NA随机变量序列的Hájeck-Rènyi不等式

本文给出了NA随机变量序列的Hájeck-Rènyi不等式,并利用它研究了NA随机变量序列的强大数律,所得结果是独立随机变量情形时相应结果的推广.而且还得到了任意随机变量序列的Hájeck-Rènyi不等式.     

φ-混合序列的Hájeck-Rènyi不等式

得到了 -混合随机变量序列的 Hájeck- Rènyi不等式及强大数律 ,所得结果是独立随机变量情形时相应结果的推广 .     

β混合随机变量序列加权和的收敛性

本文研究了混合随机变量序列加权和的收敛性.利用Utev, S.和Peligrad, M不等式得到了混合随机变量序列加权和的收敛性定理及Hajeck-Rènyi型不等式,推广和改进了W.F,Stout,吴群英,J.Hajeck和A.Rènyi.的相应结论.     

NA随机变量序列的Egorov型强大数律的等价条件

本文研究了NA随机变量的Egorov型强大数律.利用NA随机变量的概率不等式,得到了NA随机变量序列的Egorov型强大数律的一些等价条件,所获结果推广和改进了在独立随机变量序列的Egorov的结果和在NA随机变量序列已有的一些结果.     

对称随机变量序列的Hájek-Rényi型不等式和强大数律

得到了对称随机变量序列的Hájek-Rényi型不等式,并利用它研究了对称随机变量序列的强大数律.     

ρ~-混合序列的H～jeck-Rènyi型不等式及其应用

利用ρ-混合序列的Rosenthal型最大值不等式,得到了ρ-混合随机变量序列的Hájeck-Rènyi型不等式,三级数定理和Chung型强大数律,所得结果达到了独立时一致的结果.     

NA序列部分和的矩完全收敛性

讨论了NA序列部分和的矩完全收敛性,在一定条件下获得了NA序列矩完全收敛的充要条件,显示了矩完全收敛和矩条件之间的关系,将独立同分布随机变量序列矩完全收敛的结果推广到NA序列,得到了与独立随机变量序列情形类似的结果.     

ρˉ混合序列的H～jeck-Rènyi型不等式及其应用

利用ρ-混合序列的Rosenthal型最大值不等式,得到了ρ-混合随机变量序列的Hájeck-Rènyi型不等式,三级数定理和Chung型强大数律,所得结果达到了独立时一致的结果.     

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本文给出了上期望空间中独立随机变量部分和的最大不等式、指数 不等式、Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund不等式. 并且应用指数不等式和Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund不等式 研究了随机变量部分和序列完备收敛的性质.     

混合序列的Hájeck-Rènyi型不等式及强大数律

利用Utev S.和Peligrad M.不等式,得到了-混合随机变量序列的Hájeck-Rènyi不等式、三级数定理和Chung型强大数律,改进了甘师信与吴群英等人的结论,达到了与独立时一致的结果.     

ON THE INADEQUACY OF THE RELATIONAL SEMANTIC FOR THE “UNTIL” OPERATOR

Modal logics with the binary operator Until are considered. It is shown that there exists a continuum of consistent U-logics without Kripke frames, and that each U-logic whose class of order does not have the finite frame property.     

带非局部边界条件的非线性抛物方程的隐式差分解法

在准静态弹性力学中常遇到求解带有非局部边界条件的抛物方程初边值问题.本文构造了一个数值求解带有非局部边界条件的非线性抛物方程的隐式差分格式,利用离散泛函分析的知识和不动点定理证明了差分解是存在的,且在离散最大模意义下关于时间步长一阶收敛,关于空间步长二阶收敛,并给出了数值算例.     

混合边界条件下的三维定常 旋转Navier-Stokes方程的原始变量有限元计算

本文利用原始变量有限元法求解混合边界条件下的三维定常旋转Navier-Stokes方程,证明了离散问题解的存在唯一性,得到了有限元解的最优误差估计.给出了求解原始变量有限元逼近解的简单迭代算法,并证明了算法的收敛性.针对三维情况下计算资源的限制,采用压缩的行存储格式存储刚度矩阵的非零元素,并利用不完全的LU分解作预处理的GMRES方法求解线性方程组.最后分析了简单迭代和牛顿迭代的优劣对比,数值算例表明在同样精度下简单迭代更节约计算时间.     

THE INCOMPLETE‐INFORMATION SPLIT‐STREAM FISH WAR: EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETING RISKS

ABSTRACT. . It is now widely recognized that climactic regime shifts, which aperiodically alter a harvested fish stock's biomass and spatial distribution, may lead to distorted fisheries management decisions which negatively impact the fishery, both biologically and economically. This is particularly true for trans‐boundary migratory stocks, where optimal management relies on coordination among independent nation‐states. Unanticipated changes in stock distribution and abundance can upset expectations of national authorities, leading them to sanction inappropriate harvesting levels by their separately managed fleets targeting the same breeding fish stock. Our theoretical studies are based on a spatially‐distributed stochastic model, which we have called the “split‐stream model,‘ where two separately managed fleets harvest simultaneously at two separate sites. Our key assumption is that competing fleet managers, when harvesting noncooperatively, hold incomplete and asymmetric private information of current stock recruitment and spatial distribution. When subsequently negotiating to coordinate their harvests, they agree that they will share their information and then bargain over partition of the gains from their cooperation. This bargaining process takes into account the fleet's relative competitive strengths, particularly due to private information asymmetries. In this present article we introduce a more complex information structure than had been assumed in our earlier work (McKelvey and Golubtsov [2002], McKelvey, Miller and Golubtsov [2003], Mckelvey et al. [2004]). Specifically, both stock‐growth and stock‐split parameters vary stochastically and asynchronously. Thus, when harvesting noncooperatively, each fleet may possess private knowledge which is unavailable to the other. We examine the interplay of the harvesting game's information structure with other fishery characteristics, such as the fleets' economics and operating characteristics and their attitudes toward risk, to determine the implications of such structure for the outcome of the harvesting game. All of these changes are made to capture new conceptual phenomena and expand the range of applicability of the model.     

“STRAGEDY” OF THE COMMONS

This paper computes open loop and subgame perfect Nash equilibria for an infinite horizon, common property resource model with congestion and stock externalities. The model permits the comparison of the game-theoretic approach and the traditional commons literature, which preceded the widespread recognition of the games, because the underlying assumptions are equivalent. With access to the commons restricted, the subgame perfect equilibrium captures the inefficiency associated with the strategic scramble to capture the resource reserves the open loop does not. Under sole ownership, the two equilibrium concepts coincide with the surplus maximizing extraction policy. In free access, the extraction strategies under both equilibrium concepts coincide with complete rent dissipation.     

TOWARDS A STANDARD FOR THE INDIVIDUAL‐BASED MODELING OF PLANT POPULATIONS: SELF‐THINNING AND THE FIELD‐OF‐NEIGHBORHOOD APPROACH

ABSTRACT. In classical theoretical ecology there are numerous standard models which are simple, generally applicable, and have well‐known properties. These standard models are widely used as building blocks for all kinds of theoretical and applied models. In contrast, there is a total lack of standard individual‐based models (IBM's), even though they are badly needed if the advantages of the individual‐based approach are to be exploited more efficiently. We discuss the recently developed ‘field‐of‐neighborhood’ approach as a possible standard for modeling plant populations. In this approach, a plant is characterized by a circular zone of influence that grows with the plant, and a field of neighborhood that for each point within the zone of influence describes the strength of competition, i.e., growth reduction, on neighboring plants. Local competition is thus described phenomenologically. We show that a model of mangrove forest dynamics, KiWi, which is based on the FON approach, is capable of reproducing self‐thinning trajectories in an almost textbook‐like manner. In addition, we show that the entire biomass‐density trajectory (bdt) can be divided into four sections which are related to the skewness of the stem diameter distributions of the cohort. The skewness shows two zero crossings during the complete development of the population. These zero crossings indicate the beginning and the end of the self‐thinning process. A characteristic decay of the positive skewness accompanies the occurrence of a linear bdt section, the well‐known self‐thinning line. Although the slope of this line is not fixed, it is confined in two directions, with morphological constraints determining the lower limit and the strength of neighborhood competition exerted by the individuals marking the upper limit.     

THE LONG‐RUN INEFFICIENCY OF BLOCK‐RATE PRICING

ABSTRACT. In this paper we compare two regulation instruments, flat‐rate and increasing block‐rate pricing. The analysis applies to a competitive industry with free entry. Charge for irrigation water is a concrete example. It is shown that flat‐rate pricing leads to a first‐best social optimum, while with block‐rate pricing where the highest block set at the marginal cost, there is over production, firms are too small, and loss of economic surplus occurs. Moreover, first‐best is not implementable by increasing block‐rate pricing. This is in contrast to the commonly accepted view that block‐rate pricing is superior to flat‐rate pricing by allowing for income redistribution while preserving efficiency. Several second‐best situations are analyzed to show: 1) Block‐rate pricing with the highest block at the social marginal cost is optimal when the regulator must preserve the number of firms. 2) Water pricing alone cannot implement social optimum subject to a constant level of agricultural production. 3) Lobbying and political pressures, which force the regulator to sustain a constant average water price, result in optimal block‐rate pricing with the highest block below the social marginal cost.     

Bazilevič函数的对数系数

本文研究了Bazilevič函数类B_α（C,D）的对数系数.利用构造一个非负函数和对复变函数模的积分进行估计的方法,获得了B_α（C,D）的对数系数,推广了一些已有的相关结果.