both their pedagogical content knowledge and their subject matter knowledge.     

Designing an efficient supply chain network with uncertain data: a robust optimization—data envelopment analysis approach

Designing a supply chain network (SCN) is an important issue for organizations in competitive markets. In this paper, a novel robust SCN that considers the efficiencies and costs simultaneously is proposed. In order to estimate the efficiency of the producers and distributors, data envelopment analysis (DEA) model is incorporated into SCN. Moreover, to handle the uncertainty in data, a scenario-based robust optimization approach is applied. The proposed model finds out the efficient location of producers and distributors and determines the amount of purchases from each supplier in uncertain conditions. To illustrate the application of the proposed model, a numerical example is solved and results are analyzed.     

Qualifying for a government’s scrappage program to stimulate consumers’ trade-in transactions? Analysis of an automobile supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer

We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve a market with a fuel-efficient automobile under a scrappage program by the government. The program awards a subsidy to each consumer who trades in his or her used automobile with a new fuel-efficient automobile, if the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) for the new one does not exceed a cutoff level. We derive the conditions assuring that the manufacturer has an incentive to qualify for the program, and find that when the cutoff level is low, the manufacturer may be unwilling to qualify for the program even if the subsidy is high. We also show that when the manufacturer qualifies for the program, increasing the MSRP cutoff level would raise the manufacturer’s expected profit but may decrease the expected sales. A moderate cutoff level can maximize the effectiveness of the program in stimulating the sales of fuel-efficient automobiles, whereas a sufficiently high cutoff level can result in the largest profit for the manufacturer. The retailer’s profit always increases when the manufacturer chooses to qualify for the program. Furthermore, we compute the government’s optimal MSRP cutoff level and subsidy for a given sales target, and find that as the program budget increases, the government should raise the subsidy but reduce the MSRP cutoff level to maximize sales.     

Telling and illustrating stories of parity: a classroom-based design experiment on young children’s use of narrative in mathematics

This paper examines ways to engage young children in constructing and interpreting narratives to develop their understanding of parity. It reports on a teaching intervention that was developed over three research cycles of a classroom-based design experiment, and focuses on the last of these cycles. The teaching intervention set out to investigate how young children (5–6-year-olds) can be supported to draw on narrative in their explanations of whether a whole number less than 20 is odd or even. Evidence of the effectiveness of the intervention is provided through comparison of children’s performance on pre- and post-tests in the form of semi-structured individual interviews. Also, authentic examples are provided of how children utilised their power of ‘imagining and expressing’ to tell stories of whether a whole number is odd or even, using either a counting, partitive, or quotitive model for division. Implications for research and practice are discussed in light of these findings.     

Coordination of a three-level supply chain (supplier–manufacturer–retailer) with permissible delay in payments and price discounts

Different coordination mechanisms are used to manage supply chains. This paper investigates a coordination of a three-level supply chain (supplier–manufacturer–retailer) by coupling two well-known trade credit mechanisms that are widely used in practice, permissible delay in payments and price discounts, where the length of the delay period and discounts offered along the supply chain are decision variables. The paper investigates nine different cases of delay in payments along with eight cases of price discounts among the three players in the supply chain. A numerical example was presented to compare between the cases considered. Also, extensive sensitivity analyses were performed to study the effect of changing the model parameters on the optimal decisions. In addition, we point out the limitations of each model developed in this paper. The numerical examples and the sensitivity analyses conclude that the coupling of delay in payments and price discounts increases the profit of the supply chain more than using only a single mechanism at a time.     

Online assessment of students’ reasoning when solving example-eliciting tasks: using conjunction and disjunction to increase the power of examples

ZDM – Mathematics Education - We argue that examples can do more than serve the purpose of illustrating the truth of an existential statement or disconfirming the truth of a universal...     

Students’ self-regulation of emotions in mathematics: an analysis of meta-emotional knowledge and skills

Over the past decade, the concept of self-regulated learning has broadened to include motivational, volitional, and emotional components next to (meta-)cognitive ones. In this article, we present a meta-emotion perspective as an essential component of a conceptual framework on self-regulation that fully acknowledges the role of emotions. Against this background, a study is presented that attempts to contribute to the clarification of the relevance and the functioning of students’ meta-emotional knowledge and emotional regulation skills in school-related mathematical activities. It investigates the coping strategies that 393 students of the second (age 14) and fourth (age 16) year of secondary school report to use to regulate their emotions in three different mathematical school settings (i.e., a mathematics test, a difficult mathematics homework, and a difficult mathematics lesson). More specifically, it aims (1) to document the nature and frequency of the reported coping strategies, and (2) to explore—for the three different mathematical school settings—relationships between these reported coping strategies and personal characteristics (i.e., students’ familiarity with the particular school settings, their track in secondary education, their achievement level, their age, and gender). The results indicate that students report to know and to make use of several coping strategies in school-related mathematical activities, and reveal that the use of these strategies is related to specific person-related characteristics. In conclusion, we elaborate on how schools and teachers can stimulate students to acquire appropriate strategies and skills to self-regulate their emotions.     

Principal–agent problem for returns handling in a reverse supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing dealers

Focusing on the principal–agent problem in handling new-products returned by customers in a reverse supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing dealers, we investigate how a manufacturer motivates her dealers to exert their efforts to handle and sell the returned new-products using mathematical modelling. By taking into consideration the dealers’ individual rationalities, we design optimal incentive contracts under both symmetric and asymmetric information and obtain the following insights. In the symmetric information situation, dealers’ effort levels are identical to those maximising the expected overall profit of the supply chain. In the asymmetric information situation, however, the dealers’ effort levels are lower than the supply chain optimum. Further, in the case of intensifying competition between the dealers, their effort levels increase, while each dealer’ revenue share received from the manufacturer decreases and the risk, incentive and total agency costs of the entire supply chain tend to diminish. The revenue share is inversely correlated with return uncertainties. When we introduce another random environmental factor affecting returns into the incentive contract, this revenue share increases with a rise in dealers’ effort levels, while the above-mentioned costs of the entire system decline and this improves the supply chain system coordination. The incorporation of fairness into the principal–agent model promotes a further increase in the dealers’ effort levels, which is proved using the fixed-point theorem. Finally, we provide an example to demonstrate the main results.